The gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

THE GENDER GAP IN POLITICAL SUPPORT IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

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Declaration of Work

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the University of London is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others.

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Abstract

This thesis finds that women and men in the Occupied Palestinian Territories differ in their political support with women being more likely than men to support Hamas and men being more likely than women to support Fatah. Using interviews and polling data this thesis explains why this difference in political support exists. It looks at gender roles and differences in socioeconomic status finding strong connections between welfare provision, employment and support for different Palestinian political organisations. Further this thesis also explores the role of ideological factors in explaining this gender difference, through exploring religiosity, nationalism and feminism in the Palestinian Territories and how these might interact with political support. It finds that women's greater religiosity helps to explain the gender gap in political support. This thesis also considers the ways in which the violent and oppressive context of the Palestinian case might impact research in this area and the possible gendered ways in which violence and oppression may impact political support. Studying and explaining this gender gap shows the importance of gender in understanding a crucial area of international politics while also presenting a gender gap case study and as such contributing to a substantial western focused literature.

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permits, passports and checkpoints. Each interview showed me variously the humour, courage or disillusionment provoked by the current situation in the Palestinian Territories. I know, sadly, that this thesis cannot do justice to everything that I was told, nor to the warmth and spirit that I was shown.

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Finally, I would like to thank my husband Dom. He has come out to Palestine on numerous occasions, and in doing so has been a real support and comfort. He has also been a thorough yet kind proof-reader. Mostly he has sustained me with warmth and humour through an often lonely and frustrating process.

Thank you all.

Glossary of Acronyms

Fatah – (*harakat al-tahrir al-watani al-filastini*) - Palestinian National Liberation Movement

DFLP – Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine

Hamas – (*harakat al-muqawamah al-ʾislamiyyah*) - Islamic Resistance Movement

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

OPT – Occupied Palestinian Territories

PA – Palestinian Authority

PCBS – Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics

PFLP – Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PLC – Palestinian Legislative Council

PLO – Palestinian Liberation Organisation

PPP – Palestinian People's Party

PSR – Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research

Chapter 1 The Gender Gap in Political Support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

Figure 1.a Women in a Hamas parade for student elections at Birzeit University, West Bank, 20th April 2015, Minna Cowper-Coles

Feminist research has often struggled to make a case for the importance of gender in 'mainstream' politics, with a notable exception being in issues surrounding the so-called 'gender gap'. The term, said to be coined by Eleanor Smeal, president of the National Organization for Women in the US (Sigel, 1999 p. 5; Norris, 2003), describes 'a significant difference in men's and women's party, candidate, and policy preferences' (Rinehart, 1992 p. 13; Box-Steffensmeier, et al., 1997). The phenomenon of a gender gap is one of the most visible signs of the importance of gender to the study of politics, because even small variations in political opinion between such large groups as men and women, can lead to considerable differences in political outcomes (Conover, 1988 p. 986).

Although studies of sex differences in voting behaviour date back to the 1930s, the most well-known case of a voting gender gap is in the United States of America where, since 1980, greater female support for Democratic presidential candidates and reduced female support for Republican presidential candidates has been widely

reported (Norris, 2003). In some elections, the female vote has been decisive in determining the outcome, such as the US 1996 presidential election when women preferred Bill Clinton to Bob Dole (Carroll, 1999 p. 7; Mattei and Mattei, 1998 p. 412; Sigel, 1999 p. 5). The 'discovery' of the gender gap in the US in the early 1980s, and the subsequent media and political attention, means that not only has the study of gender politics become 'fashionable' (Rinehart, 1992 p. 13), but the gender gap now 'shapes everything from elite political behavior to election outcomes and public policy' (Box-Steffensmeier, et al., 2004 p. 527). Since then, political gender gaps, whether in referenda, elections, political support or in policy preferences, have been found to exist at different times and across several continents in states such as the UK, Italy, Australia, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark (see e.g. Barisione, 2014; Bergh, 2007; Campbell and Childs, 2015; Studlar, et al., 1998; Togeby, 1994).

While a greater understanding of voting and political preferences are of interest because of the role of voting in determining who has political power, and because of what voting says about the importance of different issues and values to members of the public (Tilly, 1995 p. 11), studies of the gender gap have also thrown light on how gender inequalities and the 'pressure to conform to gendered roles in society' can mean that women and men have distinct political perspectives (Mattei and Mattei, 1998 p. 415). As such, studies of the gender gap play an important role in connecting the politics of the private sphere to the politics of government.

A The Gender Gap in Palestine[1]

Using polling data from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) and its predecessor, the Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS), I found there to be a clear gender gap in political support for the two main political 'parties'[2] in

[1] In this thesis I use the terms Palestine, Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), Palestinian Territories, Occupied Territories synonymously to mean the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These terms are all laden with (contested) political meanings, as are almost all the names for the land and settlements between the Mediterranean Sea and the River Jordan (see Bregman, 2014 p. xxv). I have chosen to use the Occupied Palestinian Territories or OPT for the most part because it is the term most widely used by the international community which also emphasises the political context and the Palestinian identity of the territories.

[2] I am aware of the problems inherent in using the term 'party' when describing Fatah and Hamas. This issue will be dealt with in greater depth in Chapter 3.

the Palestinian Territories. Figure 1.b and Figure 1.c illustrate the gender gap using data from polls dating from 1998 to 2016 (CPRS Polls 32, 33, 37-47, PSR Polls 1-56 and Poll 52.1). Men are more likely than women to support Fatah and women are more likely than men to support Hamas.

Figure 1.b shows the percentage of respondents (of each gender) who responded 'Fatah' when asked 'Which of the following movements and parties do you support?' when given a choice of over ten different groups.[3] Figure 1.c shows the percentage of respondents who chose 'Hamas'. These results are from seventy-five polls over eighteen years, conducted - usually - every three months. The charts are annotated to highlight different major events and to provide some context for the results.[4] The percentage of women who say they support Hamas or Fatah is indicated in red, while the percentage of men who say they support Hamas or Fatah is indicated in blue. Smoothed lines in red and blue have been added to indicate the general trends for women and men.

These graphs show that from 1998 up to September 2016 men have said they support Fatah more than women (except for June 2014) and women have said they support Hamas more than men (except in June 2016). The percentages fluctuate over time and is clearly impacted by events such as Yasser Arafat's death, the legislative elections and the Israeli assaults on Gaza (operations 'Cast Lead', 'Pillar of Defence' and 'Protective Edge'). Nonetheless, the gender differences in political support exist throughout the polls.

[3] The choices varied for different years as small new parties were added to the selection in the polls. The full, final list used included: 1) PPP, 2) PFLP, 3) Fatah, 4) Hamas, 5) DFLP, 6) Islamic Jihad, 7) FIDA, 8) Al-Mubadara al-Wataniyya / National Initiative [added in PSR Poll 15 onwards], 9) Independent Islamists, 10) Independent Nationalists, 11) Third way headed by Salam Feyyad [added in PSR Poll 36 onwards], 12) None of the above, 13) Others

[4] The events shown are more complex than can be easily conveyed on a graph; but I hope that scholars of the region will forgive my oversimplifications for the sake of easing understanding of the graph.



Figure 1.b To show percentage support for Fatah by gender. Salient political events have been added to aid interpretation. Data = CPRS Polls 32, 33, 37-47, PSR Polls 1-61



Figure 1.c To show percentage support for Hamas by gender. Political events have been added to aid interpretation. Data = CPRS Polls 32, 33, 37-47, PSR Polls 1-61

Figure 1.d shows this gender gap more clearly. It uses a standard formulation of a gender gap - using support for the two major Palestinian 'parties' - to show the gender difference in support for the two major political groups in Palestine (Jones, 2012).

Palestine Gender Gap = ((% Women support Fatah - % Women support Hamas) - (% Men support Fatah - % Men support Hamas)) [5]

In Figure 1.d a negative result indicates that women support Hamas more than men and/or men support Fatah more than women, and a positive result would show that men support Hamas more than women and/or women support Fatah more than men. The further a point falls from the zero line, the greater the gender gap. The gender gap is negative throughout the seventy-five polls but increases and diminishes over time. It reaches a maximum of minus 27.4 in June 2006 and a minimum of minus 1.2 in June 2014. As the gap persists throughout the seventy-five polls, it suggests that this phenomenon warrants further investigation.

To explore this gap, I conducted logistic regressions on support for Fatah and support for Hamas on the 'merged dataset'[6] for the forty polls to which I have access, using a dichotomous variable for *'gender'* (0=male and 1=female).

Model 1a: Political support ~ gender

This showed a beta value of 0.47 with a standard error of 0.02, for support for Hamas, and a beta value of -0.34 with a standard error of 0.02 for support for Fatah, meaning that *'gender'* is a statistically significant predictor of support for both Fatah and Hamas at the $p<0.001$ level. However, the size of this dataset which comprises of forty opinion polls, with 51,581 observations, means that statistical significance is more likely but may not be meaningful. As such I have also conducted the same logistic regression on each of the forty polls in the 'merged dataset'. I plotted the *'gender'* coefficients in Figure 1.e and added lines to each point to represent levels of statistical significance. Thick lines show a probability of there being a statistically significant relationship of 95 percent ($p<0.05$), medium lines show a probability of 99 percent ($p<0.01$) and thin lines shows a probability of a relationship of 99.9 percent ($p<0.001$). Where these bars

[5] This is the standard formula used by Gallup. Norris uses a variation of this formula, which involves dividing the right-hand side of the equation by two (Norris, 2003).

[6] See Chapter 2 for a description of this dataset.

cross the zero line, it shows that the *'gender'* coefficient is not significant at that level. In Figure 1.e the coefficients for Fatah, coloured the yellow of Fatah, are below the zero-line indicating that it is less likely for a woman to support Fatah. The coefficients for Hamas, coloured green, are above the zero-line indicating that it is more likely for a woman to support Hamas. Gender coefficients for Hamas are statistically significant at the $p<0.001$ level in eighteen polls, at the $p<0.01$ level in eleven polls and at the $p<0.05$ level eight times. For Fatah these numbers are fifteen, eleven and five respectively. Thus, on the whole, this gender gap is present, and it is statistically significant.

This gender gap in political support might seem puzzling from a western feminist perspective. Hamas has a reputation as a violent organisation which, through the imposition of Islamic law, oppresses women, while Fatah is largely secular and pro-peace. On both these counts, the idea that women support Hamas more than men jars with feminist beliefs that women should seek gender equality, and that women are largely supportive of peace over violence where possible. However, gender gap research suggests that women often differ from men in their political perspectives, and these gaps are often attributed to gender differences in socioeconomic status. No research on gender gaps in political support have been conducted in the Palestinian Territories or the wider Middle East region.

The aim of this thesis is to propose and test some possible explanations for the gender gap in Palestine and in so doing to broaden the scope of gender gap research, highlight the relevance of gender in the political environment of the Palestinian Territories and throw light upon the relationship between gender and political support elsewhere in the Middle East and the post-colonial or 'developing' world.



Figure 1.d To show the gender gap in political support between Fatah and Hamas between 1998 and 2016. Data = CPRS Polls 32, 33, 37-47, PSR Polls 1-61



Figure 1.e To show gender coefficients for support for Hamas and Fatah with levels of significance denoted through thick (p<0.05), medium (p<0.01), and thin (p<0.001) lines. Data = PSR Polls 1-38, 42 and 56 (Merged Dataset)

B The Gender Gap Literature in Comparative Perspective

A plethora of papers and books explore the gender gap in the United States, drawing distinctions between different demographic groups, different types of elections, and different time periods and highlighting the issues which they think account for the gender gap in political support and voting (Alvarez and McCaffery, 2003; Box-Steffensmeier, et al., 2004; Conover, 1988; Cook and Wilcox, 1991; Howell and Day, 2000; Kaufmann, 2006; Norrander, 1999; Norris, 2003; Whitaker, 2008). Following the US academic literature, several papers and books continue to emerge about gender differences (or similarities) in political support or voting in other countries (Barisione, 2014; Bergh, 2007; Campbell and Childs, 2008; Desposato and Norrander, 2008; Giger, 2009; Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006; Studlar, et al., 1998; Togeby, 1994). This thesis sits within this literature on the gender gap, but extends it to a non-western, colonial context by examining the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). In this thesis, I assess how far the western gender gap literature explains the Palestinian case. I also examine the Palestinian political context and suggest additional explanations for the gender gap in political support derived from the political environment in the OPT. To this end, I draw upon gender theory, ethnographic and political studies of the Palestinian Territories and wider region and my interview data to help develop hypotheses, and then test these through statistical analysis.

The gender gap literature is based primarily on statistical analyses of opinion polls and exit polls. In almost every study of the gender gap, scholars tend to find 'more similarity than difference' between men and women (Campbell, 2017). However, scholars focus on gender differences because of their importance for gender theory and for political practice (Box-Steffensmeier, et al., 2004; Campbell, 2017). Political theory suggests that voters choose parties and candidates 'on the basis of the benefits they think or are told they will derive', these benefits range from material benefits through to simply 'an affirmation of identity' (Evans, 2004 p. 3). Studies of voting often have to 'discern common elements in voter choice' to help identify major factors that motivate people, in so doing they simplify and generalise behaviour in order to create models of political behaviour (Evans, 2004 p. 7). Studying the gender gap helps to

identify how/where men and women might perceive different benefits deriving from different political parties. Scholars of the gender gap have suggested several explanations for differences in men and women's political opinions. These explanations include differences in socioeconomic status, differences in beliefs, such as feminism and religiosity, and differences in attitudes caused by gender socialisation during childhood or through adult experiences. The sections below outline how the gender gap literature sets out these various explanations.

i) Socioeconomic Status

Numerous scholars have pointed to socioeconomic status as a possible cause for gender differences in political support (Barisione, 2014; Bergh, 2007; Box-Steffensmeier, et al., 2004; Edlund and Pande, 2002; Howell and Day, 2000; Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006). The idea is that there are differences between men and women in terms of income, occupation and education (with sometimes other variables being included) which explain the gender gap. In the US, where women tend to vote more than men for the relatively left-wing Democrats, one explanation has been proposed that women are voting this way because they are on average poorer than men and as such benefit more than men from redistributive policies. Women are, in general, less well off than men on a global level. Howell and Day write: 'Women tend to earn less than men and are more likely to live in poverty... Thus, their relative liberalism could stem from rational self-interest.' (Howell and Day, 2000 p. 860). Bergh explains:

> *'women have a lower average score on almost any measure of socioeconomic status, and, furthermore, that socioeconomic status generally correlates with voting. Those who have a high socioeconomic status are more likely to vote for a right-of-center party than those with a below average socioeconomic status.' (Bergh, 2007 p. 237)*

In Inglehart and Norris's 'developmental theory' (Inglehart and Norris, 2000), they hypothesise that economic development and societal modernisation change the direction of the gender gap from being a 'traditional' gender gap (with women voting to the right of men) to being a 'modern' gender gap (with women voting to the left of men) (Inglehart and Norris, 2000 p. 441; Giger, 2009 p. 475; Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Giger suggests that the changes in family set up, increased female entrance into

the labour force and access to education, and the shifting values that have accompanied these changes, drive gender realignment (Giger, 2009 p. 475). Further, she suggests that these developments make women both more economically vulnerable and more politically autonomous leading to their increased support of left-wing parties (Giger, 2009 p. 475).

The role of the family plays a possibly confounding role, as individuals might prioritise the family's economic interest above their own. In a family unit both sexes may prioritise policies which benefit the main breadwinner and therefore the family as a whole. Some studies suggest that because of this, rising divorce rates explain increases in gender differences in voting behaviour as individuals become more concerned for their own economic interests over those of the family unit (Edlund and Pande, 2002; Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006).

Some academics suggest that because women tend to do more 'caring' than men, whether for children, the disabled, the sick or the elderly, they might prioritise healthcare and education (Campbell and Childs, 2015 p. 629; Howell and Day, 2000 p. 860; Andersen, 1999; Manza and Brooks, 1998; Ruddick, 1989; Studlar, et al., 1998).

Other scholars consider the role that education levels play in explaining the gender gap (Campbell, et al., 2009 p. 181; Barisione, 2014; Howell and Day, 2000). More educated individuals often have different views on political issues than those with lower levels of education. Howell and Day hypothesise that education increases the gender gap by enabling women to become less 'dependent on men' (Howell and Day, 2000 pp. 870-871).

While many scholars suggest that 'class stratification does not tell the whole story of the gender gap' (Howell and Day, 2000 p. 860), most scholars suggest that how gender interacts with voting is mediated by the different ways women and men interact with the economy (see Andersen, 1999; Bergh, 2007; Box-Steffensmeier, et al., 2004; Studlar, et al., 1998). Therefore, I will test the hypothesis:

H1: Gender differences in socioeconomic status explain (reduce) the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

ii) Religiosity

Several academics consider religiosity as a major factor impacting how men and women vote (Inglehart and Norris, 2000 p446; Inglehart and Norris, 2003 p. 80; Barisione, 2014; Desposato and Norrander, 2008; Edlund and Pande, 2002). Scholars have found women to be more religious than men (Desposato and Norrander, 2008; Edlund and Pande, 2002). However, understanding the impact of religion on political attitudes and behaviour is complex. In the literature, women have been found to be more liberal than men on many indicators, yet much of the major scholarship on the gender gap associates religious belief with conservative values (Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Norrander and Wilcox show how in the United States, those who attend church frequently from evangelical denominations are becoming more conservative over time (Norrander and Wilcox, 2008 p. 521). However, Howell and Day find that being religious can make people either more conservative or more left-wing (Howell and Day, 2000 p. 862). Edlund and Pande find that being religious impacts men and women's political preferences differently, with religious women less likely than religious men to support the Democrats (Edlund and Pande, 2002 p. 947). The literature suggests the hypothesis:

H2: Gender differences in religiosity explain (reduce) the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

iii) Feminism

Feminism is also included in many accounts of the gender gap (Bergh, 2007; Campbell, 2017; Conover, 1988; Cook and Wilcox, 1991; Howell and Day, 2000; Togeby, 1994). Conover in 1988 suggests that women are more likely to be feminist than men and concluded that 'a substantial part of the gender gap can be attributed to the liberal issue positions adopted by feminist women' (Conover, 1988 p. 1005). Bergh also found that feminism contributes to the gender gap in the US and Norway (Bergh, 2007 p. 235). These scholars have found feminist consciousness to explain women being more likely to vote or support left-of-centre parties than men. Others have found that feminism does not create great gender differences for example Togeby and Cook and Wilcox have found that 'feminist attitudes seems equally strong for men and women alike' (Togeby, 1994 p. 385; Cook and Wilcox, 1991). Campbell has suggested that

differences in the impact of feminism could perhaps be accounted for by considering the positioning of political parties (Campbell, 2017). To explore these ideas, I suggest testing the hypothesis:

H3: Gender differences in feminist beliefs explain (reduce) the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

iv) Violence and Non-violence

Attitudes towards, and social constructs around, the use of force, are highly gendered. Men tend to be 'linked' to warfare and the use of violence in a way which women are not (Segal, 2008 p. 21; Tickner, 1992 p. 6). Women, because of their increased involvement in caring and nurturing roles, or because of how they have been socialised, are often considered to be more compassionate and as having more potential as 'peacemakers' (Gilligan, 1982; Kaplan, 1982; Ruddick, 1989). Many scholars have found that men and women differ in their attitudes towards the use of force in both domestic politics and in foreign policy with women tending to oppose it more than men (Conover, 1988; Eichenberg, 2003; Howell and Day, 2000; Kaufmann, 2002; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986). Attitudes towards the use of force have helped explain gender differences in political support, particularly in contexts where this has become a politically salient issue (Kaufmann, 2002 p. 296). In Palestine, where the peace process and armed resistance are at the forefront of politics, it is likely that gender differences in attitudes towards violence might help explain the gender gap in political support. Therefore, I will be testing the following hypothesis:

H4: Gender differences in attitudes to violence and non-violence explain (reduce) the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

v) Possible Issues Arising from the Palestinian Context

The gender gap literature examined above is largely based on analyses of how gender interacts with political attitudes in western, European and/or - in Inglehart and Norris' terminology - 'postindustrial' societies. The case of the Occupied Palestinian Territories presents a significantly different political context.

The Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) are not a 'state', but two territories - the West Bank and the Gaza Strip - occupied by Israel since 1967. It is under the ultimate control of the Israeli military. Within the Occupied Territories, nationalist rhetoric dominates the political sphere and the question of ending the occupation is the overriding political priority. Another feature of the political context in the OPT is the absence of an open and democratic political environment, both in terms of the Israeli Occupation but also within the Palestinian administered territories.

Although the gender gap literature does not have much to say about non-western contexts, there are several other academic spheres which might offer explanations as to how gender might interact with politics in the OPT. These range from psephology through to critical feminist anthropology. However, as in many ways this study is exploring new territory, I also draw upon my interview data to help explain how gender might impact and influence political support. There are several issues arising from the Palestinian political context which might impact the possible explanations for the gender gap suggested above.

First, gender differences in socioeconomic status seem likely to be particularly salient in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as there are stark differences in the levels of employment and poverty between men and women (Hamdan and Bargothi, 2014; Miftah, 2013), and the two major political parties, Hamas and Fatah, differ in how they provide (or are expected to be able to provide) economic and employment benefits and welfare and services.

Fatah, as the dominant force in the Palestinian Authority (PA), is able to provide employment in the public sector, and has recently tried to encourage investment in the private sector through promoting stability and a favourable economic environment (Bröning, 2013 p. 93; Gunning, 2007 p. 43). However, Fatah's reputation has been tarnished by widespread allegations of corruption and nepotism.

Hamas presents very different economic prospects. On the one hand, it has close links to a broad network of Islamic charitable organisations which have provided services and support to the needy and has a reputation as being less corrupt than Fatah. However, it has also been largely shunned by the international community. Their time in control of the Gaza Strip has been characterised by the Israeli blockade and the

restriction of goods crossing their borders (Caridi, 2012 pp. 277, 308; Esposito, 1984/1998 p. 230; Jamal, 2013 p. 293).

Therefore, Fatah might seem to be a cogent choice for those seeking economic stability, with employment and a vested interest in the status quo, while Hamas is more likely to appeal to poorer and more vulnerable individuals and those who feel overlooked in the current economic context.

Family is likely to be more important in areas where there are weak state structures and insecurity, and it may also be enhanced through the use of patronage networks (Kamrava, 1998 p. 45). Therefore it could be of increased importance in the Palestinian Territories. If family plays a major role in shaping economic interests, then the political impact of gender differences in socioeconomic status are likely to be minimal.

Second, there are tensions and complexities between the hypotheses surrounding religiosity and feminism. Religiosity could well impact upon support for political parties in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. There are clear differences between Fatah and Hamas in terms of religiosity: Hamas is an Islamist party while Fatah is broadly secular (Bröning, 2013; Shikaki, 1998). Therefore, if women are more religious than men, as indicated could be the case above, then this might lead to them supporting Hamas more than men and Fatah less. There is also a difference between Fatah and Hamas with regard to feminist credentials: Hamas has often been considered as restricting women while Fatah does not have this reputation to the same degree (Abdo, 1994 p. 165; Jamal, 2001 p. 271; Milton-Edwards and Farrell, 2010 p. 189; Hammami, 1990). Therefore, if women are more feminist than men, as indicated might be the case above, then they might support Fatah more than men and Hamas less. Here a tension begins to arise, as if women are both more religious and more feminist than men then these tendencies will be in opposition. Therefore, whether women in general tend to support Fatah or Hamas more will be determined by the salience of religion and feminism in Palestinian society. While Inglehart and Norris propose that the salience of these beliefs is determined by the level of societal modernisation, in the OPT it might be the case that the pervasive nationalist discourse determines their salience. Indeed, many forms of nationalism have been found to either postpone or deprioritise women's emancipation while emphasising the importance of cultural and religious forms of identity (Kandiyoti, 1991a; Kandiyoti, 1991b; Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010).

Furthermore, the tensions indicated in the literature above might be undermined by the way that many Muslim women see Islam. There are several lines of scholarship and thought which explore the potential for women's rights and female agency to be found within Islam and the Islamist movement (Azzam, 1996 p. 222; Karmi, 1996; Mahmood, 2005; Shitrit, 2013). The extent to which this is the case may lead to questions being raised over the usual proposal that religion and feminism pull in different political directions. Whether this might be the case in the Occupied Territories is unclear, but it means that both religion and feminism should be considered in tandem as the boundaries between these beliefs may not be clearly delineated.

Third, in exploring the relationship between gender, violence, non-violence and support for political parties, the Palestinian context might differ significantly from western political contexts. Fatah and Hamas have different stances with the former favouring negotiations and the latter favouring (or at least aligning themselves rhetorically with) the use of armed or violent resistance (Bröning, 2013; Gunning, 2007; Shikaki, 1998). The context of the nationalist struggle is likely to make questions over the use of force for political ends much more salient in determining political support, but it also might reduce gender differences in attitudes. Several studies suggest that in liberatory or ethno-nationalist contexts, or in cases where violence is used against a perceived injustice, women are much more likely to support the use of violence (Alison, 2009; Eichenberg, 2003; Togeby, 1994). Therefore, the Palestinian context might not be as easily comparable to the cases of public opinion in the US in terms of understanding the relationship between gender, the use of violence and political support.

Finally, it is important also to consider the role of political oppression. In the Occupied Palestinian Territories, people face potential violence and arrest, among other possible punishments, for their political actions. The Israeli occupying army, the PA security services and Hamas all continue to suppress free speech, arrest and even kill political opponents (Blecher, 2009; Bregman, 2014; Freedom House, 2017; Gunning, 2007). There is a very real possibility that an individual will face violence or imprisonment because of their support of one or other political group, as such individuals will have to weigh up this risk when deciding who to support, or whether it is wise to publicly declare their support. This has two implications for this thesis. On the one hand,

political oppression could mean that polling data is unreliable or misrepresenting the true levels of support. On the other, political oppression might also be gendered and as such explain the differences in reported political support in the polls. While assessing the impact of political oppression, Chapter 7 will also examine the hypothesis below:

H5: Gendered fear of political oppression explains (reduces) the gender gap in political support.

The question of socioeconomic status and support for political parties in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is explored in further depth in Chapter 4, the role of belief as an explanation for the gender gap in Palestine is addressed in Chapter 5 and the interactions between support for violence and non-violence and the gender gap is explored in further detail in Chapter 6. I look at whether political oppression might impact my findings and the gender gap in political support in Chapter 7. In each of these chapters I examine these subjects in depth and suggest hypotheses to be tested derived from the academic literature and from my interview data. I end chapters 4 to 7 by testing the hypotheses using statistical analysis of the opinion poll data. I compare explanations and propose a model for political support in the OPT in Chapter 8.

C Conclusion

There are, as far as I can find, no studies explicitly of a gender gap in political support or voting in the Middle East. This is one of the few studies of the gender gap that explore gendered political behaviour outside of the developed democracies of the West. This research tests the extent to which the insights and explanations of the gender gap in the West can relate to a subjugated, Muslim-majority and economically 'developing' population. This research can examine how far explanations for the gender gap in western and democratic contexts can explain the Palestinian case, and as such how generally applicable they might be beyond their own context.

The commonalities between this case and the existing literature can shed light on whether there is such a thing as distinctive approaches to politics for each gender, due to similarities in socialisation and experiences that cross cultures and political contexts. This finding would give weight to feminist claims that there is a distinct 'women's politics' and that women could, and should, organise around issues which they have in

common. The contrasts and differences between this case and the existing gender gap literature throw light onto areas and issues that require more research or else show the extent to which the gender gap literature is only applicable to a western democratic context. Accordingly, this research aims to broaden and deepen the research community's understanding of how gender interacts with politics.

This research also has important implications for increasing understanding of political behaviour in other locations. Most immediately it should throw light on the interaction between gender and politics in the Middle East region. The Arab Barometer suggests that women may tend to favour Islamist parties more than men across the Middle East (Arab Barometer, 2012-2014). The Arab Barometer Third Wave shows a gender gap of -5.6, taken from responses to question 605a relating to preferences for a religious or non-religious political party, with women more likely than men to report support for a religious political party (49.4 percent compared to 47 percent) and less likely than men to report support for a non-religious political party (23.6 percent compared to 26.8 percent). Studying the gender gap in political support in Palestine, might present possible hypotheses for explanations of this apparent broader regional gender gap.

Finally, this study makes a case for the inclusion of women in mainstream accounts of politics in the Middle East. Although there is a growing literature looking at how gender impacts political behaviour among everyday women and men and how this relates to elections (Blaydes and El Tarouty, 2009; Bush and Jamal, 2014; Miguel, 2013; Miguel, et al., 2015), gender is most prominent in anthropological and developmental studies of the Middle East, or in accounts of notable/exceptional women or feminist movements (Meriwether and Tucker, 1999 pp. 3-4). This thesis highlights the interactions between gender, economics, beliefs and violence and how these interactions create very real political outcomes. The gender gap in the Palestinian Territories may even have shaped one of the most surprising and politically significant electoral victories in the history of the region, namely, the victory of Hamas in the 2006 legislative elections. Building upon the substantial gender gap literature as well as the decades of research on gender and politics in these contested territories, this research makes a case for inclusion of feminist analyses within broader approaches to politics.

In the following chapters, I 'triangulate' the research of scholars of the gender gap and scholars of Middle East politics with the data from interviews and polling data. In so doing I hope to provide a rich understanding of the mechanisms and complexities of each potential explanation before analysing statistically how far they can account for the gender gap. First, I describe my methodology in Chapter 2, then I explain my choice of the Palestinian Territories as a case study in Chapter 3. Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 deal with the above theoretical possible explanations and problems in more depth, suggesting and then testing various hypotheses derived from the literature and polling data. I explore the various themes of the economy, belief, resistance and negotiations and oppression in separate chapters so as to be able to explore the wide range of relevant literature and interview data which relate to each theme. There is a lack of directly comparable research on the gender gap in similar contexts so bringing together these literatures is key to generating hypotheses for explaining the gender gap in Palestine. So as to keep the distance between the logic of the hypothesis generation and testing to a minimum, I then test newly generated hypotheses at the end of each chapter. Chapter 8 brings the themes from the previous chapters together with a model to explain the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Finally, Chapter 9 draws conclusions and points to areas for further investigation. Information on the variables used for my analyses, my interview questionnaires and the Palestinian political parties excluded from my analysis can be found in the Appendices.

Chapter 2 Methodology

A A Feminist Mixed-Methods Approach

Feminist scholarship, as distinct from the broader feminist movement, proposes the types of subject that feminists should research while also presenting critiques and challenges to the standard political science methodologies. Stanley and Wise suggest that feminist research should be ‘overtly political in its purpose and committed to changing women’s lives’ (Stanley and Wise, 1990 p. 21). It questions both ‘what we study as political scientists and how we study it’ (Carroll and Zerilli, 1993 p. 55).

In terms of 'what' feminist researchers should study, Stanley and Wise suggest research should have 'a focus *on* women' (Stanley and Wise, 1990 p. 21). This is because women have often been excluded from political accounts and seen as 'peripheral' to mainstream political science (Keohane, et al., 1982 p. vii; Carroll and Zerilli, 1993 p. 56; Sharoni, 1995 p. 20). The feminist focus on women's experience is based on the idea that knowledge formation is a political act, and the creation of knowledge ‘is constitutive of relations of ruling as well as relations of knowing’ (Stanley, 1990 p. 10). More recently, feminists have instead become increasingly interested in gender divisions which they understand as ‘fundamental categories around which all social structures are organized and meanings created’ and suggest thinking about gender ‘as a social relation rather than a set of opposite and different characteristics’ (Usher, 1997 p. 49). Many scholars now focus on ‘the social construction and transformation of particular understandings of masculinity, femininity and gender relations’ seeing them as categories which ‘vary across cultures and time’ (Sharoni, 1995 p. 22). Childs suggests that feminist analysis should look at 'how gender relations between women and men are a structuring dynamic of society’ and emphasises that 'gender is not a synonym for women' (Childs, 2008 p. xix).

Gender gap research has encouraged the move from studying women to comparing 'intrasex differences' (Rinehart, 1992 p. 13). Studies of the gender gap in general have fulfilled a political aim by making women's political presence more keenly felt and highlighted the importance of gender socialisation (Rinehart, 1992 p. 14). Studying

mass political behaviour can, and has, 'countered the image of women as apolitical or politically deficient' (Carroll and Zerilli, 1993 p. 62).

However, studies of the gender gap have tended to use quantitative methods, which some feminist scholars have misgivings about. These scholars see a 'perceived distinction between 'male' quantitative methods and feminist qualitative ones' (Stanley and Wise, 1990 p. 21). Feminists have been wary about quantitative methods because they object to research which claims impartiality and neutrality while presenting information that was frequently produced by and 'reflects the practices and knowledge of groups of highly particular white, middle-class, heterosexual men while seemingly reflecting universalisms' (Stanley and Wise, 1990 p. 39). Feminists insist that social research is for 'interpretation of social meaning and not a search for scientific truth; the search is for understandings of the social world and not for scientific laws about human beings' (Usher, 1997 p. 43; Alison, 2009).

Quantitative social research, which tests hypotheses and makes assertions around causation and models of social behaviour, has often come close to presenting findings as scientific fact. However, Stanley insists that quantitative methods can and should be used in feminist research, but such research should be clear about the process of its production and avoid generating 'alienated knowledge... bearing no trace of the conditions of its production and the social relations that gave rise to this' (Stanley, 1990 pp. 11-12).

I would suggest therefore that by contextualising and explaining the methodology and process of research, quantitative research can address feminist concerns surrounding 'alienated knowledge' and fears around social meaning masquerading as scientific truth, while providing broad insights into gendered political behaviour.

A further problem with research on mass political behaviour is that while it might highlight and give value to women's experiences and to speak out about systematic oppression, it does so often by making generalisations and reproducing stereotypes about women's behaviour and 'gloss[ing] over important differences among women' (Carroll and Zerilli, 1993 pp. 69-72). The problem with stereotyping and generalising women's experiences came to the fore in the 1970s and 1980s when different groups of women began to question feminist assumptions about 'the universality of women's experiences' (Sharoni, 1995 p. 13). Feminist assumptions were seen to be based on

‘the daily lives, concerns, and priorities of heterosexual white upper-middle class women in Europe and North America’ (Sharoni, 1995 p. 13). Indeed, a recurring question within feminist research is how best to respect difference while also advocating gender equality (Lughod, 2002; Usher, 1997). Lughod suggests accepting differences but acknowledges the difficulties involved:

> ‘*when I talk about accepting difference, I am not implying that we should resign ourselves to being cultural relativists who respect whatever goes on elsewhere as "just their culture."... What I am advocating is the hard work involved in recognizing and respecting differences-precisely as products of different histories, as expressions of different circumstances, and as manifestations of differently structured desires. We may want justice for women, but can we accept that there might be different ideas about justice and that different women might want, or choose, different futures from what we envision as best...?’ (Lughod, 2002 pp. 787-788)*

Feminist researchers can address the issue by involving the people they research and recognising that ‘the known are also knowers, research objects are their own subjects’ (Usher, 1997 p. 53). Much feminist research aims to recognise the 'objects' of their research's ‘own understandings and theories of their independent experiences’ (Stanley, 1990 pp. 8-9). By including and taking seriously the subjects of research's own theories and understandings, feminists can accept and include their difference within their work. Sharoni, who studies gender and peace activism in Israel-Palestine, stresses the importance of this approach. In her view, feminist research must go beyond only recording women's voices but should also 'establish their authority and expertise' in areas where women's perspectives have usually been excluded (Sharoni, 1995 p. 25). I aim to give space and recognition to the views of the subjects of my research and their own theories or explanations of the gender gap.

My research into the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories uses a mixed methods approach. I combine quantitative and qualitative research, with the hope that the two different forms of data should be 'mutually illuminative' (Bryman, 2012 p. 628). Indeed, the prominent scholar of the gender gap, Pippa Norris, recommends a 'multi method' approach as a way of furthering research on the gender gap and enabling greater understanding of voting preferences (Norris, 2003 pp. 13-14). Sarah Childs suggests:

'Capturing the contours of women's mass political participation in electoral politics is probably best undertaken by survey research; understanding how women feel about their participation is most likely to be forthcoming in in-depth interviews and in focus groups.' (Childs, 2008 p. xx)

Mixed methods here are used to explain, confirm and generate hypotheses, but also to add nuance and context to the research (Bryman, 2012 pp. 633-634). Both quantitative and qualitative methods are used on the understanding that they are just partial representations of a complex social fabric that, while highly variable, does have some broad trends which help explain power dynamics and the interplay of gender with political support in Palestine. This methodology enables this research to reconcile somewhat the tensions inherent in doing feminist quantitative research. It allows a number of Palestinians to theorise on and explain how political support works while comparing their accounts to theoretical approaches and then conducting statistical analysis which allow the research to highlight the importance of gender analyses for mainstream politics. A mixed methods approach is also necessary to provide a full exploration of my research question; only by using quantitative and qualitative research together am I able to address questions relating to the impact of gender on political support at a broader, Palestine-wide, level, as well as understanding the mechanisms and processes through which gender might impact upon political support at the level of individual decision making.

Often the relationship between theory and research is described as either inductive or deductive, where either the research and experience precede and shape the theory (inductive) or else theory precedes and shapes the research and the experience (deductive). This dichotomy has been challenged by feminists who see these models as 'inaccurate and over-simplified' (Alison, 2009 p. 12; Stanley and Wise, 1990). Stanley and Wise express their 'serious reservations' about both models:

'neither model has experiential validity as an actual description of how research is conducted and knowledge produced. Researchers cannot have 'empty heads', in the way that inductivism proposes; nor is it possible that theory is untainted by material experiences in the heads of theoreticians in the way that deductivism proposes.' (Stanley, and Wise, 1990 p. 22)

My research is neither inductive nor deductive. Instead it has been a process: theory and experience has shaped my early interviews and then these interviews, together with theoretical readings and my experience, has shaped my quantitative research and later interviews. The data I gathered in the interviews has shaped where I have looked for theoretical explanations, and theoretical explanations have shaped the questions I asked in the interviews. The data from the polls has been used in the most part to 'test' these theories. However, the entire thesis is built upon my own suspicions that a gender gap in political support in the Palestinian Territories existed and thus required a preliminary quantitative investigation at the very start. The subsequent chapters demonstrate how the academic literature, together with data from my interviews have shaped the statistical analyses of the opinion poll data.

In this research, to clarify where the Palestinian case differs from, and therefore might contribute to, the western gender gap literature, I present the hypotheses drawn from the gender gap literature, and then introduce my understandings of the Palestinian case and the additional or alternative hypotheses presented by the literature on Palestine and the Middle East and through my interviews.

Using statistical analysis of quantitative data helps to address descriptive questions, as well as to provide evidence to help confirm or deny my hypotheses. It is this data which establishes the main premise of my research; that there is a gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It also helps to ensure that my research speaks to the broader Palestinian context beyond the individuals that I interview. Further, the statistical analysis will allow me to consider the ways in which political support has changed over time. This means that my research can consider the period from 1998 up to 2016 rather than being ‘suspended’ at the time of the interviews in 2014-2016. Finally, the quantitative research allows my research to engage with the wider literature on gender gaps, political support and opinion polls.

The qualitative research and the interview data is necessary for more in-depth understanding. It provides a better exploration of *how* and *why* gender interacts with political support, through hearing people’s own experiences and opinions about societal norms and political parties. The qualitative research also suggests which variables should be used in the quantitative analysis, through interviewees' own theorisations and explanations. Further, the interviews help to show whether and in

what ways the opinion polls results are meaningful. Finally, the interviews provide illustrations and examples to illuminate the quantitative analysis and give voice to the narratives of Palestinians.

Below I give more details about my methodology, data and ethical considerations. As well as the methodological problems and benefits the Occupied Palestinian Territories as a case study.

B Opinion Polls

i) The Data

I spent three months from the beginning of April to the end of June 2015 in Ramallah, in the West Bank, doing an internship with the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). This organisation has been conducting opinion polls in the Occupied Palestinian Territories since 2000. When I was there, they kindly gave me the survey data, in SPSS format and in English, for Polls 1-38, which had been conducted approximately every three months between July 2000 and December 2010 and the SPSS file for Poll 56. I later found that the Centre had put the SPSS file for Poll 42, conducted in December 2011, and the SPSS data for CPRS Polls 32, 33, 37-47, (for 1998-2000) conducted by its predecessor the CPRS, online. The PSR also gave me the results, by gender and region in an Excel format, for the answer in the polls to the question 'Which of the following movements and parties do you support?' for twenty-two polls (39-55, 57-61 including an extra poll number 52.1) conducted between March 2011 and September 2016. In total, therefore, I have access to data from fifty-three opinion polls (CPRS Polls 32, 33, 37-47, PSR Polls 1-38, 42, 56) and the response to the party support question for seventy-five opinion polls (CPRS Polls 32, 33, 37-47, PSR Polls 1-61, including 52.1).[7] Data on the question of party support were combined in a large Excel file. The forty PSR Polls were merged into a single SPSS file (called 'Merged Dataset') for ease of analysis. The CPRS Polls were excluded from analysis as

[7] This question is used in preference to the question 'If there was an election tomorrow who would you vote for?' in order to minimise the impact of strategic voting techniques and to understand the core support for political parties.

they did not share the same set of questions with the PSR Polls and I have not been able to observe the polling process as conducted by that organisation.

ii) Polling in Palestine

As part of my internship, I observed how opinion polls are carried out at the PSR by observing the process that went into conducting *Poll 56*. I made notes and asked questions as the polling was being conducted, then interviewed four people from the PSR to reflect upon the process (M14x, M15x, M17x, M38x). The polling process that I observed firstly involved the PSR team coming up with questions for the polls. Each poll included several standard questions relating to demographics and opinions on continuing political issues. For each poll the team would include some additional questions - "depending on the current situation in Palestine" (M17x) - about recent political events. Finally, a poll might also include questions requested by a third party on subjects such as the US presidential elections, gender equality or the Arab Spring.

Once the questions were set, they determined the sample to be polled. "The sample consists of 1,200 individuals and it is chosen with the help of the PCBS [Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics] to be representative of the Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem." (M17x).

Then they briefed the field researchers. M17x told me, "These field researchers have been working with us for ten years and have experience of collecting data in the field. They also usually have a [university] degree relevant to this work." (M17x). The field researchers worked in pairs and were organised in four regions. Training workshops were carried out before each poll for the four regions: the northern West Bank (meeting in Nablus), central West Bank (meeting at the PSR in Ramallah), the southern West Bank (meeting in Bethlehem) and in Gaza. I went to the three West Bank workshops. In these workshops, over pizza or cakes, the field researchers read the questionnaires aloud. Then the organisers answered any questions from the field researchers relating to the meanings of the questions, problems they have encountered or other administrative issues.

In the three meetings I attended, all the field researchers were women and all the supervisors were men. M15x explained that most of the field researchers are women because they have greater access due to "the cultural situation in Palestine" which

means that "usually the man is at work and the woman is at home and she cannot let [a male researcher] inside when she is alone." (M15x).

Finally, over three days; a Thursday, Friday and Saturday, the polls would be conducted. The field researchers, in pairs, were given a map of the randomly allocated area they were to survey and some questionnaires by their supervisors. The completed questionnaires were then returned to the supervisor at the end of each day in sealed envelopes. M17x told me:

> *"The field work takes three days. We collect the data and on the same day we always enter the data into the system. After data entry, they send it to the centre by email. After receiving the data, we check it and then start with the analysis. We look into ten percent of the surveys that have been filled just to check." (M17x)*

The polls are also weighted by regional population size (by area), and, for polls after 2006, they are also weighted according to the results of the 2006 legislative election, by asking the sample which political party they voted for in that election (M17x). When I asked the reasons for the weighting, M17x explained it was important because among Palestinians there was "fear... [of] expressing who they voted for" leading to a discrepancy in their stated votes (M17x). This is an important problem with the methodology. It is a problem which might be inherent in doing this kind of research in a non-democratic context. I address this issue more directly in Chapter 6.

iii) Using the Data

The first step in analysing the opinion poll data was merging all the polls into one expanded dataset. I was given the cleaned, translated SPSS files for PSR polls 1 to 38 and Poll 56, and later I downloaded Poll 42 from the PSR website. These polls, conducted almost quarterly over 15 years, have some repeated questions, but there are often slight changes in the wording of the questions and/or how the answers are recorded. The data was limited by the fact that analysis could only be done across the polls on repeated question and only on those questions which the pollsters asked. The CPRS Polls were excluded from the 'merged dataset' as they did not share the same set of repeated questions with the PSR Polls.

Merging the forty polls was a lengthy process. I used SPSS software and kept detailed notes for the process of merging the relevant questions from these 40 polls into one dataset. The new 'merged dataset' meant that analysis could be conducted on all 40 polls at once. Most of the analysis was done using a free analytical software called 'R'[8].

For most of the polls between 2010 and September 2016, I was only given access to the results to my key question 'which of the following movements or parties do you support?' broken down by West Bank/Gaza and Male/Female. I also used the CPRS Polls 32, 33, 37-47 for this information. I used Microsoft Excel to collate the data from all seventy-five polls (both CPRS and PSR). Plots displaying this data (as in Chapter 1) are made using 'R'.

Initial explorations of the datasets helped to shape some of my interview questions. I used the interviews to discuss questions found in the polls where I thought a greater level of clarity or understanding was needed. The interviews, together with my reading of the existing literature, helped me choose the variables I used for my quantitative analysis. A full explanation of variables used can be found in the Appendices.

Tables and graphs of the opinion poll data are used in this thesis for descriptive purposes but also to test the various hypotheses generated from the literature and interview data. The major analyses of the opinion poll data use logistic regressions on two dichotomous variables: *'Fatah support'* and *'Hamas support'*. From these regressions, I work out the predicted probability for a man and a woman supporting the two different groups. Fitting these predicted probabilities into the gender gap equation (below) shows the predicted gender gap for the different models tested.

> *Palestine Gender Gap = ((Predicted probability of a woman supporting Fatah – Predicted probability of a woman supporting Hamas) - (Predicted probability of a man supporting Fatah – Predicted probability of a man supporting Hamas))*

In each chapter I test several different models to explore the relationship between each group of variables and the gender gap, using logistic regressions and gender gap

[8] R Core Team (2018). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. URL https://www.R-project.org/. I used the following packages: aod, arm, boot, car, classInt, doBy, foreign, gmodels, graphics, Hmisc, lmtest, mapdata, maps, maptools, MASS, Matrix, mvtnorm, RColorBrewer, rgeos, sandwich, sp, stringr, texreg, and Zelig

in predicted probability. With each chapter, I explore different variables and, as such, try to assess the relative impact of each variable, or set of variables, on the gender gap. Variables which, when added to a model cause the gender gap to reduce, are considered as partially explaining the gender gap. In Chapter 8, I bring together the analyses from previous chapters to create the most appropriate model for explaining the gender gap in political support. This might be seen as a variation upon the 'regression decomposition technique' (Studlar, et al., 1998 pp. 786-787). The variables used in this analysis are described in Appendix 2.

Analyses are based on support for political groups rather than intended vote because I felt that intended vote might include political machinations on the part of the individual which obscured their actual support. Box-Steffensmeier et al. prefer to study partisanship for this reason, suggesting that candidates and campaign contexts influence voting (Box-Steffensmeier, et al., 1997 pp. 5-6). In the Palestinian context, it might also be the case that certain people might vote for one party, not because they support it, but because they think it has a greater chance of ousting a rival party, or else an individual might not vote because they see voting as condoning the wider political status quo. I also concentrate on the gender gap in political support between Fatah and Hamas so as to focus on the role of gender rather than having to explain 'any non-gender-specific trend' reflecting changes in the overall environment. I do not want to obscure the wider historical political context of the Palestinian Territories (I describe this in Chapter 3) but, by limiting my analysis to the gender gap, allows this research to deal with its primary area of interest i.e. the impact of gender on political support (Box-Steffensmeier, et al., 1997 pp. 5-6).

C Interviews

I interviewed eighty-one people between June 2014 and July 2016. Thirteen interviews were carried out in June 2014 in and around Nablus as a small-scale pilot as part of my master's degree. Seventeen were carried out in May and June 2015 in Salfit, Ramallah and Jerusalem. Two were carried out in November 2015 in Bethlehem and Jerusalem. I then interviewed forty-nine people between January and July 2016, in London, Brighton, using Skype to Gaza, in the governorates of Jenin, Tubas, Tulkarm, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah, Jericho, Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron and one in Tel Aviv.

Most interviews were recorded on a small electronic voice recorder. Nine interviewees asked that I take notes rather than record, with one asking that I stop recording half way through.

All interviewees gave me their explicit consent for the interview. As well as explaining my research orally I provided each interviewee with an information sheet, written in Arabic and/or English, and asked them to sign (but not necessarily to write their name). One woman said that she consented but did not want to sign the form as she never signed anything.

The interviews fit roughly into two types; elite interviews with 'experts', and 'non-expert' interviews with ordinary people. 'Expert' interviews were unstructured interviews with people with in-depth knowledge on some aspect of my area of research. The 'experts' included high level politicians from different political parties, academics, journalists, pollsters and the directors of three different NGOs in Ramallah. The interviews were unstructured with just brief guiding notes that I made beforehand to ensure that I made the most out of the interviews. These notes targeted the interviewees' area of expertise, but also ensured that I addressed the major points of interest for my research. Some of the expert interviewees explicitly said that they were talking on the record and that I could use their names. Others, at my suggestion, preferred anonymity.

Some interviews fall in between 'expert' and 'non-expert' interviews. These are cases where I was expecting to conduct a standard interview but soon realised that the interviewee had a specialist area of interest or knowledge. Examples of this are interviewees who were political activists or members of the security services and therefore, could provide special insight into certain areas of Palestinian politics that other interviewees could not. These interviews tended to stray further from my interview schedule as new questions presented themselves and the standard questions seemed to be wasting a valuable opportunity.

Expert interviews play an important role in providing background understanding of the situation in Palestine and the ideological perspectives and political behaviour of the key players. Sharoni and Gunning in their studies of peace activists in Israel-Palestine and Hamas respectively both highlight the importance of interviews. Sharoni suggests that theorisations must come from the people involved and their experiences and

'cannot emerge in academic settings and then be applied' (Sharoni, 1995 p. 29). Gunning also emphasises the importance of interviews instead of just textual analysis for the following three reasons, which also apply in large part to my research:

> *'Palestinian culture, like others under occupation, is heavily biased towards the oral (Scott, 1991: 160). Secondly, one cannot cross-question the written word to understand its underlying logic (which is particularly important when studying Islamism, since so much of what is written in the West is based on erroneous assumptions). Thirdly, official texts do not reveal what ordinary members think, how much of their leaders' thinking they have absorbed, or how they evaluate their leaders' claims to legitimacy.' (Gunning, 2007 pp. 19-20)*

The 'non-expert' interviews were semi-structured interviews with people from a range of backgrounds and locations in the Palestinian Territories. These interviews were based on the questions used in the survey, but I allowed the interviewees a chance to voice their opinions, experiences and theories relating to political support in Palestine. These interviews took between twenty minutes and an hour to conduct. To allow for interviewees to proffer theories of their own, the final question in most interviews asked them for their ideas for what might explain the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. I attach my interview schedule in Appendix 3.

After conducting the interviews, I transcribed them myself. I then coded all the interviews using a software called 'MAXQDA'. The coding brings together comments on similar themes to make analysis of the interviews easier. I did not attempt to use grounded theory in the analysis of the interviews, but I did try to build themes from the interview data rather than according to preconceived theories, so as to allow concepts that I had not previously considered to emerge. My approach might be broadly considered an open-minded 'thematic analysis' (Bryman, 2012 p. 581). Interviews are cited by gender (M for male, F for female) and numbered chronologically by sex, expert and quasi-expert interviewees are given an 'x' after the interview number.

D Considerations

i) Language

Issues relating to language and translation affect both the quantitative and qualitative data. The opinion poll data was initially collected in Arabic, then translated into English for distribution. It is important to consider carefully any questions used in the analysis and the possible impact of translation.

As with all opinion polls, but particularly so with Arabic, there is also a difference between the official language used in the polls and the spoken dialect. Here, again, slight mismatches in meaning might take place.

I followed a team of researchers for a day conducting the polls and I found that often they would explain the questions to respondents who did not understand them. This is both helpful and problematic as a particular field-researcher's interpretation might influence responses. However, as mentioned above, any questions over the meaning of the survey questions should have been addressed at the workshops for the field researchers before the polling process. This should have helped to ensure that the survey questions were not interpreted too differently by the field researchers.

Evidently, between the respondent and the final analysis, there are several points at which meanings of questions and responses may be slightly altered, through interpretations and translations.

To help to understand how the polling questions might be understood I asked about some of the questions, surrounding topics such religion and the economy, in my interviews, allowing me to avoid misconstruing the data. I also try to ensure that I discuss any potential variation and misconceptions from the polling data to be as transparent as possible.

Language was more of an issue for the interviews. Some of the interviewees were fluent and happy to be interviewed in English. I conducted these interviews by myself. A few interviewees spoke English, but not fluently. These interviews tended to be based in English but switched to Arabic whenever we had problems communicating in English. Many of my interviews were conducted in Arabic with the help of an

interpreter.[9] Usually, before the interview, I spoke in Arabic with the interviewee to explain my research and the interview process, and to thank them for taking part. I used four different young women graduates as interpreters. Three of them, who were friends before, helped me with one or two interviews each in 2014, 2015 and, in London, in 2016. For the major field work period in the West Bank in 2016 I recruited an interpreter who was a recent graduate of English and psychology from Birzeit University. I thought it was important to have a more formal relationship with a dedicated interpreter rather than relying on friends in an ad hoc way. None of the interpreters were formally trained in translation but they all spoke Arabic and English fluently.

The use of interpreters was, for the most part, unproblematic, but there were several issues that I had to address. One problem was how different interpreters translated my questions. I realised that I should ensure that I had one interpreter to prevent personal differences in translation. I also provided the interpreter with a translation in colloquial Arabic of the English language questions that I intended to ask, to help to standardise the language. This can be seen in Appendix 3. I worked on the colloquial Arabic interview schedule with a Syrian translator friend in London and a Palestinian friend to double check their understanding of the questions.

A second problem with using an interpreter was ensuring that they translated the interviewees responses reliably. This meant politely telling the interviewees that they may be interrupted for translation as they talk and encouraging the interpreters to translate as literally as possible. One benefit of speaking Arabic myself was that, usually, I understood what was being said in Arabic, and so could pick up where certain aspects or nuances had been missed off the translation. With recorded interviews, I occasionally improved on a translation when transcribing the interview afterwards, and in one particularly fast-talking case, I called on the help of my Syrian friend.

I transcribed all the recorded interviews myself. This was complicated because several interviewees, even when interviewed in English, used a great deal of Arabic terminology, referring to the Palestinian Authority as the '*sulta*' [the Authority], to the

[9] Although I speak both Modern Standard Arabic and I am conversant in the Palestinian dialect I wanted to use an interpreter for Arabic language interviews because I am not fully fluent.

PFLP as '*jibha*' [the Front] and pepper their conversation with terms such as '*yaani*' [you know], '*khalas*' [enough!], '*walla*' [by God] or '*an jad!?*' [really!?].[10] My interpreter, knowing my level of Arabic, would not translate simple phrases such as these, formalities and greetings or the names of places and organisations. Many interviews were interrupted as coffee or tea was brought by a waiter, or as a family member popped their head through the door, or when the interviewee answered the phone. A final issue with transcription is that a great deal of language is non-verbal. Nodding heads, raised eyebrows, tuts of disapproval, smiles of disbelief, gestures of dismissal and the slow shaking of the head in memory of trauma are all lost in transcription. I found myself describing particularly significant gestures to the recorder. On the whole though, transcribing the interviews was useful as a way of reviewing the material. I tried to transcribe the interviews as soon as possible after conducting them, so as to keep them fresh in my mind, and also to help guide future interviews.

Unfortunately, small misinterpretations of language and misunderstandings are unavoidable. Limitations of funding, language training and time meant that I had to make do with the situation. Although far from perfect, the interviews were conducted with a good balance between pragmatism and precision of translation.

ii) Sampling and Bias

Palestine is a particularly difficult place to do research because of the volatile political situation. Al-Malki suggests that the rapid changes in political circumstances 'tend to confuse not only the researcher, but those being researched' by bringing up new issues which might not have been relevant before and constantly shifting the focus of the research (Al-Malki, 2011 p. 197). It is therefore difficult to claim that a particular time period can act as a reliable 'sample' for research purposes. However, I believe there are a number of factors which should act to minimise the effect of this issue.

Not only are the polls used carried out over a long period of time, but each poll asks both politically pertinent questions of the moment and, also, several repeated

[10] I would like to apologise to all Arabic speakers for my simplistic transliterations and translations of these terms. I am aware that they all have multiple meanings.

questions which relate more to the question of political support. Further, with forty different data collections over 15 years, the sheer amount of data should minimise its effect. I also analyse each poll separately or include a variable for '*poll number'* so as to control for the variations over time. In the interviews I tried to steer comments away from recent political events and towards more general trends. Having conducted interviews over two years (one set of interviews taking place as the 2014 Israeli assault on Gaza was happening), and in different locations, it should be possible to perceive the continuity of broader themes in political support, such as the role of the economy, beliefs, and attitudes towards the use of different methods in resolving the situation, rather than just being caught up in the political events surrounding an individual poll or interview.

Another problem with conducting research in Palestine is the fragmentation of the Palestinian people and the divergences between the different geographical locations. Al-Malki again suggests that research must 'take into account the geographical variations and differences in populated areas (city, village, and refugee camp), in addition to the differences in the political formation and the standard of living of people living in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, or Jerusalem' (Al-Malki, 2011 p. 200). He suggests that this variation has created serious challenges for researchers particularly those seeking to generalize results who 'have to take into consideration variations in the social landscape.' Even qualitative researchers must heed these variations:

> *'In qualitative research studies, which do not endeavor to generalize their findings, it is nonetheless essential in the sampling process to establish comprehensive standards that will include variations, and then begin the process of categorizing and comparing so as to reach conclusions that are convincing and possessing epistemological value.' (Al-Malki, 2011 p. 200)*

I have attempted to address this in my research by selecting interviewees from different areas and using surveys which cover the whole of the Territories. Full details of the locations and dates of the interviews can be found in the bibliography. In the polls I try to control for geographical variations by including three dichotomous variables – '*gaza', 'city'* and '*refugee camp'*.

Interviewees were selected as mentioned above, as ‘experts’ and ‘non-experts’. Experts were interviewed about their areas of expertise. Their selection was based on referrals, introductions and areas of expertise. Non-experts were selected for interview with the aim of mimicking the sampling of the surveys, but without aiming for representativeness. My 'purposive sampling' sought to interview people from a broad geographical range of places (from all sixteen governorates), as well as ensuring I spoke to a roughly representative number of refugees, men and women, older and younger people, people of different religions, educated and less educated people and rural and urban dwellers (Bryman, 2012 p. 418). I wanted to speak to roughly equal numbers of men and women from different backgrounds so as to try to avoid reproducing gender stereotypes or 'essentialising' their experiences and the pressures they face.

Interviews were arranged using a snowball sampling method, meaning they were largely arranged through my friends, and friends of friends, my interpreter, her friends, people I stayed with, and I even interviewed one woman I met on the bus. Expert interviews also largely followed the same pattern of introductions and referrals, but often using referrals from senior people I met in London. I used letters of recommendation to introduce myself. I knew the groups of people that I wanted to speak to: politicians, pollsters, professors of politics and gender, journalists and NGO directors. I found that introductions were very important to obtain interviews of both types.

This method leads to a certain amount of bias. I was dependent on personal relationships, but also on the willingness of someone to be interviewed. Educated or politically active people were more likely to be suggested to me as interviewees. I had to actively seek out people living in refugee camps, older people, less educated people and Christians to gain some balance.

I found that I was welcomed by most interviewees. Being both foreign and female may well have made gaining interviews easier. Al-Malki writes that often in Arab countries ‘female foreign researchers have wider opportunities to obtain information and data, sparing them the obstacles that the local female researchers usually encounter... due to prevailing traditions and norms’ (Al-Malki, 2011 pp. 192-193).

The greatest difficulty I faced was interviewing Gazans. As I was unable to get into the Gaza Strip (you must be either a registered journalist or aid worker to get permission to enter). I therefore interviewed Gazans in the UK and conducted interviews with five Gazans in the Strip by Skype. This necessarily meant there was a selection bias in those I spoke to as they had to be well off, technically savvy enough to have Skype and a generator to ensure electricity supply, or else have been inclined and able to study or work in the UK. Unfortunately, this has meant that my research is more heavily weighted towards the West Bank. This is a deep regret of mine but is an effect of the occupation.

Interviews took place in many different locations: cafés, offices, universities, two clothes shops and several homes. I usually suggested conducting an interview in a quiet spot but usually ended up being invited to join the interviewee wherever was most comfortable for them. While it would have been preferable to interview everyone individually in a situation where no one else was around, this was not always possible. Family members or else waiters, fellow guests, colleagues, phone calls and secretaries interrupted, overheard or sat in on interviews. If interrupted, we would pause to ensure greater privacy if necessary. In five interviews I was asked to interview people together. They were husbands and wives, good friends or in one case twin sisters. In these interviews, there is a possibility of the interviewee being influenced by those around them, and for some reason not telling the 'truth'. However, they only happened at the suggestion of the interviewee implying they were comfortable with the arrangement.

An even greater worry would be if interviewees were afraid of saying certain things due to fear of retribution or retaliation. To minimise these risks, I offered assurance of anonymity, offered the option of recording or taking notes, and ensured that interviewees were comfortable in their environment by meeting them wherever best suited them.

While isolated quiet locations may appear superficially to be the preferred choice for an interview, it is not practical or fair to interviewees to ask them to travel and this might put off potential interviewees, especially frail people, busy people or those with dependents. Further, bringing interviewees to official-seeming or 'scientific' settings might also bring an uncomfortable power dynamic to interviews and cause a bias of its

own. As such, I felt that ensuring the interviewees were comfortable with the location and their company was the most sensible way of conducting the interviews.

The range of opinions I heard in the interviews is, I would like to think, a testament to the fact that most of those I spoke to felt comfortable enough to be open with me. I felt that after having interviewed eighty people I was starting to hear similar sets of opinions and beliefs and explanations from interviewees, suggesting that I had spoken to a good range of people and had heard the most widely subscribed to political beliefs.

Further, with the interviews, there is a question of bias in regard to what individuals are happy to say to me, a western, female researcher, who they often knew very little about. McEvoy, in her article about elite interviewing in Northern Ireland, warns that identities and the perception that the researcher is or is not 'on their "side"', can impact the data; she warns that the 'interviewee may make assumptions about the researcher/s identity and tailor responses accordingly' (McEvoy, 2006 p. 184). Reaction to the interviewer is always going to shape an interview. I felt this dynamic come into play particularly on certain subjects. For example, many of the Palestinians I spoke to were aware of the power of international opinion in the conflict and were keen to distance themselves from the image of extremism and terrorism and wanted to highlight the suffering of Palestinians. In this, Peteet's comments on the interviews for her research struck a chord with me:

> *'The women I worked with viewed me as a foreigner to whom by telling their story they would be conveying it to the West. To them the ethnographic experience was an experience in dialogue in international politics. This is not to place fieldwork in the category of public relations; it is to recognize that the subjects of study often have just as much reason for agreeing to be studied as the ethnographer has for studying them. Palestinian women viewed their own lives as commentaries on suffering, as embodying the whole dialectical experience of national dispossession and resistance.' (Peteet, 1991 pp. 16-17)*

Many interviewees, of course, projected their own perspectives. As feared by Al-Malki, and expected of all political interviews, many politicians or political individuals 'attempt[ed] to influence outcome by slanting the information given the researcher in line with political objectives' (Al-Malki, 2011 p. 193). I tried to make sure this did not

have an undue effect by ensuring I spoke to members and supporters of many different parties and tied the interview data to the academic literature. On the whole however, I found most individuals I spoke to were warm, open and happy to talk. The fact that the interviewees were usually friends of friends, helped to establish a level of trust. It is natural that in discussing politics, a degree of Palestinian nationalism or bias played a role in shaping the narrative. In fact, it is the way that individuals interpret and portray politics which is of interest in understanding political support.

The opinion poll data is also likely subject to bias from numerous sources. The opinion poll sampling is conducted according to a rigorous method of randomly selecting locations within the sixteen Palestinian governorates. Each time there is a poll, the PSR uses Palestinian census data to divide the Palestinian Territories into different areas. Then, they randomly select areas for the poll. In theory, in each area, there are 150 homes, and each pair of field researchers select one home randomly to start with, then count every fifteen homes to get ten homes per location. They conduct polls on Thursdays, Fridays and Saturdays. Fridays and Saturdays are the usual weekend for Palestinians (although this varies for different jobs and different areas). In each home the field researchers note all the adults over 18 and then use a Kish table to randomly select one individual to interview (M15x; M17x). I spent a day with a pair of field researchers and also interviewed four people involved in organising the polls, three supervisors in Ramallah, and one in Gaza (M14x; M15x; M17x; M38). There are a few issues with the sampling that emerged from my day with the field researchers and my interviews.

First, the field researchers' maps are old and do not show most of the new buildings. Therefore, the maps are not particularly easy to follow and often the area is more populous than it is recognised as being and perhaps might mean that busy new areas are underrepresented in the surveys. In Gaza, after the wars, there was the additional problem of areas where houses have been bombed and destroyed (M38x). In these areas, I was told, they did not count the bombed houses. Those who have lost their houses, necessarily must be excluded from the surveys, this, again, would contribute to selection bias.

Second, the field researchers often found it difficult to reach men to interview. When I went with the field researchers it was a Thursday, a typical workday for most

Palestinians. As men are usually the primary breadwinners in Palestine, we visited several houses before we found a man to interview. They were supposed to interview women and men alternately where possible and were meant only to interview individuals if they live there (M15x). When I accompanied two researchers, after struggling to find men to interview they ended up interviewing one young man who had just turned eighteen and was revising for his final school exams, and one man who worked in a shop but lived nearby. This might mean that men are underrepresented in the sampling, or that there are warped results with male students or the unemployed being overrepresented as they form the majority of young men at home on a working day.

Fortunately, the polls are also conducted on two days of the weekend when it is easier to find men at home, and demographic details are included in the samples; so the over inclusion of women can be accounted for.

Third, for two of the survey interviews I sat through, family members sat with us as the respondent answered the questions. This may have influenced the respondent in their answers. For example, during one interview, a husband answered a question loudly, before his wife – the respondent – could answer. She also ended up asking him his opinion for other questions. Occurrences like this are likely to happen often and it is difficult to assess their impact.

Fourth, as mentioned in the previous section about language, in some interviews the respondent did not understand or know the answer to certain questions and so repeatedly asked the field researcher what they thought. This is probably because of a combination of the formal language of the questions and a lack of interest in politics on the part of the respondent. The presence of family members and the field researcher is also likely to create a certain amount of 'social desirability bias' in the surveys, meaning that respondents 'provide answers that they deem socially acceptable or that will paint them in a positive light' (Masoud, et al., 2016 p. 15). Again, however, cases such as this might lead to bias in the responses but is hard to account for.

Finally, it is worth noting that I heard several allegations of the polls being politically biased or that they were boycotted by Islamists. M38x told me that in the polls preceding the 2005 and 2006 elections the field researchers were being refused by

"bearded men or religious women wearing the hijab or niqab" when he asked members of Hamas what was happening "they said 'we have orders not to answer you guys and if we do to give a dishonest opinion'. So, the results said that Fatah would win... Fatah had won in the opinion polls and Hamas had won in the elections." (M39x) Gunning also explained that, while he used survey data in his research, this data is not wholly unproblematic. Of the surveys he writes:

> *'Though the methodology used follows international polling guidelines, there are persistent complaints among Hamas activists that Hamas sympathizers are systematically under-represented in the polls (Hroub, 2000: 229-33). There has indeed been a persistent discrepancy during the 1990s between electoral outcomes in student and professional bodies-until the resumption of municipal and national elections in 2004-6, the main barometer of political opinion in Palestine-and poll findings regarding the percentage of support Hamas enjoys. Exit polls at the 2006 election similarly under-represented the percentage Hamas eventually received, although the discrepancy was far less than had been the case previously. There are various explanations for this-ranging from differences in average educational and socio-economic background of the student and professional samples to the possibility that Hamas supporters are less likely to declare their allegiance to a pollster for fear of harassment by the security services. Whatever the reason, when using polls, it is important to bear in mind.' (Gunning, 2007 p. 21)*

I cannot say that I saw any evidence of bias in the process of producing the polls. I do not believe that polls can ever truly represent the 'truth' of public opinion, nor that public opinion is static, but they can be used, like interviews as 'evidence' of how people interact with politics. However, it cannot be denied that the focus of my research concerns areas where expressing an honest opinion could be risky. I address this issue further in Chapter 7.

On the whole, though, the sampling system seemed to work well, and all methods of polling have their flaws. The hope is that, due to the scale of the poll, small irregularities are evened out and systematic bias is removed. Certainly, door to door polling over weekends is probably the best way of gaining access to a representative sample of the population in Palestine. Digital or telephone polling is likely to be more difficult and exclude poorer and older residents.

A final source of bias is my own. As Al-Malki writes: 'It is not easy for the Palestinian or foreign researcher, who conducts field research on issues that have to do with Palestinian society, to be politically, intellectually and ideologically neutral' (Al-Malki, 2011 p. 202). I do not aim to be neutral, as such, but I do want to honestly present the views which were expressed to me. In terms of political opinions, I am a feminist, but I understand and seek to convey some of the problems associated with a narrow understanding of feminism. I came to and leave this research supporting Palestinian calls for independence and the end of the Israeli Occupation, but without a clear view as to how this is likely to be achieved. I do not support any of the political organisations in the Palestinian Territories.

E Ethics

There are several ethical points that I considered for this research, mainly trying to ensure the safety of participants, myself and my interpreter and to avoid exploiting any participants in this project in any way.

i) Anonymity and Consent

Anonymity is important in any research, but in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, anonymity is even more important. Both in the opinion polls and in my interviews, respondents answer questions about their feelings about the current political leadership, political situation and their political preferences. Supporters of opposition parties have often been put in prison or attacked for their views. Equally, many have told both the opinion polls and me in interviews that they do not consider it safe to express their views in public (see Chapter 7 for more on the impact of this). Therefore, anonymity is important for the interviews and the polls.

The polls are kept anonymous by not using the name of the respondent anywhere, but instead just using a number to identify each questionnaire filled in. Each person polled consents to provide information for the survey. In the interviews, I explained to participants before the interview started that they were anonymous and asked interviewees not to use their names. During certain 'expert' interviews, the interviewees said that they are happy to give their names, and indeed their positions and views are well known in the public sphere anyway. In these cases, I double-

checked that they are happy to do this, and will be able to quote them in this thesis. The interviews were numbered in sequence without any names. I also kept a separate note to explain the general location and date of the interview, and rough age and gender of the interviewee without using names to ensure I had spoken to a good demographic and geographical cross-section of society.

I gave all interviewees an information sheet summarising the research in Arabic and providing my contact details so that they can get in touch with me if they would like to reconsider their participation or have any other questions. I asked them all to read the information and consent to the interview before I began.

ii) Safety

Personal safety is an important consideration when doing research in a conflict zone. Indeed, the Palestinian Territories are prone to rapidly changing and often-violent political events. In order to carry out my research whilst keeping myself safe, I followed the Foreign Office travel advice, news reports, friendly advice and common sense. Avoiding locations and events which could turn violent, such as demonstrations, or certain checkpoints after a contentious political event.

In the course of my research, only a few events took place that might be considered to have put me in danger in any way. When I arrived in Tel Aviv in July 2014, the Israeli assault on Gaza was underway. During my first morning in Tel Aviv, I was woken by a siren sounding that a rocket was 'incoming'. I had to move to a 'bomb-proof' room. Later that day, I heard and saw several rockets being intercepted by the 'Iron Dome' and heard several alarms. When I moved to a village outside Nablus during that stay, life continued in a pretty normal way, except on one evening when the Israeli military entered the village I was in and released tear-gas, meaning that I had to run inside and use onions to remove the tear gas from my eyes. Whilst the devastation of Gaza was on the news, my own life and research was not disturbed more than at these isolated moments.

The safety of my interpreter was equally important to my own, and, in many ways, she was more vulnerable than me. She accompanied me on trips across the West Bank and was involved in interviews with people of all different political perspectives. I made it clear to her that she should not feel obliged to provide any personal information to

interviewees or to put herself in harm's way. I ensured that she would be home in good time each night. She was very professional at not letting her own views influence her work, even when interpreting for people she strongly disagreed with. On the whole, however, our trips were useful, informative and usually fun.

iii) Exploitation

There are several ethical questions surrounding exploitation and equality in research, which I have had to address. Accordingly, scholars must be aware about how power operates in their research environment and how the research process is implicated in its workings. These ethical considerations are even more urgent in Israel-Palestine, where politics invades everyday life (Khalili, 2011 p. 66).

Firstly, on an individual level, it is often difficult to ensure a non-hierarchical relationship when conducting interviews. Feminists have tried to revise the traditional 'detached' interview technique, with a 'non-hierarchical', 'reciprocal' and 'equal' relationship between the interviewer and interviewee (Alison, 2009 p. 23). The power dynamics of interviews vary widely between the expert interviews with high-level politicians and those with poorer and/or less educated non-experts. Khalili puts it:

> *'A metropolitan researcher with the resources of wealthy universities at one's fingertips, for example, will inevitably be more powerful than-for example-Bedouin women in Egypt, or former detainees in Palestine, or villagers in Iran. However, if one is studying "up"... conducting ethnography for example in international trade institutions, militaries, or finance or development ministries, the ethnographer's power position is not so clear-cut.' (Khalili, 2011 p. 70)*

Many of the experts were highly articulate and assumed that I was fairly ignorant of Palestinian politics. In these interviews, there was a certain power dynamic between myself and the interviewee, 'the respective age, gender and status' meant that some of the interviews were dominated by the interviewees (see McEvoy, 2006 p. 186). Some interviews include long and off-topic monologues when the interviewees were unwilling to manoeuvre back to the question. Other experts were more sceptical about being interviewed as they had been interviewed numerous times before by researchers and were doubtful as to the impact it had and the way they were portrayed. They had clear, coherent theoretical bases for their positions and actions,

and were keen to ensure that they shaped the interviews. Sharoni wrote with her own research that: 'Many women activists were torn between their eagerness to spread the message about their struggles to a wider audience and their uneasiness with being someone's "object of study."' (Sharoni, 1995 p. 1). While a few of the interviewees, as described above, came to the interviews with certain agendas to promote, they all treated me very politely and generously and I am deeply grateful to them for giving up their time to share their knowledge and experience with me.

With non-expert interviewees, the power dynamic was sometimes reversed. Here I had to be more aware of the impact of my interview and presence. Khalili suggests:

> *'When researching relatively less powerful peoples, attentiveness to one's interlocutors-their safety, dignity, and self-representation-is another crucial ethical consideration. This, of course, is not only about maintaining their anonymity... and ensuring that our very presence in our interlocutors' houses somehow doesn't mark them as suspect and make them vulnerable to potential harassment, ostracism, or even worse, violence. These are basic principles. As important is our duty not to ask leading questions, to probe too deeply or too obstinately if faced with their reluctance to speak, to maintain their confidentiality, and, most important, their dignity.' (Khalili, 2011 pp. 71-72)*

Some people I interviewed were surprised that I would want to know their views and were shy about their lack of understanding of the political situation. These tended to be older women who had finished their education at sixteen or so. Speaking some Arabic helped go some way to putting those who were uncomfortable at ease, as we could talk about other matters first (usually food and family). To try to address feelings of being ill prepared, I told interviewees about the subject of my research before starting the interview. I gave them an information sheet in Arabic and explained verbally what the interview was going to be about, how I sought to ensure anonymity, and that I hoped to record the interview but could take notes instead if they preferred. It was important too to explain that I was looking for opinions and descriptions rather than facts, and that their opinions were important. I did not push for details of painful experiences, nor forcefully probe for answers. It was important to me that my interviews did not feel like a trial for interviewees. I hope that by ensuring that all interviewees entered into the interview fully aware of the aims of the interview and by

giving their opinions and beliefs credit and space, I avoided exploiting them and ensured a degree of equality between myself and the interviewees.

Many of the interviews took place in the interviewees' homes, which although it may have made them feel more comfortable, it also often placed an obligation of hospitality upon them. I was lucky enough to be given lunch, countless cups of tea and coffee, biscuits, ice cream and slices of cake. While it was wonderful to experience this generosity, it raises questions about placing the respondents in the position of host as well as respondent. I tried to ensure I brought a small gift of biscuits when I knew I was going to someone's house. I also ensured that I bought interviewees coffee or tea whenever I met for an interview in a café. While this does in no way ensure an equal relationship, I hoped it might go some way in redressing the balance.

A further source of inequality is the way in which I, as the researcher, benefit from the interviews while the interviewees do not. I hope that by shaping my research based on the information and opinions given to me in the interviews, I can also provide a degree of equality in the relationship. I take the opinions, theories and self-representations of those I interviewed seriously in this research and believe that they have provided me with a great deal of insight into political support in the Palestinian Territories. I also believe that the majority of the interviewees enjoyed the interviews and the chance to discuss these issues, share their life experience, and in many cases, practice their English. I have ended up remaining in contact with several of the interviewees since.

Secondly, at a broader level, have I, by conducting research in Palestine on the subject of gender and political support been exploiting the situation and reinforcing global inequalities? Does my research reinforce stereotypes about the Middle East as undemocratic and violent, and Middle Eastern women as weak and voiceless? Is a study so linked to the idea of democracy and gender drawing attention away from the great injustices being enacted daily upon Palestinian people or reinforcing ideas about the unsuitability of democracy for the people of the Middle East? The history of exploitation of the 'Orient' by the 'Occident', and the creation of 'orientalist' stereotypes through western scholars 'speaking for' those they seek to portray, has made these concerns all the more real (Said, 1995). I am very aware that my research could be portrayed in these ways. Therefore, I have tried to ensure that I conducted my research carefully, transparently and reflectively. I have provided accurate

representations in this thesis of the views expressed by the Palestinians I interviewed. Ultimately, I believe that producing work which gives a more nuanced understanding of the political situation in Palestine, even if it risks distracting from other work or being misread, has a valuable contribution to make.

F Conclusion

This research project uses a mixed-methods approach incorporating statistical analysis of opinion polls, together with expert and non-expert interviews. While these methodologies can be problematic, they are able to complement and build up a broader and more complex understanding of the subject when used together. By analysing opinion poll data, I hope to be able to make claims about trends in, and explanations of, political support, while overcoming the restrictions of a limited timeframe and small interviewing sample. The interviews are used to contextualise the political situation of the Palestinian Territories, generate hypotheses about the gender gap and provide details of the gendered pressures and constraints which might influence support for a political party.

In this project I have tried to adhere to feminist principles of research. I have mitigated, where possible, power dynamics within the interview process, and take seriously the views of the interviewees. I have also tried to be as transparent as possible about the research process, while also safeguarding the anonymity of the interviewees. These considerations should make for a more ethical and less exploitative research project.

One persistent problem for my research, but one that may be a source of interest for this thesis, is the fact that political oppression exists within the Palestinian Territories. This may have skewed how individuals have chosen to declare their support for different parties, even in the anonymous opinion polls. I engage further with some of these problems and their possible effect on the gender gap in Chapter 7.

Chapter 3 Palestine as a Case Study

Figure 3.a Landscape near Taybeh, the West Bank, 19th March 2016, Minna Cowper-Coles

This research aims both to provide insight into the political system of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and also to produce avenues for further research into understanding the interplay between gender and political support in other contexts. Gerring defines a case study as the 'intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units' (Gerring, 2004 p. 342). Consequently, this research should be considered as a case study of the relationship between gender and political support.

In this chapter I show how the gender gap in the OPT might serve this purpose. The main interest in studying the gender gap in Palestine is as a 'most different' case. It should highlight which theories about women's political behaviour derived from the gender gap literature in the West have explanatory power in a very different political context, while also proposing alternative explanations. Further, this chapter will provide some historical, geographical and political context for this case study, so that the deeper analysis in the following chapters can be better understood.

The Palestinian Territories have tended not to be used in comparative political studies due to it being ‘anomalous in many respects, such as its diasporic dispersal, complex

interpenetrations by Middle East regional politics, and attraction of vast attention from across the world' (Pearlman, 2011 p. 3). Instead studies of Palestinian politics tend to be journalistic, historical, ethnographic or policy oriented. However, I would contend that the Palestinian case offers certain benefits as a case study. The OPT acts as a 'most different' case for comparisons with the gender gap literature in the West, but it also has characteristics similar to many other societies in the region and the rest of the 'post-colonial' world. These will be explored in this chapter.

There are several personal and pragmatic reasons for my choice of Palestine as a case study. I have studied Middle East politics and Arabic and have previously done research in the West Bank for a master's dissertation. Additionally, save for the difficulty of visiting the Gaza Strip detailed above, it is relatively easy and unproblematic doing research in the Palestinian Territories, compared to the rest of the region. Usually British citizens are granted three-month visas at the Israeli border, and a bus from Jerusalem takes you into the West Bank. Once in the West Bank, getting around, although subject to checkpoints and stops, is cheap and easy. Most regions can be visited in a day trip from Jerusalem or Ramallah. Further, there is more political and polling data readily accessible in the Occupied Palestinian Territories than in other states in the region. This is partially a result of the international interest in resolving the conflict.

In this chapter I briefly outline the political history and geography of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Norris suggests that in order to better understand gender gaps, scholars might be well advised to conduct multi-method research which takes account of 'contextual factors, including temporal, social, and national contexts' (Norris, 2003 p. 14). Political and social contexts are liable to change. Variations in context are likely to impact upon the political behaviour of individuals. Several scholars caution against generalising or making projections from 'static data', as political contexts vary over time and space (Box-Steffensmeier, et al., 2004 pp. 519-520; Wirls, 1986 p. 317; Campbell, 2017). In Palestine the political differences are particularly striking politics in different geographical areas and historical periods, and they can make it a difficult place to do research (Al-Malki, 2011). In this chapter, I aim to provide some context as to how historical events and geographical locations might have impacted political support so as to better understand the gender gap, its fluctuations and impact. I will

also provide a brief overview of the two political organisations studied in this thesis, namely, Fatah and Hamas. Then, finally, I will highlight aspects of the political context of the OPT which affect it in particular as a case study.

A History

1948 is the year the British mandate in Palestine ended and Israel declared their independence, but it also marks the Nakba or 'catastrophe' when many Palestinians fled or were forced out of their homes in what is now the state of Israel (their descendants still have refugee status and large communities live in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon as well as in the West Bank and Gaza Strip), and the Palestinian political establishment was destroyed.

During the '6-day war', in 1967, Israel invaded and occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip (as well as the Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula). This was the beginning of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories. Accordingly, from 1967 until the implementation of the Oslo Accords in the 1990s, the entirety of the Occupied Palestinian Territories was administered by Israel.

During these early years, the main hubs of Palestinian political activity, centred around Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) all of which operated under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). The PLO was based in Jordan, and later in Lebanon and then Tunisia. These organisations carried out armed raids, attacks and hijackings against Israel as part of the armed struggle for Palestinian liberation. Israeli settlement building in the Occupied Territories also began in this period.

After decades of armed struggle, spearheaded by Fatah and the PFLP based outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip, political momentum shifted to inside the Occupied Palestinian Territories in the First Intifada. This was a grassroots uprising against the occupation forces. It began with mass demonstrations in the Gaza Strip in December 1987 and lasted for several years involving much of the Palestinian population, through strikes, boycotts, demonstrations, stone-throwing against soldiers and tanks with an emphasis on Palestinian self-sufficiency. It continues to be considered a time of great creativeness and national solidarity and was defined, for the most part, by

non-violent resistance. The year 1988 also saw the founding of Hamas out of the Muslim Brotherhood (Pappé, 2006 p. 261).

Following the First Intifada came the Oslo Accords in 1993. These were a series of negotiations and agreements, starting with the Declaration of Principles. The Oslo Accords altered the face of Palestinian politics allowing the PLO into the Palestinian Territories leading to the formation of the Palestinian Authority (PA), which was permitted limited powers of governance over areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Islamic bloc and many of the 'leftist' parties opposed the Oslo Accords (Brown and Hamzawy, 2010 p. 166; Pappé, 2006 p. 260). Sabri Saidam, a senior member of Fatah, explained the mixed emotions that surrounded the revelation of the Oslo Agreement, and then the establishment of the PA. He said that Oslo was "a major blow to the aspirations of many who thought that... Palestine was the whole map of historic Palestine" (M11x), but that it was also imbued with excitement and hope: "The joy of a Palestinian... stepping foot on Palestine, establishing the Palestinian Authority, issuing the Palestinian passport, working on the Palestinian airport, carrying the flag that was banned in Palestine, was, to Palestinians, yet another positive shock." (M11x)

The Oslo Accords were popular as long as the public maintained faith that peace and a Palestinian state remained possible (Shikaki, 1998 p. 34). For most Palestinians, however, with the prospect of a peace settlement still distant, Oslo is now seen as a 'sell out' by the Palestinian leadership. F23x described Oslo as "a disaster" because they later found "Israel had no intention of withdrawing" (F23x). If the First Intifada was the golden age of Palestinian resistance, the Oslo Accords are now seen by many as its betrayal.

In September 2000, the Second Intifada erupted. The Second, or Al-Aqsa, Intifada was a violent uprising in protest at the failed peace process and the provocative walk by Israeli politician, Ariel Sharon, with a heavy security presence, on the Haram-al-Sharif, the compound containing the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem.

Unlike the First Intifada, the Second Intifada rapidly became violent. 'Palestinian casualties during the first three months nearly totaled those of the entire first year of the first Intifada' (Pearlman, 2011 p. 150). Instead of stone-throwing and strikes, this Intifada was characterised, on the Palestinian side, by suicide bombings and shootings carried out by multiple militias and, on the Israeli side, a harsh re-occupation of the

West Bank and Gaza Strip, where the Israeli military carried out mass arrests, imposed curfews, destroyed houses and fields, shelled neighbourhoods and carried out assassinations - some using helicopter gunships - of suspected militants (Pappé, 2006 p. 262; Pearlman, 2011 p. 150). Within four and a half years, over 4,500 people had been killed and 35,000 people had been wounded, the large majority of both dead and wounded were Palestinians (Pearlman, 2011 p. 150; Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter, 2006 p. 570).

Fatah was divided between the two positions of 'resistance' and the 'peace process' (Baylouny, 2009; Klein, 2003). Some sections of Fatah, such as the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, espoused resistance, while others continued to try to negotiate a settlement. In contrast to Fatah's ambivalence, Hamas's resistance and anti-Oslo rhetoric resonated with popular sentiment and gained Hamas wider appeal.

During and after the Second Intifada, the physical fragmentation initiated in the Oslo Accords became more acutely felt, and Israeli 'security measures' including the reoccupation of the West Bank began to seriously hamper transport and communication (Baylouny, 2009).

In November 2004, during the Second Intifada, Fatah leader Yasser Arafat died after a prolonged siege of his compound by the Israeli military. Arafat's death provoked widespread mourning among Palestinians (M11x). His death also triggered the need for presidential elections, and subsequently and partly as a result of Arafat's death, various groups halted hostilities and the Second Intifada reduced to a simmer. The 2005 presidential elections confirmed Mahmoud Abbas - also known as Abu Mazen - as successor to the recently deceased Yasser Arafat.

Figure 3.b illustrates the trends in support for the different political parties at this time. Until the outbreak of the Second Intifada, support for Fatah, the party of the peace process, remains high. This support then declines during the Second Intifada, while support for Hamas increases. Support for Fatah rises sharply after the death of Yasser Arafat.



Figure 3.b. To show political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 1998-2005. Data = CPRS Polls 32, 33, 37-47, PSR Polls 1-18

Following the Fatah victory in the 2005 presidential elections, the legislative elections of 2006 saw Hamas win a surprise victory (Caridi, 2012 p. 195). This has widely been considered as the result of a protest vote by the population against Fatah corruption and the failure of the peace process, although it remains a matter of debate among scholars (Caridi, 2012 pp. 195-196; Jamal, 2012; Jamal, 2013). Israel, the international community and Fatah were stunned and appalled by the results (Caridi, 2012 p. 195; Jamal, 2013 p. 273). Israel and the international community then set out the terms on which they considered it acceptable for Hamas to form a new government (Usher, 2006 pp. 28-29). Hamas refused these terms (Hilal, 2010 p. 35). In reaction, the international community in the form of the Quartet (the UN, US, EU and Russia), despite having judged the elections free and fair, cut aid and support to the Hamas government for not complying with their demands (Hilal, 2010 p. 35; Jamal, 2012 p. 191). The international community also allowed the consolidation of power by Fatah and ignored the arrest of several Hamas parliamentarians. Powers over the PA's security forces, information and finance ministries, the appointment of a new nine-

judge constitutional court and over the hiring of PA staff, were given to the (Fatah) president, Mahmoud Abbas, in what Usher describes as a 'bloodless coup' (Usher, 2006 p. 28).

In June 2007, after over a year of mounting tension, a civil war of sorts broke out between Fatah and Hamas leading to a Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip. The exact nature of this civil war/Hamas takeover is disputed by different parties, with some seeing it as a military coup and others as a pre-emptive strike (Koshy, 2007 p. 2871). These events, of course, impacted how people viewed Fatah and Hamas. Many people were horrified by the killing involved in the coup. M14x explained that "the internal fights within Fatah and Hamas, and the fact that there was blood in the process, that fact made Hamas less popular" (M14x).

The 2007 split between Hamas controlled Gaza and the Fatah dominated West Bank has led to both organisations increasingly shutting down criticism or political opposition within their territories. In the Fatah controlled West Bank, Hamas has been suppressed and many members arrested, while the opposite has been the case in Hamas controlled Gaza. Blecher documents in detail the PA's ban, from 2007 'on any public manifestation of support for the Islamic movement' (Blecher, 2009 p. 66). Jamal points to the development of creeping authoritarianism in the Palestinian Authority. She writes 'political opponents are detained without charge and basic laws and court orders are not enforced' (Jamal, 2012 p. 201). Gunning and Sayigh also relate how Hamas has used violence against political opposition in the Gaza Strip (Gunning, 2007 p. 183; Sayigh, 2011 p. 40).

These events impacted the lives of Palestinians and altered their perception and support for the different political parties. Figure 3.c shows how political support for both Fatah and Hamas increases in the lead up to the elections, with support for Hamas being slightly higher than support for Fatah in the poll after the legislative elections. However, political support reduces again after the election, with support for Hamas dipping after the Hamas takeover of Gaza.



Figure 3.c To show political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 2005-2008. Data = PSR Polls 15-30

The period since the split has been violently punctuated by three Israeli assaults on Gaza. First was 'Operation Cast Lead' from December 2008 to January 2009. This was followed by 'Operation Pillar of Defence' in November 2012 and 'Operation Protective Edge' in the summer of 2014. Each of these wars or assaults on Gaza involved the severe bombardment of the Gaza Strip by the Israeli armed forces on one side and Hamas-launched rockets landing in Israel on the other. The death toll and destruction has been heavily weighted on the Palestinian side in each war. In the summer 2014 assault, over 2100 Palestinians were killed compared to 73 Israelis (BBC, 2014).

The wars have also impacted levels of political support. The main trend that I found was that the wars increased support for Hamas, perhaps due to sympathy for them and the resistance. Some interviewees, having supported Hamas through the war, lost their support for Hamas after the war, when life continued, more difficult than ever, in its aftermath (M14x; M17x; M39x). This trend is visible on the graph in Figure 3.d.

Peaks in support for Hamas appear after each war, followed by rapid decline in support.



Figure 3.d To show political support in the Occupied Territories 2008-2016. Data = PSR Polls 27-61 (including Poll 52.1)

Since the Gaza wars, violence resurged with a 'Third Intifada' that never quite materialised in 2016 but involved, on the Palestinian side, several stabbings and drivers deliberately running down Israelis, mainly in Hebron and Jerusalem, and harsh reprisals and killings by the Israeli army.

Over the eighteen years which are covered in the opinion polls, the Occupied Palestinian Territories have experienced a number of episodes which provoke a response in the opinion polls, shifting support from certain parties to others. As Al-Malki warned, the rapid shifts in the political scene could make longer term assessments more difficult. For this reason, this research conducts analysis across the 40 opinion polls available so as to ensure any events are not restricted to a single year or opinion poll. I also, where possible, split results by poll so as to increase transparency as to the historical context of the data, and I otherwise include a variable

for '*poll number*' and '*age*' to account for these changes. Further the violence and major political shifts which have taken place in the OPT make it very different from the western political contexts where studies of gender and political support have tended to take place. However, political upheavals, international involvement and violence is not foreign to the politics in many parts of the world. As such studying the gender gap in this context is important to understanding how or whether gender interacts differently with political groups under these kinds of conditions.

B Geography

The Palestinian Territories are deeply fragmented. There are major geographical, political, demographic and social differences in the territory within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They comprise urban areas, refugee camps and rural villages; humid coastal plains, mountains and deserts. However, the major differences have been in their relation to and experience of the Israeli occupation.

The major geographical fracture in the Palestinian territories is between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. There are stark economic differences between these two areas, with Gaza having almost double the rate of unemployment (Freedom House puts it at over 40 percent) significantly lower GDP per capita, and, reportedly, over 80 percent of the population being dependent on aid (Freedom House, 2017 p. 616; Khalidi, 2010 p. xxxiii).

The Gaza Strip and the West Bank only came into existence as distinct territories in 1948. But the Gaza Strip absorbed so many refugees during the 1948 war that its population tripled. The West Bank and Jerusalem also absorbed refugees, but the proportion of refugees in relation to rest of the population and land size was not as large. The demographic changes to the two territories which took place during the 1948 war have meant that the issues of poverty and overcrowding have been much more serious in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. Certain groups are affected more than others, with Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip being much more likely to live in poverty (Miftah, 2013 p. 16).

While Israeli settlements were removed from the Gaza Strip in 2005, since 2007, life has become increasingly difficult for Gazans. After Hamas took control, Israel imposed a blockade, heavily controlling and restricting which items and people are allowed to

enter and exit the territory (Caridi, 2012 p. 260). Egypt has also often closed their border with Gaza. The effect of the restrictions has seriously hampered development in the area, despite the emergence of a faltering 'tunnel' economy smuggling produce from Egypt which continued for several years.

The three assaults on Gaza since 2008/9 have accelerated the 'de-development' of the Gaza Strip, increasing poverty and displacement of people (the term de-development was coined by Roy, 1999). F39, a Gazan, told me that "the situation was bad before that but now it is very, very bad", describing how they only have electricity for 6 hours a day (F39). F25x, the director of an aid organisation, informed me:

> *"I don't think anyone can do any development work with the conditions in Gaza, especially with the closure, inability to bring material into Gaza... So, from 2006, 2007, the last ten years, our main focus has been humanitarian assistance, emergency response, reconstruction, construction of social facilities and so on. We had to more or less do the minimum, due to the restriction on bringing commodities into Gaza." (F25x)*

The West Bank has had a different experience of occupation. The political agreements of the Oslo Accords, together with the settlements and checkpoints has created what Hilal calls a 'process of "bantustanization"' (Hilal, 2010 p. 31). Since the Oslo Accords, Palestinian self-government in the West Bank, has been limited to certain – usually highly populated - 'islands'. In 'Area A' Palestinians have 'full' authority, in 'Area B' they have joint control with Israel (these are usually villages) and Area C – the spaces and rural communities in-between - remain under full Israeli control (Baylouny, 2009 p. 52; Farsakh, 2005 pp. 239-240). Jerusalem has remained under Israeli direct governance and has been treated as part of Israel. Hilal argues that the fragmentation process has highlighted the inequalities between the different regions of the West Bank, and between towns, villages and refugee camps (Hilal, 2010 p. 32).

In the West Bank, the building of illegal Israeli settlements continues apace. Roy, in 2004, wrote that 'although built-up settlement areas comprise 1.7 percent of the total area of the West Bank, they actually control 41.9 percent of the area of the West Bank' through municipal boundaries and regional councils (Roy, 2004 p. 371). In 2010, Khalidi suggested that the number of settlers had grown to nearly half a million (Khalidi, 2010 p. xxi). Israeli settlements, with their separate roads, checkpoints and Israeli military

bases, punctuate the West Bank land so as to make travel unpredictable at best, and impossible at worst (Hilal, 2010; Roy, 2004; Weisman, 2007).

These settlements, and the checkpoints surrounding them affect different areas to different extents. The situation is worst in Hebron where settlements exist in the very centre of the Palestinian city, leading to increased tensions and Israeli military rule over the old city, with 2,000 or so soldiers posted to look after 500 or so settlers (F32).

Settlements impact those in rural areas particularly. Interviewees complained about roads being blocked for settler use (F10), settlements dumping sewage on farm land (M36; F34) and described a general fear of the aggressive behaviour of settlers (F5; M32; F32). The physical fragmentation serves to restrict access to commercial centres, employment and to institutions and services such as hospitals and universities.

A further development has been the Israeli construction of a 'security fence' or 'apartheid wall', which cuts into the Palestinian territory occupied by Israel in 1967. It separates numerous villages from their land and has transformed travel for certain neighbouring Palestinian villages and towns, most notably Qalqilya, Habla and Abu Dis, which are effectively surrounded by the wall. The wall and checkpoints now cut off Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank. Palestinians resident in the West Bank must be granted permission by the Israeli authorities before they can enter Jerusalem.

Figures 3.e and 3.f show the percentage support for Hamas and Fatah across the different governorates of the Palestinian Territories. Jerusalem and Gaza City have the lowest levels of support for Fatah (the actual figures are 22 percent support in Jerusalem and 31 percent support in Gaza City), while the rural areas of Tubas and Salfit, as well as more populous Qalqilya and Bethlehem, have the highest levels of support for Fatah. In terms of support for Hamas, the highest levels are found in the Gaza Strip and Hebron, and the lowest levels are in Jericho and Bethlehem. While local political leaders, governance systems and the demographic make-up of different areas (such as the relatively high percentage of Christians living in Bethlehem) are likely to be strong influences in determining the regional levels of political support, there is substantial support in the literature for rural and urban differences explaining different levels of political support in different areas.



Figure 3.e and Figure 3.f showing percentage support for Fatah (left) and Hamas (right) by governorate. Data = PSR Polls 1-38, 42 and 56 (dated 2000-2010, 2011, 2015, Merged Dataset)

Hamas has tended to be more popular among urban populations and Fatah to be more popular in rural areas. Gunning linked Hamas's success in urban spaces to their increased organisational presence and higher concentration of charities in towns and refugee camps (Gunning, 2007 p. 149). He further suggested that Hamas was stronger in Gaza than the West Bank primarily because of the presence of 'charismatic leaders' in Gaza, such as Ahmed Yassin, but also the 'concentrated poverty, an emerging lower middle class, and conservative culture' meant the population were receptive to the Islamist ideology and the population density meant it was 'easier to concentrate resources' (Gunning, 2007 p. 31). Gunning suggests that this fits with the thesis that 'Islamism is a modern phenomenon, facilitated by the twin processes of modernisation and urbanisation' (Gunning, 2007 p. 148).

In explaining Fatah's rural support, Sayigh and Gunning agree that the PA was largely successful in incorporating the rural population under its control through 'massive expansion of the salatariat and the out-reach of 'government' departments, utilities, and civilian services, and the proliferation of security agencies to rural areas' (Sayigh, 1997 p. 661). Fatah also has well established connections to the traditional elites and clans who tend to control the religious and charitable networks within the villages (Gunning, 2007 p. 149).

Figure 3.g shows the variation in support between the city, villages and towns and refugee camps. Fatah is on average most popular in the villages and towns – the more rural option – and Hamas is most popular in the usually relatively overcrowded and impoverished refugee camps.



Figure 3.g To show percentage support for Fatah and Hamas in Cities, Villages and Towns and Refugee Camps, Data = PSR Polls 1-38, 42 and 56 (Merged Dataset), n=51,569

These observations fit into the explanations of how geography and political support were linked in my interviews. I was told that support for Hamas tended to be higher in Gaza and Hebron (M17; F33). But that "Mostly it is in rural areas where people support Fatah" (M14x).

Beyond these generalisations, there seem to be specific factors leading to one party having more support in one area than another. For example, I was told by a Tubas resident: "Fatah made us a governorate... Before 2008 Tubas was a town, with a small city, which was linked to Jenin, and after 2008 they became what they are now [a governorate]. Fatah worked to achieve this." (M26).

In other places, party support was linked to a particularly prominent individual who came from the town or village. It might be the case that a resistance fighter or

politician from a village becomes 'a symbol' who in turn 'starts to mobilise the village', this effect can be inflated when the individual is a member of a large or prominent family (F12x). While many of those I spoke to did not know the party representatives in their local area and thought that the parties played almost no local role apart from at election time, there were some instances when this effect seems to have been the case. For example, F15 and F17 had prominent members of Hamas and Fatah from their areas and told me that because of that, the whole area now supported those parties (F15; F17).

Geographical variation in political support is caused by all kinds of different factors. These include having a particular experience of the occupation or of political control, through to the influence of prominent individuals within the local area. These differences are important in shaping political support. If an individual grows up in an area where Fatah, Hamas or the PFLP dominate, they may remain loyal to that party for the rest of their lives because they have formed a 'party identity' at a young age. Research in the US suggests that these identity formations do not shift easily because 'once they take root in early adulthood, they often persist'. Even if a group's reputation is damaged by recent events, they may 'assimilate new information about the parties and change their perceptions of the parties without changing the team for which they cheer' (Green, et al., 2002 p. 8). They even argue that ideological stances do not affect party identity because 'When people feel a sense of belonging to a given social group they absorb the doctrinal positions that the group advocates' (Green, et al., 2002 p. 4).

Due to these variations in geography, I use three dichotomous variables to try to control for the greatest possible areas of geographical variation. These are: *'gaza'*, *'city'*, and *'refugee camp'.* Again, these regional variations are starkly different from those likely to effect the various regions in the western cases where the gender gap is studied, however, it would seem that many of the differences in political support between various regions are due to factors that are common to most political contexts, party connections to rural or landowning classes or the poor and the prominence of local politicians. As such, the geography of the Palestinian Territories, while at variance with the West, does not present a model which is incomparable to those cases.

C Political Parties and Movements

Palestinian political 'parties' are not equivalent to those one would expect to find in a western democracy. Many started as social movements or armed liberation groups and few have fully evolved into political parties. Fatah, Hamas and the PFLP, and other political groups provide services and welfare, and, in some cases, continue to engage in armed operations (Bröning, 2013). Indeed, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the PFLP continue to be considered, in the eyes of the international community, as terrorist organisations, making analysis of their political behaviour particularly contentious (Herzog, 2006 p. 83). Their unorthodox methods are, Bröning contends, a reflection of the unorthodox political climate in which they work. Bröning, on this point, deserves a long citation. He writes:

> *'most factions that continue to define political life in the Palestinian Territories have until now eschewed the label of political party. Instead, they have chosen to identify as political "movements," or "liberation fronts." This is not merely a semantic particularity but a highly relevant indicator of their self-perception... Redefining "movements" as streamlined political parties would entail restricting ambitions to electoral politics, identifying government responsibility or the role of a "loyal opposition" within the existing political framework as their exclusive political objective. Any such step would essentially confine the scope of political movements to the limitations of the status quo.' (Bröning, 2013 pp. 2-3)*

Fatah and Hamas may eschew being termed political parties, and operate in a quasi-/non-democratic environment, but they do approximate, however roughly, the pictures of party systems in 'transitional' democracies as described by Webb and White (Webb and White, 2007). They are major political actors and so understanding the gender gap in their support is an important endeavour in its own right but also provides a point of comparison with patterns of political support in the West.

Below I give brief overviews of Fatah and Hamas, their ideological positions and brief history. The other parties and movements in Palestine and included in the question of political support in the PSR polls are much smaller and are described in more detail in Appendix 1. Most small Palestinian organisations are grouped as the 'leftists', but opinion polls also ask about Islamic Jihad and nationalist and Islamist independents. The 'leftists' are made up of historical socialist and communist parties, and the factions

that have split from them, often to become more moderate. They used to be a serious force in Palestinian politics, but their power has reduced significantly in the last few decades, partly due to the demise of the Soviet Union (Jamal, 2013 p. 285). These organisations have only low levels of support with few having reached over ten percent support in the entire period being considered in this thesis.

i) Fatah

Figure 3.h Fatah's 'Nationalist Bloc' flag at Birzeit university student elections, 20th April 2015, Minna Cowper-Coles

Fatah is a nationalist 'movement' which has morphed into the 'mainstream nationalist' political party. Ideologically, they are 'semi-secular pragmatists' (Shikaki, 1998 p. 30). Bröning describes how, for many Palestinians, Fatah is the 'embodiment of secular Palestinian nationalism' and that they are 'global symbols of the Palestinian cause'

(Bröning, 2013 p. 57). Interviewees variously described it as a “nationalist party” (M16x), “a national movement” (F13x) and “the nationalist, patriotic, Palestinian group” (M12x). Fatah is the ‘mainstream’ political organisation in the Palestinian Territories as well as the party of government (in the West Bank).

Fatah has always tried to avoid defining its political position beyond a broad Palestinian nationalism ‘within which all social classes and ideological currents could fit’ (Sayigh, 1997 p. 680). For decades it has led the Palestinian people through organisations such as the PLO (M12x; Sayigh, 1997 p. 680). They have gained a reputation for being open-minded and inclusive, and for “unifying the Palestinians” (F23x). Although nominally associated with socialism (Bröning, 2013 p. 57), Fatah has become more strongly associated with economic liberalism. Indeed, their 2009 political platform had a strong emphasis upon investment in the private sector (Bröning, 2013 p. 93).

Fatah, or the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, was established in the late 1950s, becoming more firmly established in the 1960s (Bröning, 2013 p. 1; M11x). Fatah soon became the majority organisation in the PLO with Yasser Arafat - or ‘Abu Ammar’ - assuming the dual roles of Chairman of the PLO and leader of Fatah. At that time, Fatah carried out regular guerrilla raids into Israel and was a militaristic liberation movement. Many of those who joined the movement at that time remain important in the organisation today, and a great deal of the rhetoric and imagery that the party uses are based on the heroes and martyrs of the early years of the nationalist struggle. Up to the end of the 1970s, the idea of liberating Palestine had a "real sense of glamour" (M35x). However, in time, Fatah and the PLO became increasingly out of touch, as it was kicked out of both Jordan and Lebanon and moved its centre to Tunis.

In 1988, the First Intifada - a grassroots and initially leaderless uprising - shook the Occupied Territories. Taking the initiative once more, Arafat took the opportunity to press for peace negotiations with Israel. This ultimately led to the Oslo Accords, which Arafat signed in 1993. Since Oslo, Fatah has transformed into "a peace movement” (M36) as it has sought to 'establish a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza through the Oslo peace process’ (Shikaki, 1998 p. 30).

However, when the Oslo Accords failed to produce the prospect of a Palestinian state or peace, the Second Intifada broke out in September 2000. This time Fatah

conspicuously played a double game; the leadership called for peace or moderation, while its membership fragmented ‘into numerous competing groups acting against each other and against their own superiors’ (Baylouny, 2009 p. 41). These groups, made up of local organisations including the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and the ‘Tanzim’ returned to the use of violence against Israel, including, this time, the use of suicide bombers against Israeli citizens (Baylouny, 2009 pp. 55-56).

Even since the Second Intifada petered out, the status quo has continued to deteriorate regarding the 'peace process', and Fatah is still seen as largely to blame. Settlements have been built in the West Bank at increasing rates since the Oslo Accords, while a full peace and Palestinian state remain elusive (Bröning, 2013 pp. 62-63).

The Oslo Accords moved the centre of gravity for Fatah back to the Palestinian Territories and into the newly established Palestinian Authority, where it has become the 'de facto party of state' (Bröning, 2013 p. 57). According to Bröning, 'The overlap is such that it has been at times difficult to distinguish Fatah's institutions from the other established forums of Palestinian political life, the PNA [PA] and the PLO.' (Bröning, 2013 p. 57). Fatah has been seen as 'promoting the national project of state-building' (Bröning, 2013 p. 62).

The current Fatah leadership face growing accusations of corruption, nepotism and authoritarianism (Bröning, 2013 pp. 62-64). Fatah is blamed for the PA's 'much-reviled security cooperation with Israeli armed forces', and the increased use of the Palestinian security services to target Fatah opponents (Bröning, 2013 pp. 62, 67). Further, since the 2006 elections, the PA has been ruled mostly by presidential decree; the Palestinian Legislative Council has hardly been convened. The PA is increasingly suffering from 'a notable lack of democratic legitimacy' (Bröning, 2013 p. 67).

Fatah is also often seen to be nepotistic. Due to its dominant position in the PA, Fatah has been able to 'offer its supporters access to positions of influence' (Bröning, 2013 p. 62). Palestinian family and/or clan based social structures have been accommodated and reproduced within Fatah (Sayigh, 1997 p. 680). The nepotistic tendencies of the regime have on the one hand cost Fatah a great deal of 'political legitimacy' but on the other have also meant that Fatah now has a great deal of 'loyalty based on patronage' (Bröning, 2013 p. 68).

Most of the finances of the PLO and PA come from external sponsors, Fatah is not dependent on the population for their revenue and so there is no pressure for democratic practices, but instead can distribute money to key supporters, which helps to perpetuate its authority, resembling the 'rentier-state' model (Parsons, 2005 p. 126). The rumours of corruption, which include allegations against Abbas's sons, have hardly been addressed by the regime despite public calls for investigations (Bröning, 2013 pp. 71-75). The current leaders were criticised in interviews because "they only think about money" (M9). Scholar and former government minister, M34x, described the decline in popularity of Fatah after Oslo. He said: "After the establishment of the Authority... Abu Ammar... and all of those leaders, they came over here and... we saw how they live... their sons and daughters, and corruption and all of this. The halo effect vanished." (M35x)

While much of their support might come from patronage, the role of the Palestinian leadership should also be mentioned. Yasser Arafat, the leader of Fatah until his death in 2004, was a "charismatic leader" and remains "the symbol of Palestinian nationalism" (M34x; M11x; M12x). He gained 87.1 percent of the valid votes in presidential elections in 1996 (Ghanem, 1996 p. 526). Although since replaced by Mahmoud Abbas as President of the Palestinian Authority and Chairman of the PLO, Arafat is still referred to in an overwhelmingly positive light today as a unifying symbol who is popular beyond the Fatah membership. His face is iconic, printed on flags and spray-painted on walls.

Fatah's popularity, even at its lowest ebb, tends to hover around 30-40 percent support in the polls. Shikaki suggests their supporters are disproportionately 'young, male, and less educated' (Shikaki, 1998 p. 30).

ii) Hamas

Figure 3.i Hamas's 'Islamic Bloc' parade at Birzeit University student elections, 20th April 2015, Minna Cowper-Coles

Hamas is an Islamist resistance organisation which has begun to participate in mainstream Palestinian politics. Hamas is 'at one and the same time a religious organization, a political organization, and a militia' (Brown and Hamzawy, 2010 p. 165; Esposito, 1984/1998 p. 229). Hamas, led by the late Ahmed Yassin, evolved out of the apolitical Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1980s as an Islamist resistance organisation with the aim of liberating Palestine (Gunning, 2007; Milton-Edwards and Farrell, 2010; M7; M13x). Hamas grew in strength during the First Intifada, building upon the Muslim Brotherhood network of mosques, schools, clinics and unions (M13x; Gunning, 2007).

The Hamas Charter (which many view as being redundant or misleading see e.g. Gunning, 2007 p. 19) takes the view that Palestine is a *waqf*, or Islamic religious endowment, and as such 'Palestine is a permanent Muslim territory' and the defence of Palestine is 'a *jihad* incumbent upon all Muslims' (Esposito, 1984/1998 p. 229; Hamas, 1988; Herzog, 2006; M34x). Whether the Hamas Charter should be considered relevant or not, the interlinking of Islam and Palestinian nationalism embodied in the idea of Palestine as *waqf* is broadly representative of Hamas's ideological stance. A

Hamas PLC member I spoke to described Hamas as “religion and state, resistance next to the Qur’an.” (F30x)

The extent to which Islam informs Hamas's political ideology has varied over time, and there is no consensus among scholars as to how to interpret their position. Some scholars describe Hamas as embracing an expansionist and violent 'radical Islam' (Schanzer, 2008 p. 5), while others suggest they aim to control people’s behaviour and want to establish an 'Islamic state' (Shikaki, 1998 p. 32). Other scholars suggest that although ‘Hamas self-consciously portrays itself as having a religious identity’, the way Islam ‘is interpreted is influenced by the wider socio-economic and political context within which Hamas operates’ (Gunning, 2007 pp. 161, 167). Hamas’s 2006 election manifesto is given as evidence of their less radical and more liberal and pragmatic use of Islam. Their manifesto was 'light years away' from the Hamas Charter, and contained explicit policy proposals for education, health, housing and agriculture which were not 'ostensibly influenced by religion' (Caridi, 2012 p. 186; Gunning, 2007 p. 167). It proposed that sharia should be the 'principal' but not sole source of legislation and explicitly called for political pluralism, citizen's rights and equality, the alternation of power and a separation of judicial, executive and legislative powers (Caridi, 2012 pp. 186-187). Gunning argues that rather than 'pursuing a Taliban-style theocracy', Hamas’s political theory and practices show a dedication to representative authority alongside religion (Gunning, 2007 p. 95). As Hamas has tried to gain approval from the international community, they have repeatedly emphasised that they have no intention of creating an 'Islamic state' (Caridi, 2012 p. 261). Bröning suggests that it was after taking power of the Gaza Strip that Hamas began 'resorting to political pragmatism and *realpolitik*' when faced with the difficulties of ruling, for example they did not implement sharia law (Bröning, 2013 p. 22). Therefore, while Hamas *is* an Islamist organisation, its political methods and manoeuvres, and the way in which they interpret Islam, are decided according to the broader political context in which they work.

Hamas’s attitude towards violence and peace is equally contested. They have been characterised as a 'violent, totalitarian organisation' who have killed many Israelis and Palestinians and who are likely 'to continue down the same path' (Schanzer, 2008 p. 4). It is true that for a long while Hamas has opposed the peace process and refused to

recognise Israel as a legitimate state and have championed armed resistance (Shikaki, 1998 p. 32; Usher, 2006 p. 20). Hamas became notorious during the Oslo period when they tried to derail the peace process with a series of bombings (Baylouny, 2009 p. 55). Then, during the Second Intifada, Hamas coordinated several suicide bombings killing many Israeli civilians. They are labelled as a terrorist organisation by Israel, the US and the EU.

However, their stance seems to have changed over time. Hamas's attitude to peace has softened in recent years. In their 2006 election manifesto, armed resistance was not mentioned (Caridi, 2012 p. 187). They have accepted several ceasefires and some scholars suggest that some of those within Hamas would accept a two-state solution (Gunning, 2007 pp. 206, 221; Sayigh, 2011 p. 13). Since taking over the Gaza Strip in 2007, their resistance activities have been mainly limited to the rocket attacks into Israel during the Israeli assaults on the Gaza Strip.

Since Hamas entered mainstream politics, its organisation has become more complicated with its leader, Khaled Meshaal, based in Syria then Qatar, while the victor of the elections - Ismail Haniyeh - was in the Gaza Strip. Many interviewees complained to me about the division between the leadership within and outside of Palestine, and between the political and military wing (F17; M19; M40; M11x; M12x).

Hamas entered the electoral process and won the 2006 legislative election. Their victory is at least partially due to good organisation and effectively using the electoral system (Jamal, 2013 p. 282). They 'ran on a platform stressing reform and good governance rather than ideological struggle' positioning themselves against Fatah which was increasingly associated with corruption, poor governance and the failure of the peace process (Chehab, 2007 pp. 4-5; Herzog, 2006 p. 87; Usher, 2006 p. 21). Indeed, their appeal is/was largely based on their reputation as an 'organisation of pious, upright citizens who defend the interests of their grassroots constituency' (Gunning, 2007 p. 95). The network of mosques, schools, charities and other Islamic institutions associated with Hamas has been credited as one of the fundamental sources of their political support (Esposito, 1984/1998 p. 229; Sayigh, 1997 p. 632). Their popularity in the polls over the last decade has tended to range between about 25 and 35 percent (M38x).

D As a Case Study

The Occupied Palestinian Territories might be considered a problematic case study for a gender gap in political support because they are not an independent state and the internal context is, at best, only quasi-democratic. While these issues will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 7, I do not believe that they invalidate the OPT as a case study. I would contend that despite (or even because of) the quasi-/non-democratic nature of the Palestinian political system, it is worth exploring Palestinians' political views.

This thesis contributes to research, such as that done by Bush and Jamal and Miguel et al., which explores the political behaviour and elections in the non-democratic states of the Arab world (Bush and Jamal, 2014; Miguel, et al., 2015). Beyond the Arab world, there is a broader stream of literature which studies hybrid regimes, which are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic, where a regime might, for example, use non-democratic practices while still holding elections. Research on political behaviour in semi-democracies is very important if democracy-promoting development goals are to be taken seriously, and if scholars are interested in the politics of ordinary people in non-western contexts.

A further problem with Palestine as a case study is that the national struggle dominates the political sphere to the extent that other policies often remain undefined. On issues such as the economy and the welfare state, the parties do not have clear ideological positions. As M35x told me:

> *"You ask them for instance, ask Fatah, ask all of these factions: 'what is your opinion about healthcare? About education?... you ask them 'what is your platform, political platform?' and the answer is 'liberation of Palestine'... all of us we want to establish an independent Palestinians state, liberate Palestine and that's it." (M35x)*

Although, Fatah and Hamas do have different ideological stances, these differ from the usual left-right political divide as studied in much of the gender gap literature (Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Inglehart and Norris, 2003). The left-right spectrum, formed of 'two dimensions: one has been termed the socialist versus laissez-faire - or left-right - dimension and the other, the libertarian - or liberal - versus authoritarian dimension' (Evans, et al., 1996 p. 94), does not describe the main differences between

Fatah and Hamas (both show authoritarian and laissez-faire tendencies). Instead they would be better compared in terms of religiosity or attitudes towards resistance.

The different way that political parties are positioned in the Palestinian Territories is not a problem as a case study, but points to the importance of introducing a 'most different' case to the gender gap literature, as a way to get beyond the problems inherent in using the left-right continuum. When Huber and Inglehart investigated the 'left-right ideological continuum' in an article in 1995, they found that 'In non-democratic societies and newly democratic societies, the left-right axis is relatively likely to reflect the polarization between authoritarian versus democratic forces, or questions of national identity.' (Huber, et al., 1995 p. 90). They concluded that, although many places use the terms left and right, their meaning 'varies in systematic ways with the underlying political and economic conditions in a given society' (Huber, et al., 1995 p. 90). As a result, it might be good to do away with the terms left and right for analyses of the gender gap, particularly in order to extend gendered analyses to non-democratic and newly democratic societies. The religious-secular divide in political positions, as shown by Hamas and Fatah, reflects the divisions between the major political parties in many states in the Arab world (Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco show similar divides). Furthermore, the dominant position of nationalist rhetoric in the Occupied Territories is echoed, in perhaps less urgent ways, across much of the post-colonial world, and even in the West understanding how nationalism interacts with political support is important from Northern Ireland to Catalonia.

Finally, the OPT would likely be characterised - in Norris and Inglehart's terminology - as a 'developing', 'traditional' or 'pre-industrial' society and a Muslim majority society (Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Inglehart and Norris, 2003). There is very little literature on gender gaps in these contexts and therefore this thesis will help point to how or where these contexts might impact how gender interacts with political support.

Because the Occupied Palestinian Territories sits outside many of the usual settings for studies of the gender gap, it should serve as an important 'most different' case study, which is able to both reinforce theories of gender and political support which fit this case, whilst also pointing to areas of the current gender gap literature which require greater nuance or even rethinking.

E Conclusion

Politics is not static. How power and influence is exerted across time and place varies, and subsequently, support for political parties vary. The political context of the Palestinian Territories is perhaps more fractured than most and has certainly changed radically over even the short period studied here. As this piece of research focuses on how the 'constant' of gender interacts with political support in the widely varying Palestinian Territories over a tumultuous period, it must inherently make certain generalisations, assumptions and use certain short-hands. However, I try to account for the variations of time by analysing the 40 polls available to me separately, so situating them in their time, or else including a variable to account for changes across the polls called '*poll number*'. Further, I include a variable *'age'* so the effect of being brought up in different periods might have on attitudes and political support is accounted for. I also account for the variations of place through interviewing individuals across the different governorates of the Palestinian Territories, and from villages, cities and refugee camps and by including three dichotomous variables for being in the Gaza Strip (*'gaza'*), living in a city (*'city'*) and living in a refugee camp (*'refugee camp'*) to hold variations across location constant.

The Palestinian case is situated within a historical and geographical context unlike any other, however there are several themes that are likely to be important in shaping how to examine the relationship between gender and politics beyond the 'West'.

First, the Palestinian context provides a good example of a quasi-democratic and -increasingly authoritarian political setting. Similar states of affairs exist around the world, and it may be the case that the interactions between gender and political support in the Palestinian context can throw light upon how gender might interact with political support elsewhere.

Secondly, political organisations in the Occupied Territories are not in opposition primarily in economic terms but in other ways, such as in terms of religiosity and different attitudes towards resistance. This resembles many states in the region much more than the standard 'left-right' opposition schema used in most studies of the gender gap.

Thirdly the Palestinian Territories offer a chance to understand how nationalist rhetoric, in a context punctuated by violence and international intervention, might intervene in the political sphere and mediate between gender and political support.

Finally, by studying a gender gap in a 'developing' and Muslim majority society, a case study of the gender gap should be able to offer more nuance to understanding these kinds of societies than is currently available in the literature.

Palestine is not a classic 'case' of the gender gap, but rather its value lies in its dissimilarity from the western gender gap cases. I hope to show the extent to which ideas generated in studies of women and men's political behaviour in the West can help to explain women and men's political behaviour elsewhere. Importantly though, this study does not seek to simply 'apply' a model conceived in the West, but to allow space for alternative theorisations about gender differences in political behaviour derived from the interviews and other academic literatures.

Figure 4.a Advertisement for Al-Quds Bank in Ramallah, it reads "Al Quds Golden Deposit Account: Start today for immediate rewards and banking benefits", 27th February 2016, Minna Cowper-Coles

Socioeconomic status has been fundamental to explanations of political support for decades, most commonly understood in terms of individual rational actors (Downs, 1957) or under broader conceptions of class (e.g. Pulzer, 1967). The gender gap literature also points to different attitudes to the economy and different socioeconomic status as causes for the gender gap in political support.

However, the Palestinian political sphere does not fit to the same moulds as many western states. The economy is warped by the effects of the occupation and aid; the party system does not fit into a clear left-right divide, and there is little explicit class consciousness. Therefore, this chapter takes into account both the western gender gap theories as well as the nuances of the Palestinian political context in order to explore and test the following hypothesis:

H1: Gender differences in socioeconomic status explain (reduce) the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

It will do so by first giving an overview of the Palestinian economy, followed by some theories of gender and political support, before exploring whether there are gender differences in socioeconomic status in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and then how these differences might impact political support. From the academic literature and my interviews, I suggest a number of hypotheses under the umbrella of the hypothesis above, then in the final section of this chapter these hypotheses and a model of the gender gap including variables accounting for socioeconomic status is tested. The following chapters will explore other possible explanations for the gender gap relating to belief and ideology, attitudes towards peace and violence and the effects of oppression before these different possible explanations are brought together in Chapter 8.

A The Palestinian Economy

The economy in the Palestinian Territories is “a disaster” (M29). The United Nations sums up the current situation as ‘weak growth, fragile fiscal position and mass unemployment’ (UNCTAD, 2014 p. 2). Almost two-thirds of Palestinians live under the poverty line, with over a third living in ‘deep poverty’ (Al-Adili, et al., 2008 p. 113; Miftah, 2013 p. 16).[11] Sayigh suggested in 2011 that around 70 percent of families in Gaza rely on nutritional assistance to survive (Sayigh, 2011 p. 3).

Many of the issues facing the Palestinian economy are linked to the Israeli Occupation (Miftah, 2013 p. 7). The Israeli Occupation has impacted the Palestinian economy in three major ways. First, through the linking of the Palestinian and Israeli economies (which inflates prices on the Palestinian side), second, through Israeli imposed ‘closures’, and, third, by providing employment in Israel and the settlements.

Since the Oslo Accords, Israel’s and Palestine's economies have been tied by a 'de facto customs union’ under the 'Paris Protocol' (Roy, 2004 p. 367). The Palestinian economy is tied to the Israeli economy and restricted by the Israeli Occupation. This drives up costs without having the same beneficial impact on salaries (M20). M4 told me: "Imagine how much the Israeli is taking as salary... 3,000 dollars monthly, and the

[11] The deep poverty line is often taken as earning less than $1.25 a day.

Palestinian man taking 300 dollars. And the economy is the same and the prices are the same and we have to pay the same." (M4)

The Israeli policies of closure are, according to Roy, 'the primary measure affecting the Palestinian economy and society during the Oslo period and beyond.' By closure she means 'Israeli-imposed restrictions on the free movement of Palestinian goods, labor and people across internal and external borders' (Roy, 2004 p. 367). The effects of this closure has been 'devastating' bringing about high unemployment ('averaging 10-20 percent in the West Bank and 18-30 percent in the Gaza Strip between 1997 and 1999') due to the loss of labour and the damage done to Palestinian trade (Roy, 2004 pp. 367-8).

Unemployment remains high, estimated at around 40 percent in Gaza in 2011 (Sayigh, 2011 p. 3). M4 said: "There are many people who don't have jobs. Many. They are educated and finish their studies but there are no places for jobs." (M4). Sayigh describes how the numbers of Palestinians gaining a tertiary education has soared but only 20 percent of graduates and high-school leavers can find employment (Sayigh, 1997 p. 608). Many of those who were employed found themselves in a vulnerable unstable job in Israel or the settlements.

Employment in Israel, or in Israeli settlements, often as illegal wage labourers, has historically been one of the staple sources of income for thousands of Palestinians (around 125,000 in the 1980s); but this type of labour is vulnerable to the political situation and variations in the Israeli economy (Sayigh, 1997 p. 607). M33 lives in a village near to the 'green line'[12], and many people in his village worked in Israel because "if you want to make money you've got to work in Israel" (M33). He found, for instance that he earned more as an illegal wage labourer in Israel than as a merchandiser in a food company in the Palestinian Territories (M33). Many Palestinians are in a similar situation where, because of high costs and unemployment in the Palestinian Territories, they are dependent on irregular or illegal work in Israel or the settlements to make ends meet. These factors have led to the impoverishment

[12] The green line is the border between the Palestinian Territories of the West Bank and the state of Israel.

of the Palestinian Territories and undermined attempts at reviving it through industry and external investment.

Further, the Palestinian economy is highly reliant on external income through foreign aid (Jamal, 2012 p. 191; Bröning, 2013). On the one hand, this makes the Palestinian economy particularly vulnerable to changes in international diplomacy - see for example Trump's recent threat to cut aid to Palestine (Sampathkumar, 2018). On the other hand, it has led to a situation which scholars have associated with the 'rentier state' model (M35x; Parsons, 2005 p. 126). This situation reflects many around the world where a government and its institutions' dependency on aid often leads to increased levels of corruption, patronage and nepotism which are linked to political support (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009 p. 408).

Overall, the issues facing the Palestinian economy are of great importance to the Palestinian population. This comes through in the polls. At the time of the 1996 election, 28.5 percent of those polled were 'concerned with economic problems' a greater proportion than those worried about democracy and free speech or security and order (Ghanem, 1996 p. 524). Many of the Palestinians I interviewed explained their political support in terms of money, with corruption and services playing an important role in colouring their views of different groups (M9; F17; F19; F20; M28; M31; F29; M33; F40). Several interviewees told me that after (or sometimes before) the "Palestinian cause", the main issue for them when choosing to support a political organisation was "the economy and giving job opportunities" (M28), "fix[ing] the economic situation" (M33) or getting "a better life than this and social status" (F20). F29 told me the factors which determine political support are "services presented, the political situation, the improvement of the situation in the negotiations, checkpoints, employment, the economy, and projects" (F29).

While the context of occupation is unique to the Palestinian Territories, phenomena such as high levels of unemployment and financial insecurity and rentier type states are much more widespread in the 'developing' world. Determining how this context interacts with theories of gender and political support in Palestine may increase understanding of these relationships in a broader context.

B Theories of the Socioeconomic Gender Gap

i) Family

Understanding gendered interactions with the economy first requires engagement with the problematic question of how the family fits into this picture. Women's economic and political interests, have often been assumed to be the same as those of their family and their 'men'. Even Simone de Beauvoir wrote of women:

> *'They live dispersed among men, tied by homes, work, economic interests, and social conditions to certain men - fathers or husbands - more closely than to other women. As bourgeois women, they are in solidarity with bourgeois men and not with women proletarians... The tie that binds her to her oppressors is unlike any other.' (Beauvoir, [1949] 2010 p. 28)*

There are strong arguments for men and women sharing socioeconomic preferences if they share a household and if the economic benefits which advantage the family help each of the members of that family. Edlund and Pande, in their explanation of the gender gap, suggest that women and men within a stable family should, logically, vote the same way. They write that 'within marriage men transfer resources to women in exchange for sex and for access to children' and that therefore (a stable/secure) marriage draws a husband and wife's political preferences closer together because they share economic interests (Edlund and Pande, 2002). Manza and Brooks make a similar point writing that the 'interdependence of men and women in traditional marriages may thus give them common material interests.' (Manza and Brooks, 1998 p. 1241). The role of family and shared economic interests might explain why, for the most part, there is 'more similarity than difference in the way men and women vote' (Campbell, 2017).

Some scholars suggest that the security of the family from divorce impacts political support. Edlund and Pande and Iversen and Rosenbluth suggest that a greater likelihood of divorce makes women and men more likely to support policies that benefit them as individuals rather than benefiting the family unit as a whole (Edlund and Pande, 2002; Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006). Indeed, scholars suggest that in the West, as divorce rates have increased the number of female headed families which are dependent on aid and welfare services, has also increased (Box-Steffensmeier, et al.,

1997 p. 3). While there is a lack of consensus on the utility of a focus on divorce, this line of questioning successfully queries the sense of treating the family 'as a unit'; instead suggesting that social scientists should 'treat family members as individuals with distinct and potentially conflicting preferences' (Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006 pp. 1-2).

Therefore, it could be expected that being married or not might impact the gender gap because married people share economic interests:

H1a: The gender gap is lower among married people.

However, family does not always mean shared interests between men and women, indeed, the gendered division of labour (and the related differential experiences of women and men) have been central to explanations of how gender interacts with the economy in determining differences in political support which will be explored further below.

ii) Income

In explaining gender differences in attitudes towards the economy and political support, many scholars have pointed to gender differences in socioeconomic status as the major cause of the gender gap in western countries. Scholars often cite women's lower economic status as an explanation for the gender gap in several different states (Inglehart and Norris, 2000p. 860; Bergh, 2007; Campbell, 2017; Giger, 2009; Howell and Day, 2000; Mattei and Mattei, 1998; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; Studlar, et al., 1998). Women tend to have, on average, lower incomes than men. They are more likely to have part time jobs and lower salaries than men (Inglehart and Norris, 2000 p. 446; Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006 p. 1; Beauvoir, [1949] 2010).

Income differences have been fundamental to explanations of political behaviour, with class being the defining political divide in British politics for decades. Pulzer wrote: 'Of all the cleavages in British society, by far the most important is that of class. Class-consciousness is the biggest single determinant of both social and political behaviour.' (Pulzer, 1967 p. 44)

These differences in income, academics suggest, lead to different political preferences. Those with lower incomes should, out of 'self-interest', be more likely to support

parties which would provide them with economic benefits or support (Box-Steffensmeier, et al., 1997). Bergh writes in his study of the US, Netherlands and Norway:

> *'The only universal finding in my analyses, with respect to individual variables, is that income, or socioeconomic status, accounts for at least part of the gender gap in all three countries. This is a finding that can be generalized to other western societies with a fair degree of confidence. Women in western countries tend to have a lower average income than men, and lower incomes tend to correspond with support for left-of-center political parties.' (Bergh, 2007 p. 251)*

The weight of literature relating income level to gender differences in political support suggests income is a likely predictor of the gender gap.

H1bi: Men have a higher income than women.

H1bii: Men's higher income (partially) accounts for (reduces) the gender gap in political support.

Women also often tend to be more dependent on social services than men, and this might explain tendencies for greater female support for left-of-centre parties, which have tended to prioritise the provision of welfare and funding of social services (Campbell and Childs, 2008 p. 9; Inglehart and Norris, 2003 p. 92; Box-Steffensmeier, et al., 1997; Manza and Brooks, 1998). Most scholars have found that a simple rational-interest income-based explanation does not fully explain differences in women and men's political attitudes (Barisione, 2014; Box-Steffensmeier, et al., 1997; Chaney, et al., 1998; Mattei and Mattei, 1998; Studlar, et al., 1998). They consider a network of interacting factors; for example, employment, type of employment, parenthood and gender differences in 'compassion'.

iii) Employment

The role of employment might explain the gender gap. In the first instance, women with paid employment may differ in their opinions from women who are primarily homemakers (Giger, 2009; Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Manza and Brooks, 1998). This might be because women in employment are less financially dependent on men and so are more likely to form independent political

opinions (Barisione, 2014 p. 118; Box-Steffensmeier, et al., 2004 pp. 526-527; Howell and Day, 2000 p. 860). Or else it could be because 'nonworking women's welfare depend *[sic]* more on the income of men than is the case for working women's, they have a stronger incentive to support policies that raise the take-home pay of males.' (Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006 p. 13).

Inglehart and Norris, have suggested that socioeconomic development and the related changes in family relations, as, for example, more women join the labour market, have led to changes in political attitudes and a transformation of gendered political preferences (Giger, 2009 p. 480; Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Inglehart and Norris, 2003). They suggest that while women before the 1980s tended to support (more than men) right-wing parties, '[i]n most nations today, women hold more left-leaning values than men in their attitudes toward the appropriate role of the state versus the market, favoring active government intervention in social protection and public ownership' (Inglehart and Norris, 2003 p. 99). Their explanation for this change has been dubbed the 'developmental theory' of the gender gap where, as states develop economically and socially, gender differences in political beliefs also evolve (Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Manza and Brooks, 1998). Inglehart and Norris explain this in their assumption that in 'traditional societies' women are discouraged from jobs outside the home, while in modern societies gender roles have 'increasingly converged' (Inglehart and Norris, 2000 p. 446; Giger, 2009).

Iversen and Rosenbluth find that women in the workforce are more likely than housewives to vote for left-wing parties, meaning that the gender gap in voting is greater among women who are more independent of their husbands (Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006 pp. 12, 16). Other scholars suggest that housewives or female homemakers tend to be 'quite conservative' compared to the rest of the population (Inglehart and Norris, 2003 p. 94; Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006 pp. 12, 16). In Italy, where '15% of the Italian electorate' are female homemakers, Barisione finds them to have 'higher religiosity, higher television consumption, lower education levels and, hence, lower feminist consciousness' (Barisione, 2014 p. 118) and finds that 'when the single control of occupational status is introduced, gender loses all significance in predicting electoral support for Berlusconi's [centre-right] party' (Barisione, 2014 p. 126).

Some scholars suggest that it is not employment *per se* but the *type* of employment that is important in explaining gender differences (Inglehart and Norris, 2000). A factor that is often considered in western explanations of the gender gap is whether an individual works in the public sector (Howell and Day, 2000 p. 860; Andersen, 1999; Bergh, 2007; Campbell and Childs, 2015; Manza and Brooks, 1998). In many states, most employees in the public sector are women. 'Working women are often overrepresented in low-paid jobs and as public sector professionals and service providers in education, healthcare, and welfare services' (Inglehart and Norris, 2000 p. 446). Andersen found that 'those working in jobs close to government... had a marked tendency to vote for Clinton in 1992' amounting to a '15 percentage-point difference' (Andersen, 1999 p. 19). Public-sector employees could be seen to be voting for pro-spending parties because of 'rational self-interest', 'a greater knowledge of the need for government action in their area of work' or else because 'government employment leads to left-wing political views' (Bergh, 2007 p. 237).

The gender gap literature therefore clearly points to the role of employment as an explanation of the gender gap. This leads to the next hypotheses:

H1ci: Men have higher levels of employment than women.

H1cii: Men and women have different kinds of employment.

H1ciii: Differences in employment levels and types (partially) account for (reduce) the gender gap in political support.

iv) Education

Education is also an important consideration. Education level can impact socioeconomic status and potential for employment, but also education in itself seems to alter political attitudes. Inglehart and Norris suggest that 'education is consistently associated with more liberal attitudes on a wide range of issues, including feminist attitudes' (Inglehart and Norris, 2003 p. 90; Inglehart and Norris, 2000 p. 446). The literature also seems to suggest that different education levels not only change attitudes but that they change differentially for men and women.

At higher levels of education, the gender gap in the US seems to be greater. The role of education and increasing levels of female education in the US is given as one of the key

changes which has led to the 'modern gender gap' in political support (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Howell and Day found that among people with higher levels of education, the gender gap in attitudes towards social welfare was the highest. They suggest education has a greater impact on women than on men, presumably because it 'increases their awareness of the economic inequities, their feminist attitudes, and their autonomy from men.' (Howell and Day, 2000 p. 869). Box-Steffensmeier et al. support this claim suggesting that higher education levels allow women to 'discern interests that may be different from those of men' and that 'this behavior translates into an expression of preferences, partisan or otherwise, that may not be shared by men.' (Box-Steffensmeier, et al., 2004 p. 521).

Often there are gender differences in the type and level of education achieved. In Italy, for example, women have lower education levels than men and Barisione found that this impacts their political views as people with lower levels of education are more likely to vote for Berlusconi (Barisione, 2014 p. 121).

The literature strongly points to education as a factor which has potential to impact the gender gap. It seems that increased levels of education can increase chances of economic independence and political awareness, and women might have lower levels of education than men. Therefore, there could be different levels of education for men and women and these gender differences in education level might explain the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

H1di: Men have higher levels of education than women.

H1dii: The gender difference in education levels (partially) accounts for (reduces) the gender gap in political support.

v) Socialisation and Care

Other scholars have noted that men and women tend to have different views regarding the economy, not all of which can be explained by income, employment or education level. Women and men often have different views on government spending and taxation, sometimes leading to a gap in political preferences. Taken as a whole, the pattern tends to show women as more in favour of spending money on education, support for the unemployed and 'social welfare issues' than men and to care more than men about the economy as a whole rather than their own economic interests

(Norrander, 2008 p. 14; Alvarez and McCaffery, 2003; Chaney, et al., 1998; Cook and Wilcox, 1991; Conover, 1988; Howell and Day, 2000; Kaufmann, 2002; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986). In sum, ‘women feel more warmly than men toward the disadvantaged in society’ (Conover, 1988 p. 988). Norrander, for example, found in US NES surveys from 1982-2004 that 'Across the time series, on average, 34 percent of men and 45 percent of women favored more government services.' (Norrander, 2008 p. 15). Scholars tend to suggest two explanations for this; a gender division in responsibility for care, and gender socialisation.

Women are more likely to take on unpaid caring roles than men, whether for children, the elderly, the sick or the disabled (Inglehart and Norris, 2000 p. 446; Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006 p. 1; Beauvoir, [1949] 2010). This might be an explanation for men and women having different political views (Howell and Day, 2000 p. 860; Campbell and Childs, 2015; Manza and Brooks, 1998; Studlar, et al., 1998; Ruddick, 1989). Andersen suggests that women have more interaction with and reliance upon the welfare, education and day-care provision offered by the state. She calls this 'the experience gap' (Andersen, 1999 pp. 17-19). Andersen finds that women and their families are more likely than men and their families to receive government payments and that those who receive these payments were more likely to have supported the democratic presidential candidate - Bill Clinton (Andersen, 1999 pp. 17-19).

Howell and Day found the gender gap to be non-existent among people without children but seems to increase with more children. They suggest ‘Given the child care responsibilities of women, those who have large numbers of children are more likely to see a need for or to actually rely on social welfare programs.’ (Howell and Day, 2000 p. 869).

In the UK, studies have shown that education and healthcare are priority issues for women while the economy is the most important issue for men (Campbell and Childs, 2008 p. 12). These studies show that women are more likely to support political parties that provide or aim to provide better welfare provision and services because women tend to rely on or see the need for these services more than men because women tend to do more ‘caring’ than men.

Scholars have often found that it is not solely because women tend to be poorer than men and are more likely to be dependent on government welfare provisions, that they

tend to support, more than men, greater government spending on social welfare issues. There seems to be something else going on and scholars have suggested that this might be because women have a particular perspective or 'feminine compassion' drawn from their 'caring roles' or childhood socialisation (Box-Steffensmeier, et al., 1997; Conover, 1988; Chaney, et al., 1998). This is often given as an explanation for women supporting issues such as increasing social services and government support for the poor and needy even when they do not economically benefit from or receive welfare support themselves (Campbell and Childs, 2008 p. 9; Norrander and Wilcox, 2008 p. 504; Box-Steffensmeier, et al., 1997; Norris, 2003).

Scholars of the gender gap often refer to the work of Ruddick and Gilligan in their explanations of these differences in ‘feminine compassion’ (Box-Steffensmeier, et al., 1997; Campbell and Childs, 2008; Conover, 1988; Cook and Wilcox, 1991; Howell and Day, 2000; Manza and Brooks, 1998). Ruddick highlights the potential impact of 'mothering' on women's beliefs and politics and suggests that women's thinking is shaped by their practices, and so parenting produces a type of thinking - 'maternal thinking' which prioritises care (Ruddick, 1989). Ruddick suggests that this care extends, or has the potential to extend, beyond the direct family. She writes: 'Negotiating with nature on behalf of love, harassed by daily demands, yet glimpsing larger questions, mothers acquire a fundamental attitude toward the vulnerable, a characterological protectiveness' (Ruddick, 1989 p. 78). This view has been critiqued by Andersen who suggests that the 'maternalist' explanation 'unacceptably essentializes gender differences.' (Andersen, 1999 p. 17).

Gilligan has suggested that women feel more responsible than men for the needs of others due to their childhood socialisation (Gilligan, 1982). Socialisation explanations suggest that ‘it is differing early life experiences of men and women, especially their learning of ‘appropriate gender roles,’ that may explain the dissimilar voting patterns between men and women’ (Studlar, et al., 1998 pp. 782-783). The wider implications of gender socialisation will be explored further in Chapters 5 and 6. Determining the extent to which socialisation or ‘feminine compassion’ explains the gender gap is difficult, instead it is often seen to account for gender differences which remain after socioeconomic status has been taken into account (Manza and Brooks, 1998).

The above two accounts suggest that there might be a connection between motherhood or caring and political preference whether due to a change in attitudes or because of responsibilities. This suggests the following hypotheses:

H1ei: Women are more responsible for care than men.

H1eii: The gender gap in caring responsibility (partially) accounts for (reduces) the gender gap in political support.

Accounts of the gender gap in the West suggest that women's lower economic status gives them a rational interest in supporting parties which are more likely to provide for them (Campbell and Childs, 2008 p. 9; Box-Steffensmeier, et al., 1997; Manza and Brooks, 1998). Besides this, the literature also suggests that the fact that women do a greater share of the caring means that they are more likely to support parties which support the provision of welfare services, education and healthcare (Howell and Day, 2000 p. 869; Andersen, 1999; Manza and Brooks, 1998). This points to the further expected finding, that women are more likely than men to support the best party for welfare provision.

H1f: Women support a party or movement which supports or provides welfare and services more than men.

However, scholars suggest that socioeconomic status, while important, does not fully explain gender differences in political support, and that other factors must help to explain it as well. Howell and Day find that socioeconomic status does not tell the whole story, as 'gender often remains statistically significant even when controlling for such major socioeconomic variables as income, education, occupation, race, and age' (Howell and Day, 2000 p. 860). The literature is therefore inconclusive as to the extent to which gender differences in socioeconomic status explain gender gaps in political opinions and voting behaviour, but there does seem to be a convincing consensus that socioeconomic status at least partially explains the gender gap in political support.

In the following chapters, other possible explanations for the gender gap will be explored. The literature cited above is largely focused on academic studies of the gender gap in political support in the West. Below I will explore the Palestinian context to see the extent to which there are gender differences in socioeconomic status, and potential relations between men and women and the economy and how these connect

with the political parties in Palestine so as to potentially explain gender differences in political support.

C Gender Differences in Socioeconomic Status in Palestine

Figure 4.b A women's collective making savoury snacks to sell to local schools, 27th March 2016, Minna Cowper-Coles

Gender differences in socioeconomic status exist globally. They are created primarily through differential gender structuring of society and the 'traditional' division of labour where men are expected to earn money, and women are expected to do the caring. The literature on the gender gap in the West emphasises family structure as an important determinant of gender differences in political support.

In the Palestinian Territories, the literature suggests that more traditional family structures are likely to be prevalent. Scholarship points both to Middle Eastern society as being dominated by traditional family structures, and also see instability and poor governance as increasing the importance of family in society. Some scholars directly link family structures to the wider political context. For example, Norris and Inglehart argue that in societies with 'high levels of insecurity', traditional authority, family structures and social status are of increased importance (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). They describe how in these contexts, 'the traditional two-parent family, with its

division of sex roles between male breadwinner and female caregivers, is crucial for the survival of children' (Inglehart and Norris, 2003 p. 16). Kamrava also suggests the family remains such an important social structure in the Middle East in part because states have proven to be both authoritarian and unable to deliver on their promises. As a result, Kamrava suggests: 'people have clung to the social ties that were always trusted and relied on in times of hardship', their families (Kamrava, 1998 p. 45). Whatever the reason for it, in the Middle East, as elsewhere, family is an important, even *the* most important social structure (Kamrava, 1998 p. 49).

The family in the Middle East is designated by Kandiyoti as a 'classic patriarchy' (Kandiyoti, 1988). In the classic patriarchy, power tends to be vested in men, particularly in the father. Barakat describes the family as 'traditionally' being dominated by the father, who 'owned family property and provided the family's livelihood' and as such held authority over other members (Barakat, 1985, 1994 p. 32). Kamrava describes the authority of the father as 'virtually absolute' (Kamrava, 1998 p. 50). In this structure, women are responsible for reproduction, childcare and domestic labour and are in return provided with economic and physical security by their menfolk, whether husbands, brothers, fathers or sons (Kandiyoti, 1988).

The family structure in the Middle East is often considered to be held together by economic ties but also through mechanisms of 'honour' (Kamrava, 1998 p. 43). This can be thought of in terms of behaviour and sexual propriety, but also in terms of economic obligations, where male responsibility for taking care of their family is closely concerned with questions of honour and is fundamental to the patriarchal 'bargain' (Kandiyoti, 1988). According to Baxter, male financial provision to their family, and appearance of generosity plays an important part in raising the prestige of the family (Baxter, 2007 p. 747).

Views which portray the family in the Middle East as a monolithic, 'traditional' institution have increasingly been challenged in the academic literature as reductive and harmfully creating and perpetuating stereotypes (Doumani, 2003). Further, Barakat and Moghadam suggest that the patriarchal family is changing. With increased female employment, education and the necessity of migration for many in the Middle East to make a good salary, there is the start of a 'democratization of husband-wife and father-children relationships' where more often, 'fathers are tending to relinquish

their grip over family life and to share authority and responsibility with other family members' (Barakat, 1985, 1994 p. 32; Moghadam, 2004). Further, many family forms in the Middle East are now more similar to the 'bourgeois nuclear family' rather than the extended families usually considered pervasive in the Middle East (Moghadam, 2004 p. 157). Nonetheless Moghadam concludes 'the patriarchal gender contract remains in place, but economic changes and women's collective action may undermine it in the years to come' (Moghadam, 2004 p. 157). Importantly, however, it is important to be aware that family is a 'slippery concept' and as such should be placed in historical context as much as possible (Doumani, 2003 p. 2).

The persistence of patriarchal structures has economic and gender implications. If the family is, as Barakat describes it, 'an economic and social unit' where 'all members cooperate to secure its livelihood and improve its standing in the community' (Barakat, 1985, 1994 p. 28; Kamrava, 1998), then women might be bound to the family and so may hold political views which support or encourage the increase in family income and status even if it constrains their individual progress. Gender differences in income or education level might make no difference to political support. This argument is similar to that set out above in relation to marriage ***(H1a)***. On the other hand, this structure might mean that men and women face different socioeconomic pressures and therefore seek different types of resources from political parties.

In the OPT, patriarchal families are the norm (Aweidah and Espanioli, 2007 p. 29). This family structure has implications for both men and women which interact with the political and economic context of the Palestinian Territories. In patriarchal families, as described above, men are given the responsibility of providing for their family. If a young man wants to marry they are expected to pay for the wedding, which may amount to around $50,000 (Baxter, 2007 p. 755). They are also expected to 'earn' social status, Gren suggests in her study of Dheisheh Camp, by 'displaying generosity' (Gren, 2015 p. 155). Therefore, men in Palestine are under intense social pressure to earn money but live in an area with cripplingly high unemployment and low wages. Several scholars emphasise the strains that the occupation places on families, particularly in terms of the difficulty of finding work, which, some suggest, amount to a 'crisis of masculinity' (Johnson and Kuttab, 2001 pp. 33-34; Roy, 2004 p. 384; Aweidah and Omar, 2013; Baxter, 2007 p. 749). Roy and Johnson and Kuttab connect this crisis

to the inability of fathers to provide for their families, the difficulty for men of accumulating enough money to marry through to rising levels of violence in schools and domestic violence (Johnson and Kuttab, 2001 pp. 33-34; Roy, 2004 p. 384). Aweidah and Espanioli, in their study, suggest that the lack of employment leads to men becoming 'nervous, violent, frustrated, desperate and depressed' (Aweidah and Espanioli, 2007 p. 29).

The pressure on men to earn money came through in my interviews. I was told that men are not just expected to "financially support the family" (M19), but they should also "build a house" (F17) and when they get married they are expected to "pay for all the costs of the wedding which are huge" (M19). Many of the young men I spoke to felt that they would never be able to afford to get married or maybe in "a hundred years" (M33; M29; M40).

This pressure is exacerbated by the failings of the Palestinian economy. With low salaries some people are obliged to work multiple jobs. One young mother's husband "is currently working two jobs – in a centre in the day and in a store in the evenings where he sells products" (F29). Others work, illegally or legally, in Israel. Despite being a graduate, M32 earned double the salary working in construction in Israel (5,000 NIS [≈$1,400]/month) than he did as a merchandiser for a food company in the West Bank. The patriarchal expectations for men to provide financially for their families would reinforce the expectation generated from the gender gap literature above. Namely, that men are more likely to be employed ***(H1ci)***, work in different fields ***(H1cii***) and earn more than women ***(H1bi)***. It also adds weight to the prospect of these differences contributing to the gender gap in political support ***(H1bii, H1ciii)***. It also suggests that men are more likely than women to support a political party that will increase their chances of being able to earn a living and provide for their family.

> ***H1g: Men are more likely than women to support a party or movement which is better able to provide employment opportunities.***

The other gendered impact of the patriarchal family structure is that women tend to hold a very different socioeconomic status from men, as well as very different responsibilities. For the most part, women play the main caring role for children, the sick and the elderly - as they do in the West ***(H1ei)***. In this role, it might be expected that women are likely to benefit or come into contact with charities, and the welfare

services more than men and support the organisations or parties which provide them ***(H1f).***

Scholars of the wider region point to significant differences between men and women in terms of literacy and poverty (Jamal, 2010 p. 29; Blaydes and El Tarouty, 2009 p. 370). This is also the case in Palestine, where women and men tend to interact differently with the economy. Firstly, women are commonly excluded from the world of employment which contributes to their increased exposure to poverty. Women's participation in the labour market has not exceeded 18 percent (17.3), while men's participation is four times as high at 69.3 percent (Hamdan and Bargothi, 2014 p. 56; Miftah, 2013 p. 17). This is partly due to 'discrimination' in favour of men in the labour market and social pressures for child-rearing.

> *'Culture may also constitute an obstacle that impedes women participation the labor market* [sic] *especially that paid labor is not attractive to most women, because of low wages compared to the social and financial costs of working, including transportation costs, day-care and kindergarten fees and absence from family and children. However, it is noted that the role of this social and cultural factor has receded under economic pressure.' (Miftah, 2013 pp. 17-18)*

Unlike the West, men outnumber women in the public sector in Palestine (41.2 percent female: 58.8 percent male) while drastically outnumbering women at the higher levels (10.9 percent female: 89.1 percent male at General Director level or above) (Hamdan and Bargothi, 2014 p. 65). However, like the West, women do tend to do different types of work, such as working more often in the informal sector or doing agricultural work which lacks legal protection, or in low-paying, low-status jobs (Miftah, 2013 pp. 17-18). Sayigh's 1981 work documents women's involvement in women's unions, crèches and craft work (Sayigh, 1981 p. 8). Many women are, or have been, involved in income-generating projects which 'are geared to women working at home' and so do not significantly disrupt women's other domestic duties (Sayigh, 1981 p. 18). These projects increased somewhat in the First Intifada when women founded cooperatives and small-scale manufacturing projects to avoid economic dependence on Israel. However, the impact of the Intifada was far from revolutionary for women and their role in the economy (Pappé, 2006 p. 239). Women remain, for the most part, excluded from the formal workforce. F13x told me, the difference is not just that "in

the labour force, women are less than men" but that many women are "working informally in service sectors and they don't enjoy any of the benefits of those who work in the formal sector, those who are registered formally." (F13x). This reinforces the expectation that men are more likely to earn more and to be in employment more than women, and to have different types of employment ***(H1bi, H1ci and Hcii)***.

Women are also likely to have less capital than men. This is because they usually are not entitled to their 'dowry', and they rarely claim their inheritance (although this has been changing in recent decades) (F12x). Kandiyoti explains: 'In Muslim communities, for a woman to press for her inheritance rights would be tantamount to losing her brothers' favor, her only recourse in case of severe ill-treatment by her husband or divorce.' (Kandiyoti, 1988 p. 279) Therefore, women tend to be poorer on an individual level than men, and where they do not form part of a traditional family group, or are isolated or excluded for some reason, they are also more likely to be exposed to poverty than men. A survey of recipients of Ministry of Social Affairs services shows that poorer, less educated and single women are the most vulnerable (Miftah, 2013 p. 8). This gives additional weight to the suggestion that women might, for reasons of economic self-interest, be more likely to support parties or organisations that support or provide welfare and services to the poor and vulnerable in society ***(H1f)***. Women are particularly vulnerable when they find themselves outside of the traditional protection of the family (Miftah, 2013). Single women are 'seen to be of less worth in the eyes of the community' and are often 'constrained in her daily activities and her social interactions and relationships' (Al-Adili, et al., 2008 p. 113). Other women lose the 'men' who are meant to provide for them, whether to prison or death or disability. In these cases, women suffer considerable difficulties. Female headed households account for almost 10 percent of all Palestinian households and are poorer than male households (Al-Adili, et al., 2008 p. 113; Hamdan and Bargothi, 2014 p. 20; Miftah, 2013 p. 17). Miftah explain the causes of female headed households and the increased likelihood of female poverty include not getting married, the death of a husband (because of women's greater life expectancy and frequent marriage of older men to younger women) and polygamy where 'the first wife and her children are often deprived of the father's resources' (Miftah, 2013 p. 19). Child marriage and widowhood are often two sides of the same coin, meaning there are much higher

numbers of female than male widow(er)s and high levels of female child marriage (Hamdan and Bargothi, 2014 pp. 22, 50). This suggests that marriage may be an important determinant of political support, because unmarried women might occupy a significantly lower socioeconomic position compared to men and, accordingly, seek greater support from political parties. This and the context of the patriarchal family structure gives extra weight to the suggestion that unmarried women are likely to hold more divergent political opinions to men ***(H1a)*** and suggests that women in general are more vulnerable and therefore might be more likely to support parties that are better at providing welfare and services than married women ***(H1f)***.

There are also disparities between men and women when it comes to education. Overall, literacy is higher among men (98.4 percent) than among women (94.1 percent) (Hamdan and Bargothi, 2014 p. 24), but it is likely that this disparity is due to differences among older generations where men received more education than women. There seem to be greater numbers of old women who are illiterate (F12x). Among younger generations, the picture is less clear cut. Many women attend university in Palestine these days, often more than men (Hamdan and Bargothi, 2014 p. 30), however they are less likely to be supported by the family to travel overseas for their education, unlike men, which might account for the greater number of female students in Palestine (F12x).

The literature and my interviews indicate that there are clear gender differences in socioeconomic status in the Palestinian Territories. Many of these gender differences fit the explanations often given for the gender gap in political support in the West. In the Occupied Palestinian Territories, women are likely to have lower individual incomes ***(H1bi)***, lower levels and different forms of employment ***(H1ci and H1cii)***, lower levels of education ***(H1di)*** and women are more likely than men to be responsible for care ***(H1ei)***. There do seem to be differences in terms of the importance of the role of family, although it is likely that the implications for the gender gap will be directionally similar with women primarily responsible for care and men primarily responsible for financially supporting the family.

D Palestinian Political Organisations and the Economy

The differences in socioeconomic status will only be able to explain the gender gap in political support if there are clear distinctions between Fatah and Hamas on issues relating to the economy. Below I explain the differences between the political parties in terms of how they interact with the economic system.

i) Employment, Clientelism and Corruption

Fatah, the major political party in the Palestinian Territories, has become almost synonymous with the Palestinian Authority. When the PA was established it incorporated 'patterns of patronage' that 'largely obscured the distinctions between Arafat's personal political machine, the Fatah party, and the institutions of the proto-state' (Brown and Hamzawy, 2010 p. 166). Two interviewees explicitly told me that "the [Palestinian] Authority is basically Fatah" (M35x) and so "when you say Fatah it is Palestinian Authority" (M18).

There are, of course, benefits to this in terms of gaining support. The PA benefits from being the recipients of domestic taxes (via Israel), international aid funding and from controlling the institutions of government, giving them power and money in these areas that has 'far outstripped' Hamas (Gunning, 2007 p. 43).

Fatah's position as the dominant power in the PA has allowed them to forge alliances with the traditional elite and the middle class through 'financial and employment incentives' (Gunning, 2007 p. 43). They employed 22 percent of the Palestinian workforce in the public sector in 2015 or 89,947 public sector workers (Hamdan, and Bargothi, 2014 p. 65; Jamal, 2007; Palestinian Trade Center), including tens of thousands of members of the security forces (Gunning, 2007 p. 44; Johnson and Kuttab, 2001 p. 23; Pearlman, 2011 p. 132). Employment in the public sector is sought after because it is seen as a better (or more reliable) source of income than the private sector (in that families dependent on a private sector income are poorer than those dependent on a public sector income) (F25x; Miftah, 2013 p. 17). With the PA dominated by Fatah, the connection between supporting the party and gaining employment is quite clear.

The theme of Fatah being able to provide employment and opportunities came up again and again in interviews. A Fatah activist told me: “We used to help our members to secure jobs after they graduate from the university.” (M41) As some interviewees said “maybe you have people who are affiliated to [Fatah] because it is giving access to the *sulta* [PA] and employment and other things” (M12x) or “if you are Fatah they give you support to get the job, and to go to up” (M34).

There was a particularly strong link between employment within the security apparatus and Fatah membership. F1 said: “Fatah is the government and most of the people who have jobs have jobs in the government. All the ministries, all the police.” (F1). The two individuals that I interviewed in the security services were both pro-Fatah. M18 said “inside of the authority, of the Palestinian Authority, police, intelligence... soldier all are Fatah.” (M18) and M24 explained:

> *“The security apparatus is part of the PA and Fatah is the biggest part of the PA, so it is normal that Fatah is the security forces... Legally [recruits] cannot belong to a party and be in the security apparatus, but previously, because of the conflict between Fatah and Hamas, a blind eye was turned to political recruitment.” (M24)*

While being associated with Fatah “opens doors”, Hamas supporters in the West Bank “will find obstacles and problems, with his situation, his future” (M26). M34 said: “Nowadays if you support Hamas and I say that, maybe I go to take a job and they are know this, maybe they refuse me.” (M34). People who are known to support Hamas may also find it difficult to look for work outside of the Palestinian Territories because “he will have problems if he wants to travel outside of Palestine” (M26), because people associated with Hamas are often blacklisted for travel and prevented from crossing borders by Israel.

Hamas have now had a decade of experience ruling the Gaza Strip. Their rule over the territory is more complex than Fatah’s role in the West Bank. There is no doubt that Hamas does extend, to some extent, the same kinds of employment and support to their supporters. However, their resources are less reliable than those of Fatah and the PA in the West Bank. Sayigh writes that the Hamas government is reliant on ‘over $1.4 billion annually paid by the rival, donor-supported government of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in the West Bank for public sector salaries, welfare payments, and public

utility subsidies' but they also get money from private and religiously affiliated donations from abroad (and often the Gulf states), and they had – while they were operating - gained some income from taxing goods coming through the illegal tunnels from Egypt (Sayigh, 2011 p. 3; Hollis, 2010). Even accounting for these sources of income the Hamas government is 'subject to periodic shortages of liquidity due to Israel's refusal to ensure a regular supply of money to local banks, as part of its general restrictions on Gaza' (Sayigh, 2011 p. 3). Hamas's dependence on external sources of income has sometimes reflected badly on them. In particular, they have drawn criticism from Salafist groups among others who take offence at their gaining support from 'Shia' Iran (M4; M13x; F17; Sayigh, 2011).

One particularly odd phenomenon in the Gaza Strip is the duplication of government employees. The PA – and so Fatah – paid the wages of government employees up until the 2007 Hamas 'coup' of Gaza. At this point, President Mahmoud Abbas told most government employees to go home so as not to work for the Hamas government, reassuring them that they would continue to receive their wages (Sayigh, 2011 p. 7). Hamas immediately recruited a full, second staff to administer the Gaza Strip. The end result of this is that there are '19,500–27,900 civil servants and 34,500 PASF [Palestinian Authority Security Forces] personnel' who are abstaining from work but continuing to receive a salary from the PA (Sayigh, 2011 p. 8). Those on the Hamas payroll have often had to go without their salaries. M38x told me: "Hamas employees have not been paid for the past two years... some 40,000 employees were recruited and working with Hamas, they are not paid their salaries on time, they were paid a thousand shekels [≈$285] every two months which is very, very little." (M38x) F39 explained:

> *"For Hamas employees they work, they go to work at 8 am to 3pm and they don't have salaries because Hamas suffer actually from financial crisis. They pay them actually sometimes they pay them 200 dollars, 300 dollars which is nothing actually. It is not their real salaries because they don't have money, especially after the crisis in Syria and Lebanon and they actually lose the support of Hezbollah and the Syria government and so, now they don't have any financial resources, and because of [Egyptian President] Sisi actually he destroyed the tunnels and actually the tunnels was one of the main resources for Hamas" (F39)*

Despite the problems of employment by the Hamas government, in the context of the high unemployment of the Gaza Strip, it would seem that providing some kind of employment does gain them political support. M39x suggests that Hamas does have a similar relationship with its employees as Fatah: “The people that support Hamas are the people who work in the government of Hamas, or if one of their relatives or their son or father works in the government." (M39x)

The smaller political parties may provide employment but as they do not have access to resources on anywhere near the same scale of Fatah and Hamas, they do not provide it to the same extent.

The use of employment to gain support should be seen within the context of patronage (Miguel, et al., 2015 p. 2) and ‘clientelism’ (Jamal, 2007 p. 14). It works through what in many of my interviews, is described as "wasta" or connections (F1; M3; M5; F4; F7; M31; M35x; F37; F39). Jamal describes clientelism as follows:

> *‘clientelism provides clients with paths to exclusive services and influence in return for their support of their patron. It subverts the democratic process: the client who receives money to vote in a certain way; the individual who is granted political access because he supports the party in power; the woman who pays lip service to the state in return for benefits-the list is endless.’ (Jamal, 2007 p. 14)*

This phenomenon plays an important role in explaining how socioeconomic status relates to political support in the Palestinian Territories. Firstly, it must be noted that clientelism ‘is not foreign to democratic countries’ (Jamal, 2007 p. 15), and I certainly do not consider this phenomenon to be in anyway exclusive to Palestine or the Middle East.

The formation of clientelist networks in Palestine dates back decades. Arafat ‘distributed funds freely to individuals in all spheres and areas and encouraged the emergence of a large and uncoordinated network of beneficiaries who reported directly to him’ (Sayigh, 1997 p. 689). Arafat's ‘unstructured and constantly shifting coterie’ were given ‘substantial cash sums... ostensibly to pay recruits and purchase weapons, but in reality to secure the loyalty of the Fateh constituency’ (Sayigh, 1997 p. 635).

Since the Oslo Agreement, it seems that clientelism has been an increasing problem in the Palestinian Territories. After Oslo, Arafat and 'several thousand PLO cadres and their families' (Jamal, 2001 p. 274) returned to the Palestinian Territories where they 'reforged political ties based on family and place of origin' (Sayigh, 1997 p. 661), and made up the PA. In the ensuing years, the PA expanded, further strengthening clientelistic structures. Indeed, Jamal writes: 'Since the emergence of the Palestinian National Authority in 1993, clientelism and patronage have defined state-society relations in the West Bank.' (Jamal, 2007 p. 21) The government payroll expanded to 'some 75,000 by 1997' (Sayigh, 1997 p. 661). This 'opened the door for political leaders to create their own circles of political supporters' leading to 'patronage and clientelism' (Jamal, 2001 p. 274). Clientelism meant that for ordinary Palestinians: 'It was far easier, for example, to obtain the necessary paperwork to build a house by seeking the help of a clientelistic tie (or wasta) that it was to go directly to the government' (Jamal, 2007 p. 41)

Clientelism is effective in buying political support through directly and indirectly offering benefits to supporters. M30, a middle-aged man from Qalqilya, explained the situation to me:

> *"In order to make their life and issues easy to handle, [people] support the party in control. Work and opportunities are better if you support the party in charge. For example, to get health insurance you need to support the authority – you need wasta or loyalty to a certain party, you cannot oppose it. For example, for joining the [social/work group not disclosed to ensure anonymity] institute I needed a paper of good behaviour which is basically to show that you are not against the Authority." (M31, 2016)*

For many Palestinians, especially those not benefitting from clientelistic relationships, their existence is a serious cause of concern. They have led to serious mismanagement, squandered resources and corruption. On an individual level, qualified people might be overlooked for employment, benefits or promotion; while those with the right connections get ahead. At a territories-wide level, the implications of clientelism are even more serious. Sayigh describes how Arafat's 'reliance on planned corruption prevented rational planning, minimized learning and accumulation of experience, and impeded coordination of resources' (Sayigh, 1997 p. 691). Klein describes how Arafat established a 'chaotic system' through a lack of coordination within the PA, duplicate

authorities, a lack of systematic planning and the ‘personification of the political and ruling systems... centered on a chain of patron-client’ relations (Klein, 2003 p. 200). This has led to a non-meritocratic, inefficient and largely corrupt bureaucratic structure.

There are several personal instances of conspicuous spending, and allegations of corruption which have continued to surround Fatah (Sayigh, 1997 p. 635). Arafat himself was accused of spending public funds on his wife's expensive lifestyle in Paris and on buying the support of politicians (Abrams, 2012 pp. 1-2). Abbas, despite his pledges to tackle corruption, has failed in his task. The PA's anti-corruption court has a very poor record of convicting corrupt politicians (Abrams, 2012 p. 3). What Abrams calls the 'apogee of corrupt practices' was the reselling of almost 20,000 tons of Palestinian cement, intended for rebuilding Palestinian homes in the Gaza Strip, to the Israelis for the building of the 'apartheid' wall (Abrams, 2012 p. 2). This incident demonstrates how explicitly corruption in the upper levels of the PA can work in conjunction with the Israeli occupying forces.

This corruption has not gone unnoticed by the Palestinian population. Indeed Fatah's ‘record of corruption’ certainly was a contributing factor to its electoral defeat in 2006 (Gunning, 2007 p. 153; Jamal, 2013 pp. 283-284). Abrams cites that 82 percent of Palestinians believed there was corruption in the PA in 2012 (Abrams, 2012 p. 1).

On a personal level, many of those I spoke to who were struggling to find jobs resented the privileges granted to those with ‘wasta’. You need connections to get a job, or at least it gives you a better chance (F1; M2; M1; M5; M6; F19; F22).

Clientelism also impacts political support because of the way in which it reinforces family structures. This has contributed to the conception of political loyalties as being almost hereditary. Fatah's patronage networks build upon already existent clan and family networks. Fatah has a long history of working with large middle-class families and the traditional elite in the Palestinian Territories (Sayigh, 1997 p. 608). These developments have meant that ‘clan- or family-based loyalties... elders, mukhtars, and other persons of traditional social standing’ maintain much of their prominence (Sayigh, 1997 p. 680).

With the establishment of the Palestinian Authority 'The family was re-empowered as a political network for individuals who seek to enter the public service.' (Jamal, 2001 p. 274) Those with power have tended to act 'not just as a patron to his clients but also on behalf of a clan or a hometown' (Klein, 2003 p. 200). Clan membership certainly impacts political support (see Ghanem, 1996). Gunning credits clan structures with having a significant impact on support for Fatah. Gunning shows how family pressure ties together with the geographical factors described in Chapter 3. He writes:

> *'Fatah enjoyed better access than Hamas to the traditional elites who were more likely to be still in control of the local religious and charitable networks in the villages than in the towns. This differential access to the traditionally powerful clans may also help to explain why Fatah did considerably better in the villages-and less well in the towns... During elections, clan members face considerable pressure to vote according to the wishes of their clan elders who make tactical alliances with a particular political faction. In the villages, Fatah's alliance with some of the more powerful clan elders is strong. At the same time, clan elders are more likely to be powerful in the villages than in urban centres where people are subject to a far greater variety of political influences and networks.' (Gunning, 2007 p. 149)*

The importance of family on political support was highlighted in my interviews. Several interviewees described how party allegiance, like religion, is something that is passed from parents to their children or described how their own family's preferences were important to them (M17x; M12x; F1; F19; M26; F5; M23; M5; M41; M21). The idea of party support as an identity generated from your social upbringing and as something which shapes an individual's political views rather than forming as a result of rational political calculations, is also important in the US literature on voting. The 'Michigan model' of voting emphasises the importance of 'party identity' in this way (Campbell, et al., 1960). M24 told me:

> *"Just as children of Christian parents are brought up Christian and children of Muslim parents are brought up Muslim so are political parties passed from parents to children. Religion is an ideology just like the parties." (M24)*

A few interviewees explained to me how their families had influenced them, such as M22, a Hamas activist, who had been brought up to support Hamas. F39 had altered her vote to fit with her father's wishes (F39).

The extent to which party identity is important to the family can be seen by two Gazans' comments about marriage. F36 told me: "When a guy goes and asks for a girl's hand, the family go to the mosque and ask, 'Which political party is this guy affiliated to?', as the mosques know about every mosque that they are affiliated to." (F36). F39 said: "In 2009, for example, I went to see a girl for my brother – her family asked which party he was in as they just gave their girls to marry Hamas supporters." (F39). M35x stated that the major form of political recruitment is "familia":

> *"When you look at families, even, even nuclear families, you will find that all of the members, they belong to a faction, because the father is that way... it is family, connections... you start thinking of political factions as clans... So, I belong to Fatah. It is my clan... This political clan gives me benefits and protects me, and after I finish and graduate, maybe the wasta will find me a job through the connections within the clan, within the political clan." (M35x)*

As such, the clientelism reinforces the patriarchal family structure by distributing employment and opportunities through traditional, hierarchical patterns.

Finally, when considering the connection between political parties and employment, it is worth also considering the wider impact of Fatah and Hamas's policies on the economy in general, and, as such, the impact of their rule on employment in the private sector.

Fatah's policy of seeking a resolution to the conflict through negotiations has the support of the international community and has gained it a great deal of financial support and generated investment into the region. Furthermore, Fatah is seen as bringing stability and relative economic security to the West Bank and smoothing relations with Israel and as such facilitating Palestinian labour in Israel. For some, Fatah's rule has brought a kind of "economic security for social stability" (M11x). M11x put it that voting for Fatah is like "holding the hands for the future" (M11x). Recent technocratic governments, with the endorsement of (Fatah) President Abbas, have brought about a more 'liberal' economic system, encouraging the banks to give loans and creating a boom in housing in areas like Ramallah (M35x). When paired with Fatah's support for the peace process, these policies position Fatah as the party for business and stability.

Connected to Fatah's investment and stability policies – and particularly the policies of the Salam Fayyad government - there is an interesting relationship developing between debt and support for Fatah. Personal debt in Palestine has been increasing rapidly, with Palestinian consumer debt at $1.391 billion (up almost 6-fold since 2008) (Harker, 2014). The number of people taking loans are often using them to build a house, buy a car or to pay for a wedding (M35x). Harker does not directly link indebtedness to support for Fatah but suggests 'debt fuelled consumption is actively promoted by a range of institutions as a kind of economic peace initiative, a form of pacification that replaces political struggles for national liberation with the promise of a good life defined by capitalism' (Harker, 2014). Debt, of course, gives a long-term interest in 'stability' (M13x). M13x observed that people who have taken loans:

> *"They are afraid... they want stability, and they want to receive their salaries, because their salaries are important to pay the debt. If there is chaos, people will lose jobs. And they will lose maybe their own properties. Because this apartment for example is in the name of the bank... you will not own it until you pay the money. So, if there is instability you will lose your home." (M13x)*

Hence, the economic strain would, for many people, encourage them to support Fatah, the party which promises peace and stability (M14x).

Hamas's economic reputation is markedly different. It has largely been boycotted by the international community and blockaded by Israel. Under Hamas, 'Gaza's borders remained closed' meaning life in Gaza was 'like a prison' (Caridi, 2012 pp. 277, 308). Some of those I spoke to in Gaza saw Hamas as responsible for the deteriorating economy. F38 accused Hamas of stockpiling products, and blamed Hamas for the bad economic situation (F38). The benefit of Fatah rule is beginning to appeal more to certain people in Gaza who believe that if Fatah were in control, the economic situation would improve as the siege would be lifted. M39x told me:

> *"In the beginning people believed that Hamas would get them out of the poverty and the hard conditions socially, economically, politically that they were living... now after ten years it is very evident that [Hamas] have done nothing concerning poverty, unemployment and the situation... A lot of people realised that after ten years of Hamas being in control they haven't been able to accomplish much so that is why they are looking for an alternative... " (M39x)*

F39 told me:

> *"I voted for Hamas actually in 2006, but after they controlled us actually and I live under their control, I felt that 'no, most of the political parties are the same', they only care about their interests. They have corruption, and Hamas have corruption as Fatah also, but at least Fatah at the days of Fatah our life was actually better because you know Fatah they have the support of the international community. That is why at that time we have life, we have borders, open borders, we have job opportunities, but because Hamas actually most of the people and especially the donors they boycott Hamas government that is why we don't have actually any resources in Palestine" (F39)*

Subsequently, for a person with connections, or desiring a job and improved economic conditions Fatah would seem a better political choice than Hamas. A strong political association with Fatah might help improve job prospects, and at least their policy of negotiations has mostly encouraged support, aid and investment from the international community and ensured relative stability. Hamas on the other hand do not have such a high level of resources so cannot offer the same kind of employment and their time in control of the Gaza Strip has seen it blockaded and bombarded by Israel and the economy and infrastructure have greatly suffered as a result. This stark difference has been connected, in my interviews, with gendered support for the two organisations.

The way that Fatah is seen to support peace and economic development, and which has proven to be a major provider of employment, is likely to mean that it appeals particularly to men who are under pressure to provide for their families. F24 observed the benefits of proximity to Fatah and saw these as particularly gendered. She said:

> *"To acquire the appropriate work for example, Fatah gives this sustainable constant work... you can get privileges from working with Fatah... just following them opens doors for you, whether it is in your own family or in your workplace and so on. I think women don't need that. The pressure on men to sustain... their status and their family or whatever is more... than women." (F24)*

Feminist scholar, F12x expressed the same view:

> *"Men have more benefits and privileges and Fatah gives them that, you know, Fatah mobilises people through benefits and they co-opt them through the system, through all*

these privileges, you know. The women are not in the public sector, who reaches them is Hamas... Fatah has the PA. You see, so it is the power. I mean Fatah is the ruling party, so if you really want to reach somewhere you have to go through Fatah." (F12x)

As has been described above, the opposite is also true in the West Bank. Hamas supporters are less likely to be able to find work or be able to travel. These problems are much less likely to affect women, who are not only less likely to seek employment but also are less likely to travel than men (M26). It seems that men are more likely than women to feel pressure to gain employment, and the best way to do that is through the use of the clientelistic networks and employment opportunities open to supporters of Fatah. It is notable also that men are more likely to enter into debt to fund, for example weddings, and so are subjected to these additional pressures (Harker, 2014; Harker, 2017).

The international and Israeli reaction to Hamas has usually been to restrict funds to them, and when they took control of Gaza, Israel imposed a siege. Therefore, Hamas might be seen as incredibly disruptive of the economy. One Gazan directly linked this view to gender and political support: "Hamas was seen as the number one reason why there are no jobs in Gaza and men are usually the ones who are responsible [for providing for the family]" (F40)

The literature and interviews show that Fatah and the PA are seen as able, relatively reliably, to provide employment, and their policies are acknowledged to be better for a stable and growing economy, at least in comparison with Hamas. Those members of Palestinian society benefiting from Fatah employment and a stable economy, or seeking to benefit from them, might support Fatah ***(H1g).*** If men are more likely to support a party or movement that will increase their chances of being able to earn a living and provide for their family, then Fatah is this party. As shown in Chapter 1, men are more likely than women to support Fatah, and thus the null hypothesis should be rejected as ***H1g*** is in fact the case.

ii) Welfare Provision

Hamas and Fatah also often provide welfare and services. The extent of this provision is wide-ranging, and it varies considerably. M38x told me some of the things provided by parties include food, university fees, equipment such as wheelchairs, furniture,

clothes, gas in winter, kitchen accessories, assistance with the cost of marriage, cash and medical assistance (M38x).

The provision of welfare by political organisations dates back to well before the establishment of the PA. Sayigh in his historical account describes how, from the beginning, the mainstream PLO, effectively the Fatah leadership, 'viewed the population as a target audience to be co-opted through the provision of services and public goods' (Sayigh, 1997 p. 612). They arranged this through the allocation of, among other things, '$463 million in steadfastness funds by the end of 1986' (Sayigh, 1997 p. 612). These 'steadfastness funds' were meant to support and encourage the Palestinian population to remain on the land despite the difficulties of living under occupation. The 'steadfastness funds' were made up of a variety of welfare provisions and between 1979-86 included 'housing loans ($77 million), grants to educational institutions ($121 million), and various social benefits ($26 million).' (Sayigh, 1997 p. 611).

Since the foundation of the PA in the 1990s, Fatah's service provision infrastructure has largely become integrated into the infrastructure of the PA (Bröning, 2013 p. 2). As the party merged with the government, work that used to be done by the party began to be done through the government. Efforts that had been effective tools of party recruitment became (unsatisfactory) government services. Sabri Saidam told me:

> *"Fatah had made the big mistake upon establishing the Palestinian Authority... I feel that this inability to differentiate between what a political party does and what an Authority, what a state is supposed to be doing, meant that a lot of Fatah has been diluted in the Palestinian Authority... The grassroots work became something that should happen through the ministries and no longer through party lines, so we stopped providing healthcare we stopped providing educational support we stopped providing rations... we have lent and delegated part of our services to the Palestinian Authority, because it was something logical to do but then we could not differentiate what is the party and what is the state, it all became... merged... to the extent that... we woke up 2006 and what the vote was, a landslide and it was representing at the time the wish of the Palestinian people and could well be the very people we divorced because whatever rations they got, they got under the banner of the ministries and not Fatah." (M11x)*

Saidam's account describes the general trend of Fatah services being subsumed into the structure of the proto-state. The Palestinian Authority is now a 'primary funder of the social protection sector' through the Ministry of Social Affairs, however, 'this sector does not constitute a priority compared to other sectors, such as the security sector' and its services have suffered as a result (Miftah, 2013 p. 7). That being said, the numbers of those who benefit are not insubstantial. Miftah documents that, in 2011, 93,946 families received regular cash transfers and around '66,000 families receive[d] health insurance services and 45,000 families benefit[ed] from regular food aid.' (Miftah, 2013 p. 24)

However, Fatah has not fully given up its social work to the Ministry of Social Affairs. In my interviews I was given several examples of Fatah providing services for Palestinians such as: how Fatah provides food for *iftar* during Ramadan (M18; F40), and had provided charity to victims of war (F40), provided food and care for the poor (F3; M18; F16), provided inflatable boats, food and water when Gaza flooded (M40), drawn the portraits of local 'martyrs' on the walls of refugee camps (F16), organised marches, demonstrations, workshops and lectures on subjects such as women's rights and prisoner hunger strikes (F16; F21x; M25; M27; M32). In this way, Fatah reaches out to individuals at a local level, trying to connect them with the Palestinian cause and Fatah. However, in the provision of welfare services, their role has become diminished and subsumed within the PA.

Hamas has also played an important role in welfare provision, including in healthcare, kindergartens, schools, libraries, clubs, scholarships, and the distribution of basic goods and food (Esposito, 1984/1998 p. 230; Jamal, 2013 p. 293). The Muslim Brotherhood's focus, long before the establishment of Hamas, was the Islamisation of society, through mosques, education and the provision of welfare (Brown and Hamzawy, 2010 p. 163). The Muslim Brotherhood 'sought to encourage observance of Islam and widen its social base by establishing religious schools, Islamic libraries, childcare centres, vocational training centres for young men, and sports clubs, usually attached to local mosques' (Sayigh, 1997 p. 628). They built mosques and established Islamic colleges and other public institutions such as the Islamic University in Gaza and the Maqasid charitable hospital in Jerusalem which both helped Palestinians and

provided them with employment. Much of their work was funded with official and private donations from the Gulf states (Sayigh, 1997 p. 629).

> *'The focus of the Brotherhood's activity in the 1970s was the mosque. By 1979, there were 750 mosques in the occupied territories, twice as many as there had been in 1967. The mosques attracted the lower socio-economic strata of society: workers, the unemployed, refugees, teachers and students, peasants and city dwellers. They provided economic aid, social contact and religious preaching. The more the national leadership failed to ease the burden of the occupation, the more the mosque became the refuge for those suffering from it the most.' (Pappé, 2006 p. 261)*

These mosques formed a network which provided a sound basis of support for Hamas when it was established (Sayigh, 1997 p. 632). Gunning argues that this network was fundamental to their grass-roots appeal and their 2006 electoral success (Gunning, 2007 pp. 45-46, 149). Indeed, of the seventy-four Hamas legislators elected in 2006, many had been involved with their local mosques (Gunning, 2007 p. 162).

Hamas distributes welfare services mostly through the religious charity sector. This has been the subject of much speculation and academic (and not so academic) writing (Bröning, 2013 p. 2; Caridi, 2012; Roy, [2011] 2014; Jamal, 2013; Levitt, 2006). Hamas's welfare provision and its 'extensive infrastructure of charitable social services' are the expression of its 'social action theory' which specifies that the Palestinian struggle 'must be waged by a "fortified society"' and that this is achieved 'through religious education and a commitment to Islam' (Hroub, 2000 p. 234). Compared to Fatah, which has largely incorporated their services into the infrastructure of the PA, Hamas has a substantial history of welfare provision through civil society, built upon the charity, welfare and education networks and institutions of its predecessor, the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas's charities gained Hamas support 'by offering services that made people beholden to Hamas' (Gunning, 2007 p. 153).

Through their schools, mosques, orphanages, childcare centres and sports clubs Hamas has developed a close connection to the Palestinian people. They were described by interviewees as having "a kind of social services network" (M12x), which meant they were "closer to the people" (M13x). I was told that Hamas care about the poor people, children's and women's health and would give people food or clothes and help to access education or medical assistance (M4; F12x; F13x; F19). Several

interviewees explained how Hamas used the *zakat* system. F30x, a PLC Hamas member, described the *zakat* system, which is run by the *zakat* committees, often dominated by Hamas members: “everyone who is rich has to pay 2.5 percent of their income to who? To the poor, the unfortunate, the unfortunate employees, homeless, for the sake of God.” (F30x). In this way, Hamas members are in charge of distributing charity to the needy. This system however, is not officially run by Hamas, although it has often been dominated by people sympathetic to them (F30x).

The extent to which Hamas has continued in its role as 'welfare provider' has perhaps diminished somewhat after taking control of Gaza. In the Gaza strip, Hamas’s resources are on the one hand expanded because of being in power there, and on the other, curtailed by the restrictions imposed on them by the Israeli siege. Indeed, Sayigh suggests that the Hamas government ‘has been able to leave meeting a very large part of the humanitarian needs of its population to others’ such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees, which provides schooling, healthcare, food rations and employment to thousands of refugees, and other smaller charities and NGOs (Sayigh, 2011 p. 7).

M5, M7 and M30x told me that after the 2007 takeover “the services provided by Hamas stopped in the West Bank” (M7; M5; M30x). However, some interviewees said that although Hamas had largely been closed down in the West Bank, it’s charitable arm was still operating, albeit covertly. M18 explained how all the political parties give food boxes, “they give the meat, they open the table for families for Ramadan for families to eat.” He also said that Hamas do this, but “under the table, because it is not allowed for them to do this... For example, they go to the house, they know they are poor, they put the box [knock and run]... they say from... al-haraka al-islamiya [the Islamic movement], and the green [Hamas] flag.” (M18) When speaking to me in 2014 in a Nablus refugee camp, M6 suggested that Hamas was seen as doing more for the poor. He explained to me how they do it without being explicitly Hamas: “They are not saying that they are Hamas. But everyone knows that Abdullah is Hamas, and Abdullah is helping the people, and they know and believe that he is Hamas, but he is not saying that this is from Hamas, that they donate this.” (M6)

It should be mentioned that ‘leftist’ organisations have also played a role in providing services. They have tended to do so through voluntary and non-governmental

organisations (NGOs) (Bröning, 2013 p. 2). These organisations' goals tend to be social and economic development, and they work in 'the areas of literacy, women's skills, and early learning, among others.' (Sayigh, 1997 p. 612). What is clear is that the political parties behind these ventures have 'utilized these bodies primarily as a means to recruit new members... The Palestinian Left may not have employed patronage in the manner or scale of Fateh, but it, too, operated 'rent'.' (Sayigh, 1997 p. 613) These organisations sometimes have promoted radical agendas, in that they have 'sought consciously to alter conventional methods of political action, and... they strove to involve all sectors of the population in participatory forms of political organization.' (Sayigh, 1997 p. 612). However, these agendas have changed as they became more dependent on foreign funding from western aid programmes and NGOs. This has, according to Jamal, been problematic for their support long term as 'these groups became accountable to the donors who support them, rather than the communities they are supposed to serve' (Jamal, 2013 p. 287). These NGOs are, according to Allen, 'popularly regarded as self-serving, self-promoting, corrupt and corrupting "dakakin" (stores), serving mainly to line their directors' pockets' (Allen, 2002b p. 40). This has created a distance between them and the people and may have even contributed to the drop in support for the 'leftists' over recent decades (Jamal, 2013).

Welfare and the provision of services is also used by political parties to recruit university students. In Palestine, universities are highly politicised spaces and student elections are hotly contested. Student elections are widely commented upon and are seen as important indicators of the strength and support for different parties (e.g. Sayigh, 1997 p. 628). As such, parties put a great deal of effort into eliciting support from students. The importance of student elections has meant that the different political parties target university students in particular with their recruitment strategies, including the provision of certain services. M38x describes the role of universities for recruitment in Gaza:

> *"The university is the main kitchen, or the main platform to recruit... because university has a lot of possible members... [there] are five big universities and many colleges where Gaza youth go and get for an education, so it is a place for both to meet: political parties and the youth" (M38x)*

Most of the major political parties are active at universities even if they have little presence elsewhere in the Palestinian Territories. Interviewees spoke of seeing Fatah, Hamas, the PFLP, Al-Mubadara, FIDA among other groups at university (M1; F5; F8; F9; F11; F15; F16; F17; M19; F19; M20; F22; M23; F24; M25; M26; M27; M28; M29; F25x; F26; F27; F28; M32; F29; M33; F39; M41). University campuses at election times are an opportunity for different parties to demonstrate the extent of their following and their influence through demonstrations, parades and entertainment events. Hamas would parade with cardboard rocket launchers around the campuses while Fatah supporters carried banners showing Arafat wearing the black and white *kufiya* which symbolises Palestinian nationalism (see e.g. Figure 3.h and Figure 3.i) (F17; F28; F29; M41). I visited Birzeit university at election time and was astonished by the profusion of flags and posters decorating the grounds and managed to see Hamas supporters parade in military fatigues to the sound of drums.

I was told by many of those I interviewed that political organisations at university frequently offered students money or phone cards to entice them into voting for them or supporting them. Students, recent students and professors told me that Fatah gave out 300 shekels [≈$85] and a credit card (M1), a 50 shekel [≈$15] phone card (F9; F12x; F15) and free taxis to vote at student elections (F15, 2016). M33 said that in one day before elections at Birzeit university, he collected "300 shekels [≈$85] and 100 shekels [≈$30] of credit for my phone" from "FIDA and Fatah and Hamas and Mubadara" but that he did not vote for anyone (M33).

Outside of the election rush, parties offer students discounts and services throughout the year. Shabiba, Fatah's youth organisation, plays an important role in recruiting young people into the organisation. They are highly active in student politics. Several of those I interviewed said they had been members of Shabiba (F29; M32; M41). Many of the younger interviewees saw Fatah mainly through the prism of student politics. Fatah offered half price on stationary items and helped out with university fees (F19; M38x). M41 told me what he did when he was a Fatah activist at university:

> *"We always paid the fees for students... We used to help them pay the rents... Helping students sometimes if they have any difficulties. Like, let's say a student he has a problem with his lecturer or a problem, so we used to go bring these people together, try to make a to settle the problems and make them come friends or something." (M41)*

Hamas also give financial support to students, they "give books for free or with discounts" and also help students with "coupons for tuition so they can graduate" (F9; M23; M33). F17 agreed that they had "a lot of services to give for the students" (F17). I was told that they had bought an ambulance for Birzeit university (F19), they provided materials, support, events and trips to people with disabilities at Birzeit (F26; F27). F26 and F27 both supported Hamas in university elections because of the services that they provided (F26; F27). F17 told me why she voted for Hamas at a student election:

> *"As a first-year student I voted for Hamas... because I felt like they had the most organised agenda and they had like a lot of services to give for the students... They had a very organised academic exhibition with a lot of books and like this huge library. They gave some things for free. They did this really, really nice and organised parade which was... really interesting. And when I went to the table and talked to them about it, you know I had, they were really helpful about it... that's something I really appreciate in a party, someone who is really... committed to their job and they really want to make a change in the university, and it's been proven that [with] Hamas in Birzeit... students had better services." (F17)*

Some of Hamas's provisions have a distinctly Islamic character. F27 said: "Hamas would hold competitions for people who memorise the Qur'an and they would give courses for memorising the Qur'an. And they would do celebrations for [these] talents at university." (F27)

Those with a higher education in Palestine are likely to have been more exposed to political parties, their policies and welfare services than the rest of the population. However, it is unclear as to whether those with higher education are more likely to support one party over another, and current levels of higher education access are fairly equal for men and women. There is no clear pattern in the literature or from the interviews as to how education level would impact the gender gap in political support ***(H1dii).***

In terms of welfare services in general, however, there does seem to be a gendered aspect to their provision and political support. Hamas, as described above, is well known for its distribution of services (Jamal, 2013 p. 293), and these services often converge with women's greater responsibility for care. F36 told me about the situation in Gaza:

"The economic situation is very bad and that means there is no work and so the result is they get aid from institutions. And men find it very difficult to go to institutions for their family and ask for money. So that is the woman's role now. She goes to institutions, she goes to those institutions and asks for money and she votes for those institutions that provide her with money." (F36)

Some of those I spoke to thought that Hamas deliberately targeted women with their service provision so as to be able to "influence the voters within the household" (M11x; M4). The implication here was that women are more impressionable and, therefore, easier to influence than men. M4, who was strongly opposed to Hamas, told me:

"The Islamic people usually they work really well on the women... because they are helping her family with food, by saying she will go to heaven, by giving many, many... things, saying that it will be okay. They are very clever the party people. They work professionally in their small committees and in their organisations. For example, in [his village] they work professionally, in the healthcare, professionally, better than the minister, to get the people to say, 'oh look at the way they work!' People see. So they make the people feel comfortable. For these reasons they succeed very good." (M4)

M14x reinforced this view of Hamas using their welfare provision as a way of recruiting women supporters. He said:

"Women who support Hamas will go help other women, so they can get food for example, they help them open a business, like simple, like a cooking business or embroidery, so giving economic empowerment... they are more on the ground. They go to each house and talk to the women there and tell them why do you want to vote for that, he is corrupt, and then they help them financially." (M14x)

It must be noted of course that Hamas is not the only welfare provider. The Fatah-dominated PA distributes welfare services through the Ministry of Social Affairs. Giacaman et al. found that the PA had not given much time or thought to 'central aspects of public policy usually designed as social welfare issues-social and income security, old age benefits, social services, public housing, unemployment and occupational welfare' nor was there a philosophy of 'citizen's rights to basic social welfare services' (Giacaman, et al., 1996 p. 12). This lack of welfare being provided as a

right or policy in the Palestinian Territories, has ‘serious implications for women’ (Giacaman, et al., 1996 p. 12). Giacaman et al. explain that in the absence of PLO/PA welfare provision, access to social security is unequal and inadequate (Giacaman, et al., 1996 p. 13). The support which was available was subject to ‘an irregular and politicized system of claims and favors’ which often work through ‘family-based networks’ (Giacaman, et al., 1996 p. 13). Giacaman et al.'s findings seem to hold true seventeen years later when Miftah found that the Ministry of Social Affairs seems to distribute its services mainly to men. This is because it assumes that families are "unified nuclear units headed by men" and only in a few cases where "a man is proven incompetent or unfit to care for his family, the resources are given to the woman in the family" (Miftah, 2013 p. 18).

While all of the political parties provide welfare services, Hamas's welfare network is the most widespread, has the best reputation and is more closely associated with the party than the PA institutions are associate with Fatah. Therefore, those members of society who are more dependent on welfare and services might be more likely to support Hamas over Fatah and the ‘leftist’ parties. Further, it has been suggested that Hamas particularly targets women with its welfare provision. ***H1f*** suggests that women are more likely than men to support a party or movement which is most strongly associated with the provision of welfare. As set out in Chapter 1, women support Hamas more than men, so if Hamas is this party then ***H1f*** can be accepted.

E Findings

In this final section of this chapter on the economy I test some of the hypotheses generated from the literature above as well as addressing the main hypothesis of this chapter that gender differences in socioeconomic status explain the gender gap in political support ***(H1)***. In this way this chapter can provide a clear overview of the relationship between gender, the economy and political support in the Palestinian Territories while also showing some of the complexities and nuances which underpin this relationship.

The polls have several questions which relate to socioeconomic status, including marital status, occupation, employment sector, income and education level. The data on these variables shows where gender differences in socioeconomic status seem to

occur in Palestine. Below I use the polling data to test the hypotheses generated above.

H1a: The gender gap is lower among married people.

Analysis of the grouped polling data (Merged Dataset) shows that the gender gap for married people is 16.1, while the gender gap for those who are either 'single' or 'other' is 11.5. Therefore, ***H1a*** cannot be accepted as the gender gap is larger among married people than those who are not. This suggests there might be a confounding variable (perhaps certain types of people are more likely to get married younger, or that within marriage men and women are more likely to adopt more differentiated gender roles). Clearly marriage does impact the gender gap, and as such I include the dichotomous variable *'married'* in models of the gender gap which account for gender differences in socioeconomic status.

H1bi: Men have a higher income than women.

Figure 4.c shows the gender difference in reported family monthly income between men and women in the Merged Dataset.[13] There are major problems inherent in questions about income (Micklewright and Schnepf, 2010). The problems usually involve 'mean reversion' which means that poorer people report higher incomes and richer people report lower incomes. Micklewright and Schnepf suggest that there are serious inaccuracies in incomes reported using a single question, as was used in the PSR polls (Micklewright and Schnepf, 2010). An additional problem with the income variable below comes from my having to combine three different income measures used in different polls, which themselves used different currencies (Israeli Shekels and Jordanian Dinar) whose values would have changed over the length of the polling period. All the confusion and inaccuracy would be problematic if the goal was to accurately report incomes in the Palestinian Territories, but instead the interest is in the relationship between gender and reported income, which should not be obscured by these problems.

[13] The question reads:... متوسط دخل أسرتك الشهري الحالي هو: . Responses differed in different polls. Income ranges were used in Jordanian Dinars and Israeli Shekels.



Figure 4.c To show income levels by gender. Data = PSR Polls 1-38, 42 and 56 (Merged Dataset), n=51367, Mean(women) = 1.4, Mean(men) = 1.5, ANOVA = [F(1, 51365)=291.96, p=0.000]

Interestingly although the income stated is for their family, women tended to report lower incomes than men. This is likely because women-only households were polled who had lower income levels bringing down the average for women, as suggested by the literature and interviews above. This figure suggests that, even if most men and women view their socioeconomic status in terms of their family, there is a gender difference apparent in this most fundamental indicator of socioeconomic status. Additionally, there is a statistically significant difference (at the $p<0.001$ level) in means between men and women (although the large sample size probably makes this more likely). Therefore, although an imperfect measure, the null hypothesis can be rejected as women do tend to have lower incomes than men ***(H1bi)***. This variable, as *'income',* will be included in models of political support below, to test ***H1bii***.

H1ci: Men have higher levels of employment than women.

H1cii: Men and women have different kinds of employment.

Figure 4.d shows that women and men have very different occupations. Almost 80 percent of women polled said they were housewives compared to only 0.3 percent of

men, while men have a much broader range of occupations.[14] Figure 4.e shows the percentage of men and women employed in the public and private sector. The differences are statistically significant at the p<0.001 level. As mentioned above, these charts may not give an accurate view of economic role because many women are involved in the informal and agricultural economy, however they do mean the null can be rejected because ***H1ci*** is clearly the case. Men are more likely to be employed than women in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. These charts also show that ***H1cii*** – that women and men are likely to have a different type of employment - is also true, although the main difference in men and women's employment is that women are much less likely to be employed. The employment sector variable used in Figure 4.e is recoded and used in statistical models below as *'employment'*.



Figure 4.d. To show gender differences in occupation. Data = PSR Polls 1-38, 42 and 56 (Merged Dataset), χ^2 (8)=34085.93, p<0.001), n=51172

[14] The question here uses the Arabic term for housewife which is in the feminine, which obviously is problematic for finding men who stay at home and look after their homes and families.



Figure 4.e To show employment sector of men and women in Palestine, Data = PSR Polls 1-38, 42 and 56 (Merged Dataset), χ^2 (2)=3092.97, p<0.001) n=36440

H1di: Men have higher levels of education than women.

Figure 4.f shows that in education level as well, women tend to average lower than men, with fewer women than men reaching a secondary level education or above. This difference is statistically significant. Therefore, the null hypothesis can be rejected, because men do on average have higher levels of education than women in the Occupied Palestinian Territories ***(H1di)***.



Figure 4.f To show education levels by gender. Data = PSR Polls 1-38, 42 and 56 (Merged Dataset), Mean(women) = 3.45, Mean(men) = 3.79, ANOVA [F(1, 51391)=738.9, p=0.000], n=51393

H1ei: Women are more responsible for care than men.

H1eii: The gender gap in caring responsibility (partially) accounts for (reduces) the gender gap in political support.

Unfortunately, there are no variables included in the Merged Dataset which can measure whether women have a greater responsibility for care than men. Whether these hypotheses are correct cannot be resolved either way. To mediate for this, further analysis includes a variable for *'family size'* which can be held constant to assess whether this impacts political support. Further, it should be noted that using only quantitative methods, socialisation and the effects of responsibility for care as an explanation is difficult to measure and often 'remains a residual explanation because of the lack of measurable indicators in research on male-female differences' (Studlar, et al., 1998 p. 783).

Figure 4.c, Figure 4.d, Figure 4.e, and Figure 4.f show that there are indeed socioeconomic differences between men and women in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Men on the whole have higher incomes ***(H1bi),*** higher levels of

employment ***(H1ci),*** different forms of employment ***(H1cii)*** and higher levels of education than women ***(H1di)***. If men and women find themselves with differing interests due to their socioeconomic position, this may explain, to a certain extent, the gender gap in political support. It is likely that political attitudes will be shaped through the type of interaction an individual has with the outside world, particularly if this involves accessing resources. An employed person might socialise with their colleagues and get on with them in a way which their partner might not. Those receiving donations and services may feel favourably towards the providers through their direct contact with these organisations. There are clearly very different financial pressures and incentives which may attract or put off people from different political groups in the Palestinian Territories. Therefore, the gender gaps in occupation, family income and education level are likely to provide something of an explanation for the gender gap in political support.

In order to test hypothesis ***H1***, I will conduct logistic regressions on the variables *'Fatah support'* and *'Hamas support'*. Each logistic regression will include a greater number of variables to see whether and how they contribute to a model explaining support for Fatah and Hamas, but also whether these variables reduce the size of the *'gender'* coefficient. If *'gender'* becomes smaller with the addition of another variable, then that variable partially explains the gender gap.

Here I compare six models.

Model 1a: Political support ~ gender

Model 1a shows the impact of gender on party support. The variable *'gender'* is a dichotomous variable with female coded as 1, and male coded as 0. Table 4.a shows that *'gender'* has a positive beta value for Hamas (0.47) and a negative beta value for Fatah (-0.34), meaning that a woman is more likely to support Hamas than a man and less likely to support Fatah than a man. The values for *'gender'* are significant at the $p<0.0001$ level, meaning that the findings are very unlikely to be coincidences.

Model 1b: Political support ~ gender (+ poll number) + age + gaza + city + refugee camp

Model 1b has the *'gender'* variable again, but it also contains variables accounting for time, age and location. These variables are included in this model so that variations across time and place can be held constant. Importantly, including these variables

makes very little difference on the size and significance of *'gender'*. When holding these variables constant, Table 4.a shows that the beta value for *'gender'* for support for Fatah changes to -0.35, increasing slightly the size of the gender gap.

It might be of interest to see that residents of the cities and refugee camps are less likely to support Fatah, which confirms that Fatah is most popular in rural locations. Gazans are more likely to support both Fatah and Hamas, suggesting that political support is higher in the Gaza Strip, although the size of the effect is larger for Hamas.

Model 2a: Political support ~ gender (+ poll number) + age + gaza + city + refugee camp + married + family size

Model 2a includes the variables from Model 1b but also includes variables *'married'* and *'family size'*. *'Married'* is a dichotomous variable where 1 = married, and everything else is coded 0. *'Family size'* is almost a scale variable for the size of a family. However, I have capped the size at 13, so that all family sizes given over 13 have been given the weight of 13. This is because there were a very small number of very large family sizes given (99, 81 etc.) which would have a warping effect on the results. The inclusion of these variables slightly decreases the gender gap, by reducing the strength of the beta value for *'gender'* for Hamas (by 0.01) but does not impact Fatah support. Further, these variables are significant predictors of political support for Hamas, with married people with large families more likely to support Hamas. The reasons for this may be connected to 'confounding' factors such as religious belief and traditional conservative values or poverty or reliance on welfare. Marrying young and having large families being perhaps more frequent among the traditionally conservative and religious. There may also be factors connecting this to Hamas's welfare provision, as large families may struggle more to provide for everyone and so be more reliant on welfare and services. Members of larger families are also significantly more likely to support Fatah, perhaps reflecting the importance of family connections in Fatah's support structures. The variables '*married*' and '*family size'* are included to control for the possibilities of different impacts of marital status and family size on political support, which are highlighted in ***H1a***, ***H1ei*** and ***H1eii***. However, these models fail to conclusively determine how marital status, and gendered responsibility for care impact on the gender gap.

H1bii: Men's higher income (partially) accounts for (reduces) the gender gap in political support.

Model 2b: Political support ~ gender (+ poll number) + age + gaza + city + refugee camp + married + family size + income

In Model 2b '*income'* is included. It is created from the household income variable shown in Figure 4.c above. Even though this is for household rather than individual income, when *'income'* is held constant, Table 4.a shows the gender gap does slightly reduce with the *'gender'* variable for *'Hamas support'* decreasing by 0.02. This means that gender differences in income do partially account for the gender gap ***(H1bii)***. Income is a statistically significant predictor of both *'Fatah support'* and *'Hamas support'* with people with higher incomes being slightly less likely to support either.

H1ciii: Differences in employment levels and types (partially) account for (reduce) the gender gap in political support.

Model 2c: Political support ~ gender (+ poll number) + age + gaza + city + refugee camp + married + family size + income + employment

In Model 2c '*employment'* has been added to the model. '*Employment'* is a dichotomous variable where 1 is being employed in the public or private sector, and 0 is not being employed in those sectors. This is recoded from the variable used in Figure 4.e. When this variable is held constant the gender gap is greatly reduced with the beta values for *'gender'* for both *'Fatah support'* and *'Hamas support'* decreasing by 0.09 and 0.06 respectively in Table 4.a. Therefore, differences in employment status partially account for the gender gap ***(H1ciii)***. It is interesting to note that *'employment'* is where support for Fatah and Hamas diverge most strongly with being employed being a strong predictor of support for Fatah and being unemployed being a strong predictor of support for Hamas. This suggests the importance of economic interest in determining political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and, from the interview data, it can be supposed that clientelism and possibly welfare provision play important mediating roles.

H1dii: The gender difference in education levels (partially) accounts for (reduces) the gender gap in political support.

Model 2d: Political support ~ gender (+ poll number) + age + gaza + city + refugee camp + married + family size + income + employment + education

This final model includes the variable *'education'*, which is the same variable as is used in Figure 4.f. Education makes no impact on the beta values for *'gender'* for either the Fatah or Hamas models in Table 4.a. As such the null hypothesis cannot be rejected ***(H1dii)***. However, I would suggest keeping *'education'* in the model as it is an important indicator of socioeconomic status.

> ***H1: Gender differences in socioeconomic status explain the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.***

To test the main hypothesis of this chapter and in order to better display the impact of these different models on the gender gap, and their variance over the different polls, I compare the gender gap in predicted probability for Models 1b and 2d in Figure 4.g. This is the difference in predicted probability of a man and a woman supporting Fatah or Hamas, using the gender gap equation from Chapter 1. As in Chapter 1, the further a point falls from the zero line, the greater the gender gap. A negative gender gap also means that there is a higher probability of a woman supporting Hamas than a man, and/or a lower probability of a woman supporting Fatah. It is important to note that I have removed *'poll number'* from these models for this table as a logistic regression is being conducted on each poll separately to create the predicted probability, and so this variable would be redundant.

Figure 4.g shows that the gender gap is reduced when socioeconomic status is accounted for. That is, if men and women had the same household income levels, employment statuses and education levels, and when marital status and family size are accounted for, women would be less likely to support Hamas and/or men would be less likely to support Fatah. This implies that the gender differences in socioeconomic status are causing some women and men to support different parties. Therefore, the null hypothesis can be rejected ***(H1)***.

The clearest finding demonstrated in Table 4.a and Figure 4.g is that gender differences in socioeconomic status do account for a substantial portion of the gender gap, however even when these factors are held constant, *'gender'* is still a significant predictor of political support therefore socioeconomic status cannot be said to

account for all of the gender gap. It should be noted however that in Table 4.a the sample size is very large and as such variables are more likely to appear statistically significant, and that statistical significance is not taken into account in Figure 4.g. This will be taken into consideration in Chapter 8.

Model/varia	*Model 1a*		*Model 1b*		*Model 2a*		*Model2b*		*Model2c*		*Model 2d*	
	Fatah	***Hamas***	***Fatah***	***Hamas***	***Fatah***	***Hamas***	***Fatah***	***Hamas***	***Fatah***	***Hamas***	***Fatah***	***Hamas***
(Intercept)	-0.46 (0.01)***	-1.61 (0.02)***	-0.37 (0.03)***	-1.58 (0.04)***	-0.45 (0.04)***	-1.85 (0.05)***	-0.41 (0.05)***	-1.70 (0.06)***	-0.49 (0.05)***	-1.63 (0.06)	-0.23 (0.06)***	-1.59 (0.07)***
Gender	**-0.34 (0.02)*** **	**0.47 (0.02)*** **	**-0.35 (0.02)*** **	**0.47 (0.02)*** **	**-0.35 (0.02)*** **	**0.46 (0.02)*** **	**-0.35 (0.02)*** **	**0.44 (0.02)*** **	**-0.26 (0.02)*** **	**0.38 (0.03)*** **	**-0.26 (0.02)*** **	**0.38 (0.03)*** **
Poll Number			0.01 (0.00)***	-0.00 (0.00)**	0.01 (0.00)***	-0.00 (0.00) .	0.02 (0.00)***	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)***	-0.00 (0.00)	0.02 (0.00)***	-0.00 (0.00)
Age			-0.07 (0.01)***	-0.05 (0.01)***	-0.07 (0.01)***	-0.07 (0.01)***	-0.07 (0.01)***	-0.07 (0.01)***	-0.07 (0.01)***	-0.07 (0.00)***	-0.09 (0.01)***	-0.08 (0.01)***
Gaza			0.05 (0.02)*	0.47 (0.02)***	0.04 (0.02)	0.42 (0.03)***	0.03 (0.02)	0.39 (0.03)***	0.04 (0.02) .	0.38 (0.03)***	0.06 (0.02)**	0.38 (0.03)***
City			-0.24 (0.02)***	0.02 (0.03)	-0.23 (0.02)***	0.03 (0.03)	-0.23 (0.02)***	0.04 (0.03)	-0.23 (0.02)***	0.05 (0.03) .	-0.23 (0.02)***	0.05 (0.03) .
Refugee			-0.15(0.03)***	0.02 (0.03)	-0.14 (0.03)***	0.03 (0.03)	-0.14 (0.03)***	0.03 (0.03)	-0.15 (0.03)***	0.03 (0.03)	-0.14 (0.03)***	0.04 (0.03)
Married					0.01 (0.02)	0.18 (0.03)***	0.01 (0.02)	0.18 (0.03)***	-0.02 (0.02)	0.20 (0.03)***	-0.02 (0.02)	0.20 (0.03)***
Family size					0.01 (0.00)**	0.03 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)**	0.03 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)*	0.03 (0.00)***
Income							-0.03 (0.01)*	-0.10 (0.02)***	-0.05 (0.01)**	-0.09 (0.01)***	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.09 (0.02)***
Employment									0.16 (0.02)***	-0.13 (0.03)***	0.21 (0.02)***	-0.13 (0.03)***
Education											-0.07 (0.01)***	-0.01 (0.01)
Deviance	66262 (66589)	51789 (52239)	65594 (66445)	51171 (52125)	65409 (66264)	50933 (51980)	65286 (66140)	50804 (51879)	65240 (66140)	50783 (51879)	65045 (66032)	50719 (51815)
AIC	66266	51793	65608	51185	65427	50951	65306	50824	65262	50805	65069	50743

*Table 4.a Showing the B values, Standard Errors (in brackets) and level of significance for logistic regressions on the variables '*Fatah support' *and* 'Hamas support', *p<0.0001=***, p<0.001=**, p<0.01=*, p<0.05=. , Data = PSR Polls 1-38, 42 and 56 (Merged Dataset)*



Figure 4.g To show the gender gap in predicted probability of support for Fatah and Hamas with Models 1b and 2d. Using the formula in Chapter 1. Data = PSR Polls 1-38, 42 and 56 (Merged Dataset)

F Conclusion

This chapter explores the relationship between the economy, gender and political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It takes the western gender gap literature as a base for generating hypotheses as to how gender, the economy and political support tend to interact in the West. The literature and interviews then show that the way gender and the economy interact in the Middle East and Palestine might mean that many of the same issues are likely to exist even in the Palestinian context. The major difference between the expectations from the western gender gap literature and the Palestinian context comes in how Fatah and Hamas interact with the economy. Here, Fatah's use of a clientelistic hierarchy and Hamas's historical charitable network, mean that they have a very different relationship with the economy compared with political parties in a Western context. Nonetheless, when tested in the final section, many of the hypotheses generated from the western gender gap literature hold.

This chapter has shown socioeconomic status to be an important explanatory factor in accounting for the gender gap in support for Fatah and Hamas. The gender gap in political support is reduced by holding socioeconomic variables constant for men and women. The greatest impact is achieved by holding employment status constant. These findings support the idea that Fatah is more likely to appeal to men because of the employment opportunities that Fatah presents, and Hamas is more likely to appeal to women because of the welfare services that they provide. These findings broadly support the hypotheses generated from the western gender gap literature, showing that women's lower socioeconomic status and the gendered division of labour impact political support in contexts outside the West.

This chapter has shown that for the most part the western gender gap literature's socioeconomic explanation for the gender gap has substantial explanatory power even in the very different context of the Palestinian Territories. This is the case despite the fact that Fatah and Hamas are not defined by their right or left-wing economic positioning. The main difference between the two parties in relation to the economy is that Fatah is better able to provide employment opportunities to its loyalists, while Hamas is strongly associated with welfare provision through Islamic charitable

institutions. We have shown that there seems to be a strong gender interaction with both forms of clientelism and the charity networks, with men being more supportive of the clientelistic Fatah, and women being more supportive of the charitable Hamas. These differences echo differences in the wider Middle East region between establishment parties and the Muslim Brotherhood in opposition. There have already been some studies which explore female exclusion from clientelistic politics, and this thesis helps to contribute to this literature (Benstead, et al., 2015). On a wider level, international involvement, aid and clientelism, as well as violence and corruption, impact and warp economies across the globe, by studying how gender interacts with these features is important for increasing understanding of quasi-democratic politics on a much broader scale.

The role of the family is a little unclear in this chapter. While from the interviews it seems that family is an important shaper of political positions, the fact that socioeconomic status plays such a large part in determining political support suggests that not all women and men see their family as their primary economic unit. This chapter finds that the gender gap *increases* among married people. This may mean that men and women make political decisions based on their own roles and experience, and that because their experiences are more differentiated within marriage, men's and women's differences in political support increase within marriage. This idea runs counter to some of the ideas on the relationship between marriage and political support in the western gender gap literature which suggest that within marriage men and women share economic interests and as such should have similar political views. Further this finding puts ideas around female subservience within Middle Eastern patriarchal family structures into question.

One question that this chapter leaves unresolved is the role of women's greater responsibility for care and gender socialisation in accounting for the gender gap. As in the West, there are no measures in the polls which can directly measure these gender differences, therefore they may have to be inferred as causes of the gender gap which still exists once other gender differences are accounted for.

Finally, this chapter highlights the importance of political models taking account of the gendered division of labour. This shapes women's and men's experiences, economic

interests and political preferences, and at least partially explains the significant gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Chapter 5 Belief, Ideology and the Gender Gap

An individual's beliefs shape the way they see the world, and the way they would wish for it to be. The gender gap in political support has frequently been attributed to the differing levels, or types of belief between men and women. Scholars variously find women to be more religious and/or feminist than men and suggest this tends to make them more conservative or liberal (Barisione, 2014; Bergh, 2007; Conover, 1988; Desposato and Norrander, 2008; Edlund and Pande, 2002; Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Many scholars suggest that these gender differences in beliefs lead men and women to vote for different political parties. This chapter looks at how belief and ideology might interact with gender and political support, in the same way as the previous chapter dealt with the economy, gender and political support. The vast and complex literature on these subjects means that it is best to explore these subjects separately before proposing a more complete model for the gender gap in political support, which will be explored in Chapter 8.

Until the 1980s political 'conventional wisdom' suggested that women were more conservative than men (Inglehart and Norris, 2003 p. 75). However, this has changed in the West, with women now more likely to support left-wing parties than men (Inglehart and Norris, 2003 p. 75). Inglehart and Norris point to the emergence of the feminist movement and the decline in religiosity in their explanation of the changing gender gaps over time (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Inglehart and Norris, 2000). They describe how the 'traditional gender gap' where women were/are more conservative or right-wing in their political preferences than men, is usually explained through reference to women's greater religiosity than men's (Inglehart and Norris, 2000 p. 446; Inglehart and Norris, 2003 p. 77). They also suggest that the 'growth of feminist identity and consciousness has been the catalyst producing the modern gender gap in party support' (Inglehart and Norris, 2003 pp. 91-92). Religion and feminism are often cited as the two areas of belief which explain the gender gap. This chapter explores two hypotheses, as set out below, and in doing so explores the relationship between belief and ideology, gender and political support.

H2: Gender differences in religiosity explain (reduce) the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

H3: Gender differences in feminist beliefs explain (reduce) the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

The Inglehart and Norris formulation places religiosity and feminism as having oppositional 'pulls' on political support, with religion explaining traditional views and feminism explaining modern or progressive views. In the context of the Palestinian Territories there are challenges to the idea that they are necessarily always in opposition, with many suggesting that Islam offers avenues of empowerment to some women. Further, in Palestine the heavily nationalist framing of political discourse alters the salience of ideologies according to the national priorities of the moment. This chapter surveys how gender, belief and political support have been found to interact in the western gender gap literature. It then, through the interview data and literature on religion, nationalism, feminism and politics in the OPT and the wider Middle East, explores how beliefs might interact with gender and political support in the Palestinian context. From the academic literature and interview data, I generate hypotheses which I then go on to test using statistical analysis of the opinion polls in the final section of the chapter. I ultimately return to ***H2*** and ***H3*** (above) to see how beliefs might impact the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

A Gender Differences in Beliefs

i) Gender Differences in Religiosity

Several scholars of the western gender gap have found women to be more religious than men (Edlund and Pande, 2002; Desposato and Norrander, 2008; Conover, 1988; Howell and Day, 2000). Edlund and Pande found women 13 percent more likely to attend church regularly than men (Edlund and Pande, 2002 p. 934). Conover found women to be on average higher on her scale of 'religious fundamentalism' than men, concluding that ‘religion plays a bigger role in the daily lives of women than it does in the lives of men’ (Conover, 1988 p. 995). Barisione finds that Italian women present ‘significantly higher levels of religiosity’ than men (Barisione, 2014 p. 121). Scholars have suggested that increased female religiosity is particularly likely to be the case in 'traditional' or developing societies (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). These findings suggest the following hypothesis:

H2a: Women are more religious than men in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

The academic literature rarely explains why women might be more religious than men. Scholars hint at explanations, which tend to point to gendered social roles. Women's religiosity might represent their traditional role as 'guardians of the emotional and moral well-being of their family members' (Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010 p. 63). Scholars have found women to be more concerned with morality. Shapiro and Mahajan found that women had more conservative values than men regarding issues such as pornography, use of marijuana and issues around sex education and provision of birth control to teenagers (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986 p. 52). Campbell and Childs found that among Conservative party members in the UK, there was a large gender difference in attitudes towards censorship, with 20 percent more women than men agreeing with the statement 'Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral values' (Campbell and Childs, 2015 p. 632). The suggestion that women are more religious as a result of their greater social role in reinforcing moral behaviour is rather circular and could be both a symptom of and explanation for gender differences in religiosity.

Other studies seem to point to where women go - or rather do not go - as affecting their views. For example, some studies suggest that housewives, in particular, are more conservative than both men and working women (Barisione, 2014 p. 118; Norrander and Wilcox, 2008). Here the suggestion is that women are more religious as a result of having less access to the public sphere. I will also test the following hypothesis:

H2b: Greater religiosity is a result of women having less access to the public sphere.

Here I look at religion in Palestinian society to explore how religiosity might impact political support. The majority religion in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is Islam. Christians form a small but significant minority (around 2-3 percent), and there are a tiny number of people from other religions (excluding the Israeli settlers who live in the Occupied Territories but do not make up a part of its social network but part of the occupation) (Seidel, 2006). The role of Islam in Palestinian society should be seen within a wider trend of a religious 'revival' in the Middle East, that has taken place in

the last few decades partly due to 'widespread disillusionment' with secular nationalism (Moghadam, 1994 p. 8). Religion plays such an important role in Palestinian society that it might be considered as ‘sacralized’ in that it ‘displays visible, audible, outward, and otherwise expressions of religiosity’ as has been found to be the case in Kuwait (González, 2011 p. 340). This is not to say that there is no room for non-belief - indeed I met several devoted Palestinian atheists - however society, in its broader sense, is 'religious'. In this context, it is more difficult to distinguish private belief from public religious identity (González, 2011 p. 349).

While faith and personal belief should be readily accessible to both sexes, a gendered social context might encourage religious behaviour more in one sex than the other. Palestinian society follows the pattern of a patriarchal, hierarchal social structure common to many Arab societies (while also existing to a ‘greater or lesser degree in most societies in the world’) (Karmi, 1996 p. 82; Kandiyoti, 1988). Abdo suggests that social conservatism and ‘entrenched patriarchal traditions’ pervade ‘all segments of the society' (Abdo, 1999 pp. 42-48). This patriarchal system is, according to some academics, closely tied to questions of honour which reinforces gendered forms of behaviour. Baxter characterises standard accounts of the honour system as ‘male selves controlling the bodies, movement-in-space, and sexuality of female selves’ (Baxter, 2007 p. 743).

An explanation for women's increased religiosity, or at least their desire to appear more religious, could be explained by the greater pressures women face in terms of their behaviour. Barakat describes how women's reputations reflect upon the family: ‘The sexual misbehaviour of a girl, for example, reflects not just upon herself but upon her father, her brother, her family as a whole’ and accordingly they are sometimes violently policed (Barakat, 1985, 1994 p. 28). The most upsetting and extreme examples of this pressure is the probably underreported phenomena of women attempting suicide or even being killed by relatives when they have been perceived to have breached what some scholars term ‘family honour’ (Al-Adili, et al., 2008 p. 119-120; Baxter, 2007 p. 753). Abdo writes:

> *‘In general, within the context of Palestinian social relations, customary laws continue to predominate over written laws, particularly with regard to gender relations and the issue of woman's body and sexuality. "Honor killings," for example, in which male family*

members are justified in killing a female relative judged to have besmirched the family honor, continue to occur.' (Abdo, 1999 p. 44)

While this threat certainly may exist in some contexts in Palestine, fear of reprisals is not the whole story. Some scholars suggest that many women may actively support the patriarchal system. Baxter suggests that, what she calls 'honor ideology', is not just about males threatening females, but is a system which can bestow benefits on both men and women.

'Holding honor translates into being respected and this brings rewards of various kinds: psychological/emotional, as individuals have the approval of their community and of living by a set of standards they themselves (usually) regard highly; familial, in that tensions among members are reduced as their expectations of each other are generally met; political, particularly in that males whose honor is intact are eligible for various types of advancement; economic, since community members choose to do business with those of honorable repute; and socio/econ/political, in that the critical issue of arranging marriages for family members is highly contingent on the reputation of prospective in-laws.' (Baxter, 2007 p. 746)

Baxter's description of the honour system points to why women would want to conform to codes of behaviour as individuals even if the system might be restrictive for them as women. Baxter, in a challenge to feminist conceptions of agency and selfhood as only being achieved when women resist or deviate from traditional social structures, contends that women within the honour system have scope for agency as well as 'rights/claims/privileges' in terms of being provided for and looked after by men (Baxter, 2007 pp. 738-739). Kandiyoti's concept of patriarchal bargaining provides another explanation for why women might support traditional elements of the status quo in places where there is gender inequality. She argues that in most patriarchal societies younger women undergo the 'deprivation and hardship' of being a young bride with low authority because they know they will eventually gain prestige and power as a mother, and then mother-in-law, leading to a 'thorough internalization of this form of patriarchy' (Kandiyoti, 1988 p. 279). Acting with propriety in this context grants women respectability, security and stability. She suggests that when poverty or change threatens to break down the patriarchal system, some women resist because they have already experienced the difficult side of the patriarchal bargain and are

being denied the prestige of the later stages; these women's resistance may take the form of the ‘intensification of traditional modesty markers, such as veiling’ to ‘signify that they continue to be worthy of protection’ (Kandiyoti, 1988 p. 283). She sees ‘female conservatism as a reaction to the breakdown of classic patriarchy’ (Kandiyoti, 1988). González's study of Kuwaiti students finds women to be more religious than men and she suggests that this might be because women have a greater ‘stake in social conformity’ (González, 2011 p. 343). These scholars have highlighted the role of social prestige and respectability granted to women who observe religious and modest behaviour, and the possible risks of not conforming.

In Palestinian society, social pressures suggest particular forms of behaviour, particularly for women. These include ‘modesty in dress’ (Baxter, 2007 p. 751; Gren, 2015 p. 155). Wearing a headscarf or covering clothing is ‘a visual marker of compliance’ (Baxter, 2007 pp. 751-752). As more and more women wear the hijab, the social and psychological pressure means that for many women ‘it becomes more comfortable and more secure to follow suit’ (Azzam, 1996 p. 226). Indeed, the social implications of not portraying oneself as a good Muslim can be life-changing as, for instance, many men ‘will only marry a woman who is a muhajjaba’ [wears the hijab/headscarf] (Azzam, 1996 p. 226). Beyond dress, women must take care to protect their sexual reputation, with not only ‘virginity until marriage, and sexual faithfulness' but also ensuring their public demeanour should 'demonstrate indifference to non-relative males and avert unnecessary interactions with them', sometimes women even take ‘care not to move about on their own' (Baxter, 2007 pp. 751-752; Gren, 2015 p. 155). Finally, Gren also suggests that that women's morality is tied to their performance as housewives and mothers, with a clean tidy house, the preparation of good food, tea and coffee, and the education of their children being important social priorities (Gren, 2015 p. 155). While these restrictions and forms of behaviour will change between social groups and over time, there are clear pressures upon women to emphasise their modesty and propriety of behaviour. Interestingly, the lines between religious morality and social behaviour are not clearly defined, suggesting social pressures might be equivalent to pressures for religious behaviour among women.

In my interviews, I was told frequently that women and girls were held to higher moral standards than men and boys. I was told by F15 that people in her village knew her schedule and would call her parents or gossip if she was seen coming home late (F15). She also told me that smoking “is still not as accepted for a girl as it would be for a guy, they’ll still talk about the girl that smokes”, and that if a couple are seen on a date “the first thing they’ll do is call the girl’s mum not the guy’s mum, because it’s okay for the guy” (F15). The implications of being caught behaving in this way were bad: “She’d be the tramp of the village... it definitely affects her long-term” (F15). F22 explained that “most of [women’s] problems are from the society. Because society is always with men”. Using the example of getting drunk, she said that for men "society forgive[s] him everything" but for a woman it stays with her "for the rest of her life. No one will marry her" (F22). This view came through in several other interviews, usually those with young women and in one case the father of a young woman who said he would not let her travel abroad because of what people would say (F16; F26; M9).

Women’s morality is watched and safeguarded more than men’s in Palestinian society and women risk losing greater status by breaching these norms. Accordingly, adopting a religious identity, which would reinforce an image of morality would bring particular benefits for a woman over a man. M24 thought that "If women are religious, they get more respect from people. For example, parents are happier when their daughters wear the hijab and memorise the Qur’an rather than getting good grades.” (M24)

Women's greater religiosity could also be linked to the regulation of spaces that women can occupy, echoing the arguments above. Describing the wider Middle East, Kamrava suggests ‘men tend to socialise in mosques, tea houses, bazaar shops, and sports clubs, whereas women gather in private homes and bathhouses and at religious charity events.’ (Kamrava, 1998 p. 47). The patriarchal nature of Palestinian society means that there are restrictions on women's movement, however, these are intensified because of the Israeli Occupation and the very real threats it poses.

Several interviewees found that they were not welcomed in certain spaces. F27 told me: “I went to the Bank of Palestine to work and one of the guys said to me, ‘You can’t work, you can’t come and work here. I can as a man’ and he said ‘You can’t work here at the Islamic bank or anywhere because as a female you should be at home’.” (F27) Another interviewee said that “the streets are male dominated” and “I do get a lot of

guys hitting on me, throwing words at me" (F17). Other women were restricted in their behaviour by their families, because of traditional restrictions. F19 explained the control that a father might have over his daughter. She said:

> *"For example, my father [would] have to choose for me what to work as, what not to work as, where to study, where to go, what time I should go home. I should be married for example at a certain age... I wouldn't be free to work as I want, to be late and invest in myself as much as I want, to go to faraway places, because I am just a girl and that's part of the tradition to not be away, to be always with the family, to be always with the male member of the family." (F19)*

F28 told me that one of the major problems that women face is "free movement."

> *"It is not so easy for a woman to move between cities without a* mahram*... a man from the family... because it is not safe. That is why they take someone with them. The other thing is you are a woman by yourself someone might go and rape you and that's why you do need someone with you... For the jobs, if you are a pharmacist [for example], it is better for you to work in a pharmacy than as a sales manager, because you have to go with your car from one city to another until it is so late... [Also, a woman] who does a lot of work with men, [people say] 'you have to beware of her! We don't know what is she doing late at night with men.'" (F28)*

In Gaza, many interviewees found their freedom of movement was constrained by Hamas's policy that women should have a male family member's permission or to accompany them when travelling (F36; F37; F38; F39). F37 explained, "whenever we get a training outside of Gaza for study or work there has to be a male with us, a guardian" (F37). F39 described how at a Hamas checkpoint leaving Gaza they made her call her father to give her permission to leave (F39).

The Israeli occupation has made women's movement even more limited. Fear of soldiers has made families all the more protective of women (Baxter, 2007 p. 750). F12x told me that a major impact of the occupation for women was mobility.

> *"check points, siege... all this is isolating women, because they are afraid to go out and be humiliated by soldiers or attacked by soldiers... with the restrictions, with these gates which close at four [pm]... men can go through the mountains... women cannot do that. With the wall, families have been separated - inside and outside the wall. And this has*

isolated the women further. They have been isolated even from their social networks... because they don't work, they are more poor so they cannot even socially connect. Because social connection means presents, gifts, going to weddings and they can't do it anymore, so they are more and more separated from the real world... [it is] like a routine, systematic, structural violence, that is with her all of the time, because she is isolated, separated, marginalised" (F12x)

These restrictions, in comparison to the relatively freer life of men, may mean that women are exposed to fewer ideas, views and experiences than men, as M38x expressed it:

"The men in Gaza they go out to meet, they go to the coffee shop, they are influenced by other opinions and the women are not... I think the social structure [means] women in Gaza are more conservative, so they are closer to the mosque, they are closer to the social network. Men can go out, talk to somebody else, travel, or they go to their work in society, participate in the activities of civil society so they are open to other ideas." (M38x)

Even virtual spaces are often unfriendly for women. Women's presence online is often limited and subjected to double standards. A young woman I spoke to said, "On Facebook a guy can have both female and male friends on his Facebook while the girl shouldn't have male friends on Facebook." (F26). Statistics also show that in Palestine '65.3 percent of women 10 years and above own a cellular phone, compared to 81.8 percent of men in the same age' suggesting that there are widespread differences in connectivity too (Hamdan and Bargothi, 2014 p. 44).

Clearly 'women are subject to social constraints that impede their movement more than men,' (Miftah, 2013 p. 18). The social restrictions on women's work and movement, and on the places they are able to comfortably occupy, has, some of my interviewees suggested, given them more opportunity to become religious. Thus, perhaps women have the 'time' for religion by being at home. The idea that women 'have more time' reflects the fact that women 'have less space' due to the social restrictions placed upon women's movements and activities. M3 said "they don't have work or other things to do so they become more religious" (M3). F15 explained:

"women... in general are given the role of staying at home and being a mother and staying home and cooking so they have that free time to focus on more spiritual things, on more

relaxing and reading Qur'an and practicing religion whereas men are always out or hanging out or working... I think women explore religion because they have the time for it, whereas men can occupy themselves with either going to smoke shisha or going to play cards or something like that, whereas a woman she can't do that." (F15)

Another implication of women's restricted access to certain areas of public space is that women spend more time at home consuming media in the form of television and radio. This finding was emphasised in Barisione's study of Italian homemakers' political support (Barisione, 2014 p. 118), but also came through in the interviews (F13x; M6; M41). M41 told me: "[Women] are sitting at home most of the time so they are watching... these kind of programs... some stories [from] Mohammed's time, during Abu Bakr's time and so it is always easy for the media to affect the women mentality rather than the men." (M41) It makes sense that an enforced smaller sphere of physical space, and ability to contact other people and other ideas, may encourage a narrower and deeper sphere of mental and spiritual reflection. This gives additional weight to the idea that women's religiosity is connected to their access to the public sphere ***(H2b)***.

Women might be more religious than men as a result of their morality and movement being policed, meaning, on the one hand that they have the time and space to develop their religious understanding, while their exposure to contrasting viewpoints is restricted; while on the other, social pressure to behave in a certain way may mean that it is beneficial to overtly show religious belief. These explanations would widely fit in with Inglehart and Norris' association of female religiosity with traditional social structures. As a traditional, patriarchal society, it would be expected that women in the Occupied Palestinian Territories are significantly more religious than men ***(H2a)***. Below I will explore some other possibilities which partially challenge this view.

ii) Gender Differences in Feminist Attitudes

Several studies suggest that feminism - or rather attitudes towards gender equality - is the explanation for the gender gap in political support, because women are more likely to be supportive of gender equality than men and this in turn impacts political support. Inglehart and Norris find that in 'postindustrial societies' women tend to be more supportive of gender equality than men, but that in 'traditional societies, both men

and women often accept substantial gender inequalities' (Inglehart and Norris, 2003 pp. 18-19). Campbell et al. find in the UK that women are more in favour of gender equality than men (Campbell, et al., 2009 p. 180). Bergh also considers 'feminist consciousness' to play an important role in explaining the gender gaps in the US and Norway (Bergh, 2007 p. 235). Manza and Brooks found gender differences in attitudes towards the women's movement did not explain the gender gap up to 1988 in the US but that it did explain the gender gap in the 1992 US elections (Manza and Brooks, 1998 p. 1260).

While feminism certainly does seem to play a role in shaping values, Cook and Wilcox suggest that its effects are not limited to women's values but effect men as well. Cook and Wilcox find 'that feminism is indeed strongly correlated with liberal values and policy preferences, but that the correlations are significant for both men and women' (Cook and Wilcox, 1991 p. 1117). They find that feminism does not uniquely effect women's values and, as such, '[f]eminism does not explain the gender gap' (Cook and Wilcox, 1991 p. 1121). Many scholars have found that gender differences on attitudes towards women's issues are relatively insubstantial or non-existent (Edlund and Pande, 2002 p. 934; Norrander, 2008 p. 13; Norris, 2003). Therefore I will test the following hypothesis:

H3a: Women are more feminist (supportive of gender equality) than men.

The issue of feminist identity is likely to be somewhat distorted in the Middle East for two reasons. Firstly, there is greater gender inequality in the region compared to the West, and secondly feminism and issues around gender roles are often caught up with debates around identity, westernisation, colonialism and religion.

The Middle East as a region has serious problems with gender inequality. While western stereotypes about 'the veiled and oppressed Middle Eastern woman' (Meriwether and Tucker, 1999 p. 1) are problematic, the evidence does show substantial gender inequality with considerable gender gaps in labour force participation, and low levels of women in positions of power (Jamal, 2010 p. 28; Masoud, et al., 2016 p. 3). The causes of this inequality is often attributed to Islam and its 'ideological legacy', including interpretations of Islamic law which often guide personal status laws in the region (Alexander and Welzel, 2011 pp. 371-372; Al-Labadi,

2014 p. 169; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Jamal, 2010 p. 31) or else to 'Arab cultural mores' (see Masoud, et al., 2016 p. 7).

Inglehart and Norris find that Muslim states have the least egalitarian and the most 'traditional' views on gender equality, even when they control for possible confounding factors such as wealth and level of development (Inglehart and Norris, 2003 pp. 67-68). They suggest that this indicates that Islamic values and laws 'have played an important role in reinforcing social norms of a separate and subordinate role for women as homemakers and mothers, and a role for men as patriarchs within the family and primary bread winners in the paid workforce' (Inglehart and Norris, 2003 p. 68). They conclude that 'an Islamic religious heritage is one of the most powerful barriers to the rising tide of gender equality' (Inglehart and Norris, 2003 p. 71).

Masoud et al. emphasise that it is not Islam that is the problem but 'a particular interpretation of Islam' and that attitudes towards women are 'more egalitarian' in non-Arab Muslim states (Masoud, et al., 2016 p. 7). Another line of thought suggests that the context of a lack of peace, prosperity and security enables 'belief systems with an emphasis on authority, conformity, and patriarchy' to prevail (Alexander and Welzel, 2011 pp. 366-367). Elsewhere, economic explanations have attributed gender inequality to oil wealth (Ross in Masoud, et al., 2016 p. 8). Whatever its cause, this deep-rooted inequality might give women in the region a greater impetus to seek change and therefore to support feminist and women's rights agendas ***(H3a)***.

However, in the Middle East and elsewhere, feminism has strong associations with colonialism, in particular with the British and French colonial projects in the region. Ahmed tells how issues surrounding women's appearance and behaviour are deeply connected to the colonial history of the region which portrayed the 'native culture' as innately misogynistic (Ahmed, 1992 p. 129). Feminism has been used 'as an instrument of colonial domination' and so has been tainted 'in Arab eyes' ever since (Ahmed, 1992 p. 167). Since the colonial period, issues surrounding women, and signifiers such as the headscarf, have become fused with issues of nationalism and culture. Subsequently: ‘Progress or regress in the position and rights of women has often directly depended on which side of the debates over nationalism and culture the men holding or gaining political power espoused.’ (Ahmed, 1992 p. 129)

Although certain (usually leftist) nationalist movements adopted explicitly feminist positions, more recently, as nationalist movements tended to converge into state structures, feminism has come to be seen by many as serving an authoritarian leadership or an educated elite at the expense of the people (Muhanna-Matar, 2014 p. 11; Sika and Khodary, 2012 p. 99; Moghadam, 1994). Bush and Jamal found that 'improving women's rights may serve as a strategy of authoritarian survival in the Arab world' by gaining a regime international legitimacy (Bush and Jamal, 2014 p. 4). They found that members of the public opposed progressive policies because they were seen to strengthen a regime which they opposed (Bush and Jamal, 2014). Finally, the feminist priorities of western NGO agendas have also been seen to miss the real development priorities of the population (Muhanna-Matar, 2014 p. 11). This suggests that there might be a greater hostility to feminist values in the region, perhaps meaning that there is less support for feminist values. However, if there is a dynamic where certain parties adopt feminist values to gain legitimacy from the international sphere while others position themselves in opposition to this, then it still holds that gender differences in attitudes towards gender equality might explain the gender gap in political support ***(H3).***

iii) Islam and Women's Empowerment

Understandings of feminist and religious beliefs are complicated further by the possibility of Islam as a space for women's empowerment. For the most part, scholarship has pointed to mutual distaste and rejection between feminism and Islamic movements. There are, however, an increasing number of scholars who question the tendency to position religion, and especially Islam (which is 'so often seen as justifying the subordination of women in the Arab world' (Masoud, et al., 2016 p. 1)), and women's empowerment as contradictory (Abu-Lughod, 2002; Ahmed, 1992; Al-Ali, 2000; Al-Labadi, 2014; Deeb, 2006; Masoud, et al., 2016; Shitrit, 2013).

First it is worth pointing to the apparent antagonism between feminism and Islamism. A rejection of feminism has been particularly strong in the Islamist movement. Akhami and Friedl describe how Islamists were able to reject gender equality commitments as being against 'authentic Muslim traditions' (Akhami and Friedl, 1997 p. xii). Abu-Lughod suggests Islamists are 'the best examples of those who condemn feminism as

Western' (Abu-Lughod, 1998 p. 243). Salime looks at the Islamist women's movement in Morocco and finds that Islamist activists reject the feminist label because of their 'understanding of feminist politics as secular and Western in origin, and therefore hostile to Islam' (Salime, 2011 p. xxv). She finds that Islamists see feminism as setting men and women in competition and conflict rather than acknowledging 'their mutual responsibilities toward each other and their mutual obligations to honor their commitments vis-à-vis god... [they reject feminism] because it stresses women's rights independently of their obligations, and because it eliminates the mediating dimension of the divine.' (Salime, 2011 p. 137). Islamist women activists see feminism as focusing on men as 'the enemies within' while ignoring broader issues of economic exploitation, colonialism and despotism (Salime, 2011 p. 138). There is also a broader Islamist discourse which frames feminism as an assault on the cohesion of the Muslim family (Salime, 2011 p. 140).

This hostility is reciprocated by feminists who object to Islamist women's politics. Feminists have tended to assume that, as Mahmood puts it, 'women Islamist supporters are pawns in a grand patriarchal plan, who, if freed from their bondage, would naturally express their instinctual abhorrence for the traditional Islamic mores used to enchain them' (Mahmood, 2005 pp. 1-2). Salime describes how in Morocco feminists view Islamist women as 'mere followers of male politics' with no 'genuine concern about women's rights'. She says that feminists see these women as being used by Islamist movements to engage with women (Salime, 2011 p. xxii). Yuval-Davis does not think women benefit from involvement in Islamic fundamentalist movements. She writes: 'the overall effect of fundamentalist movements has been very detrimental to women, limiting and defining their roles and activities and actively oppressing them when they step outside their preordained limits.' (Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010 p. 63)

This polarisation, between Islamists being against women's rights and feminists as 'for' them, is overly simplistic. Dichotomies such as 'traditional-modern' and 'indigenous-western', which are 'conspicuous' in academic accounts of gender in the Middle East, and make up powerful oppositional discourses by both feminists and Islamists, in Egypt, are problematic and are increasingly being unsettled and questioned (Al-Ali, 2000 p. 2). Calling for an end to these polarisations Abu Lughod writes:

'My point is to remind us to be aware of differences, respectful of other paths toward

social change that might give women better lives. Can there be a liberation that is Islamic? And, beyond this, is liberation even a goal for which all women or people strive? Are emancipation, equality, and rights part of a universal language we must use?... might other desires be more meaningful for different groups of people? Living in close families? Living in a godly way? Living without war?' (Lughod, 2002 p. 788)

Several scholars have emphasised how for women being religious or part of a religious movement is not necessarily an anti-feminist position. Mahmood questions whether it is right to assume that women should 'oppose the practices, values, and injunctions that the Islamist movement embodies' (Mahmood, 2005 p. 2). Mahmood studied a women's mosque movement in Cairo, where women read, studied and taught Islamic scripture. In her study, she challenges the idea that agency must be seen as resisting the dominant structures of power (Mahmood, 2005 p. 14). Instead she suggests that:

'what may appear to be a case of deplorable passivity and docility from a progressivist point of view, may actually be a form of agency-but one that can be understood only from within the discourses and structures of subordination that create the conditions of its enactment.' (Mahmood, 2005 p. 15)

Deeb in her book 'An Enchanted Modern' studying the Shia community in Lebanon describes how modern piety is entangled with feminist discourses, and that by measuring the status of women against western models ignores emerging understandings of 'an ideal modern woman, one based in public piety'. She describes this alternative ideal:

'This ideal entails demonstrating knowledge and practice of authenticated Islam, being dedicated to self-improvement, and participating actively in the public life and betterment of the community. Rather than an individualized self, this modern self is embedded in social relationships. In addition to the "emancipated woman," who is imagined as selfishly abandoning her family and community, or as demanding an irrational absolute equality (understood to mean identicality) with men, this pious modern woman is set in opposition to two other ideal types in Lebanon: the "traditional" person, who practices religion improperly or without true comprehension and who believes that her only role is a domestic one; and the "empty modern" and "westernized" person, who is selfish, materialistic, and obsessed with her appearance and social status.' (Deeb, 2006 p. 30)

Deeb finds that these pious, modern women are pushing gender boundaries. They emphasise the importance of women's education and ability to read and interpret religious texts. They are committed to community service work and are happy to be outspoken, while remaining 'pious and committed to her faith, family and community' (Deeb, 2006 p. 217). In so doing, they challenge traditional views of women, and push for a greater presence of women in employment and the public sphere.

Ben Shitrit in her study of women in Jewish and Islamic movements in Israel, finds that for 'many women religious movements offer real liberation from oppressive socioeconomic realities and limiting cultural norms' (Shitrit, 2013 p. 81). Ben Shitrit shows how although the Islamic movement in Israel adheres to a gender ideology which promotes a sex-based division of labour and the strict control over women's bodies, behaviour and appearance in public; it presents women members with emancipatory narratives through the lessons and lectures given by senior women in the movement (Shitrit, 2013 pp. 84-97). Islam is perceived as helping to guide an individual to achieve their 'true self-interest' and overcome desire and ignorance (Shitrit, 2013 pp. 91-92). She suggests that women within the movement 'associate customs, traditions, norms, and social coercion with the internal and external elements that prevent the individual from achieving true self-realization' (Shitrit, 2013 p. 92). In her discussions with women in these movements, they emphasised the importance of 'intention' and conscious decision making in religious actions and behaviours, rather than merely following social customs (Shitrit, 2013 p. 93). Women with knowledge of Islam are empowered to resist 'customs and traditions that they view as oppressive to women, as un-Islamic and therefore un-authoritative' (Shitrit, 2013 p. 97). She gives the example of women opposing pressure (and the tribal customs) that encourage her to marry her cousin. Nonetheless Ben Shitrit emphasises that these liberatory narratives 'should not be confused with a feminist consciousness' and that women within the movement do not seek religious leadership roles (Shitrit, 2013 p. 103)

Beyond Mahmoud's, Deeb's and Ben Shitrit's work, several other scholars find that Islamist movements have space for female empowerment. Many scholars highlight the importance of a rights discourse within the modern Islamic resurgence, which suggests Muslim women are given 'superior rights' in Islam, 'when compared with their sexually

exploited Western counterparts' (Karmi, 1996 p. 72). According to this view, Islam grants women not equal rights with men but different rights centred around 'an enhanced position that demands that they be honoured as wives and mothers as an integral part of religious duty' (Azzam, 1996 p. 228). Muhanna-Matar finds that Islamist women use 'women's rights discourses similar to their feminist counterparts' and she found that they shared many aims with feminists (Muhanna-Matar, 2014 p. 10). Kandiyoti also suggests that 'a significant female constituency may find not only solace and solidarity in Islamic militancy but a legitimate route to greater empowerment' (Kandiyoti, 1997 p. 6). Azzam concludes that 'by turning to Islam for legitimisation and to the legacy of learned women throughout Islamic history for inspiration, Muslim women today are attempting to authoritatively extend their roles beyond the home' (Azzam, 1996 p. 228).

An important nuance to these ways of thinking is how embracing Islam is often coupled with the rejection of 'backwards' traditions. Deeb argues that Islam is neither static and monolithic nor is it incompatible with modernity (Deeb, 2006 p. 4). She argues that both material and spiritual progress is seen as necessary to modern-ness for those trying to avoid the 'emptiness' of modernity in the West (Deeb, 2006 p. 5). She describes how spiritual progress is seen to be 'a move 'forward,' away from 'tradition' and into a new kind of religiosity, one that involves conscious and conscientious commitment' (Deeb, 2006 p. 5). It is, she asserts, women who play the key role in this process 'as women's practices and morality have often been constructed as necessary to collective identities.' (Deeb, 2006 p. 5) By picking apart what is meant by modernity, she shows how this group of Shia women's views of development and progress are juxtaposed with ideas of ignorance and tradition (Deeb, 2006 p. 19). In this view, a conscious committed piety is a rejection of tradition, not an expression of it.

Further, Islamic movements can enable women to access 'a legitimate place in a public sphere which otherwise might be blocked to them, and which in certain circumstances they might be able to subvert for their purposes' (Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010 p. 63). Azzam also emphasises women's active participation in Islamic movements, which even though it does not amount to a 'radical shift' in their position, does make women more visible in society and gives them a greater opportunity to participate in public life

(Azzam, 1996 p. 222). Here she suggests that women might find public life more accessible ‘under the umbrella of Islam’ than through other means, as long as they adhere to rules about the approved forms of appearance and range of subjects and opinions which they are expected to stick to (Azzam, 1996 p. 222). Cherifati-Merabtine describes how women in the Islamist movement in Algeria ‘engage in socio-educative activities’ such as visiting the poor and providing extra classes for children (Cherifati-Merabtine, 1994 p. 57). Therefore, Islamic movements can help women to gain access to the public sphere and participate in public engagement which they might not have been able to do within other contexts.

There are also important anti-colonial ideological associations with women's religiosity in the Middle East which bestow a sense of 'authenticity' upon Islamic movements, rendering them particularly attractive in post-colonial and colonised states (Azzam, 1996 pp. 217-218). The way that Islam has in some cases become associated with anti-western sentiment makes adherence to Islamic goals an act of subversion of the global political elite and can bestow extra significance to adopting markers of piety. When Islam is rhetorically counterposed with a 'morally corrupt and imperialistic West' and 'privileged local elites seen as aping the West' as it often is, then political Islam becomes imbued with the appearance of 'moral rectitude and cultural integrity' (Kandiyoti, 1997 p. 6). In many Muslim societies a narrow elite have adopted a westernised lifestyle complete with feminist ideology, and in this context the 'popular classes' have often used Islam as a way to 'express their alienation' from these groups, and as a source of comfort in the midst of rapid changes (Azzam, 1996 p. 220; Kandiyoti, 1991a p. 8; Kandiyoti, 1997 p. 6; Moghadam, 1994 p. 9).

Furthermore, scholars have also suggested a connection between education and women's participation in the Islamic movement. On the one hand, the Islamic movement has been widely supportive of women's education, while on the other, women are using their increased knowledge to find 'inspiration to excel' within Islam and to enter into religious discourse (Azzam, 1996 p. 221; Hegland, 1999 p. 183).

These views show how Islam can place a challenge to backwards traditions, and Islamist movements can enable women to take a more active role in society. They highlight the importance of Islam as a potentially empowering discourse for women, but simultaneously it is a discourse which, unlike feminism, is not seen as a threat to

social cohesion or cultural norms. Many modern women in the Middle East are therefore able, through Islam, to seek an improved status, while adhering to seemingly authentic and non-westernised social structures. Azzam writes: ‘For some women, an Islamic framework of reference is the only really viable means for change, since it would allow them to remain within the bounds accepted by society and which men cannot attack because it is based on Islam.’ (Azzam, 1996 p. 227) Kandiyoti also suggests that it might be more effective for women, when faced with a patriarchal society, to secure protection by appealing to men's obligations 'from within an Islamic discourse' (Kandiyoti, 1997 p. 6). Hegland suggests that most women in the Middle East

> *‘live in a social environment, which makes it difficult to overtly resist religious pronouncements on gender and the dependent status of women. Judging it difficult or even dangerous to turn their backs on their social communities, these women must work to find ways to address their spiritual and social needs without obviously straying outside of state, community, family, and self-imposed boundaries.’ (Hegland, 1999 p. 178)*

Understanding these views can help to elucidate the various roles of symbols such as the veil/hijab/headscarf. While colonisers thought that 'Islam innately oppressed women, and that the veil and segregation epitomized that oppression.' (Chatty and Rabo, 1997 p. 15). In practice ‘There is no single reason why women veil, and in some cases women may veil as a sign of their own agency.’ (Sharoni, 1995 p. 27) Abu Lughod suggests that ‘modern Islamic modest dress that many educated women across the Muslim world have taken on since the mid-1970s now both publicly marks piety and can be read as a sign of educated urban sophistication, a sort of modernity’ (Lughod, 2002 p. 786). In fact, the issue of veiling now encompasses 'far broader issues than merely the position of women' such as the conflict 'between the colonized and the colonizers’ (Chatty and Rabo, 1997 p. 15). Azzam also highlights this point. She explains that wearing a hijab for some, not only fulfils a religious duty, but it is also a rejection of westernisation and the ‘sexual promiscuity and decadence’ associated with western fashions (Azzam, 1996 p. 225). Further, wearing a hijab allows a woman to be judged for more than her physical appearance while also discouraging male sexual harassment in public (Azzam, 1996 p. 225). Hegland agrees that wearing a veil can allow women greater mobility and access to work and education, with less

'approbation and harassment'. As such, she suggests that women 'veil to further their own goals' (Hegland, 1999 p. 193). Kandiyoti gives the examples of how Islamic dress allows conservative women to access education providing 'mobility rather than seclusion' (Kandiyoti, 1997 p. 6).

In Ahmed's authoritative account of the role of the veil, she sees 'Islamic dress' as the 'visible emblem' of the Islamist movement in Egypt (Ahmed, 1992 p. 217). By dressing in Islamic dress women describe how they gain 'inner peace' and respect from others, while also discouraging harassment from men in public (Ahmed, 1992 p. 223). She acknowledges that veiled women are more conservative than non-veiled women and less feminist in terms of their expectations of women's education and entrance into the workplace (Ahmed, 1992 p. 226). Ahmed does, however, highlight the striking levels of similarity in attitudes between veiled and unveiled women and the findings that 'the overwhelming majority of veiled women support women's rights to education and work, that a majority support equality in public life and equal political rights, and that a substantial proportion support equality in marriage', suggesting that the conventional view of veiled women as 'committed to the view that women's place is in the home' is incorrect (Ahmed, 1992 p. 227). She describes how the 'sum of their responses on matters of women's roles and rights indicates that most were consistently *for* education, *for* the right to employment, *for* avenues of professional achievement being open to women, and *for* equal political rights' (Ahmed, 1992 p. 227). Ahmed suggests that veiled women's views are more progressive for women's rights than the position set out for women as 'identified with traditional Islam' and the conventional interpretations of the shari'a.' (Ahmed, 1992 p. 227). These views point to the veil not so much symbolising the oppression of women but rather some of the many ways in which modern women negotiate their relationship with Islam and society.

A relatively new, but contentious, development is the emergence of Islamic feminism. This movement promotes the reinterpretation of religious texts so as to 'remove the fetters imposed by centuries of patriarchal interpretation and practice' (Al-Labadi, 2014 p. 169). Islamic feminists seek to support and enhance women's status without doing away with Islam as a whole (Akhami and Friedl, 1997 p. xiii). This movement has had 'wide resonance' among Muslims and non-Muslims (Esfandiari and Badran, 2010

p. 7). Akhami and Friedl and Masoud et al. suggest that Islamic feminism seems to be successful in improving attitudes towards gender equality. They stress the difficulties women face in trying to gain their rights, often having to confront the fundamental bases of their communities; 'the family, the village, the workplace, the city, male-female relations. They must dare to displease those who are near them emotionally and on whom they depend in times of need.' (Akhami and Friedl, 1997 p. xiii). In this context, they suggest that 'separating cultural conditions that impede women's rights from "Islam" often are crucial to success' because people are more willing to do away with customs than with their religion (Akhami and Friedl, 1997 p. xiii). Masoud et al. measured support for women's political leadership after hearing religious and non-religious justifications for it (Masoud, et al., 2016 p. 1). They find that: 'Respondents exposed to a Qur'ānically justified argument in favor of female political leadership were more likely to express acceptance of women in power than were those exposed to an equivalent, non-religious argument, or to not argument at all.' (Masoud, et al., 2016 p. 3) This suggests that Islamic feminism might be a good method for promoting greater gender equality.

However, the movement has faced substantial criticism. Masoud et al. voice their concern for the 'pitfalls' inherent in Islamic feminism, suggesting it risks delegitimising secularists, promoting a restricted version of gender equality and excluding certain women (Masoud, et al., 2016 p. 36). They conclude:

> *'We are unable to resolve this debate. We can only offer evidence on the efficacy of an Islamic feminist rhetorical strategy, and leave to activists and theorists the greater task of determining whether the gains to be had from deploying Islamic rhetoric and symbols in service of women's rights are outweighed by the potential costs of doing so.' (Masoud, et al., 2016 p. 36)*

Esfandiari and Badran express their concern that Islamic feminism is portraying itself as an 'indigenous' feminism at the expense of secular feminism (Esfandiari and Badran, 2010 p. 3). Barakat calls it a 'reconciliatory apologetic reformist trend' (Barakat, 1985, 1994 p. 33). Meriwether and Tucker suggest that some feminists in the region 'argue that to engage with the "Islamic" discourse on gender is a mistake' because it is a system which cannot be rehabilitated and so engaging with it is a waste of time (Meriwether and Tucker, 1999 p. 8). While the debate surrounding the efficacy of

Islamic feminism is unresolved, its arguments have nonetheless been filtering into the mainstream of women within Islam, bolstering views of Islam as by no means antithetical to the empowerment of women.

These developments and the synthesis of elements that might usually be considered as conservative with potentially subversive or empowering gender positions is not exclusive to the Middle East. In feminist literature in the West, there are several examples of similar phenomena. The scholar Kaplan, for example, emphasises the radical potential of conservative women in her case study of women in Barcelona, where ‘to fulfil women's obligations, they rebelled against the state’ (Kaplan, 1982 p. 76). She posits that women with female consciousness defend their women's work of 'preserving life' and will fight all those who interfere with this work whether ‘left or right, male or female’ (Kaplan, 1982 p. 76). In a study of Catholicism and the republic in France, Sudda and Itçaina found that conservative women's organisations which were dedicatedly anti-feminist and opposed to female suffrage, ‘paradoxically provided frameworks for political socialization’ in their efforts to support the Catholic political agenda (Sudda and Itçaina, 2011). Rinehart also suggests that women of the New Right, although dedicated to conservative gender roles, often breach these norms in order to speak out in their defence (Rinehart, 1992 pp. 15-16). These views highlight the problems in viewing conservative movements as inherently and homogenously enforcing the submission of women and puts Islamist women into a much broader context of conservatism creating opportunities for female empowerment.

Here it is worth suggesting exploring the following hypothesis:

> ***H3b: Religious women are more feminist (supportive of gender equality) than the average societal level of support for gender equality.***

Understanding these nuances and the locations where Islam can be, or is felt to be, empowering is important in countering simplistic - and even dangerous - portrayals of Muslim women as victims of patriarchy (Ahmed, 1992 p. 167; Masoud, et al., 2016 p. 4; Sharoni, 1995 p. 28; Abu-Lughod, 2002). This picture questions assumptions which associate religion with tradition as is proposed, for example, in the Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap (Inglehart and Norris, 2000). It also shows how women have managed to find a space for female empowerment within a religious context,

therefore accounting for the role of community and responsibility, while rejecting the colonial, sexualised connotations of western feminism.

This picture veers away from explanations for the gender gap put forward in the literature. If Islamist discourse provides an alternative route towards gaining greater rights, which does not put women on a collision course with societal norms, it might be that some women who seek greater rights for women adopt this path rather than the western feminist path. This reaffirms the expectation that women are more likely to consider themselves religious ***(H2a)*** but positions this as an active decision that holds the possibility of empowerment. Women might be more religious because they are making use of the opportunities and increased rights and status afforded them through demonstrating religiosity.

iv) Nationalism, Feminism and Religion

I have not found nationalism included in western explanations of political gender gaps. This may be because most of the literature deals with states where, while nationalism is certainly present, it is perhaps not as pervasive as it might be in a colonial or post-colonial context. However, I consider nationalism to be a powerful shaper of Palestinian politics acting to define certain forms of behaviour and beliefs which are both integral and potentially damaging to the national project of ending the occupation. For the reasons set out below, I consider that nationalism plays an important and complicated role in mediating between how gender and belief might impact political support.

Yuval-Davis has written the most authoritative text on gender and nationalism. She proposes that although gender has usually been excluded from analyses of nationalism it is inherently gendered (Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010). She contends that all 'constructions of nationhood usually involve specific notions of both 'manhood' and 'womanhood'.' (Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010 p. 1).

Ethnic conceptions of nationalism, which emphasise blood, genealogy and 'kinship', can often be related to policies governing women's bodies and reproduction (Moghadam, 1994; Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010). This has been the case in several nationalist projects where 'some or all women of childbearing age groups would be called on, sometimes bribed, and sometimes even forced, to have more, or fewer,

children’ in order to increase, decrease or improve the 'national stock'' (Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010 p. 22). These forms of nationalism that conceive of women's role ‘primarily as reproducers' have tended to be viewed negatively by feminist scholars who see them as having the potential for both sexist and racial discrimination (Abdo, 1994 p. 150).

Cultural forms of nationalism also have implications for women, who often are portrayed as the symbols of the nation and are given responsibility for reproducing the ideas that define it and passing them on to successive generations (Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010 p. 23). Yuval-Davis explains that in the search for ‘cultural authenticity’, women are often forced into what the leadership perceive to be traditional, apparently ‘authentic’ female roles (Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010). These nationalist discourses are problematic for women because they also become constructed as ‘the bearers of the collectivity's honour’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010 p. 45). Women are often used to determine the 'us' and 'them' of nationalist movements, by embodying the 'nation' and performing the role of symbolic border guards or boundary markers (Kandiyoti, 1991b p. 441; Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010 p. 23). Meaning that, ‘Women, in their ‘proper’ behaviour, their ‘proper’ clothing, embody the line which signifies the collectivity’s boundaries.’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010 p. 46) Women may signal the cultural difference of the nation or group through their dress and deportment (Kandiyoti, 1991b p. 435). Deeb in her study of the Shia community in Lebanon, describes how ‘the burden of cultural authenticity and the markers of public piety fall more heavily on the shoulders of women than men’ (Deeb, 2006 p. 31). In order to demonstrate their public piety, women 'perform' their religious identity, ‘in what jewelry is worn, which clothing is chosen, or how a scarf is pinned.’ (Deeb, 2006 p. 36).

Often gender relations are seen as the bedrock of a culture, with a particular emphasis on the domestic. Yuval-Davis writes:

> *‘The construction of ‘home’ is of particular importance here, including relations between adults and between adults and children in the family, ways of cooking and eating, domestic labour, play and bedtime stories, out of which a whole world view, ethical and aesthetic, can become naturalized and reproduced.’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010 p. 43)*

Sometimes religious markers are used in definitions and perceptions of the nation. Yuval-Davis argues that when this happens, religious symbols ‘can become some of the most intractable and inflexible symbolic border guards of specific collectivity boundaries and cultural traditions’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010 p. 42). Moghadam highlights that in nationalist Islamist movements, ‘women assume the onerous burden of a largely male-defined tradition and are cast as the embodiment of cultural identity and the custodians of cultural values' (Moghadam, 1994 p. 9). She suggests that women diverge on whether they view this as 'an exalted position' or as 'a form of social control' depending on their attitudes towards the Islamist movement (Moghadam, 1994 p. 9).

Where culture and religion are privileged parts of the discourse of a national project, the implications of religious or cultural non-conformity are much higher. To break away from expectations is, somehow, to fracture or betray the national project. Therefore, transgressions and 'deviant' or defiant behaviour can provoke often violent reprisals from the collective, and conforming behaviour can be coercively imposed (Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010 pp. 45-46). For example, campaigns of forced veiling in post-revolutionary Iran and the use of the veil in Algeria after the civil war might be seen as examples of this (Moghadam, 1994 p. 6; Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010 p. 61). Al-Ali finds that in Egypt, as in many other post-colonial societies, women are at the centre of tensions between 'the pursuit of modernization, attempts at liberalization, a pervasive nationalist rhetoric of ‘authenticity’ and ongoing imperialist encroachments' (Al-Ali, 2000 p. 1). She suggests that these tensions impact women activists who fear 'transgressing the norms' of their society, particularly regarding issues of national identity (Al-Ali, 2000 p. 2).

Kandiyoti suggests that where nationalism is framed in Islamic terms, feminist discourse can only take two forms, without risking alienation, 'either denying that Islamic practices are necessarily oppressive or asserting that oppressive practices are not necessarily Islamic' (Kandiyoti, 1991b p. 433). These two strategies have been used widely in the Middle East and can be seen in the Islamic feminist movement described above.

Kandiyoti strongly condemns cultural nationalism and suggests that ‘Wherever women continue to serve as boundary markers between different national, ethnic and

religious collectivities, their emergence as full-fledged citizens will be jeopardised, and whatever rights they may have achieved during one stage of nation-building may be sacrificed on the altar of identity politics during another.' (Kandiyoti, 1991b p. 435) Cultural nationalism reinforces the pressures on women to conform to social pressures.

Even civic nationalism, the most inclusive type, is gendered, often through the intimate links between nationhood and the military (Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010 p. 89). Women have been excluded from much access to state power and authority, with lower levels of women in most legislative, executive and judicial positions, although this is changing. Kandiyoti writes that 'The apparent convergence between the interests of men and the definition of national priorities leads some feminists to suggest that the state itself is a direct expression of men's interests.' (Kandiyoti, 1991b p. 429)

Although nationalism has often been seen by feminists as bad for women's rights, several nationalist movements, particularly those that were revolutionary or 'liberation struggles', have espoused women's emancipation, because 'women's emancipation is seen to symbolize the emancipation of the people as a whole.' (Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010 p. 101).

While some scholars praise the social transformations precipitated by liberatory nationalist movements (Barakat, 1985, 1994 p. 35), other scholars have warned that even when movements have espoused the rhetoric of women's emancipation, this does not inevitably lead towards it (Abdo, 1994 p. 150; Jamal, 2001 p. 257; Moghadam, 1994 p. 2; Jayawardena, 1986). Indeed, as Jamal warns, in most cases women are not granted their due, even when they have been actively involved in the nationalist struggle. Jamal describes how, 'In many cases, women experienced a "backlash" or retreat in their position after independence was achieved.' (Jamal, 2001 p. 257)

More often, nationalist movements deprioritise women's emancipation. In the context of occupation or of a struggle against colonialism, the nationalist cause is put above all else. Those who seek to promote their own interests are seen as distracting from, or even a risk to, the more important issues and nationalist movement as a whole (Kandiyoti, 1991b p. 433; Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010 p. 117).

Nevertheless, it should be noted that many women join and actively support nationalist movements and organisations. In contexts of 'nationalist mobilization' the nationalist struggle is, for most women, more important than the struggle for women's rights (Alison, 2009 p. 218). Even feminist women participate in nationalist movements but often it is difficult to maintain and balance the two priorities (Alison, 2009 p. 218). Those involved in the nationalist movement suggest that 'equality between men and women cannot be realised under conditions of oppression' (Ness, 2008 p. 15). This view may however be seen as an excuse given by nationalist leaders who are reluctant to challenge the structure of gender relations and potentially divide the nationalist movement (Ness, 2008 pp. 15-16).

Jayawardena suggests that participation in nationalist movements has been a crucial step in the development of feminist movements in the 'third world' because it 'pushed [women] into participating in the political life of their communities' even if ultimately some of their newly found freedoms ended up being circumscribed by the male leadership (Jayawardena, 1986 p. 257).

Nationalism, then, interacts in complex ways with gender. Where nationalist discourses embrace a revolutionary, emancipatory discourse, there may be an opportunity for women to secure and obtain greater social, economic and political freedom. However, where national projects use cultural or religious rhetoric, it is likely that women will be encouraged to conform to certain 'proper' behaviours.

The above discussion suggests that in a political context dominated by a nationalist discourse, there will be less scope for women to adopt potentially socially divisive behaviours. If women's emancipation has not been embedded within the rhetoric of national liberation, feminism could be seen as a 'divisive' behaviour and as such discouraged. This might result in gender equality being relegated as a political priority and therefore playing a smaller role in determining political support ***(H3)***. The gendering of nationalism also suggests that there is a great deal of pressure on women to conform to appropriate gender roles in the context of ethnic or cultural nationalisms. Accordingly, depending on the prevalent framing of nationalist rhetoric, it may encourage religious and conservative behaviour, particularly among women, who are often expected to protect and promote the national culture. This strengthens

the theoretical support for the hypothesis that women will be more religious than men ***(H2a).***

Figure 5.a Part of a mural in Ramallah, 27th February 2016, Minna Cowper-Coles

In the Occupied Palestinian Territories, nationalism is the 'overall guiding meta-frame for Palestinian politics' (Aggestam, 1999 p. 68); it pervades not just the political but also the social realm (Richter-Devroe, 2008 pp. 36-37). Palestinian nationalism is a wide and diverse discourse made up of revolutionary, ethnic, cultural and religious elements. The nationalist discourses vary between different groups and have changed over time.

Early revolutionary forms of Palestinian nationalism, particularly those promoted by the PFLP and other 'leftist' groups, emphasised active participation in the struggle for both women and men. Several women took part in the guerrilla activities during the 1960s and 1970s. Most famous among them is Leila Khaled, who hijacked airplanes with the PFLP. She is memorialised in Palestine where her face is still painted on walls urging others to keep fighting (Irving, 2012, see also Figure 6.b). Indeed, early resistance slogans include 'Women must carry a gun', and a prominent Palestinian National Council member wrote 'In the revolution we need women comrades who are

intelligent and educated; we cannot reach victory flying on one wing' (cited in Antonius, 1979 p. 26).

Many activist women hoped that by participating in the national struggle they would be taking a step towards gender equality. Some Palestinian women's rights activists have tried to tie women's position in society to the question of the national struggle (Aweidah and Omar, 2013 p. 14; Peteet, 1991 p. 97). They maintain that 'Palestinian women experience oppression not only due to their national identity but also based on their gender and class identities' (Sharoni, 1995 p. 78). The idea of interlocking oppression has led to the suggestion that as long as women participate in the struggle, women's emancipation will come with national liberation (Sharoni, 1995 p. 88). Peteet also describes a 'specifically Palestinian feminist perspective' which sought to link nationalist and feminist behaviour (Peteet, 1991 p. 72). This idea was borne out in my interviewees. Many women expressed their belief that women's liberation and Palestinian liberation should go hand-in-hand (F17; F21x; F23x). F21x, an activist with Fatah, told me that women's liberation and Palestinian liberation should come "together, because the freedom of people is the freedom of the nation" (F21x). F23x, who had also been an activist, said that the two were linked and that the women's movement's slogan used to be "partner in the struggle" (F23x).

For the most part, however, the nationalist context has tended to somewhat eclipse the feminist movement (Abdulhadi, 1998 p. 656; Aweidah and Omar, 2013 p. 14). Even the more radical elements of the Palestinian national struggle prioritises the 'potency and unity of the nation' over the issues faced by individuals and social subgroups (Sharoni, 1995 p. 36). This has meant that throughout Palestinian history few women have labelled themselves as explicitly feminist (Peteet, 1991 pp. 97, 172; Richter-Devroe, 2008 p. 40; Sharoni, 1995 p. 2). As Jamal writes: 'The primacy of the nationalist discourse has rendered women's rights secondary.' (Jamal, 2001 p. 258) Research in both 1983 and 2013 show the endurance of the belief that women's rights should be subordinated to those of the nation (Sayigh, 1983; Aweidah and Omar, 2013 p. 48). Richter-Devroe writes:

> *'the majority of Palestinian women not only construct their identity and choose their agency in line with this resistance discourse, they are also expected to do so. They (are expected to) view themselves, first of all, as Palestinians resisting the occupation, before*

their status as women in patriarchal society can be discussed. Drastically challenging these expectations and normative structures might not only be dangerous, by producing too strong a reaction from conservative forces, it might also be detrimental to women's struggle for both national and gender liberation.' (Richter-Devroe, 2008 pp. 36-37)

This view was also expressed by some of those I interviewed (F16; M20; F33). F16 told me: "For me priorities are different, for me the priorities are not women's rights, children's rights, for me priorities are Palestine and liberation and then comes women's rights and children's rights and homosexuals' [rights]" (F16). M20 said: "So the priority now for all Palestinians for women or men is the conflict with Israel, not the rights... all other things will come after." (M20)

Scholars suggest that women's involvement in the nationalist movement might have achieved small transformations in 'women's lives and perceptions of their societal roles' (Massad, 1995 p. 482), often as 'an accidental consequence of their determination to carry out some political action, such as a demonstration, which entailed a flouting of conventional mores' (Antonius, 1979 p. 26). However, it has not 'significantly changed the way Palestinian nationalist thought conceives [of] Palestinian women. They are still considered subordinate members of the nation.' (Massad, 1995 p. 482)

After the high point of the First Intifada, where women of all ages and classes participated alongside men, women became increasingly aware that 'their full participation in the struggle for national liberation did not necessarily guarantee improvements in their social and political status' (Sharoni, 1995 p. 88). This disappointment became concrete with the formation of the PA in the early-mid 1990s, which was seen to undo a lot of the work women had put into the struggle. Women's roles were not acknowledged in the founding of the institutions of state (Sharoni, 1995 p. 49). Nor were they equally represented. Women constituted, for example, only 3 percent of the PA government (Jamal, 2001 p. 274). Abdo argues that 'Traditional patriarchy within Palestinian political culture has been solidified under the PA.' (Abdo, 1999 p. 40) Jamal describes how the PA reinforced traditional family patriarchal structures and so the PA came to endorse 'the primacy of man' (Jamal, 2001 p. 274).

An analysis by Giacaman et al. of the PLO's 'General Program for National Economic Development' highlights the extent to which women's needs were excluded from and

ignored within the plans of the proto-state of the Palestinian Authority (Giacaman, et al., 1996 p. 12). Abdo describes the non-meritocratic and non-democratic appointment of positions within the PA to those with the right connections rather than 'the necessary qualifications' as reinforcing clan structures and blocking women's access to the public sphere (Abdo, 1999 pp. 40-41). She also examines the legal bases of social relations under the PA, such as definitions of citizenship which benefit men and husbands at the expense of women and wives (Abdo, 1999 pp. 43-44).

Abdo and Jamal also criticise the continued presence of sharia law as the basis for family law in Palestine under the PA - laws which Karmi suggests 'unquestionably discriminate against women' (Karmi, 1996 p. 75; Abdo, 1999 pp. 43-44; Jamal, 2001 p. 266). Jamal describes how the PA would often refuse to work with the women's movement, 'in order not to alienate conservative religious sentiments and not to strengthen the Islamic opposition' (Jamal, 2001 p. 271). Jamal suggests that the formation of the PA has led to the fracturing of the women's movement (Jamal, 2001 pp. 263-264).

Women who wanted to continue to seek equal rights after the First Intifada often joined or founded women's rights NGOs. These are often seen to have strayed from the nationalist cause and grassroots women's movements because of their dependence on international donors and their need to address western feminist concerns to get this funding. Richter-Devroe writes that 'most urban-based professional women's NGOs have gradually lost and continue to lose their constituencies, leaving the huge burden of responding to women's practical needs to smaller local women's groups and charitable organizations' (Richter-Devroe, 2008 p. 43).

Interestingly, in my interviews, I found that when discussing the women who support the PFLP, a 'leftist', 'revolutionary' organisation which explicitly supports gender equality, I was told that it was "for women's rights" but also there was a "stigma" attached to PFLP women (F15). I was told that the PFLP only cared about "making parties and girls dancing all over the place" (M10), and that PFLP women "are the ones that smoke, and that drink and go out with the guys... it's like they are super free can do whatever they want" (F15). One interviewee said that the 'leftists' are "told to date boys" (M40). F17, who was sympathetic to the PFLP and had herself found that as a

party it was “easier for women” to be a member, told me that the stereotype was that it was a party for “sexual” people (F17). M41 said that PFLP women do not care about going “against the culture” and that they might say “I drink. I don’t care” or “Why should I get married in order to have sex” (M41). These examples of the stereotypes of ‘leftist’ women show the social criticism which women who might opt for supporting these secular groups might face. While it is unclear as to whether these views have emerged recently, they do tend to suggest that the tide has turned on the emancipatory radical nationalism. Fatah has evolved into the Palestinian Authority and quietly reduced its commitment to women’s rights while the ‘leftists’ are seen as too feminist and as such threatening Palestinian culture. These developments have undermined somewhat the logic that national liberation - and women's role within that struggle - would open the way for women's emancipation.

In this context, more conservative biological, ethnic, cultural and religious forms of nationalism have had an increased influence on the political scene.

Palestinian nationalist discourse often emphasises women’s role as the 'fertile mother' (Abdulhadi, 1998 p. 655). The emphasis on women as mothers has been shaped in response to Israel with whom a 'demographic race' has been developing over the decades (Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010 pp. 30-36; Abdo, 1994 p. 151; Abdulhadi, 1998 p. 655; Sharoni, 1995 p. 34). Yasser Arafat is reputed to have called on women to have twelve children each (Abdulhadi, 1998 p. 655). In her ethnography of Dheisheh Camp, Gren describes how this was problematic for inhabitants of the camp: '[A] dilemma was that of childbearing: should one have many children in response to nationalist calls to outnumber Israelis and to a kin ideology demanding many men, or should one have few so as to be sure of being able to support them?’ (Gren, 2015 p. 191) Abdo cites the slogan that ‘Israelis beat us at the borders but we beat them in the bedrooms’ and famous Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish's poem which includes the lines: ‘‘Write down I am an Arab... I have eight children and the ninth will come next summer... Are you angry?’’ as evidence of the significance of the 'demographic war' where Palestinian Arab's increased fertility is considered a threat by Israel (Abdo, 1994 p. 151). One interviewee told me: “in our struggle even pregnancy is something important... because it’s an existential struggle” (F17).

Giacaman has found pro-natalist policies enshrined in policy documents such as the General Program for National Economic Development which provides birth allowances of $90 per child (while limiting maternity leave to two-months rather than the UN's recommended three months) (Giacaman, et al., 1996 p. 15). Jamal describes how women activists were confronted and restrained by nationalist ideology: 'Palestinian women were ideologically defined to suit the official priorities of the PLO and had to bear the burden of being "mothers of the nation." They were encouraged to concentrate on grassroots activity leaving the main battlefield-military or political-to "real soldiers".' (Jamal, 2001 pp. 258-259) The role of women as mothers has been most controversial with the rise to prominence of mothers of suicide bombers during the Second Intifada. Chehab describes Umm Nidal or Miriam Farhat who had three sons who died as suicide bombers and herself became a Hamas icon and member of the PLC (Chehab, 2007 pp. 85-87). She saw women's important role in the conflict being to give birth to children willing to fight and die for the cause (Chehab, 2007 p. 87). Other scholars have emphasised women as mothers in a more protective role, defending boys from the Israeli forces, acting as witnesses and remonstrating with the soldiers (Peteet, 2000 p. 119). For the most part, Palestinian nationalism's focus on women as mothers has restricted and marginalised women (Jamal, 2001 p. 275).

There has also been a gradually changing cultural conception of nationalism in Palestine. The connection between culture and the national struggle came through in my interviews. F33 told me “If we lose part of the culture, we could be losing part of being Palestinian.” (F33) F28 suggested the importance of “food, culture, songs, dresses” (F28). Cultural symbols, such as dabke dancing, the *kufiya* and the embroidered Palestinian woman’s thobe [dress] have all been used in explicitly nationalistic ways at demonstrations against the occupation, and often came up in interviews (Peteet, 1991 pp. 107, 200; Sharoni, 1995 p. 64; F10; F16; F17). While these symbols and their prominence do not serve explicitly to restrict women’s roles, instead it is the more general emphasis that nationalist rhetoric places upon women's cultural roles and the subtler insistence on certain culturally appropriate forms of behaviour that has relegated women ‘to the domestic sphere’ (Abdo, 1999 pp. 42-43).

Culturally appropriate nationalist behaviour, in accordance with boundary-marker, mothering and domesticated roles, have been encouraged for women by the

nationalist movement. Women have often been encouraged to participate in the national struggle through '*sumud*' which is 'steadfastness in the face of adversity'. This is usually understood to manifest itself in 'stubbornly and defiantly' remaining on the land in the face of attacks and hostility (Peteet, 1991 p. 153). This non-active nationalism plays an important part in giving the message that the Palestinians will not be forced off their land. Peteet and others equate the qualities of *sumud* with the characteristics associated with femininity: 'silent endurance and sacrifice for others'. *Sumud* has meant that the non-action of many ordinary women has been deemed a nationalist act (Peteet, 1991 p. 153; Sharoni, 1995 p. 35).

Other forms of gendered nationalist behaviour include involvement in charitable or social work, raising awareness, or increasing self-sufficiency through economic projects, care or education (Sayigh, 1981). The attraction of these roles is that women can perform them, and support the national cause, without breaking with societal norms and avoiding the risks associated with non-conformist behaviour. Their effect is to reaffirm traditional forms of women's behaviour, such as embroidery, caring or food production, with only slight alterations to include community work or political awareness.

In the last few decades Palestinian national culture has been reinterpreted through an Islamist lens. The Islamisation of Palestinian society has reflected a growing Islamisation in the region and has been signalled through the women's 'increasingly modest dress code', with the veil becoming increasingly prevalent (Caridi, 2012 pp. 91-92). F13x told me how the "Islamisation of women" started after "Khomeini's revolution in 1979" until "even women who are not Hamas nor very religious, are obliged to wear the veil in certain areas" (F13x). This Islamic framework replicates and supports the gendered roles proposed by nationalist rhetoric. Hamas has successfully promoted the idea that there is a 'causal relationship between victory and adherence to Islamic faith' (Hroub, 2000 p. 237). Initially promoted during the First Intifada, modesty was seen to reflect the view that 'Palestine was in mourning' and a degree of solemnity and respect was expected from the population (Caridi, 2012 p. 91). This idea seems to have gained considerable traction with men and women; it has extended beyond Islamists and Hamas supporters (Caridi, 2012 p. 92). This has led to some

individuals seeing ‘living a religious life as a mode of political resistance’ (Abdo, 1994 p. 165).

Several interviewees described the nationalist project in this way to me. F1 told me: "we have this belief that our Palestine will be free if we believe in the right Islam and we achieve good values” (F1). This view was repeated by F20 when she said: “Religion is the base or root of the society, and we pray to God, so he will be with us and give us a solution. God asks us to defend our home and our land and our self, our honour, our everything and our dignity.” (F20) F22 explained that “People connect al-watan [the nation] with religion... ‘Why are you protecting the homeland?’ ‘Because we need to fight for God – because God ordered us to fight in Palestine’” (F22). These views make moral behaviour a nationalist statement. These Islamist conceptions of nationalism have ‘offered an alternative "authentic" space for women who could now organize without having to worry about violating social norms’ (Abdulhadi, 1998 p. 659).

Palestinian nationalism is clearly gendered; it has worked to reshape and reprioritise different forms of behaviour and political agendas. It has served, for the most part, to minimise the influence of the feminist and women's movement and prioritise female behaviour which conforms to traditional gender norms in terms of domesticity and morality. It is particularly difficult to become a feminist in Palestine. A feminist scholar herself, F12x, explained the obstacles that feminist movements face in Palestine:

> *“When women decide to change and be empowered, there is a big sacrifice... what happens is then a fight within the family and then they talk about them as women who are deviants you know, who are not abiding by the customs and traditions, so they are bad women, so they become stigmatised. So, this is the sacrifice that they have to pay if really they take the decision of becoming autonomous. So, most of the women don’t do that, why would they do that, just to have you know, an independent character or whatever. But other women are really fighting for their own rights. But these are still a minority” (F12x)*

Feminist rhetoric in favour of women’s rights is often seen to undermine either the national project (it is not the priority) or your personal reputation (sexual ‘leftist’ women). Additionally, the mainstream nationalist movement is seen to have excluded and deprioritised women when it came to founding the PA. It has further fortified conservative views of ideal womanhood. These developments have served to decouple the feminist and nationalist agendas. The outcome being that pursuing women's rights

is increasingly perceived as working *against* the national struggle. These perceptions have been increased with nationalist conceptions of women's rights taking an increasingly conservative turn.

The role of nationalism, therefore, might mean women and men are less supportive of promoting gender equality when it is seen to challenge social cohesion or nationally and religiously condoned forms of behaviour.

> ***H3c: Gender differences in feminism (support for gender equality) do not extend to behaviours which breach 'accepted' forms of behaviour.***

Further, as described above, feminism is likely to play less of a role in determining political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and as such it is less likely to explain the gender gap ***(H3).***

Biological, cultural and religious conceptions of women's roles in Palestinian nationalism have both reinforced traditional gender structures (which emphasise the gendered division of labour), while making it particularly important for society to police women's morality and women's bodies. If women's morality represents the integrity of the nation, and a woman's body represents the potential for the nation to reproduce, violation could be seen as an attack on the nation. For women in this context, the risks of nonconformity are high. This has meant that there is a greater motivation for women who care about the national struggle to abide by social norms and commit themselves to pious behaviour.

Historical experience, and the nationalist colonial distaste for the more socially contentious forms of feminism, have encouraged the articulation of a women's rights discourse within an Islamist nationalist framework. Islamist rhetoric can be used both to reinforce traditional values or to critique them in a way which does not undermine the national project in the same way that feminist and secular rhetoric might be seen to do.

As nationalism continues to take priority, and with the secular versions of nationalism presented by the 'leftists' and, to a certain extent by Fatah, losing credibility, it is likely that the Islamic version of nationalism will hold sway for the time being. With it, it is likely that women will continue to be more religious than men.

There is also a greater need and emphasis placed upon restricting women's movements. If women's bodies need to be protected, and their morality guarded, then it is the duty of society to ensure that women will not be placed in situations which could put them at risk. By restricting women's movements ***(H2b)*** and guarding their morality, and equating piety with national struggle, the nationalist discourse gives a greater opportunity, space and power to women's piety.

B Beliefs and Political Preferences

It has been established above that women are likely to be more religious than men, and that religiosity is an important feature of the Palestinian social context, in part, at least, because of the way it has been linked to nationalist discourse. It is also suggested that women might support gender equality more than men, but that pressure for gender equality has been dampened by the nationalist context (which prioritises the national struggle and discourages support for any movement which is potentially socially divisive). This section moves on to assess how these gender differences might impact support for the two major political groups in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. First I will briefly review how the literature on the gender gap relates feminism and religion with political preferences, before considering the differences and similarities with the Palestinian case.

The gender gap literature points to both feminism and religion as possible (and partial) explanations of gender differences in political support. Most studies link religiosity with voting for more right-wing or conservative parties (Barisione, 2014 p. 121; Conover, 1988 p. 995; Inglehart and Norris, 2000). Inglehart and Norris suggest that the attitudinal changes (towards the secular) that accompany economic development change the way women and men vote. They contend that greater female religiosity in 'traditional' societies is one of the reasons why women have voted for right-wing parties more often than men in these societies (Inglehart and Norris, 2003 p. 50).

However, there are several studies which question this, such as Kaufmann's study which finds women to be both more religious and more politically liberal than men (Kaufmann, 2002), and Howell and Day's finding that ‘the conservatizing effect of religiosity on political attitudes is more pronounced among males than females’ (Howell and Day, 2000 p. 869). Furthermore, Desposato and Norrander have found

that religion can both increase and decrease women's participation in politics, through either encouraging activity outside the home or by reinforcing traditional gender roles (Desposato and Norrander, 2008 p. 150).

Feminism is also proposed as an explanation for women's greater support for left-wing parties than men. Inglehart and Norris suggest that as class-based politics has subsided, gender equality has become more politically salient. Accordingly, it could be that 'the growth of feminist identity and consciousness has been the catalyst producing the modern gender gap in party support' (Inglehart and Norris, 2003 pp. 91-92). Conover suggested in 1988 that ‘there is not so much a gap between men and women as there is a gap between men and feminist women’ (Conover, 1988 p. 1005). She suggests this is caused by the distinctive set of values held by most feminist women (while non-feminist women hold values closer to those of men). She finds feminist women, compared to non-feminist women: ‘are more liberal, less racist, more egalitarian, less traditional morally and with regard to sex roles, and more sympathetic to the disadvantaged’ (Conover, 1988 p. 999). Bergh describes two ways feminism might impact political support:

> *‘First, feminists obviously favor equality between the sexes, which may also lead to generally egalitarian attitudes in other areas and finally translate into support for left-wing parties. Second, there may be a more direct effect between feminism and left-wing voting, in that left-of-center parties often support feminist objectives or feminist policies, which lead feminist to support these parties.’ (Bergh, 2007 p. 238)*

Some scholars contend this point, with Box-Steffensmeier et al. suggesting that gender differences on 'women's issues' are not the cause for the gender gap (Box-Steffensmeier, et al., 1997 p. 2; Cook and Wilcox, 1991).

The gender gap literature suggests the following hypotheses:

> ***H2c: Women are more likely than men to support a political party or movement whose values overlap with dominant religious principles.***
>
> ***H3d: Women are more likely than men to support a political party or movement that identifies itself as feminist (supportive of gender equality).***

However, in the context of the Palestinian Territories, religion will probably have greater political salience than feminism. Further, Islam has been portrayed as being

supportive of women's empowerment so the clear line between the two has begun to be blurred. Nonetheless it is worth exploring how Hamas and Fatah are associated with religion and feminism and therefore whether gender differences in beliefs might explain the gender gap in political support.

i) Hamas

The most obvious connection between the belief systems described above and political parties in Palestine, is the religious character of Hamas. Hamas has espoused an avowedly Islamist ideological stance and has used Islamic rhetoric to try to gain support (Gunning, 2007 p. 200). It uses Islam to inform and justify its political programme and it seeks to Islamise Palestinian, and particularly Gazan, society (Caridi, 2012 p. 313; Hroub, 2010 p. 172). Hamas conflates nationalist and religious rhetoric, Islamising the nationalist discourse in the Occupied Territories and reframing the liberation of Palestine as a religious duty (Esposito, 1984/1998 p. 229; Hroub, 2010 pp. 171-174). That being said, Hamas also 'sees itself as a moderate Islamic party' (Caridi, 2012 p. 311). Khaled Meshaal has emphasised how Palestine is a civilised, plural and open society (Caridi, 2012 p. 313). Its ideological position is based in 'the reformist interpretation of the Muslim Brotherhood, which broke with the traditional reading of the Muslim faith', meaning it is 'very far from the Salafi literalist interpretation of Islam' (Caridi, 2012 pp. 311-312). More recently, they have also steered clear, perhaps with the international community in mind, of overtly aggressive moves to impose Islamic precepts on the people of Gaza (Hroub, 2010 pp. 171-174).

Hamas's religious identity has appealed to many Palestinians because it claims to be working according to God's laws. M35x explained the attraction of Hamas.

> *"With Hamas it is different from the other factions because over there, there is ideology, a religious ideology. It is not a sort of pure political program, it is religious–political program that you belong to it, not only to liberate Palestine but to go to heaven. It is your path to salvation." (M35x)*

A senior female member of Hamas said "What is Hamas? Hamas is religion... Everyone who you see that loves religion you will see them supportive of Hamas." (F30x) Many interviewees described Hamas to me as being defined by religion (M12x; M18; F15; F17; F19; M21; F21x; F22; M24; M30x; M32; F30x; F33; F36; F37; F38; F40; M41).

Interviewees ranged from impressed to sceptical: F1, a Hamas supporter, said that she “found the values and good Islam in this party” (F1), F22 told me "They connect everything with religion... they connect everything with God" (F22) while M23 suggested "Both parties try to recruit people. Fatah uses authority, government, media and money. Hamas uses religion." (M24)

Hamas seems to clearly fit the role of a political party aligned with religious policies, and, as described in Chapter 1, women support Hamas more than men. Therefore, the null hypothesis can be rejected, as women are more likely to support a party or movement strongly associated with Islam ***(H2c)***.

Whether women might support Hamas more due to associations with feminism or the promotion of gender equality is less clear cut. As set out above, whether religion, Islam or conservatism can be empowering for women is a matter of debate. This debate extends to Islamist movements including Hamas.

Islamist parties have, sometimes, been seen to promote an Islamic form of women's empowerment. Islamists have tended to welcome women's education. Indeed, according to Ahmed, the Muslim Brothers in Egypt 'stressed that education was as essential to women as to men, chiefly that they might fulfil their roles as wives and mothers, though this need not be their sole objective’ (Ahmed, 1992 p. 194). Abu-Lughod suggests that although Islamists 'stigmatise sexual independence and public freedoms as Western' they are open to the idea of women working and women's education (Abu-Lughod, 1998 p. 243).

Belonging to, participating in, and supporting an Islamist organisation can be a form of empowerment in itself. Blaydes and El Tarouty suggest that women who vote for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 'often carve out a unique form of *political* empowerment in a society where politics is often viewed as a male domain' (Blaydes and El Tarouty, 2009 p. 379). Blaydes and El Tarouty also suggest that women's participation was pivotal in securing certain positions for Islamist candidates in the Egyptian elections (Blaydes and El Tarouty, 2009 p. 379). Biagini suggests that women activists in the Freedom and Justice and Al-Nour parties in Egypt and for the Ennahda party in Tunisia are motivated by the idea of constructing a new society based through the 're-affirmation of Muslim Identity' rather than any subscription to western-style feminism (Biagini, 2012 p. 49). Yet despite this she claims that:

'The fact that Islamist women embrace cultural traditions and political ideologies which exalt traditional women's roles does not necessarily means that those women do not intend to redress the gender imbalances present in their societies. On the contrary, their activism aims precisely at enhancing their social and political status which stands on community values and not over individual empowerment which is not considered beneficial to the structure of their society.' (Biagini, 2012 p. 49).

Hegland also suggests that women are beginning to help shape Islamic discourse as 'active participants' (Hegland, 1999 p. 177). But she only tends to see women's empowerment in the cases where women 'manipulate religious precepts and rituals to improve their situations' without resisting openly (Hegland, 1999 p. 191). For example, she suggests that:

'Women may speak their dissent privately or in women's gatherings, disobey, veil inappropriately, develop personal Islamic interpretations, dissimulate and camouflage with pious behaviour, vote, gain public office and pressure for change, and appropriate rituals and myths for their own needs. They may subvert religious meanings to better fit their own existential situations.' (Hegland, 1999 p. 192)

Blaydes and El Tarouty suggest that while they see voting for an Islamist party as empowering for a woman individually, as expressing her political views, this does not mean 'empowerment of Egyptian women as a social class' because an increased Islamist political presence, tends to place constraints upon women's social roles (Blaydes and El Tarouty, 2009 pp. 379-380).

Whether Hamas empowers women is contentious. There is a growing women's rights discourse within Islamist nationalist movements such as Hamas (as described above), and many women see their participation in Islamist organisations and their relationship with Islam as empowering. There are many 'traditionalist' women's rights activists, as Jamal calls them, in Palestine, who lead and work for the many organisations which focus on women's needs but operate according to an Islamic or conservative framework, as well as many of the women active within organisations such as Hamas (Jamal, 2001 p. 263). Peteet explains that for these types of women's rights activists, 'equality with men was not their concern' but instead their priorities are:

'culturally sanctioned rights as women, mothers, and sustainers of life-to carry out their domestic tasks and raise their children in peace and material security and to be protected from assaults. Autonomy in the choice of a husband, the opportunity to attend school, and work before marriage were the foundations of their notion of what actually constituted women's rights.' (Peteet, 1991 p. 90)

Some of these women might use logic and rhetoric similar to that highlighted by Azzam and Karmi above. They might use a 'rights discourse' and highlight Islam as being better for women compared to either corrupt and exploitative western society or the backwardness of traditional Arab society.

In my interviews, I heard from a number of Palestinian women who subscribed to the 'rights discourse' within Islam, saying that Islam granted them more rights than traditional society. Most of these women supported Hamas. They criticised 'tradition' because of the restrictions it places upon women, and did so in the name of religion. Islam was often placed into comparison with "traditions" which "play a big role in limiting [women's] roles in society" (F36). F20 told me: "Religion gives women every single right that they deserve but society never gives them a right" (F20). I was given many examples of the much greater rights accorded to women in Islam compared to the rights traditionally granted them (M6; M9; F21x; F23x; F26; F28; F30x; F36). I was told that, while traditions disapproved of women working, Islam permitted it (M30x; F26); tradition said a woman caught behaving inappropriately with a man should be killed, but Islam suggested a lesser punishment (M6); while 'traditionally' women had no inheritance, Islam gave women half that of their brothers (M29; F30x; F36). F26 explained this idea further when she explained:

"Our religion is not complicated. It is not, like, backwards but society is what makes it complicated and backward. For our religion, it is alright for a girl to go outside, work, work beside males and work with them, within certain limits. But [the problem] is from society, not from religion itself...So basically the society will tell you, you are a female, you shouldn't be working with males." (F26)

Hamas's policies towards women seem to embrace this rhetoric of Islam as empowering, while also maintaining several 'regressive' gender policies. Gunning describes how, on the one hand, Hamas's position on inheritance and polygamy 'buttress existing inequalities', while on the other hand, its election manifesto and its

female candidates have called for a reduction in gender inequalities, with reference to Islam (Gunning, 2007 p. 168). Hamas's attitude towards women is an example of how Hamas does not necessarily 'interpret Islam conventionally or in accordance with Western stereotypes' (Gunning, 2007 p. 170).

Aware of western perceptions, Hamas has, since taking power, been keen to articulate that 'Hamas does not oppress women', and to emphasise the increased participation of women in education, the labour force and the public sector (Sayigh, 2011 p. 100). Sheikh Yassin even took the 'revolutionary' step of offering 'special religious lessons for females' - a privilege only previously open to men (Chehab, 2007 p. 18). Hamas also promote and encourage women's participation in the public sphere, even if this does mean not showing their faces on election posters and the segregation of political meetings (Milton-Edwards and Farrell, 2010 p. 201). Gunning quotes Hamas candidate Jamila al-Shanti, who stated '"there are traditions here that say that a woman should take a secondary role-that she should be at the back, but that is not Islam. Hamas will scrap these traditions. You will find women going out and participating"' (Gunning, 2007 p. 168). Gunning also notes the increased prominence of women in Hamas in the run up to the 2006 election and credits their encouragement of women's participation with increasing its levels of support (Gunning, 2007 pp. 169-172).

Within Hamas, while men dominate the very top levels, there is a parallel women's structure within the organisation which allows them a prominent role (Milton-Edwards and Farrell, 2010 p. 182). The women's structure within Hamas is mostly separate from the male structure "it is like a different political party" (M41; M30x). Describing the Islamic bloc - the Hamas student organisation - at Birzeit University, Ababneh explains how it has 'two equal bodies, one for women and one for men' and how these different groups elect their leaders leading to a parallel and gender balanced leadership (Ababneh, 2014 p. 46). The 'rationale behind having these two structures was the belief that gender mixing was haram (religiously prohibited)'. This strategy means that they have tended to have a larger proportion of female representatives on the student council than Fatah (Ababneh, 2014 p. 47). Ababneh suggests that this example questions 'the belief that gender segregation is necessarily disempowering for women' and shows how 'Islamist thinking in general, and the belief in segregation

more specifically, does not necessarily lead to depriving women of certain freedoms' (Ababneh, 2014 pp. 47-48).

Hamas also has numerous organisations focusing on women and which are mostly run by women (F30x; M30x). F30x, a female Hamas PLC member told me:

> *"There are several institutions...[for] improving the women's situations and creating job opportunities for women, especially for those that are poor. For example, they would concentrate on Palestinian heritage at the same time, this would be for the benefit of women, like, for example, embroidery, Palestinian embroidery. Poor women would do embroidery and get an income. Women who are running these organisations would organise exhibitions and sell the products, for example there were organisations interested in cultural things for women and encouraging women to read." (F30x)*

Because of the parallel gender structure within Hamas, many of those I spoke to felt that women were given a bigger voice and role within the organisation than in other political parties (F17; F19; M23). F17 said: "I think for a religious woman who still wants to maintain her religion as part of their political activism then yes they would choose that because they have a lot of power, and at the same time they would have a good platform and ideology" (F17). Being part of an Islamist nationalist organisation can provide rewards; several of those I interviewed explained that it was easier to be politically active within Hamas without challenging social norms. M24 told me: "Unfortunately, here in eastern communities especially in lower status places, women who are active in religious movements are seen as good and holy." (M24) F19 said:

> *"[As] a woman I would think that being part of Hamas, which is more conservative, would be better for me... It would give me this look of [a] polite, quiet, like religious person. And my family agrees with it because I would not have to go out a lot, I would be doing nothing wrong because they are religious." (F19)*

Hamas therefore might provide women with an organisation that values them and their work and provides them with roles that do not confront social expectations.

Some scholars suggest that women's roles within the Palestinian Islamist movement have allowed them to start to challenge more rigid interpretations of Islam. Abdulhadi describes how the Islamist women she met criticised the imposition of the hijab, strongly opposed women's seclusion in the home and suggested that women learn to

interpret Islamic writings themselves so as to be able to judge what is appropriate (Abdulhadi, 1998 p. 663).

Furthermore, the way Hamas addresses women's needs is often considered more appropriate to the context in which they are living, compared to the seemingly irrelevant feminist campaigns of some NGOs. As emphasised above, Hamas is well known for its charitable sector. This provides welfare for women, but also provides socially acceptable work for women too. The appeal of an Islamist ideology or religious identity might be stronger when you see examples in your community of religious individuals helping people. Whether this might cause women to be more religious than men is questionable, but it does strengthen the connection between women and exposure to and admiration of Islamist ideas and discourse (Milton-Edwards and Farrell, 2010 p. 205).

Many scholars see Hamas as hostile to women's interests and not as a possible source of women's empowerment. Ababneh found that Palestinian academics and women's rights practitioners saw female Islamists as 'tools in the hands of the male elite of Hamas who reproduced their own subordination' (Ababneh, 2014 p. 36). This explains Shikaki's finding that Islamist movements in Palestine have ‘less support among feminists' (Shikaki, 1998 p. 32). Some of the opposition to Hamas is due to accounts of it, or organisations affiliated with the Islamist movement, having coerced women to cover up. Scholars frequently cite the fact that Gazan women were beaten or had stones thrown at them for not wearing headscarves during the First Intifada (Abdo, 1994 p. 165; Caridi, 2012 pp. 91-92; Jamal, 2001 p. 271; Milton-Edwards and Farrell, 2010 p. 189; Hammami, 1990). Milton-Edwards and Farrell describe how 'bareheaded women were being stoned and abused in the street; their moral and national commitment was openly questioned’ by groups of ‘young men or boys with Hamas affiliations’ (Milton-Edwards and Farrell, 2010 p. 189). Hammami explains how the hijab became 'a sign of women's political commitment, as women, to the intifada' and of 'respect for the martyrs' while also being construed as 'a form of cultural struggle, an assertion of national heritage' (Hammami, 1990 p. 26). Sayigh describes Hamas’s policy towards women since taking power, some of their measures include: ‘imposing a “proper” dress code on women, separating unmarried men and women on the beach, banning women from riding motorcycles, requiring female lawyers to wear the

hijab in court, and preventing male hairdressers from working in women's hair salons'; although, some of these measures have since been withdrawn in the face of opposition (Sayigh, 2011 p. 94).

Whether Hamas have enforced an 'Islamic' moral code in Gaza was rejected by some interviewees (F36; F37; F38) and confirmed by others (F39; F40). Some scholars also question the extent of the role which Hamas played in the hijab campaign of the First Intifada (Gunning, 2007 p. 188; Hroub, 2000 p. 237), and the way in which feminist scholars have used Hammami's article to discredit all Islamist women (Ababneh, 2014). Holt suggests that for many Palestinians the question of the headscarf is not a priority. She writes: 'everyone longs for liberation and, therefore, what one wears is of secondary importance' (Holt, 1996 p. 76).

There was no consensus in my interviews as to whether Hamas was good or bad for women. Feminists I spoke to suggested Hamas had a negative effect. F12x told me:

> *"Women are more restricted by Hamas now, they are more oppressed by Hamas... And they are fed up with all these restrictions on their mobility. They have to be veiled... there is daily violence, that is not only physical, it is emotional and psychological, you see, because women are targeted by Hamas, through the ethics, through the code of ethics. Because there are these ethical guards... who are in the street just monitoring women... the market for women now has become restricted too. They feel they are monitored all the time and I think that's the feeling is very miserable." (F12x)*

F23x suggested that "In Gaza under Hamas there is a huge regression in women's rights." And that "at the moment Hamas are battling against women's NGOs, they are making them register again, splitting schools and universities into boys and girl's schools and segregating society" (F23x).

Other interviewees painted a different picture of how Hamas treats women. Hamas activists suggest that within Hamas's Islamic bloc "men and women... both have the same power" (M23). Other Hamas members suggest the same thing. M30x told me that "woman is half of the people so, if we put them only in homes we lose fifty percent of our power. So... women must work with us... going to work, going everywhere, making demonstrations." (M30x) F30x explained: "Islam respects women, Hamas is implementing Islam, this means Hamas respects women. For example, Islam

allows women to work, allows them to do political work, it gives them their inheritance, and to express their opinion, it respects her voice." (F30x)

Interestingly, feminist and non-religious young women also shared the opinion that Hamas was not bad for women. F17 said "girls in Hamas have a huge role, but it is not the same role as men. Men [in] Hamas are in the field, you know they are out there. Girls do all the other things, they organise things they do things, they help people they make a like they make a family out of it." (F17) F19 told me "these girls have a higher level or position inside this group of people who belong to Hamas" (F19). And F39, a young Gazan woman, said that there was no oppression of women when Hamas came to power, she then moderated that when I probed by saying:

> *"There were limitations on hairdressers, but just for a short time. For a short time, women were prevented from smoking shisha. And if there was a couple, a man and a woman on the beach they would ask to see their marriage certificate - but this was only for a limited time. This was not a problem affecting women. I don't feel my freedom of going out, of having to wear the hijab or being able to work is restricted by Hamas." (F39)*

Certainly, Islamist organisations such as Hamas have a mixed record regarding women. They can enhance women's positions and prominence as long as they conform to certain roles deemed appropriate for them 'as women' (see Ababneh, 2014; Jamal, 2001). However, what is important here is that the rhetoric of Islam, as progressive and as giving women their rights, has certainly gained substantial ground in Palestine. This Islamic form of women's rights rejects 'traditional' restraints upon women without exposing them to the dangerous associations that western-style feminism has with promiscuity and corruption.

Interestingly, several scholars suggest that Islamist organisations target women in particular for recruitment. Hegland suggests that 'Islamic femininities' have a core position within Islamist movements as identity symbols and that women are 'central to the Islamic agenda'. Women act as markers between the 'righteous Islamic nation' and the corrupt West (Hegland, 1999 pp. 177, 183). Further, they are also the backbone of the family which is the major source of stability for an Islamic society (Hegland, 1999 p. 183; Shitrit, 2013 pp. 85-86). Hegland suggests that women are used as 'Islamic icons; as religious, political, and anti-imperialist symbols; and as recruiters and socialisers' (Hegland, 1999 p. 183). As such, Islamist movements 'give women attention, recruit

them into movements, court their votes, use them for leadership and propaganda, inflame them to attack the opposition, bring them into public positions and offices, get them on the streets in mass demonstrations, pressure them into Muslim dress and behaviour, urge them to correct their less-advances sisters, and honour them for donating their sons for service and martyrdom' (Hegland, 1999 p. 183). Because of women's central importance, Islamists emphasise that women must be tightly controlled to ensure that they are socialised and educated to fulfil these roles (Hegland, 1999 p. 183).

Blaydes and El Tarouty propose that women in Egypt are targeted by Islamist activists because they are 'highly effective political recruiters for Muslim Brotherhood candidates' (Blaydes and El Tarouty, 2009 p. 365). The advantages of women recruiters for the Muslim Brotherhood is their ability to make house calls to other women, and to use pre-existing social networks and mosque groups to emphasise the benefits of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and helping in their work to aid the poor (Blaydes and El Tarouty, 2009 p. 374). 'Muslim Brotherhood women — generally literate and members of the middle class — are highly effective recruiters of other women, and the symbolic importance of their participation may garner even more support for their candidates.' (Blaydes and El Tarouty, 2009 p. 379)

Kandiyoti suggests that women are 'targeted primarily and explicitly as objects of social control by Islamist governments and movements' (Kandiyoti, 1997 p. 4). She suggests that where authoritarian regimes are in power by adopting a form of control seemingly embedded in local custom, they have 'a greater chance of eliciting consent' from the population (Kandiyoti, 1997 p. 9). By targeting women's behaviour, Islamists can often successfully build broad consensuses among men, and enhance the us-vs-them logic inherent to many national projects (Kandiyoti, 1997 p. 8). She writes that 'It has little to do with religious dogma as such but follows the logic of realpolitik.' (Kandiyoti, 1997 p. 9).

Women form a large part of Hamas's support base, as evidenced by the polls. This is acknowledged by Hamas themselves with Hamed Bitawi asserting "Hamas is now made up of more women than men" (in Caridi, 2012 p. 90). But they also see women as important agents in their agendas for Islamising society and liberating Palestine. Whether designed for the recruitment of women or not, Hamas has a television

channel and a radio channel, both called 'Al-Aqsa' launched in 2006 and 2003 respectively. Programmes on the channel ‘draw on the Islamic past as having relevance to the present’ and ‘depict Hamas as the true guardians of religion’ while also often giving tips on how to raise children as good Muslims (Alshaer, 2012 p. 243).

Many Islamist parties also have policies that appeal to women. These include policies usually associated with ‘leftist’ parties such as 'anti-corruption rhetoric and welfare programs' (Kandiyoti, 1997 p. 9) and 'social justice and national independence' (Al-Ali, 2000 p. 216). But also, women might support policies which privilege family values and 'cultural authenticity', particularly when they are seen as a defence against colonial domination and foreign influences (Biagini, 2012 p. 49; Kandiyoti, 1991a p. 8). In terms of Hamas’s policies, they certainly provides welfare services which benefit and help women in their day-to-day life as seen in the previous chapter.

Therefore, with a strong religious identity Hamas is likely to appeal to religious elements in Palestinian society ***(H2c)***. Hamas is unlikely to appeal to avowedly feminist elements in Palestinian society ***(H3d),*** but it could appeal to people who support greater gender equality but within an Islamic framework.

ii) Fatah

Fatah is a broadly nationalist party which does not officially subscribe to any ideological current. Fatah has tended to toe a more secular line, however, it has appropriated ‘some religious symbolism’ in its publicity and campaigns, and polls show that people who pray frequently are 'as likely to support the secular nationalists of Fatah as they are to support Hamas' (Shikaki, 1998 p. 32).

The middle-ground position of Fatah has meant that those without a strong Islamist or socialist stance have found Fatah the most representative party for them. M11x told me: “So Fatah had based its work on recruiting as many Palestinian people... and built its philosophy on the approach of inclusiveness for those Palestinians who have no political affiliation” (M11x). Fatah is a party where you can find atheist communists, devout Muslims and those with no strong ideological position (M4; M12x; M13x). Fatah member M41 explained why he chose this party:

“I am not really religious and not really open and liberal. [Fatah] respect Islam, they

respect our culture, so they respect the one who pray, and they respect the one even who does not pray. So, I found that they are really flexible people. So that if I don't pray no one will say that he should leave us. If I should pray I would be still welcome." (M41)

F13x described Fatah to me as: "Fatah is more secular... you might be religious in Fatah, but you don't tell the other guy 'don't drink wine'" (F13x). But M11x told me: "sometimes you feel that they try to emphasise their secular attitude against Islamists, but sometimes they do the opposite" (M11x). This ambivalence appeared again and again in interviews. M6 said: "They are separating religion and politics, most of them do whatever they want. But the government and our politics, they are not related to our religion. But at the same time, they, or most of them, are Muslim." (M6)

Nor does Fatah have a clear position regarding feminism and support for gender equality. In their attempt at representing the middle ground, Fatah seem to have avoided taking a position on the 'women's question', as such Fatah tend to represent the status quo and to reproduce existing patriarchal constructs (Abdulhadi, 1998 pp. 654-655; Gluck 1995 p. 8).

In recent years, the PA has been seen as reinforcing patriarchal norms and putting in place laws which discriminate against women (Abdo, 1999 pp. 43-44; Jamal, 2001 p. 266; Karmi, 1996 p. 75). Accordingly, the mainstream of Fatah cannot be associated with a strong pro-gender equality stance.

A mixed picture of Fatah appeared in the interviews. Some characterised it as a party which was male dominated (F19) with men having more power than women and being members in greater numbers (M20). M20 suggested that this is because they do not reach out to women in the same way that Hamas does (M20). F17 characterised women in Fatah as being like "the first lady" and only joining because it is dominant, or because their boyfriend is Fatah, but "they don't know anything about the political" (F17). F23x, who had been a prominent member of Fatah, suggested there were fewer women because there is a problem with the culture of Fatah (F23x). This view emerged more fully from M41, a Fatah member from Gaza; he told me that women do not really play a big role although he would like to see them play a bigger role. He suggested the problem was from social pressure. Although some girls are "really good in politics", "if [they] become... active... in a political organisation, maybe [they] will be struggle to find a husband". He suggested that people might think "she is always busy

because of these activities. How can she look after your sons or daughters? She cannot be a good wife because she is always sitting with other men." Further to this he also suggested that men tended to avoid "talking with girls in meetings" because of the risk to their reputations. "I always try not to sit with girls because I don't want even the other people to blackmail me" (M41).

On the other hand, some interviews suggested Fatah took a more proactive approach with women. M18 and M24 both suggested that Mahmoud Abbas had worked to improve gender inequality. M24 described how "The president previously agreed to rights for women and children" (M24), while M18 emphasises how he had encouraged equal pay and employment for women. F29 suggested that there was a good system of female mentoring within Fatah. She said "In political life women participate inside the movement of Fatah. For example, I was following a woman in a higher position than me, and she was following someone, a woman, in a higher position than her in the party. So, there was a chain of female supervision... " (F29). F21x worked for Fatah "raising political awareness among women encouraging women to be part of the political party. Volunteering and encouraging them to join in the volunteer work." She suggested that Fatah tried to recruit women through "conferences, meetings, awareness-raising meetings, workshops" (F21x)

This mixed picture suggests that there are no particular draws for women to support Fatah in terms of their women's rights agenda, nor does Fatah position itself as a pro-women party in their policies, nor appeal to a particularly religious constituency. Fatah has remained open to a wide range of opinions but has not taken a strong position in relation to women's rights or women in general. It is therefore unlikely that belief, either in terms of feminist belief or religious belief, would strongly account for political support for Fatah; these factors are therefore unlikely to account for the gender gap in support for Fatah.

C Findings

This chapter has so far suggested that differences in political belief might account for the gender gap in political support. While the western gender gap literature suggests both that women might be more religious than men and thus support more conservative parties, and that women might be more supportive of feminism or

gender equality than men and so support more left-leaning or progressive political parties, the Middle Eastern and Palestinian context presents an even more complex picture. An Islamic women's rights discourse might mean that women who support greater gender equality (if not radical feminism), might support Islamist organisations. Further, the role of nationalism is likely to mean that feminism is deprioritised as a political issue, because it is seen to be socially divisive and something that should come after national liberation. In the Palestinian context, Hamas has both the religious appeal for women, and it may even attract women who seek greater gender equality, while Fatah remains non-committal in terms of both their religious and feminist credentials. These suggestions have produced a number of hypotheses which will be tested in this section by quantitative analyses of the polling data.

i) Religion

H2a: Women are more religious than men in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Religion came up as the primary explanation for the gender gap in political support in the Palestinian Territories in my interviews. I was told repeatedly that women are more religious than men and that this was why women were more likely to vote for Hamas and less likely to vote for Fatah than men (F1; M3; M8; F5; M12x; M17x; F15; F21x; F22; M24; M26; F25x; M35x; F39; M41). Here I will compare the data in the polls to see whether it is the case that women are more religious than men in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Measuring religiosity is complex and varies according to context. Certain indicators must be used to approximate or signify differing levels of religious devotion. There are numerous different scales developed for measuring religiosity (see Hill and Hood, 1999) although many of them have been found to be problematic in measuring religiosity in a Muslim majority context, because they were developed in Judeo-Christian heritage contexts (González, 2011).

Different religious practices denote different levels of belief in Muslim societies, and many of the standard measures of religiosity are problematic due to differential gender expectations. For example, Howell and Day considered frequency of church attendance as a measure of religiosity in the US (Howell and Day, 2000 p. 862),

however, praying at the mosque might be a problematic variable for measuring religiosity in a Muslim society. In some contexts (as is mostly the case in the Palestinian Territories) women are expected to pray at home or at work, while men are encouraged to pray at the mosque. The exception is Friday prayers when both sexes are welcomed for prayer in the mosque. González highlights the difficulties that these differences play upon measuring certain behaviours as indicators of religiosity in a Muslim majority context (González, 2011).

It is also important to be aware that while religious belief can lead to certain norms of behaviour such as prayer, going to the mosque, forms of dress, reading the Qur'an, abstaining from alcohol and avoiding unwarranted interaction with those of the opposite sex; because these behaviours form part of the architecture of expected social conduct, they may also be adopted by those who do not have religious faith. This is more likely to be associated with obvious and public social practices such as forms of dress, fasting during Ramadan and even prayer.

The PSR and CPRS polls used several questions to measure religiosity. Different questions were placed on different polls meaning there is no one measure used across all the polls. The questions used to measure religiosity in the polls necessarily limits what I can use, and unfortunately a full religiosity scale is not available. Instead I use three variables which seem to approximate religiosity well, although some are more subjective, while the more 'objective' scales might show behaviour rather than belief.

First, I will look at a question which asks respondents to self-identify as 'religious', 'somewhat religious' or 'not religious'. This variable is complex as it is highly contextualised. In order to understand interpretations of this question, I asked some of those I interviewed if they would consider themselves religious. Many of them – aware of my western outsider status - were keen to separate their belief in Islam from extremist, conservative forms of Islam (M9; M2; M5; M26; F28). M34 identified for me why some interviewees were reluctant to call themselves religious. He told me: "I am religious somehow, but there is wrong understanding about Islam from everywhere, from some people, they understand Islam wrongly because what happened in the Daesh [ISIS] and things like that, they give bad idea about Islam. But I mean I am religious." (M34) Several others, when telling me about their religion, also said that they were not like Daesh [ISIS], or emphasised that it was not Islamic

to kill or hurt others (M9; M37; F34). This is a reflection on how they feel Islam is misportrayed in the West. This issue would have less of an impact in the polling data, as the polls are gathered by Palestinians, so this clarification or wariness of self-identifying as religious would be lessened.

It came through in my interviews that the 'standards' of religiosity were higher for young women. Some of the women I spoke to felt that they might not 'qualify' as a 'religious' person because of small infractions or liberal attitudes, such as wearing make-up, or too-tight clothes; despite practicing the major tenets of Islam (F22; F5). F24, who wears a headscarf, fasts during Ramadan and prays five times a day also told me: "If we would rank me out of a hundred I would say 70... Just from the way I dress, some acts I do... no one is perfect, so I wouldn't rank myself as a religious person." (F24). That being said, a few female interviewees described themselves as not at all religious (F16; F17; F33), notably these were young women strongly aligned with the Palestinian Left and who had travelled to the UK for their education or work. There was a clear range in levels of religiosity in those I spoke to.[15]

I suspect that coming as a westerner I would have found myself in generally less religious circles than Palestinian society is overall. This is likely because some of my contacts there came from Palestinians I had met in the UK and who, as such, were more likely to have come from a middle class and/or 'leftist' background and were more comfortable transgressing traditional behavioural norms.

Figure 5.b shows gender difference in religiosity, using the self-description question from the polls. It shows that women are more likely to consider themselves religious than men. Taking my recoded form of this question, where those who designate themselves as 'religious' coded '3', those who call themselves 'somewhat religious' coded as 2, and those who call themselves 'not religious' coded as '1', the mean for women is 2.51, while the mean for men is 2.35 (from a sample of 13515 and 12873 respectively). Therefore, on average, women score themselves as more religious than men.

[15] On the question of self-identification as religious, I should also note that of the two Christians that I interviewed, one considered themselves religious and the other did not.



Figure 5.b To show the percentage difference in how men and women completed the statement 'Generally do you see yourself as:' given the options 'Religious', 'Somewhat Religious' and 'Not Religious' in Arabic. Data = PSR Polls 19-38, 42 and 56 (Merged Dataset). χ^2 *(2)=635.45, p<0.001, n=26,348*

Second, I will look at prayer frequency as an indicator of religiosity. When I asked many of those I interviewed if they considered themselves religious, and what that meant, prayer was frequently mentioned. Prayer was clearly an important part of religiosity. F5 explained the importance of prayer in Islam she said: “Praying is the main thing in Islam. Like if you are a Muslim you have to pray” (F5). This view was reflected in the answers of many of those I interviewed. Prayer was often the first thing that interviewees answered when I asked what being religious means. Many said, for example “I pray, I fast... ” (F7; F8; F10; M16x; F15; F19; F20; M25; M26). F1 told me “I am religious; I consider myself as a religious person. I pray, I fast, I praise God, and I read the Qur’an” (F1). M10 explained that he considered himself religious and this meant: “There are certain things that I shouldn’t do, and there are certain red lines that I shouldn’t cross... First of all, I must pray and do good things. I am not supposed to hurt anyone. I am not supposed to gossip. I am not supposed to do any bad thing.” (M10)

Prayer was also used to indicate a lack of religiosity. F17 reversed the normal

response by telling me that she was not religious and “I don’t pray. I don’t fast” (F17). M7 pointed to his lack of prayer as an indication of his lack of religiosity. He said: “I pray, but not regularly, not five times a day. I fast in Ramadan, but I don't consider myself a religious person.” (M7). Prayer is, however, a behaviour and may not reflect actual belief. It is often a social and/or visible activity. While this may be problematic for a test of belief, perhaps a social behaviour reflecting how you would like to be seen, as well as reflecting belief, may be a good way of measuring religiosity for the purposes of how religion interacts with politics. Overall, I think prayer frequency is an adequate reflection of an individual’s religiosity. Figure 5.c shows differences in prayer frequency by gender. Here I have recoded the options from being '5 times a day', '1-2 times a day', 'Only on Friday', 'Occasionally', 'Rarely', 'Never' to being 'Never', 'Sometimes', and '5 times a day', because, overwhelmingly, respondents answered '5 times a day' and so there was not much meaningful variation across the other options. Again, women are more religious than men by this measure, and a Pearson’s Chi-Square test shows this relationship to be statistically significant at the $p<0.001$ level.



Figure 5.c To show the percentage difference in how often men and women reported praying. Data = PSR Polls 9-38, 42 and 56 (Merged Dataset). χ^2 *(2)=1647.02, p<0.001, n=39098*

Unfortunately, the questions on prayer frequency and religious self-identification only cover polls 19-56 and 9-56 respectively. Therefore, I have also included a variable looking at the frequency that an individual reads the Qur'an. This question is only present in polls 2-9. Reading the Qur'an was mentioned frequently in my interviews but is not as fundamental a part of Islamic religious practice as prayer. Here again I have recoded the original poll question which gave four options, 'Everyday', 'Occasionally', 'Every week', 'Never', to just three options, 'Never', 'Sometimes' and 'Everyday', because of ambiguity between the two middle options. I have also rearranged the coding so that the most religious is highest, so that 'Everyday' is coded 3, 'Sometimes' is coded 2, and 'Never' is coded 1. Again Figure 5.d shows that there is a slight gender difference in reported frequency between men and women, with women more likely to read the Qur'an daily.



Figure 5.d To show the percentage difference in how often men and women reported reading the Qur'an, Data = PSR Polls 2-8 (Merged Dataset). χ^2 *(2)=377.43, p<0.001, n=9047*

Figure 5.b, Figure 5.c and Figure 5.d show that there is a gender difference in religiosity. In these bar charts women are more likely than men to choose the 'most religious' choice. Women pray more than men, read the Qur'an more than men and are more likely to consider themselves religious than men. Therefore, the null hypothesis, can be rejected because women are statistically more religious than men in the Occupied Palestinian Territories according to these three measures ***(H2a)***. Below, I use a *'religiosity'* variable which combines the above three indicators to form a scale from 1-3, with greater religiosity being coded higher on the scale. Unfortunately, none of these indicators are available for Poll 1.

H2b: Greater religiosity is a result of women having less access to the public sphere.

Here I test whether there is an explanation for greater female religiosity. There is no clear measure for access to the public sphere, so I created a dichotomous variable called *'housewife'* where those who put their occupation as housewife are coded 1 and all other responses are coded 0. I compared to the mean *'religiosity'* on the above

scale for women who are and who are not housewives. The mean for housewives is 2.24, while the mean for non-housewife women is 2.17. This difference is significant at the $p<0.001$ level as shown in an ANOVA test [$F(1, 26039)=37.53$, $p=0.000$]. These tests show that there is a correlation, but they do not show that being a housewife *causes* religiosity. This is more difficult to show. As such I do not feel able to reject the null hypothesis as I am unsure of the direction of the relationship between religiosity and access to the public sphere ***(H2b)***.

ii) Feminism

H3a: Women are more feminist (supportive of gender equality) than men.

Unlike religion, feminism or support for women's rights rarely came up as an explanation for differences in voting between women and men. Interviewees F16 and F19 suggested women might support the PFLP or the PPP more because “it supports women's rights” (F16; F19) and M40 suggested women wanted “to be more liberal” (M40). Nonetheless, the academic literature in the West suggests that gender differences in support for gender equality might be a partial explanation of the gender gap in political support.

There are problems in assessing the extent of feminist attitudes because of problems associated with the term 'feminist'. Rinehart suggests there is, at least in the US, a 'vast majority of women' who do not identify as feminist but ‘large numbers of them are identifying with policy positions and goals that we would call feminist’ (Rinehart, 1992 p. 16). This makes the use of self-identification as feminist - as Conover does - possibly problematic for analyses of how feminist values might impact the gender gap (Conover, 1988 p. 990). In Palestine, women's organisations have even avoided the term feminist, instead choosing terms surrounding women's rights and empowerment which 'forwards women's interests without raising the specter of feminism' (Gluck, 1995 p. 10). As such, it is likely to be more productive to explore values rather than self-identification to determine attitudes towards feminism.

In my interviews, I found that both men and women tended to express the same kinds of views when I asked about women's rights or gender equality, although women more often than men acknowledged that there were problems with the status quo and that it should change. I interviewed forty-one men and forty women, however out of those

I only asked 27 men and 29 women about their views on gender equality. This is because I usually did not ask this question in expert interviews, but also because in the pilot study, a number of interviewees interpreted my question on equality as solely about economic equality (which is why I later changed the wording) and finally in some of the interviews, where more than one participant was present, one of the interviewees would often let the other answer for them.

When I asked interviewees about their opinions on, or the situation for women's rights, the main themes which came up were that levels of inequality varied according to place, with the villages being much more conservative than the cities (M18; F15; F17; F19; F24; F26; F27; F33), others told me that Islam gives women all their rights (this interestingly was given as an answer both by those who thought the status quo was okay and those who thought that there was gender inequality and it needed to change) (F30x; F39; M9; M28; M30x; M36; F20), and others said that women's rights were not a priority because of the occupation (F16; F17; F21x; F40; M7; M9; M19). Some men and women told me that women had rights "more than men" (M33) or "more than they need" (F7) or that "most of the rights go to women" (M22). Although I do not want to derive quantitative results from my interviews, I noticed that double the number of women to men (and I am reading the male answers in the most feminist light possible here) thought that the situation needed to improve, with 18 women (F1; F3; F5; F9; F11; F15; F17; F19; F19; F20; F21x; F24; F26; F28; F31; F32; F37; F36; F36; F39) and 9 men (M1; M3; M7; M9; M18; M29; M30x; M31; M38x) suggesting this.

Unfortunately, feminist attitudes are not frequently measured in the polls. In order to test it I had to create a measure of attitudes towards gender equality taken from PSR Poll 24 (June 2007). Seven questions, intended to measure general attitudes towards gender equality rather than sexual equality or other specific feminist values, were included in the poll. Respondents to Poll 24 were asked to choose between 'strongly agree', 'agree', 'disagree' and 'strongly disagree' in response to seven statements. The statements were: 'A woman can be a president or prime minister of a Muslim country', 'A married woman can work outside the home if she wishes', 'On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do', 'A university education is more important for a boy than a girl', 'Men and women should have equal job opportunities and wages', 'Men and women should receive equal wages and salaries' and 'A woman can travel

abroad by herself if she wishes'. I recoded the responses to the statements so that the more 'pro-equality' attitude was given a higher ranked response and so that the highest score per question was 3 and the lowest score was 0. These seven statements had a Cronbach's Alpha of 634. I combined the statements to produce a Gender Equality Scale between 0 and 21 where higher scores imply a higher level of support for gender equality.



Figure 5.e To show the placement of men and women on the Gender Equality Scale as percentages. n=1222, Data = PSR Poll 24 (Merged Dataset) ANOVA [F(1, 1228)=66.36, p=0.000]

Figure 5.e shows that on a scale of 0-21, the sample have a mean of 11.5. It also shows that women tend to be higher on the scale than men. Indeed, the mean placement on the Gender Equality Scale for women is 12.1 and for men it is 10.8, showing that on average women are 1.3 points higher on the scale than men. The standard deviation for women is 2.4 and for men it is 3, as men hold a wider range of attitudes than women. An ANOVA test shows that the difference in means is statistically significant at the $p<0.001$ level. As such the null hypothesis should be rejected because women do indeed, at least as far as this poll is concerned, support gender equality more than men ***(H3a)***.

This finding is interesting for several reasons. First, it should be noted that the population is not very in favour of gender equality even on the not very provocative questions asked as part of the scale. Second, the fact that women are both more religious and more supportive of gender equality overall, strains the standard presentation of the traditional and modern gender gap, with the former being explained by increased female religiosity and the latter being explained by growing feminist consciousness. Therefore it is increasingly important to understand the context of how these beliefs fit together and interact.

H3b: Religious women are more 'feminist' (supportive of gender equality) than the average societal level of support for gender equality.

This hypothesis aims to measure the extent to which Islam could be seen as an empowering rhetoric for women. To test it I compared the mean on the gender equality scale for women with a score of '3' on the *'religiosity'* scale with the mean for the gender equality scale for all respondents to Poll 24. The mean gender equality scale for religious women is 11.6 compared to a sample mean of 11.5 (and a mean for men of 10.8).

Therefore, religious women are only slightly more (0.1 point) in favour of gender equality than the sample. This small difference does allow for the null hypothesis to be tentatively rejected ***(H3b)***, although religious women do score lower than less/non-religious women on the gender equality scale. This small difference shows that female religiosity should not be presented, necessarily as socially conservative as it often is. Religious women in Palestine are no more conservative in their views than society is more broadly, and they are certainly more supportive of gender equality than men are on average.

H3c: Gender differences in feminism (support for gender equality) do not extend to behaviours which breach 'accepted' forms of behaviour.

The discussion above suggests that women might support gender equality so long as it does not threaten social cohesion, or nationally and religiously condoned forms of behaviour. When doing my internship at the PSR, I was interested in exploring the question of attitudes towards gender equality a bit further and wanted to see whether there might be a limit to how far there was support for gender equality, linked to a

religious and nationalist identity. After much discussion with my supervisors and the polling agency I decided to ask the following two questions in the poll being conducted at the time, Poll 56:

Q1. *To what extent you agree with the following statement: When a man and a woman do the same work, their salaries should be equal.*

1) *Certainly agree*
2) *Agree*
3) *Not agree not disagree*
4) *Disagree*
5) *Certainly disagree*
6) *Don't know / NA*

Q2. *If a (female) relative of yours decides to stop wearing the hijab for personal reasons, would you respect or not respect her decision?*

1) *Certainly respect and encourage*
2) *Respect it but will not interfere*
3) *It is none of my business*
4) *Will not respect her decision but will not interfere*
5) *Will not respect her decision and will try to prevent her from doing so*
6) *Don't know / NA*

The first question was intended to measure support for gender equality at its simplest form, equal pay for equal work. The second question posed a highly controversial question which taps into ideas of propriety, family reputation and nationalist ideas of appropriate behaviour for women. Although this question went out in a poll before I had conducted most of my interviews, the hijab was chosen as an issue because of how it is used as a symbol of conformity and piety but does not always reflect religious belief. Of course, there is a strong overlap between religious belief and wearing the hijab, but there are many religious Muslim women who do not wear it, and many non-religious women who do wear it. Wearing the hijab could also be seen as a feminist question of female personal choice. Although this is not a perfect variable to test for a 'breach' of socially acceptable behaviour, it is perhaps an acceptable proxy for use here.

While I did not ask explicit questions about attitudes towards the hijab in my interviews, it often came up. To illustrate how this issue fits with the concept of a breach of socially acceptable behaviour, I draw from the comments made about the hijab or headscarf in my interviews. Many interviewees suggested that wearing the hijab does not necessarily mean that the wearer is religious (M1; F9; F29; M12x; F19; F13x). I was told, you might think, "'They wear hijab, they must be religious.' But they are not religious. This issue, the hijab issue, it is one of the traditions issue[s]" (M1). F9 told me "I am not very religious... I wear a scarf, but I don't pray" (F9). F29 said "It is rare to find someone without a scarf here... They do not wear the scarf here because of religion but because it is *'aib* and not *haram* to not wear the scarf." (F29).[16] Interestingly, wearing the hijab was seen on the one hand to be a question of tradition, yet on the other many, particularly older, interviewees described how the popularity of the hijab was a new phenomenon (M12x; F14x; F13x; F17). I was told in interviews that even adamant feminists and "female comrades" in left-wing organisations had started wearing the hijab (F14x; M16x; M35x). The pervasiveness of the headscarf was seen as a result of increasing Islamisation of the political sphere, and the pressures to conform and avoid harassment. Women want to wear these clothes "to be part of society. It is confirmative of the society" (M12x). They "want to declare, at least symbolically, that they are part of the mainstream, and part of the mainstream is adhering, you know, to the religious practices or the nationalist practices" (F14x). If they do not wear the hijab "neighbours start saying things... like... I'm... impolite. I'm not that good of a person if I don't wear a scarf" (F19). Others cited pressure from men to cover up (F11; F12x). The issue and pressures seemed contingent on the surroundings (F13x). Some women, mostly from cosmopolitan or 'leftist' areas, said that they themselves did not feel pressure to wear the hijab, (F33; F17). A Jerusalemite said she took it off to travel at the airport (F22). Gazans told me that only one percent of women do not wear the hijab now (M38x; F40). Others suggested that dress religiously involved more than simply donning the hijab. It required the *jilbab*, *niqab*, an absence of make-up and accessories (F29; F36; F37).

[16] ''aib' means shameful according to traditions, while 'haram' means forbidden in Islam.



Figure 5.f To show percentage responses to Q1. Data = PSR Poll 56 (Merged Dataset), n=1,196



Figure 5.g To show percentage responses to Q2. Data = PSR Poll 56 (Merged Dataset), n=1,163

Responses to these questions, as displayed in Figure 5.f and Figure 5.g show that there might be a 'limit' to gender differences in support for gender equality. The overall trend is in favour of gender equality in terms of equal pay for equal work, but most people would not respect a family member deciding to stop wearing the hijab.

Further, while the gender gap is significant for Q1 at the $p<0.001$ level with women more supportive of gender equality (ANOVA) [$F(1, 1194)=27.13$, $p=0.000$], there is not a statistically significant gender gap for Q2 [$F(1, 1161)=0.24$, $p=0.626$). Thus women seem to support gender equality more than men only so far as it does not breach socially/nationally/religiously acceptable behaviour ***(H3c)***. This finding, based on difficult proxy questions posed in only one poll, is far from definitive, but it does add another layer of complexity to the picture of beliefs and political support, and hints at the role of nationalism and social pressure in moderating the effects of certain beliefs.

> ***H3d: Women are more likely than men to support a political party or movement that identifies itself as feminist (supportive of gender equality).***

Finally, and building on this idea of supporting gender equality within the constraints of societal and nationalist acceptance, I look at whether women do, in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, support the parties which most fervently advocate gender equality more than men. These are the 'leftist' parties. The gender gap literature in the West suggests that where there is a party with more explicitly feminist policies, it might have greater female support. Further, two interviewees suggested women might prefer them because of their pro-gender equality policies (F16; F19). However, I suspect that within a nationalist context, which buttresses traditional social mores and encourages traditional and socially cohesive gender behaviour, it is unlikely that women do in fact support these groups in large numbers.



Figure 5.h To show percentage support for 'leftist' Parties (PFLP, DFLP and PPP) by gender. Salient political events have been added to aid interpretation. Data = CPRS Polls 32, 33, 37-47, PSR Polls 1-61

Figure 5.h shows that women support 'leftist' parties less than men, despite these parties advocating gender equality. As described above women who support the 'leftists' are stigmatised as being 'sexual' and going 'against the culture'. In the Palestinian political context, achieving greater gender equality is not, for most women, worth risking one's reputation and cultural cohesion. An ANOVA test shows the difference in the means for these values is statistically significant at the $p<0.001$ level [$F(1, 51525)=173.94$, $p=0.000$]. Therefore ***H3d*** is not the case, women do not support the organisations which explicitly advocate gender equality more than men.

iii) Belief and Political Support

H2: Gender differences in religiosity explain (reduce) the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

In order to work out whether the gender difference in religiosity is the explanation for the gender gap in political support, I will explore three logistical regression models for support for Fatah and Hamas. The results can be seen in Table 5.a below.

Model 1a: Political support ~ gender

Model 1b: Political support ~ gender (+ poll number) + age + gaza + city + refugee camp

These two preliminary models are the same as used in Chapter 4 and provide a comparison with the baseline models for gender and political support.

Model 3a: Political support ~ gender (+ poll number) + age + gaza + city + refugee camp + religiosity

This third model introduces the variable '*religiosity'* this is a three-point scale made up from the factors described above, relating to self-identification as religious, frequency of prayer and frequency reading the Qur'an. Introducing this factor reduces the gender gap as the strength of the *'gender'* variable is slightly reduced here, with the beta value for '*Fatah support'* reducing from -0.35 to -0.32, and the beta value for Hamas reducing from 0.47 to 0.43 as shown in Table 5.a. Therefore, ***H2*** can be accepted because gender differences in religiosity do to some extent explain gender differences in political support. Nonetheless, *'gender'* is still a strong predictor of political support, even when accounting for *'religiosity'*. This indicates that other factors play an important part too.

Model/Variable	*Model 1a*		*Model 1b*		*Model 3a*	
	Fatah	***Hamas***	***Fatah***	***Hamas***	***Fatah***	***Hamas***
(Intercept)	-0.46 (0.01)***	-1.61 (0.02)***	-0.37 (0.03)***	-1.58 (0.04)***	-0.15 (0.04)***	-2.02 (0.05)***
Gender	**-0.34 (0.02)*** **	**0.47 (0.02)*** **	**-0.35 (0.02)*** **	**0.47 (0.02)*** **	**-0.32 (0.02)*** **	**0.43 (0.02)*** **
Poll Number			0.01 (0.00)***	-0.05 (0.01)**	0.02 (0.00)***	-0.01 (0.00)***
Age			-0.07 (0.01)***	-0.00 (0.00)***	-0.06 (0.01)***	-0.07 (0.01)***
Gaza			0.05 (0.02)*	0.47 (0.02)***	0.09 (0.02)***	0.41 (0.03)***
City			-0.24 (0.02)***	0.02 (0.03)	-0.26 (0.02)***	0.05 (0.03).
Refugee Camp			-0.15 (0.03)***	0.02 (0.03)	-0.16 (0.03)***	0.05 (0.03)
Religiosity					-0.19 (0.01)***	0.33 (0.02)***
Deviance (Null)	66262 (66589)	51789 (52239)	65594 (66445)	51171 (52125)	65423 (66445)	50790 (52125)
AIC	66266	51793	65608	51185	65439	50806

*Table 5.a Showing the B values, Standard Errors (in brackets) and level of significance for logistic regressions on the variables '*Fatah support*' and* 'Hamas support', *p<0.0001=***, p<0.001=**, p<0.01=*, p<0.05=. , Data = PSR Polls 1-38, 42 and 56 (Merged Dataset)*

H3: Gender differences in feminist beliefs explain (reduce) the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Unfortunately, the gender equality scale is only present in PSR Poll 24. As such, to measure the effect of support for gender equality on the gender gap, I compare logistic regressions of three models on PSR Poll 24 in Table 5.b below, using the gender equality scale as a variable called *'gender equality'*.

Model 1b: Political support ~ gender (+ poll number) + age + gaza + city + refugee camp

This sets the baseline for a model of political support taking account of age and location. Interestingly, as shown in Table 5.b, for PSR Poll 24, *'gender'* is only a significant predictor of political support for Hamas.

Model 4a: Political support ~ gender (+ poll number) age + gaza + city + refugee camp + gender equality

This model shows the impact of attitudes towards gender equality on the gender gap in political support. There is almost no difference in the beta values for *'gender'* with only the value for '*Hamas support'* increasing from 0.38 to 0.39. Further, the deviance for Model 4a does not reduce by much either, suggesting that ***H3*** cannot be accepted as feminist beliefs do not contribute significantly towards explanations for the gender gap in political support.

Model 4b: Political support ~ gender (+ poll number) + age + gaza + city + refugee camp + gender equality + religiosity

I have included this final model because it makes sense to be able to compare the impact of attitudes towards gender equality and religiosity more directly. As shown in Table 5.a, including *'religiosity'* reduces the gender gap for both the Hamas and Fatah model. For Fatah, the inclusion of *'religiosity'* reduces the beta value from -0.15 to -0.13, while for Hamas it reduced the beta value from 0.39 to 0.27, a relatively large reduction. Further, this reduces the significance of *'gender'* in the Hamas model from being significant at the $p<0.001$ level to only being significant at the $p<0.05$ level. This suggests that in PSR Poll 24, gender differences in religiosity account for most of the gender gap in political support ***(H2).***

Further, comparing the deviance between the Models shows that the addition of '*religiosity'* makes a greater reduction of the deviance for Hamas rather than Fatah, indicating that religion is a more important predictor of *'Hamas support'* than *'Fatah support'*. In the comparison of models across all polls (as shown in Table 5.a above), the addition of *'religiosity'* reduces the deviance for Fatah by 171 and for Hamas by 381. The regressions on PSR Poll 24, shown in Table 5.b below, show that including *'religiosity'* does not reduce the deviance by more than one for the Fatah model, but it reduces the deviance for the Hamas model by almost eighteen. In this case religion is not helpful at all in predicting support for Fatah. This comparison of deviances shows the different factors which explain support for the different parties and highlight the role that religiosity has in explaining support for Hamas.

Model/Variable	*Model 1b*		*Model 4a*		*Model 4b*	
	Fatah	***Hamas***	***Fatah***	***Hamas***	***Fatah***	***Hamas***
(Intercept)	-0.03 (0.2)	-1.53 (0.24)***	-0.01 (0.21)	-1.42 (0.25)***	0.25 (0.35)	-3.23 (0.54)***
Gender	**-0.15 (0.12)**	**0.38 (0.14)****	**-0.15 (0.12)**	**0.39 (0.14)****	**-0.13 (0.12)**	**0.27 (0.15).**
Age	-0.15 (0.05)***	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.15 (0.05)***	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.15 (0.05)**	-0.12 (0.06)*
Gaza	0.12 (0.13)	0.82 (0.16)***	0.12 (0.13)	0.83 (0.16)***	0.15 (0.14)	0.66 (0.16)***
City	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.19 (0.17)	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.19 (0.17)	-0.10 (0.14)	-0.11 (0.17)
Refugee Camp	0.00 (0.18)	-0.16 (0.21)	-0.00 (0.18)	-0.16 (0.21)	-0.01 (0.18)	-0.10 (0.21)
Gender Equality			-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Religiosity					-0.12 (0.13)	0.78 (0.20)***
Deviance (Null)	1612.7 (1627.3)	1237.6 (1275.2)	1610.2 (1624.8)	1234.6 (1273.8)	1609.4 (1624.8)	1216.7 (1273.8)
AIC	1624.7	1249.6	1624.2	1248.6	1625.4	1232.7

Table 5.b Showing the B values, Standard Errors (in brackets) and level of significance for logistic regressions on 'Fatah support' *and* 'Hamas support' *for PSR Poll 24, p<0.0001=***, p<0.001=**, p<0.01=*, p<0.05=.*

The graph below shows the impact that factoring in religiosity has on the gender gap across the different polls.

Figure 5.i shows the gender gap in predicted probability of support for Hamas and Fatah for Model 1b and Model 3a. In Model 3a, the gender gap is smaller (closer to zero), meaning that religiosity partly explains the gender gap in political support. There is considerable variation in the size of the gender gap in the different polls, but the gap on the whole is smaller once *'religiosity'* is taken into account.

The logistic regressions above and the graph showing the gender gap in predicted probability of supporting Fatah and Hamas below, suggest that gender differences in religiosity play an important role in explaining the gender gap in political support in the

Occupied Palestinian Territories, while there is no evidence that attitudes towards gender equality play a role. This means that women are more likely to support Hamas than men because women are more likely to be religious than men. The causes of greater female religiosity are unclear but are likely to be connected to gender differences in social expectations, limited opportunities for work and travel and the way these pressures have been amplified by the nationalist context of the Palestinian Territories.



Figure 5.i To show the gender gap in predicted probability of support for Fatah or Hamas. Using the formula in Chapter 1 for models 1b and 3a. Data = PSR Polls 1-38, 42 and 56 (Merged Dataset)

D Conclusion

This chapter has explored the two major ideological explanations for the gender gap in the gender gap literature, namely that women are more religious than men or that women are more feminist than men. In the literature, these two tendencies have been presented as leading to different gender gaps, with women's religiosity pulling them towards making more conservative political choices, and their feminism leading them to make more progressive political choices. Inglehart and Norris suggest that the level of development determines which direction the gender gap will go, with women likely to be more 'traditional' than men in less developed societies (Inglehart and Norris, 2000).

The quantitative analysis of the polls suggests that, in the Palestinian Territories, attitudes towards gender equality are not important in shaping political support ***(H3),*** but religiosity is ***(H2).*** This is the case despite women being both more religious than men ***(H2a)*** and more supportive of gender equality than men ***(H3a).*** This analysis tentatively suggests some further findings. First, that women's religiosity is linked to their being constrained in domestic roles ***(H2b)***. Second, this analysis shows that religious women support gender equality slightly more than the societal average ***(H3b),*** but that women only support gender equality more than men as far as it does not breach societal norms ***(H3c).*** Finally, women support Hamas more than men, and both Fatah and the 'leftist' organisations less than men, even though the latter have been more strongly associated with promoting gender equality.

These findings in themselves present a rather confusing picture. However, together with the theory and interview data, a complex but relatively coherent picture emerges. Conservative elements in Palestinian society have been reinforced by increasingly Islamist nationalist discourse in emphasising and reinforcing differential gender roles in Palestine, and, according to the conservative-nationalist discourse, women are obliged to conform to certain modes of acceptable behaviour so as not to undermine either social unity or the national project. This means that, for the most part, women are expected to look after the domestic sphere. For all the above reasons, women conform more to religious behaviour than men, and see themselves as more religious than men more frequently.

Another effect of the conservative society and nationalist discourse is that in general support for gender equality is not particularly high. Overt feminism is often seen as socially disruptive and a distraction from the real goal of national liberation. Not only do gender equality issues not impact the gender gap in political support, but women are actually less likely than men to support parties which are explicitly feminist.

Yet, despite these apparently very conservative findings, which would reinforce the view of Palestine as a 'traditional' society which is more religious and less feminist and where women vote to the right of men (Inglehart and Norris, 2000), there are small elements which suggest that this is not the complete picture. Some women in Palestinian society, like many women in the wider Middle East region, by employing Islamic discourse and joining Islamist movements, are able to critique 'backwards' traditions and feel empowered to get involved in social work and politics. Religious women are still more in favour of gender equality than the average for Palestinian society ***(H3b)***.

This picture adds two major complications to the usual explanation for the gender gap in Palestinian society.

First is the idea that religion, unlike feminism, could hold the potential for enabling greater female empowerment while not presenting an overt threat to the social fabric. The rights discourse expressed by women supporters of Hamas, where Islam was portrayed as giving women 'their rights' unlike backwards Palestinian traditions, reflects a move away from the western assumption that secularisation goes hand in hand with modernisation (Gunning, 2007 p. 11). Deeb explores Shia conceptions of a religious modernity in detail and points to the problems inherent in the assumption that the West is 'the universal example for all that is modern' (Deeb, 2006 p. 14).

Second is the probability that it is nationalism, rather than simply 'traditional society', that has acted as a conservative force in Palestinian society. The nationalist context of Palestinian society has placed greater meaning on certain forms of, usually traditional and moral, behaviour and maligned those who disrupt or divide society. This nationalist context has allowed women to perceive their traditional and moral behaviours as contributing to the national struggle and has added weight to criticisms of feminists who are seen to be setting women against men and prioritising their own interests over those of the Palestinian collective. These two factors present a different

account of why women might be more religious than men and moves away from a flat portrayal of their voting preference as being a passive expression of traditional values.

Hamas should be seen as an active agent in shaping nationalist discourse. It has ‘combined Islamic social-instructional discourse with the discourse of nationalist resistance', meaning that for many people it seems that 'commitment to an Islamic code of conduct served the objectives of resistance and liberation’ (Hroub, 2000 p. 239). By bestowing nationalist meaning to religious behaviour, Hamas has given additional weight to differential gender roles and increased the burden of modesty and piety upon women.

While the political context of the Occupied Palestinian Territories is perhaps more imbued with nationalist discourse than other places, in the post-colonial world, nationalist movements often promote cultural or religious forms of nationalism that have similar effects. Understanding the complexities of the way nationalist discourse is framed can help comprehension of women's apparently conservative behaviour in post-colonial contexts. Women's support of conservative, religious or right-wing movements is often misunderstood or deliberately maligned as 'false consciousness' (Campbell and Childs, 2015 p. 628). Western feminists have also had a difficult relationship with nationalist or Islamic movements, so understanding why women support them is important if feminism does indeed seek to speak 'for women'.

While there have, since 2001, been significant attempts to increase engagement and understanding of Islamist organisations among the academic community, there is still a long way to go. The academic focus has been on women involved in tight knit Islamic communities (Mahmood, 2005; Shitrit, 2013), rather than ordinary women. In the West, there is a growing literature exploring the political views of conservative women and their interests (Campbell, and Childs, 2015; Sudda and Itçaina, 2011; Barisione, 2014) but there is still space for greater understanding.

This chapter also shows how even in societies with stark gender inequality, feminism can fail to make a big political impact. This has implications for those seeking to promote and support gender equality. In a nationalist political context, people will tend to prioritise the unity of the group over other interests. The findings above add weight to Ababneh's assertion that feminists in the Palestinian Territories should not simply exclude Hamas women on principle, but need to engage with women within

this movement, many of whom are pursuing female empowerment, but within an Islamic context.

Finally, the important conclusion of this chapter is that gender differences in religiosity account for a portion of the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Women tend to support Hamas more than men because women tend to be more religious than men. Women's greater religiosity is likely to be fostered by the gendered political context, which has been shaped by 'traditional' patriarchal practices and cultural nationalist discourse. Women may also be more religious than men because piety offers them not only room for spiritual growth, but a more socially acceptable means to engage in social work, politics and even assert their rights.

Figure 6.a A poster for Hamas's Islamic Bloc displayed for the student elections at Birzeit university. It reads "The Resistance is our choice and our protective shield" and quotes a passage from the Qur'an, in the bottom right corner it gives the details for students to vote for the Islamic Bloc, 20th April 2015, Minna Cowper-Coles

Violence and warfare tend to be gendered, with men much more strongly associated with it than women. The gender gap literature in the West shows that women are less likely than men to support policies associated with the use of force. In the Palestinian context, where the question of whether armed resistance or negotiations is a better choice is of high political salience, if there are gender differences in support for either tactic, this is likely to impact support for different political parties. In this chapter I explore the following hypothesis:

> ***H4: Gender differences in attitudes to violence and non-violence explain (reduce) the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.***

This chapter, like the previous two, engages with the western gender gap literature, and the academic literature surrounding the Palestinian context. It also looks into the relationship between gender, violence and peace. As with the previous chapters I use these literatures together with the interview data to help contextualise and

hypothesise how attitudes towards violence and non-violence might be gendered and how they relate to the gender gap in political support. The final section of this chapter tests these hypotheses, and the main hypothesis of the chapter, ***H4***, above, through statistical analysis of the polling data.

A Violence, non-violence and the Gender Gap

Several statistical studies have found that women do, in general, tend to be more averse to the use of force, or the potential for violence, than men and that these differences shape their political beliefs and even voting patterns (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; Conover, 1988; Kaufmann, 2002; Howell and Day, 2000; Norrander and Wilcox, 2008; Norris, 2003; Norrander, 2008). Several scholars find women more in favour of gun control in the US (Howell and Day, 2000 pp. 870-871; Norrander, 2008 pp. 17-19; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986 pp. 48-49). They are also more likely to oppose capital punishment, and the use of force by the police for quelling riots (Norrander, 2008 pp. 17-19; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986 pp. 48-49). Many scholars have also looked at gender differences in attitudes to foreign policy and find that women are more likely than men to oppose troop deployments abroad and aggressive foreign policy stances (Norrander, 2008 pp. 17-19; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986 pp. 48-49). Conover finds that women with stronger feminist identities are more likely to fear conventional and nuclear war, oppose US military involvement in Central America and to be more in favour of cutting defence spending (Conover, 1988 p. 998). Eichenberg finds that '[o]n average, women are less supportive of the use of military force for any purpose' (Eichenberg, 2003 p. 112). Segal cites the Pew Center for the People and the Press's statistics which showed that 'in the USA only 52 per cent of women under twenty-five supported the (second) US war in Iraq in 2003, compared with 82 per cent of men' (Segal, 2008 p. 22). As such, there is a formidable weight of gender gap literature which suggests the following hypotheses:

H4a: Women are less supportive of the use of violence than men.

H4b: Women support political organisations committed to the use of violent methods less than men.

The explanations for these differences are fairly diverse, but scholars suggest these values extend well beyond a simple opposition to violence and encompass a wider

'ethic of caring' (Conover, 1988 p. 988; Cook and Wilcox, 1991 p. 1111; Norrander, 2008 p. 14). This 'ethic of caring' or feminine compassion has previously been discussed in relation to women's economic support for policies which help others and redistribute resources (see Chapter 4) (Howell and Day, 2000 p. 871, Alvarez and McCaffery,2003; Box-Steffensmeier, et al., 2004; Chaney, et al., 1998; Conover, 1988; Studlar, et al., 1998; Togeby, 1994). Howell and Day propose that these 'inherent value differences' can be understood as differences in male and female morality where: 'female morality tends to be more cooperative, caring, and nurturing, while male morality emphasizes justice, fairness, impersonal rules, and individual rights' (Howell and Day, 2000 p. 859).

The two books most frequently cited in the gender gap literature as explanations for women's and men's value differences are Carole Gilligan's 1982 book *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* and Sara Ruddick's 1989 book *Maternal Thinking.*

Gilligan challenges the male-centric accounts of morality and development by highlighting the different developmental path that women follow (Gilligan, 1982). She suggests that as childcare is mostly done by women, girls grow up learning to prioritise attachment and give value to relationships, while boys identify with individuation and boundaries (Gilligan, 1982 pp. 7-8). By tracing women and men's experiences through life and with a focus on difficult moral questions, Gilligan suggests that women and men view morality differently, with women more than men prioritising 'the needs of others' and often assuming 'responsibility for taking care', because of their 'overriding concern with relationships and responsibilities' rather than clear cut and hierarchical definitions of morality (Gilligan, 1982 pp. 7-8).

Ruddick instead focuses on later life gender socialisation. She proposes that mothers (usually women) must develop the skills of compassion and empathy as part of the practice of mothering. She posits that mothering requires commitment to love, nurturance and training (Ruddick, 1989 p. 17). She does not assert that compassion and empathy are inherently gendered but, because more women than men do the caring and 'mothering' roles, women tend to be more compassionate. Going further, Ruddick argues that the skills learned through mothering, make women a potential resource for peace (Ruddick, 1989 p. 157).

Gilligan and Ruddick present explanations of why and how women tend to be 'caring' or 'peaceful' through looking at women's views of morality, and experiences of motherhood.

The idea that women might be more inclined towards, or more prominent in, care and peace work finds support elsewhere. In Kaplan's work, she describes women's or, rather female consciousness, as based on ‘the need to preserve life’ and suggests that female consciousness involves placing 'human life above property, profit and even individual rights’ (Kaplan, 1982 p. 56). She suggests that it is a learned behaviour, inscribed as part of gender socialisation, she writes: ‘As part of being female, women learn to nurture’ (Kaplan, 1982 p. 56). Some feminist accounts also highlight women as a resource for peace because they see 'the commonality of women’s experience as superseding man-made national boundaries' and so identify with unity and shared values which transcend the 'borders and boundaries which enflame the intertwining, swirling circles of violence' (Afshar, 2003 p. 186). Segal suggests that women have been ‘most prominent in working for peace’ and points to how many women's peace movements have mobilised support through referring to their positions as women and mothers (Segal, 2008 pp. 21-23). Therefore, it is also worth testing the alternatives to ***H4a*** and ***H4b*** i.e. that it is not just in aversion to violence, but in support for peace, that men differ from women.

H4c: Women are more supportive of non-violence (peace) than men.

H4d: Women support political organisations committed to non-violent (peaceful) methods more than men.

Many feminist accounts of gender and violence highlight and critique the 'gendering' of war, such as the way that ‘men have been constructed as naturally linked to warfare, [and] women have been constructed as naturally linked to peace’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010 p. 94; Sjoberg, 2014; Turpin, 1998). Prominent among these scholars are Sjoberg, Segal and Tickner, who highlight the importance of gender for understanding war and international relations. These scholars point to the problematic way that “[w]ar-making and war-fighting have been traditionally associated not only with men, but also with the traits that men are expected to have, or masculinities.” (Sjoberg, 2014 p. 3). Manliness has ‘been associated with violence and the use of force' (Tickner, 1992 p. 6). War requires 'manliness' and war is itself used as a way of shaping

and evolving masculinity. Indeed, war is seen as ‘an event when boys become men’ and military training is a way of disciplining masculinity (Segal, 2008 p. 21; Tickner, 1992 p. 40). Male violence in the context of war has tended to be 'valorized and applauded in the name of defending one's country’ (Tickner, 1992 p. 6). These scholars suggest that perceptions of masculinity, as associated with warfare, are problematic both because of how they obscure the involvement of others in war, but also because of their implications for masculinity itself (Sjoberg, 2014).

The same scholars also point to how women have often been excluded from accounts of war, save for being portrayed as the innocents needing protection back at home (Sjoberg, 2014). These portrayals of women serve to justify and glorify warfare and the use of violence. Therefore, scholars have been keen to challenge these simplistic gendered portrayals of war and conflict. While armies in most countries and in most centuries, have been mostly made up of men, these scholars highlight the role of women in war, the roles other than soldiering played by men and the problem with narrow visions of warfare offered where men play the role of soldiers and women (together with children) are the innocents to be protected at home (Sjoberg, 2014).

In reality, women have, throughout history, been complicit in war and violence. Most women have supported their country's wars, and many have supported dictators or shamed conscientious objectors (Segal, 2008 p. 22; Ruddick, 1989; Afshar, 2003). Segal emphasises that there are no ‘necessary links between women and opposition to militarism’ (Segal, 2008 p. 22).

Studies of violent women, suicide bombers and fighters suggest that women are more likely to become involved in 'ethno-separatist' terrorist organisations and 'anti-state-'liberatory'' nationalist movements than more conventional wars (Ness, 2008 p. 7; Alison, 2009 p. 2). Alison suggests that women's attitudes change according to the type of war and they are more likely to be involved in wars over liberation, justice or the defence of the home than wars over political power or economic resources (Alison, 2009 p. 113). Women in colonised societies might argue that they ‘could not afford the luxury of being anti-militaristic, because the national liberation of oppressed people can only be carried out with the help of an armed struggle’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010 p. 113). Women have tended to be most involved in warfare where wars have either

developed to involve civilians or when they are centred on questions of identity, liberation and self-determination (Richter-Devroe, 2008 p. 31).

The importance of context comes through in studies of public opinion in the West as well. Research shows that gender differences in attitudes towards war are circumstance-dependent, but also that, for the most part, men and women share views. Eichenberg emphasises the importance of remembering that that 'women are hardly pacifists, and men are not uniformly bellicose' and that these gender differences occur 'at the margins in response to specific circumstances and the particular military actions being contemplated' (Eichenberg, 2003 pp. 112-113).

Studies by Eichenberg, Togeby and Clark and Clark give further weight to the suggestion that different 'types' of violence provoke different gendered responses. Eichenberg finds that women's support for the use of military force in the US depends upon the purpose and the likely consequences of using force in a particular instance. He suggests that women are more sensitive to humanitarian concerns and the loss of human life and will support or oppose more depending on their perceptions of these factors (Eichenberg, 2003 p. 112). Togeby observes that while women in Denmark seem more inclined towards peace in terms of cutting the defence budget and antipathy towards Denmark's membership in NATO, they also 'support resistance movements in the Third World' a number of which are 'fairly violent' (Togeby, 1994 p. 379). Togeby suggests that women do not simply oppose violence but they 'take a more liberal position or have more critical views of foreign policy than men' (Togeby, 1994 p. 379). Clark and Clark have showed that the gender gap in the US disappeared briefly in 2002, because women, in the wake of the September 11 attacks, jumped to being even more right-wing than men on issues such as increasing the defence budget (Clark and Clark, 2008).

This literature indicates that the major exceptions to female antipathy towards the use of force are in circumstances where ethno-nationalism (Alison, 2009; Yuval-Davis, 1997/2010; Ness, 2008; Sarkar and Butalia, 1995), the defence of the home(land) (Clark and Clark, 2008), or some perceived injustice is involved (Togeby, 1994; Eichenberg, 2003). The accounts suggest that it is likely that women will be less inclined to support violence than men on the whole, but that certain circumstances might limit the extent of these gender differences. In Palestine, all three of the

circumstances mentioned above frame the conflict; a perceived injustice, defence of the home(land) and ethno-nationalism are all very much present in the nationalist rhetoric surrounding the use of force. While it is difficult to test the impact of ethno-nationalism or perceived injustice (which are arguably present throughout the time period covered in the polls), it is possible to test the impact of an enemy threat to the home(land):

H4e: The gender gap in support for the use of violence is reduced in contexts when an enemy threatens the home(land).

B Resistance, Negotiations and Gender

Figure 6.b Mural of Leila Khaled on the Wall, 27th March 2016, Minna Cowper-Coles

Violence plays an important role in Palestinian politics. Conflict and occupation have plagued the Palestinian Territories for almost a century, and Palestinians have been using violent methods to resist the occupation for decades. Nationalist discourse dominates the political sphere, and how to liberate Palestine and/or establish a Palestinian state is the most important political question. In the context of the national struggle, the use of both violent and non-violent methods for achieving these aims are seen as legitimate. There is a long history of armed resistance, ranging from guerrilla

warfare to suicide bombing, and 'resistance to occupation and sacrificing for that struggle are highly praised and everywhere commemorated in Palestine' (Allen, 2002a p. 34). Participants and victims of the national struggle are glorified to the extent that 'people who have died because of Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza' are called martyrs and have streets, hospitals and babies named after them (Allen, 2002a p. 34).

The strength of this discourse can also be aimed at the enemy; Allen describes how many Palestinians at the peak of the Second Intifada, justified suicide bombings by insisting that there is 'no such thing as an Israeli civilian' because of conscription in Israel or because they saw all Israelis as complicit in the occupation because of their support for the Israeli government (Allen, 2002a p. 36).

Most Palestinians reflect the views of international law and see 'Israeli soldiers as entirely legitimate targets' (Allen, 2002a p. 36). Fervent support of the resistance does not, however, preclude there being support for non-violent methods and peace negotiations in the Palestinian Territories. Richter-Devroe points out that far from being only 'violent radicalism', Palestinian resistance includes a wide range of activities (Richter-Devroe, 2008 p. 45). She writes:

> *'Every single day Palestinians engage in everyday forms of resistance, such as resisting closures, roadblocks, curfews, invasions, land-grabs, etc., in order to carry on with their daily life. They also take part in more formally organized nonviolent direct action, resisting the occupation through demonstrations, sit-ins, or protests. Furthermore academic boycott, awareness-raising campaigns, speaking tours and festivals, or projects to celebrate Palestinian history and culture, these are all acts of resistance-of resisting the occupation and resisting the establishment of facts on the ground as normal and irreversible.' (Richter-Devroe, 2008 pp. 45-46).*

The peace process, when seen to be progressing, was also very popular in Palestine. In the 1990s there was majority support for the peace process, due to exhaustion with the conflict and the hope that the peace process would lead to political and economic gains (Pearlman, 2011 pp. 126-127). Just as political parties have changed their positions and methods, public opinion has also shifted over time.

i) Different Methods, Different Parties

Support for negotiations or resistance is seen as the main difference between Fatah and Hamas. For the last few decades, Fatah and Hamas have (on the whole) espoused divergent methods for ending the Israeli occupation. Fatah has adopted a non-violent approach favouring negotiations, while Hamas has continued to affiliate itself with violent resistance (Shikaki, 1998 p. 29). However, this characterisation of these organisations positions is overly simplistic. It overlooks important historical changes in position and the important disparity between the rhetoric and the reality of the methods being pursued.

At its founding, Fatah insisted upon 'the primacy of armed struggle as the sole means of liberating Palestine' (Sayigh, 1997 p. 89). Some commentators suggest that Yasser Arafat was a particular advocate of attacks on Israeli civilians as a way to undermine immigration to Israel, divert their security forces and to destroy the Israeli economy (Rubin and Rubin, 2003 p. 41).

The first sign of a change came in November 1988 when the Palestine National Council (dominated by Fatah) renounced all forms of terrorism (although they continued to assert the legitimacy of armed struggle) (Sayigh, 1997 p. 547). Then, in the early 1990s with the signing of the Oslo Accords, the foundation of the Palestinian Authority and the peace process, their tactics switched to seeking a Palestinian state through negotiations with Israel. Oslo signalled a key turning point, when the Palestinian nationalist movement in its broadest conception became divided between those who supported and those who opposed the Oslo Accords and the peace process. On the 'pro peace' side was Fatah, the People's party (PPP) and FIDA, while on the opposition side, disagreeing fundamentally with the terms of the Oslo Accords, was the PFLP, DFLP, Hamas and Islamic Jihad (Stork and Doumani, 1994 p. 3).

However, during the Second Intifada, Fatah once again carried out violent attacks on Israel, including suicide bombings against Israeli civilians. Brown and Hamzawy describe how, at this time, the divisions between parties lifted and 'Suddenly "resistance" was the common denominator for all Palestinian groups' (Brown and Hamzawy, 2010 p. 167). During the Second Intifada, Fatah played a double game with the leadership calling for negotiations, while Fatah militias carried out attacks

sometimes with and sometimes without the blessing of the leadership (Baylouny, 2009). After the Second Intifada, Fatah regained its position as the advocates of the peace processes. Yet, they never gave up on the rhetoric and symbolism of armed resistance. They still play an important role in the imagery and speeches of Fatah.

Since the formation of the PA, Fatah have tried to portray 'good governance' as a form of resistance (Blecher, 2009 p. 69), by both encouraging Palestinians to carry on living in the West Bank, but also as a way of proving to the international community that they are competent and able to maintain control and stability therefore 'earning sovereignty through good behavior' (Blecher, 2009 p. 70).

Hamas, unlike Fatah, have never disavowed the use of force or violent resistance to achieve their goals (Bröning, 2013 p. 12). Gunning writes:

> *'From its inception, it has attacked Israelis as part of its opposition to occupation and the... peace process... The type of violence used has changed over time, from stone throwing, knifings and shootings to kidnappings, suicide bombings and rocket attacks-and increasingly, a set of uneasy ceasefires.' (Gunning, 2007 p. 195)*

It is worth pointing out that Hamas has not been in a continual state of attack against Israel but has kept several ceasefires (Bröning, 2013 pp. 19, 64; Caridi, 2012 pp. 196-197; Gunning, 2007 pp. 52, 221; Sayigh, 2011 p. 13). Indeed, Hamas's position with regard to the long-term solution to the conflict, has been 'ambiguous' (Gunning, 2007 p. 195). Since 2005 they have been seen to be gradually turning away from violent resistance, as signalled by their participation in the 2006 elections (Gunning, 2007 pp. 195-196). They have also shown willingness for compromise and have tried to demonstrate its 'readiness to accept a two-state solution' to the conflict to western powers (Gunning, 2007 pp. 195-196; Jamal, 2012 p. 195; Sayigh, 2011 p. 13). Hroub reveals the extent to which Hamas's attitude changed: 'Two years after assuming power, Hamas went so far as to accuse those groups and factions that kept launching rockets against Israeli towns after the June 2008 ceasefire of damaging the national Palestinian interest and serving the Israeli occupation.' (Hroub, 2010 p. 174)

The choice of methods is a subject of much academic discussion and has variously been attributed to the ideological positions of different groups, the level of internal cohesion (Pearlman, 2011), or by the opportunities and restrictions presented by the

political context (Allen, 2002b p. 42). Hamas's critique of the peace process has been rooted in its ideological stance but has also been justified as the most effective method of gaining concessions from Israel (Gunning, 2007 p. 199; Pearlman, 2011 p. 136). As Gunning writes: 'Without violence, the argument goes, Palestinians have no leverage over Israel. In the absence of a powerful neutral arbiter who can force Israel to live up to its commitments, negotiations by themselves are unlikely to persuade Israel to do so.' (Gunning, 2007 p. 203) Events such as the Israeli retreat from Gaza in 2005, and the prisoner exchange when Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was freed in return for several hundred Palestinian prisoners being released from Israeli jails, have played 'to the benefit of Hamas', because they can be seen as evidence that resistance is more effective than negotiations (Hollis, 2010 p. 12).

Furthermore, Hamas's stance might be a political manoeuvre. Gunning suggests that the ability to inflict violence on Israel is 'an important source of authority' for Hamas and has helped it to improve its position vis-a-vis Fatah. Undermining the peace process was seen as 'a sure way to weaken Fatah' who had 'staked its political future on the Oslo agreement' (Gunning, 2007 p. 46; Pearlman, 2011 p. 136). The resistance plays a significant role in its discourse and symbolism (Gunning, 2007 pp. 139, 175).

A question mark hangs over where Hamas's military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, sits in relation to the rest of the organisation. Some scholars suggest that it has a certain degree of independence from the rest of the organisation, and that it is controlled and funded by the external leadership (Brown and Hamzawy, 2010 p. 165; Gunning, 2007 p. 40). Others argue that there is no 'separation between its military and its political wing' and that the same authority 'makes the principal decisions on terror operations as well as on political, social, and other policies' (Herzog, 2006 p. 85). The use of violence has reputedly been one of the areas of 'tension' between the internal and external leadership of Hamas, with external leaders being more militant (Gunning, 2007 p. 40; Pearlman, 2011 p. 138).

Despite the broad changes over time, Palestinians tend to see negotiations or resistance as the main difference between Fatah and Hamas. F4 told me: "Fatah – Hamas, actually there is a difference. As you can see Hamas believe in resistance for getting back Palestine. But [for] Fatah negotiations are the way to get back Palestine. And I think it is a big difference between them." (F4)

Fatah are still characterised as, for the most part, the party supporting negotiations and the peace process. This was clear in my interviews (M2; M18; F15; M24; M26; M30x; M36; M41). Interviewees described the "Fatah peace programme" (M30x) and how "Fatah has the peace agenda" (M2) and how "Abu Mazen... believes just in peace" (M41).

Hamas position themselves, particularly to the Palestinian populace, as the resistance party (as can be seen in Figure 6.a). Gunning describes how, in the lead up to the 2006 election as well as in student election campaigns, 'references to violence have been prominent' including highlighting their role in the resistance, posters of 'martyrs' including suicide bombers and in one university election even blowing up a model of a bus (Gunning, 2007 pp. 175-6). 'During election rallies, references to the resistance- and in particular to Hamas' role in 'forcing' the IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) out of Gaza- were commonplace, as were posters of Hamas' martyrs' (Gunning, 2007 p. 175). They are also broadly seen by interviewees as a resistance organisation (M9; M12x; F9; F11; F16; M19; F22; M23; M25; M28; M30x; F27; F33; M36; F35; F39; F40). I was told "when I look at Hamas as a political movement I see the resistance" (F12x), "they are fighters" (F11). Although there was some nuance to these views, with most interviewees seeing this as positive, there were some who told me that Hamas just "want to kill" (F36; M36).

These characterisations of Fatah and Hamas allow hypotheses ***H4b*** and ***H4d*** to be tested.

> ***H4b: Women support political organisations committed to the use of violent methods less than men.***
>
> ***H4d: Women support political organisations committed to non-violent (peaceful) methods more than men.***

There is then a clear divide between Hamas and Fatah in terms of how they are perceived in relation to the use of force. Fatah are seen as largely unwilling to use force to liberate Palestine, while Hamas are seen as very clearly dedicated to the use of force for this end. These characterisations of Fatah and Hamas mean that the null hypotheses for ***H4b*** and ***H4d*** cannot be rejected as these hypotheses are not the case in Palestine. As shown in Chapter 1, women support Hamas more than men and Fatah

less than men, meaning that women do not support the organisation committed to non-violence more than men and do not support the organisation most committed to violent resistance less than men. Instead the reverse is true: Women support Hamas more and Fatah less than men. These findings go against the expectations of the western gender gap literature and question ideas which equate masculinity with violence and femininity with peace.

ii) Public Opinion

The changes over time and the divergence in attitudes between the two parties have impacted how the different parties are viewed by Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Popular opinion tends to back the use of methods that are deemed to be effective.

Arafat's peace process gained the people's support as long as he could 'plausibly hold out the prospect of an end to the Israeli occupation' (Stork and Doumani, 1994 p. 4; Shikaki, 1998). While the peace process was seen as the best chance at ending the conflict and gaining an independent Palestinian state, Islamic terrorism was unpopular and was seen as undermining the broader process (Shikaki, 1998 p. 36). Shikaki writes:

> *'As the peace process progressed, Palestinian support for violence against Israeli targets declined. Opposition to terrorism depends on diplomatic movement, national reconstruction, and Arafat's leadership. Support for attacks against Israelis has dropped from 57 percent in November 1994, to 46 percent in February 1995, to 33 percent a month later, and to 31 percent in March 1996 - all dates of major suicide bombings by members of Hamas or Islamic Jihad.' (Shikaki, 1998 p. 35)*

However, more recently support for the peace process has started to wane. First came frustration as Israel closed off the West Bank and Gaza in response to violence, leading to increased support for the use of violence (Shikaki, 1998 p. 35). Gradually however, the Oslo process became 'thoroughly discredited', as no progress was made towards a 'credible two-state solution', while Israeli settlement building and land confiscations proceeded apace, and the promised prosperity foundered (Gunning, 2007 p. 48). In the midst of this came the Second Intifada when support for the use of force significantly increased (Johnson and Kuttab, 2001 p. 32).

During the Second Intifada, those who opposed suicide bombings were often seen as being self-interested or trying to appeal to western donors and many peace NGOs were seen as trying to promote 'Western, defeatist attitudes harmful to the Palestinian cause' (Allen, 2002b p. 40). Political factions were aware of the strength of the appeal of the resistance at this time and often vied over claiming the dead as members of their organisations (Allen, 2002a p. 34).

Even after the Second Intifada, the trend of disillusionment with the peace process increased with the Israeli assaults on Gaza showing Palestinians how powerless the Abbas government is to protect them (Blecher, 2009 p. 70).

Many feel that negotiations have not improved the position of Palestinians; whereas, many see Hamas's violence against Israel as more effective in eliciting concessions from the Israelis. Prisoner releases and the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 are given as examples of the 'victories' that Hamas is alleged to have achieved through these means (Gunning, 2007 p. 52). This meant that Hamas's 'resistance record was also seen by a significant number of Palestinians as having done more for Palestinian state-building than the peace process' (Gunning, 2007 p. 52). Esposito suggests that the parties are so strongly identified with their divergent positions on resistance and negotiations that Hamas's popularity is 'contingent on the progress of the peace process' with their popularity soaring when 'relations between Israel and the Palestinians have deteriorated' (Esposito, 1984/1998 p. 230). This has also affected how Fatah are seen. Jamal writes:

> *'For many Palestinians, the peace process revolved around Israel's security concerns, and US ambitions in the region, paying little attention to the persistence of Israel's military occupation. The Fateh leadership's willingness to accommodate Israeli security demands, with little in return, simply delegitimised the organisation in the eyes of the Palestinian people.' (Jamal, 2013 pp. 283-284)*

A few of those I spoke to continue to support Fatah's peace process (M36; M18; M24; M26; F3). M18 firmly supported the president and his dedication to peace. He called Abbas a "peace man" who only wants Palestinians to live in safety (M18). M35 echoed the same sentiment. Fatah has maintained support with people who see their approach as pragmatic and realistic. M24 said: "Fatah don't see the world in black and white and understand that you have to sacrifice something to gain something else.

They are pragmatic in politics." (M24) Likewise, M26 said "Fatah is the logical party. If you look at it logically Fatah do what they have to do." (M26) F3 told me that "[Fatah] want to have a Palestinian state. They believe in a two-state solution. They are talking in reality, not like Hamas who are imagining things." (F3) These views were not widespread, but those who held them were either long term employees of the PA security services or lived in rural areas dominated by Fatah.

I found many Palestinians to be despondent when talking about Fatah's peace process (M2; M8; M17x; M30x; M41). M2 told me: "Fatah has the peace agenda which has no results" (M2). M8 said: "The settlements are increasing, and the occupation is still here. Negotiations are going nowhere, so Fatah cadres are not satisfied, and Fatah is losing members" (M8). M17x reflects the same sentiment: "The failure of the peace process is the reason for the decrease in support for Fatah" (M17x). M30x, a Hamas PLC Member in Ramallah, and M41, a Fatah member from Gaza, tried to explain to me why peace did not seem to make sense anymore:

> *"the Fatah peace programme has failed. They have been negotiating for more than 25 years with no results. We have the wall which has separated East Jerusalem from the West Bank and they have cut it [off from] all the cities... we have now more than a hundred thousand settlers who are living in the West Bank, so what results do we have from the Oslo Accords? They are negative. They are eating our land. So now if you look on a map and you look at the West Bank, you will see that it is impossible to have a two-state solution because they are spreading everywhere in the West Bank, everywhere." (M30x)*

M41:

> *"Abu Mazen, he believes just in peace. And you know the resistance is something the people, like, wanted... They need somebody to defend them. They need somebody to protect them. We are talking about settlers burning, like, children alive, attacking the civilians and houses while our president is, like, standing all the time and saying 'I just believe in peace. We have just like to work to reach a peaceful agreement.' While the other side... the [Israeli] defence minister. He is saying we should destroy... these cities and kill Palestinians." (M41)*

M11x, a Fatah politician, described the peace process and the growing disillusionment that the people have with it. In doing so, he blames Israel rather than Fatah for the failure of the peace process. He said:

> *"[The people] have seen nothing over twenty years, that Arafat's dream was nothing, that Israel has consolidated its grip on geography with the construction of more and more settlements and then creating the environment that was conducive to the erection of the wall. The stagnation led to the election of Hamas... Israel has turned the peace process into a process that yields no results whatsoever, that Palestine has been turned into a Swiss cheese-like country where we win the holes and Israel wins the cheese" (M11x)*

Hamas gained support as the 'faction of choice for those opposed to the peace-process', being much more effective than the waning 'leftists' after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In fact, they became popular even with those who 'did not wholly subscribe to the Brotherhood's ideological programme' (Gunning, 2007 pp. 39-40). As Hamas became more and more prominent in the violence of the Second Intifada, and the leadership became targeted by Israel for assassination, they gained popular appeal leading to 'an increase in volunteers and political support' (Gunning, 2007 p. 50). This view could be reflected in the view expressed by F16, a young atheist woman:

> *"Hamas is not the attraction. The attraction is Al-Qassam, the military faction of Hamas. This is the attraction. Everyone wants resistance. They are resisting, they are doing something. So, of course, I would be attracted to them. Everyone [else] is compromising, they're not." (F16)*

Many of those I spoke to said that they like Hamas because of their role in the resistance (even if they might not support them overall for other reasons) (F1; F15; F16; F17; F33). Most interviewees couched their support for the resistance to me in terms of fairness, international law, self-defence or pragmatism. Hamas activists I spoke to said: "The land will not come back to its people unless we fight or unless we use power and resistance. We believe in peace, but with a state like Israel we can't see this as something that could be successful." (M23) And: "All the international rules gave legitimacy to the resistance... People feel there is no escape from the Israeli occupation except with Hamas. It is the one that raises the flag of the resistance." (F30x). M14x said: "When they withdrew from Gaza, 2005, without consulting the

Palestinian Authority, it was seen as a victory for Hamas because they seemed to cause the withdrawal. So, the military approach to the conflict was better than the peace approach." (M14x) M1 told me:

> *"Let Fatah do the negotiation and let Hamas do the resistance... we say the negotiation side you need a power, you can let Hamas be that power and you can do negotiation and now the world starts to respect you, because... your base is strong. You are expressing something strong. You are saying 'No! This our right! I'm not going to the negotiation process without a result. You have to give me a deadline. You have to give me this. We want these lands. We want this.'" (M1)*

M19 explained to me why he supported the resistance. He said:

> *"The usual argument is that Hamas should stop violence, so they can sit down and talk. Well, the West Bank is doing it and what they are getting is more settlements and it hasn't benefitted us at all. Actually, it just made it worse. So, this is where the rhetoric of why diplomacy isn't working out, why we should be ditching it, is coming from. I mean it's coming out from a reason, it's not just us liking to be getting violent... It's just a cumulative process, where we got to a point where we see that by being peaceful we are being more marginalised." (M19)*

A few interviewees opposed Hamas because of their resistance methods. F3 told me, "what Hamas is doing it is not good for the Palestinian people" (F3). M4 was upset because Hamas "are not thinking of the people who are dying" (M4). M11x said "Hamas was not able to liberate an inch of Palestine despite all the rhetoric and the three wars we witnessed" (M11x).

During time of war, such as the 2014 conflict that was taking place during my first field trip, support for Hamas and the resistance reached a high point (Blecher, 2009 pp. 64-65). An activist with the Islamic bloc at Birzeit university explained that Hamas's role in the war had been an important factor in getting them to win the student council (M23). M8 said: "with the current situation, with the recent news from Gaza, of course people tend to support the resistance" (M8). F34 told me: "during the war on Gaza I supported Hamas strongly, because it was self-defence." (F34) F5 who I spoke to during the war explained her thinking:

> *"I support resistance. Because right now I am with the resistance 100 percent, because I*

believe that what Israel is doing in Gaza is a war crime because they are killing innocent people. But what the resistance is doing, they are killing soldiers who are killing innocent people. They don't mean no harm for innocent people... I hate when people kill each other. It is not right. It cannot be this way; we cannot live this life. But I am with the resistance because they need to do something to survive to live through this life." (F5)

Many of those I spoke to said that Hamas's behaviour during the 2014 war made a favourable impression on them (M9; M25; F34; M19) "They were very good in the last war, they strengthened the Palestinian people, particularly how they freed the Palestinian prisoners in exchange for kidnapped Israeli soldiers." (M25)

Even those who are loyal to Fatah in general felt some sympathy – or even support – for Hamas at this time. The reasons for those who oppose the use of violence in general supporting Hamas during the war were explained very well by M18, who told me:

"even me... I am kind of supporting of Hamas in terms of resistance I'm personally against killing innocent civilians. But... in the... 2014 war, I mean Hamas killed 3 civilians and 62 soldiers and the other side killed 70 to 80 percent according to the UN were civilians and the rest were militants. Even in that sense it seems that Hamas is doing more of a fair war... so I am kind of with Hamas in the resistance part, but I am totally against them in the political arena... this is why Palestinian society shifted towards Hamas because they, kind of, found the one that is, kind of, defending them, that is standing for them: something that they haven't seen for a long, long, long time." (M19)

Some interviewees - particularly those in Gaza - having supported Hamas through the war, lost their support for Hamas after the war, when life continued, more difficult than ever, in its aftermath (M14x; M17x; M39x; F40). Pollster, M14x, told me: "During the wars the popularity of Hamas actually increased, but then after a couple of months of the, after the war, the popularity decreases again because people will see how the war affected them and made the situation much worse" (M14x). M39x, who does polling in Gaza, told me:

"After the last assault on Gaza, support for Hamas was actually raised because they were able to overcome the last assault. We did a poll on the last day of the wars, or the last two days of the war, and the results were very high for Hamas... it was an immediate reaction to the assault on Gaza, and it was more of an emotional thing. After a small period of time

people realised the destruction that happened in Gaza and how hard the situation was and so that is why that support began diminishing." (M39x)

F40, who was also in Gaza during the war, told me how she went from elation and support for Hamas during the war, to disappointment with them in its immediate aftermath. She said:

"Right after the war people were extremely disappointed with Hamas because they accepted the terms that they could have accepted on the eighth day of the war and saved so many lives and so much destruction and so on." (F40)

These views signal a disenchantment with the resistance that might be specific to those in Gaza who have experienced so much suffering that even a compromise peace seems better than continuing the struggle. M38x told me:

"People start to question the issue of the resistance. What does resistance mean and why we need to suffer this and why we need to be having wars and why? Why? Why? People to start to [question] because they don't see the [benefits]" (M38x)

Within the Palestinian population, people support both resistance and negotiations. They can provide justifications rooted in pragmatism for both methods. The question of resistance or negotiations remains unresolved with both methods seemingly failing to produce a solution. As the Israeli occupation persists, the question of how to gain a favourable resolution remains vital. Hamas and Fatah are largely seen to support rival methods, as such, support for one method or another is likely to be a large determinant of political support. Accordingly, if there are gender differences in support for resistance or negotiations then this may explain the gender gap in political support.

iii) Gender

Participation in the national struggle has been broadly gendered. The leadership of all Palestinian political movements is overwhelmingly male (Abdo, 1999 p. 42; Holt, 1996 p. 39; Tessler and Nachtwey, 1999 p. 27). This has transferred into the structures of the PA (Gluck, 1995 p. 11), and the peace negotiations (Sharoni, 1995 p. 20). The actors in the resistance have also been overwhelmingly men, whether guerrillas,

stone-throwing demonstrators or suicide bombers (Johnson and Kuttab, 2001 p. 36; Sharoni, 1995).

The gender differences in participation in the national movement is tied to the gendered national discourse. As has been touched upon above, '[t]he Palestinian national discourse is a masculine discourse', which expects male participation (Aweidah and Omar, 2013 p. 14). Yasser Arafat was described as the '"symbolic father" of the nation, and the iconic black and white *kufiya*, emblematic of the resistance, is a male head scarf (Massad, 1995 pp. 477-479). Directives and slogans tend to prioritise the masculine overwhelmingly conceiving of 'Palestinian nationalist agents as masculine' (Massad, 1995 p. 473).

Palestinian masculinity has itself become to be defined by participation in the national struggle. Baxter suggests that a man being 'supportive of the nationalist cause' can bestow honour on the whole family (Baxter, 2007 p. 747). Peteet explains how beatings and surviving detention by Israeli soldiers became reinvented as a mark of manliness, at a time when men's ability to provide for and protect their families was hindered by the occupation (Peteet, 2000 p. 113).

Women are expected to find roles within the national struggle that act as extensions of traditional female roles, in caring, protecting, sustaining and nurturing (Peteet, 1991 p.93). Only a few women have participated in the violent side of the resistance, whether in the Palestinian guerrilla movements in the 1960s, 70s and 80s, such as the PFLP member Laila Khaled, or as female suicide bombers of the Second Intifada (Chehab, 2007 p. 87; Irving, 2012; Ness, 2008).

Instead, women's involvement in the national struggle has, for the most part, been more closely tied to non-violent activity. Abdo describes women's involvement in petitions, strikes, delegations and a ‘120-car parade of veiled women’ during the British Mandate in Palestine (Abdo, 1994 p. 153). Women's involvement in the national struggle reached its zenith during the First Intifada. At this point, women confronted the occupation directly, through demonstrations and stone-throwing, but also worked in multiple ways to ensure Palestinian self-sufficiency during strikes, closures and boycotts (Abdo, 1994 p. 157). They organised to provide day-care centres, health education and to encourage and support economic independence through cooperatives for women (usually involving food preparation or small-scale

manufacturing) (Abdo, 1994 p. 159; Abdo, 1999 p. 42; Abdulhadi, 1998 p. 656). The Second Intifada was more problematic in terms of female participation. It was much more violent than the First Intifada, and women did not play such a large role.

For the most part, women have been prominent in resistance in forms such as the idea of '*sumud*' being steadfastness (Abdo, 1994 p. 153; Pappé, 2006 p. 238; Peteet, 1991 p. 153; Sharoni, 1995 p. 35) or in roles which are seen as extensions of 'women's responsibilities' such as mothering and care (Johnson and Kuttab, 2001 p. 37; Peteet, 2000 p. 119). Further, women have been particularly prominent in peace movements, from candlelit vigils, sewing patchwork quilts, and through dialogues between Palestinian and Israeli women (Afshar, 2003 p. 187; Johnson and Kuttab, 2001 p. 38; Powers, 2003 p. 25; Golan, 2011). However, these initiatives have often fallen flat due to power inequalities between the two sides and Palestinian women's prioritising their solidarity with the Palestinian cause over their solidarity as women (Richter-Devroe, 2008 p. 35; Golan, 2011; F23x; F18x).

Women who do actively participate in the national struggle do not benefit, as Peteet and Baxter suggests men do, from an improved reputation rather they face serious social stigma. Peteet describes how women detainees are tainted with ‘the shame of having bodily contact with strange men’, and how, once they return to the community ‘Foremost on everyone's mind is the question of sexual violation’ (Peteet, 2000 p. 118). Aweidah and Espanioli spoke to a female ex-prisoner who described how on being released from prison she was not allowed back into school because they thought she would 'subvert' the other girls, her friends deserted her, and people told her that no one would marry her. In comparison, male prisoners are considered heroes (Aweidah and Espanioli, 2007 p. 36). As a result, families are often hesitant to allow their daughters to become activists (Sayigh, 1981 p. 6).

It is impossible to assess the extent to which men and women participated in violent or non-violent activism from the interviews. While I asked about the extent that interviewees participated in political activism, I did not ask specifically about the use of violence nor did I want to, because of the risks and suspicions these kinds of questions would create. Nonetheless, by looking at participation in demonstrations as an example of non-violent but active participation in a nationalist activity, there is a clear gender difference. Fifteen of the thirty-two women I asked, and eighteen of the thirty

men I asked said they had attended a demonstration. A quick analysis of PSR Polls 28 and 29 shows that 10 percent of women and 26 percent of men said they had attended a demonstration in the last year (PSR Polls 28 and 29). This indicates a gender difference in attendance. Many interviewees said that women were less likely to attend demonstrations, because their "family do not allow [them] to go because it's dangerous" (F1), or "she has to be at home with the kids" (F37), or "because of the society's culture" (M32) or even because "there are a lot of bad guys and at the demonstrations they are trying to touch or start sexual stuff" (M33). These reasons reflect those used to prevent women from joining in many nationalist activities.

While the gender difference in active participation in the nationalist project is apparent, there is less information about perspectives towards the different methods in the Palestinian context. The literature suggests that in certain circumstances, such as in ethno-nationalist conflicts, gender differences in attitudes towards the use of force diminishes. Johnson and Kuttab found this to be the case. In their analysis of a poll in January 2001, they found that 'Palestinian men and women do not have significantly different attitudes towards the violent nature of this war on the face of it', finding gaps of only four percent, with most of the population supportive of military operations and about half the population supportive of suicide attacks (Johnson and Kuttab, 2001 p. 32). They found that women do have greater support for the 'peace process' but that 'overall attitudes between women and men towards Palestinian use of violence are more similar than different' (Johnson and Kuttab, 2001 p. 32-33). As a result of their findings, they suggest that the major differences between men and women with regard to war and peace is 'perhaps truer in gender roles than in attitudes and beliefs' (Johnson and Kuttab, 2001 p. 33).

In my interviews, I did not find any stark differences between men and women in their attitudes towards the use of resistance or negotiations. I interviewed forty-one men and forty women, but only 28 men and 32 women were asked what their preferences were. Fifteen men and fifteen women clearly stated their support for the resistance, while nine women and five men said they supported using negotiations. The rest of the interviewees expressed a belief either in the use of both, or else thought that neither were effective. As described above, support for the use of armed resistance or

negotiations tended to be couched in the language of pragmatism, self-defence and legality.

The literature and the interviews seem to show that while active participation in the national struggle is gendered, this gendering might not transfer to attitudes towards peace or violence, where the liberatory nationalist discourses justify the use of violence. Whether this is indeed the case can be tested with the hypotheses above ***(H4a*** and ***H4c).***

C Findings

Here I will explore whether the hypotheses set out in the previous sections can be confirmed by statistical analysis of the opinion poll data. I first test the sub-hypotheses (***H4a, H4c*** and ***H4e***, as ***H4b*** and ***H4d*** have already been rejected) before looking at whether attitudes towards violence and peace can explain gender differences in support for Fatah and Hamas.

H4a: Women are less supportive of the use of violence than men.

First I will test whether Palestinian women are more supportive of peaceful methods or the use of force than men in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict. The gender gap literature finds women on the whole are less supportive of the use of violence, while the academic literature suggests that in liberatory or ethno-nationalist contexts, women are less likely to position themselves differently from men.

There are two variables in the Merged Dataset which can be used to test this hypothesis. Both relate to the Palestinian context as opposed to ideas of peace and violence more generally.

Figure 6.c shows responses to a question, present in thirty polls, which asks whether respondents support or oppose attacks on Israeli civilians. What exactly is meant by this changes throughout the period, with suicide bombings being the main form of attack during the Second Intifada, and rockets being the main form of attack after 2007. There is a statistically significant gender difference in responses. The main gender difference is that women are more 'moderate' in their responses, tending towards the less strongly worded sentences in the middle ground. This phenomenon,

where women support more moderate positions or 'don't know' options is well known in the literature (see e.g. Togeby, 1994).



Figure 6.c To show percentage support and opposition to attacks on Israeli civilians. Data = PSR Polls 2-7, 9 -21, 27, 28, 30, 31, 34-38, 42 and 56, χ^2 (3)=74.41, p<0.001, *n=37760*

However, a Pearson's Chi-Square test on grouped responses (so counting 'strongly oppose' and 'oppose' together and 'support' and 'strongly support' together) shows that there is no statistically significant relationship between gender and support or opposition to attacks on civilians [χ^2 (1)=2.08, p=0.15]. As such, the null hypothesis for ***H4a*** cannot be rejected as women do not support the use of violence less than men.

Another question in the polls offers a different perspective on support for the use of violence. It is phrased: 'Do you believe that armed confrontations have so far achieved Palestinian rights in a way that the negotiations could not?' and the responses are 'definitely yes/ certainly yes', 'yes', 'no' and 'definitely no/ certainly no' (as well as a 'don't know' option). The responses are presented below in Figure 6.d. Women are less likely to think that armed confrontations are an effective tactic compared to men. A Pearson's Chi-Square test confirms that there is a relationship between gender and responses to this question at the p<0.001 level. The findings from this question suggest

rejecting the null for ***H4a*** very hesitantly, because women do not tend to see armed confrontations as having been as effective as men. It is notable how high the overall percentage is of people who think armed confrontations are effective are, with over sixty percent of respondents thinking they have been more effective than negotiations.



Figure 6.d. To show gender differences in attitudes about the effectiveness of armed confrontations versus negotiations, Data = PSR Polls 2-23 (Merged Dataset), χ^2 (3)=105.21, p<0.001, n=27917

H4c: Women are more supportive of non-violence (peace) than men.

Figure 6.e shows the percentage of men and women's responses to the question 'Generally do you see yourself as:', with the choice of three answers: 'Supportive of the Peace Process', 'Opposed to the Peace Process', 'Between Supportive and Opposed'.

Overall, more women are supportive of the peace process than men. The difference is confirmed as statistically significant with a Pearson's Chi-Square test which suggests a relationship between gender and support for the peace process. This reflects the widely-held view that women are more 'peace-loving' than men, and the null hypothesis for ***H4c*** can be rejected. However, the gender differences are not stark.



Figure 6.e To show percentage support and opposition to peace process. Data = PSR Polls 19-38, 42 and 56 (Merged Dataset), χ^2 (2)=461.44, p<0.001, n=27424

H4e: The gender gap in support for the use of violence is reduced in contexts when an enemy threatens the home(land).

While the charts above suggest that women are overall (perhaps) slightly less supportive of the use of violence and more in favour of peace than men, there are theories which suggest that women's and men's attitudes might change at times of particular stress (see e.g. Clark and Clark, 2008). Research has shown that in Israel political attitudes and in-group feelings increase at times of violence and unrest (Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter, 2006). It is likely therefore that political attitudes are impacted by the political context.

The tables below compare attitudes to the use of violence during times when Palestinians might feel an increased threat (here the Second Intifada) and when they are likely to feel less threatened. I have used the question relating to attacks on civilians (used in Figure 6.c above) and the question relating to armed confrontation (used in Figure 6.d above) as they are present in both the Second Intifada and after.

After the Second Intifada women are more likely to adopt moderate positions, while during the Intifada they hold equally strong views to men. I have included two Pearson's Chi-Square tests; the second 'grouped' one compares positive and negative views rather than all four subsections to control for women choosing the more moderate choice as seen above. The evidence shows that gender differences do not substantially change during the Second Intifada. As such ***H4e*** cannot be accepted because it seems that when facing a threat to the homeland, gender differences in attitudes towards peace and violence are moderated but they do not change completely.

	Second Intifada		*Other times*	
Attack civilians?	**Men %**	**Women %**	**Men %**	**Women %**
Strongly Support	26	25.9	15.6	12.7
Support	29	28.3	32.9	35.2
Oppose	39.6	40.4	42.7	46.2
Strongly oppose	5.4	5.4	8.8	5.9
n	7729	7736	10962	11333
χ^2 *(3)*	***1.30, p=0.729***		***117.47, p=0.000***	
Grouped χ^2 *(1)*	***1.00, p=0.32***		***0.85, p=0.356***	

Table 6.a Data = PSR Polls 2-7,9-21,27, 28, 30,31, 34-38, 42, 56 (PSR Polls 2-14, are taken as Second Intifada, Merged Dataset), n=37,760

	Second Intifada		*Other times*	
Confrontations?	**Men %**	**Women %**	**Men %**	**Women %**
Definitely no	4.9	5.7	6.2	5
No	24.9	29.2	28.9	35.1
Yes	45.2	41.6	42.7	43.7
Definitely yes	25	23.4	22.2	16.3
n	8412	8159	5688	5658
χ^2 *(3)*	***50.23, p=0.000***		***96.38, p=0.000***	
Grouped χ^2 *(1)*	***50.02, p=0.000***		***30.15, p<0.0001***	

Table 6.b Data = PSR Polls 2-23 (PSR Polls 2-14, are taken as Second Intifada, Merged Dataset), n=27,917

H4: Gender differences in attitudes to violence and non-violence explain (reduce) the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Here I conduct logistic regressions to measure the impact of the overriding hypothesis for this chapter to work out whether attitudes towards peace and the use of violence explain the gender gap in political support. The results can be seen in Table 6.c.

Model 1b: Political support ~ gender (+ poll number) + age + gaza + city + refugee camp

This preliminary model is the same as used in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. It provides a comparison with the baseline model for the models below.

Model 5a: Political support ~ gender (+ poll number) + age + gaza + city + refugee camp + peace process

This second model includes the variable '*peace process'* as is used above. As shown in Table 6.c, the beta values for this variable are strongly negative for *'Fatah support'* and strongly positive for *'Hamas support'*. Both are statistically significant at the p<0.0001 level. This shows, that, as expected, opposing the peace process and supporting Hamas are connected, as are supporting the peace process and supporting Fatah. By looking

at the Deviance, it is clear that these both are important in explaining political support. However, the beta coefficient for *'gender'* increases substantially when this variable is included, implying that were men and women both to support/oppose the peace process to the same extent, women/men would support Hamas even more/less and men/women would support Fatah even more/less. Therefore, ***H4*** is not the case as gender differences towards peace do not explain the gender gap.

Model 5b: Political support ~ gender (+ poll number) + age + gaza + city + refugee camp + peace process + attack civilians

In this model, I include a variable for '*attack civilians'* as shown in Figure 6.c above. This variable makes less of an impact on the overall model than '*peace process'* as can be seen by the AIC and the Deviance. It also increases the *'gender'* variable for Hamas while have no effect on the *'gender'* variable for Fatah. Thus, gender differences in attitudes towards support for violent or non-violent methods, do not explain the gender gap in political support.

Model/Variable	*Model 1a*		*Model 5a*		*Model 5b*	
	Fatah	***Hamas***	***Fatah***	***Hamas***	***Fatah***	***Hamas***
(Intercept)	-0.37 (0.03)***	-1.58 (0.04)***	-0.44 (0.03)***	-1.54 (0.04)***	-0.12 (0.04)**	-2.02 (0.05)***
Gender	**-0.35 (0.02)*** **	**0.47 (0.02)*** **	**-0.41 (0.02)*** **	**0.53 (0.02)*** **	**-0.41 (0.02)*** **	**0.55 (0.02)*** **
Poll Number	0.01 (0.00)***	-0.05 (0.01)**	0.04 (0.00)***	-0.03 (0.00)***	0.04 (0.00)***	-0.03 (0.00)***
Age	-0.07 (0.01)***	-0.00 (0.00)***	-0.08 (0.01)***	-0.04 (0.01)***	-0.09 (0.01)***	-0.03 (0.01)***
Gaza	0.05 (0.02)*	0.47 (0.02)***	0.04 (0.02)	0.50 (0.03)***	0.07 (0.02)**	0.46 (0.03)***
City	-0.24 (0.02)***	0.02 (0.03)	-0.26 (0.02)***	0.03 (0.03)	-0.24 (0.02)***	-0.00 (0.03)
Refugee Camp	-0.15 (0.03)***	0.02 (0.03)	-0.15 (0.03)***	0.02 (0.03)	-0.13 (0.03)***	-0.01 (0.04)
Peace Process			-0.53 (0.02)***	0.48 (0.02)***	-0.59 (0.02)***	0.52 (0.02)***
Attack Civilians					-0.15 (0.01)***	0.21 (0.01)***
Deviance (Null)	65594 (66445)	51171 (52125)	64294 (66445)	50261 (52125)	63850 (66445)	49575 (52125)
AIC	65608	51185	64310	50277	63868	49593

*Table 6.c Showing the B values, Standard Errors (in brackets) and level of significance for logistic regressions on the variables '*Fatah support*' and* 'Hamas support', *p<0.0001=***, p<0.001=**, p<0.01=*, p<0.05=. , Data = PSR Polls 1-38, 42 and 56 (Merged Dataset)*

To properly display the effect of support for peace and the use of violence on the gender gap, Figure 6.f shows the gender gap in predicted probability of supporting Fatah and Hamas for the two models below.

Model 1b: Political support ~ gender (+ poll number) + age + gaza + city + refugee camp

Model 5b: Political support ~ gender (+ poll number) + age + gaza + city + refugee camp + peace process + attack civilians

It is worth bearing in mind when looking at the graph, that *'peace process'* is only present in PSR Polls 19-56 and, as such, its effect cannot be seen in the first part of the graph. It is therefore difficult to assess whether there would be much of a difference if it included the period during and after the Second Intifada. This graph shows clearly that Model 5b is further from the zero line than Model 1b, demonstrating that holding

attitudes towards the peace process constant in fact increases the gender gap in political support. That is, if men and women had similar attitudes towards the use of violence, then women would be even more likely to support Hamas more than men, and men would be even more likely to support Fatah more than women.



Figure 6.f To show gender gap in political support with just gender and comparing with gender taking into account attitudes towards violent tactics and peace, Data = PSR Polls 1-38, 42 and 56 (Merged Dataset)

D Conclusion

This chapter has explored how questions around the use of armed resistance and the peace process have impacted political support. It has shown that despite the prominence of the question of negotiations or armed resistance in Palestinian politics, and its importance as a point of differentiation between Fatah and Hamas, gender differences in attitude towards these questions do not explain the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. This chapter has however raised a number of points of interest.

First, the distinction between Fatah and Hamas on the question of whether resistance or negotiations is the best course of action, is reflected in their political support. Those who oppose the peace process and support attacks on Israeli civilians are more likely to support Hamas, and those that support the peace process and oppose attacks on Israeli civilians are more likely to support Fatah. Even though this does not extend to an explanation of the gender gap in support.

Second, the Palestinian case does, in many ways, conform with expectations derived from the gender gap and gender and conflict literature. Women are slightly less in favour of the use of violence and are more supportive of the peace process than men. The broad overall support for armed resistance and attacks on civilians and the small size of these gender gaps shows the strength of the effect of the nationalist discourse and confirms the idea proposed in the literature that gender difference in attitudes towards the use of violence would be minimised in particular contexts, such as liberatory struggles, ethno-nationalist conflicts and against perceived injustice. Interestingly, the expectations around times of stress leading to smaller gender differences in attitudes towards peace and violence found very little support here, although there was some evidence of attitudes becoming more extreme during the Second Intifada and more moderate afterwards, gender differences did not change.

Further, gender differences in actions and opinions do not seem to correlate: although women play a minimal role in the execution of violent and armed resistance activities, they do on the whole support it. Violence is greatly gendered in Palestine, but attitudes towards violence are much less determined by gender.

A puzzle proposed by this chapter is why these slight gender differences in attitudes towards the peace process and the use of violence are not reflected in support for organisations holding similar views. Women on average support Hamas, an organisation committed supporting the resistance, more than men despite being both more in favour of the peace process and slightly less supportive of the use of armed resistance than men. This might be because other factors outweigh these considerations in choosing which organisation to support. Or else perhaps because of the nationalist discourse in Palestine individuals might be broadly supportive of all forms of resistance. Indeed, this chapter and the polling questions used are unable to distinguish the nuances and depth of these political attitudes.

A final thought posed by this chapter is how ideas around feminine compassion and the use of violence and support for peace must be treated with caution, and regard should be given to the context and nuance surrounding them. Women, like men, may take utilitarian attitudes, self-defence attitudes and protect or claim what they feel are their rights and their due, and in doing so participate in and/or endorse the use of violence.

Chapter 7 Oppression



Figure 7.a Mural in Ramallah, 27th February 2016, Minna Cowper-Coles

This chapter aims both to highlight the role of political oppression in the Occupied Palestinian Territories but also to explore whether an oppressive political context might impact on or explain the gender gap in political support in Palestine.

Most gender gap research is conducted in the West in relatively open and democratic societies, whereas Palestinian politics takes place under Israeli military occupation in the West Bank where there is limited 'self-government' by the PA and in the Gaza Strip under the Hamas government which have both shown signs of being increasingly autocratic and intolerant of political opposition.

Under authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, as well as in contexts of occupation, governments and regimes can usually ensure displays of support from the population partly through coercion and control. Compliance can be achieved through 'carrots' and 'sticks', which for a regime or organisation can mean economic benefits, employment, and access to power, or restrictions on access to the above benefits and, of course, the use of imprisonment and physical violence. The threat of violence or other negative repercussions may alter an individual's public and political behaviour. Scott and Wedeen have both explored the phenomena of individuals behaving publicly

for the benefit of those in power (Scott, 1990; Wedeen, 1998). Scott suggests that, most of the time, ‘the public performance of the subordinate will, out of prudence, fear, and the desire to curry favor, be shaped to appeal to the expectations of the powerful’ (Scott, 1990 p. 2). Wedeen examines the Syrian state under Assad, finding that people behave loyally due to ‘coercive compliance’ where ‘people obey because they fear being punished’ (Wedeen, 1998 p. 519). In the context of an oppressive political environment, it becomes more difficult to see people's public behaviour as a reflection of their true feelings or beliefs.

However, that is not to say that people's political behaviour in every society that does not have a full democracy should be discredited because of coercion. Studies show that there is scope for the population to express their opposition to the government within the context of electoral politics in authoritarian regimes. Elections in authoritarian regimes mostly serve as a tool for co-opting elites and party members and distributing 'the spoils of office', working as 'competitive clientelism' where different candidates seek the position of 'intermediaries in patron-client relations' (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009 pp. 405-407). Regimes usually use force or intimidation, together with favours, to make the population turn out and vote in its favour (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009 p. 405). However, expressions of opposition do occur. For example, Miguel et al.'s work suggests that in non-democracies while there is no proper opportunity for voting out politicians with whom they are not happy, the public can express their disapproval of the regime through abstaining from voting (Miguel, et al., 2015). They write: ‘Expressing opposition in this way can be very effective because elites in competitive authoritarian regimes value high voter turnout as a means of legitimating their rule to both domestic and international audiences.’ (Miguel, et al., 2015 p. 9) Further Gandhi and Lust-Okar find that voters who strongly oppose the regime tend to vote for opposition parties, even if they do not agree with their policies. They suggest that because of the cost and risk of doing so, these people tend to be 'more highly ideological' (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009 p. 409). These studies suggest that despite government coercion, citizens in authoritarian regimes do use the opportunity of elections to voice their support or opposition to political groups. In this chapter I will explore the extent to which the public feel free to express their political

views in the Palestinian Territories and how this might affect their declared political support.

Further this chapter also questions the extent to which political coercion and oppression are gendered. Research suggests that men tend to be targeted more than women by authoritarian governments and occupying forces (Blaydes and El Tarouty, 2009; Khalili, 2010; Segal, 2008; Sjoberg, 2014). Therefore, in this chapter I will consider whether the context of oppression might be gendered and whether it might impact the gender gap, looking at the following hypothesis:

H5: Gendered fear of political oppression explains (reduces) the gender gap in political support.

A Oppression in Palestine

There are multiple sources of oppression in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The occupying forces of the Israeli military provide the overall context, while within the nominally autonomous sections within the territories the PA and Hamas have shown increasingly authoritarian behaviour. However, there have been many 'free and fair' elections in the territories, and some political freedoms remain, including, to some extent, a culture of political pluralism. Personal circumstances, political preferences and the current political climate are likely to determine whether individuals in this quasi-authoritarian context feel able to express their political views.

Since 1967, the major source of coercion for the Palestinian people has been the occupation army, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), but more recently other 'security forces' have started to play similar roles. The Palestinian Authority's own police force and security apparatus also use violence to exert control. The PA now often works together - in 'security cooperation' - with the IDF, and their security services have proliferated to at least '40,000 men under arms' (Johnson and Kuttab, 2001 p. 23). Since the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, Hamas has formed its own police force to keep control of the population in that territory. Beyond these, there are several armed militias and militarised organisations which have acted on the command of different political groups in recent decades (Gunning, 2007 p. 26). The occupants of the territories are subject to the violence of different powers. Gunning writes:

'Occupation, the violent practices of the Israeli army and Jewish settlers, the plethora of resistance factions, clan militias and criminal gangs, and their violent practices, combined with the widespread availability of arms, the relative weakness of central authority structures and the existence of violent clan traditions, have all served to create a political environment in which violence is commonplace.' (Gunning, 2007 p. 175)

Fear of being subject to violence, or facing imprisonment, threats, or a loss of livelihood or freedom, is likely to impact how Palestinians express their political support. This subject has largely been absent from the gender gap literature for the reason that political oppression on this scale is not often found in the western democracies that have been the subject of research.

The Occupied Palestinian Territories are, as the name suggests, occupied territories, and not a state. Ultimate power has remained, since 1967 and even after the Oslo Agreement, in the hands of the Israelis: they control the borders, airspace, and even the subterranean waters of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Hilal, 2010 p. 33; Weisman, 2007 p. 19). The occupation means that at the most fundamental level, the Palestinian political system is not democratic: Israel is in ultimate control and Palestinians cannot vote to change their rule.

The Israeli occupation is based, for the most part, on the coercion and subjugation of the Palestinian population. The extent of arrests and violence by the occupying forces is astonishing. Sayigh writes that by '1985 an estimated 250,000 Palestinians had experienced interrogation or detention-40 per cent of all adult males had been held for at least one night-since 1967' (Sayigh, 1997 p. 608). In the years 1986 and 1987 he describes how '103 Palestinians died, 668 were wounded, and 12,842 were arrested in confrontations with Israeli forces' (Sayigh, 1997 p. 608). As of August 2016, there were over six thousand Palestinian prisoners and security detainees from the Gaza Strip and West Bank in Israeli prisons and military facilities (Freedom House, 2017 pp. 619, 648).

Further, Israel uses other forms of coercion and punishment against the Palestinians, including assassinations, firing at demonstrators and farmers, the demolition of Palestinian homes and businesses, and, most prominently, restricting movement. Restriction of movement often amounts to collective punishment such as the Gaza blockade, where movement of goods and people to and from the Gaza Strip are

heavily regulated, 'impeding civilian life and reconstruction efforts' (Freedom House, 2017 p. 616). Or for example, as Freedom House recounts:

> *'In July, one village had its access points sealed after a teenage resident stabbed and killed an Israeli girl in a nearby settlement. The village was cut off for 34 days, and 2,771 permits to work in Israel were canceled.' (Freedom House, 2017 p. 649)*

Israel deems many of the Palestinian political movements, including Hamas, as terrorist organisations. They have assassinated, detained and tortured many prominent members of these organisations. 'Indeed Israel has made no bones about backing Fatah and attacking only Hamas targets.' (Koshy, 2007 p. 2871) Because Israel controls not only the Palestinian borders but also has numerous check points within the West Bank, they can also make life difficult for people suspected of being associated with, say, Hamas by preventing them from travelling outside of and even within the Occupied Territories. The threat or possibility of facing repercussions from Israel is likely to impact individual political support for these organisations, and how, or whether, they voice it.

The testimonies of those I interviewed point to the Israeli Occupation forces as violent and oppressive. Several interviewees had suffered very directly from Israeli violence. M40 was shot at the age of eleven in his stomach by an Israeli soldier (M40). F30x's husband, a prominent member of Hamas, was assassinated in 2001 (F30x). Several other interviewees' relatives had been killed (M30; F5) or arrested by Israel (M2; M18; M25). Interviewees suggested that fear of repercussions from Israel meant they should watch what they say (F15; F17; F20; F22; M38x; M2). F15 told me that she had not involved herself in student politics because she feared the repercussions. She said:

> *"Once I was really considering becoming a member of... the student council, especially because people in my town really wanted me to, but I haven't... because everyone who participates in them becomes on the black list of Israel, so I'm like, maybe later there are other ways I can participate, just not that way." (F15)*

M2 told me about his father: "[my] father is a professor at the university and he has been in an Israeli jail in an administrative detention for no reason, because [he] expressed himself in lectures." (M2)

Internally, within the territories under Palestinian Authority or Hamas control, democratic freedoms ebb and flow with external pressure and internal reform. Its status for the ten years covered by Freedom House fluctuates between partially free and not free. There have been, particularly since 2007, major problems with expressions of support for the respective opposing parties in the Fatah-dominated West Bank, and Hamas-dominated Gaza Strip. This has taken the form of harassment and arrest by the security forces of Fatah and Israel in the West Bank, and Hamas's armed wing in the Gaza Strip (see Blecher, 2009; Bröning, 2013 p. 67; Caridi, 2012 p. 262; Hilal, 2010 p. 24; Usher, 2006 p. 27). In addition to the arrests, sympathisers of the opposing parties have been dismissed from their jobs in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and Hamas's charitable organisations have, for the most part, been disbanded or co-opted by the PA (Bröning, 2013 p. 23).

Since the Oslo Accords and increasingly since 2007, the Israeli military have, for the most part, worked together with the PA. As such, Israel can arrest and detain Palestinians they deem as 'security risks', often with the explicit help of the PA security services. Gunning writes: 'The security forces were the instrument by which [the PA] could maintain control. By the late 1990s, an estimated 60,000 personnel were employed by over ten security services, providing a 'police'-to population ratio of a staggering 1:150' (Gunning, 2007 p. 44).[17] Both Israel and the PA have a shared interest in ousting and/or suppressing organisations like Hamas. Since the 1990s and up to the present, PA and Israeli forces have tried to suppress Hamas, by targeting members in mass arrests, firing sympathisers from government jobs and by shutting down affiliated organisations (Brown and Hamzawy, 2010 p. 167; Freedom House, 2017 p. 645; Pearlman, 2011 pp. 139-140).

The major crackdown on Hamas in the West Bank came in the aftermath of the 2006 election, when Fatah boycotted the Hamas-led Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), and forty-six Hamas legislators were imprisoned in Israel or given movement restrictions leading to their near imprisonment in certain towns or cities (Sayigh, 2011 p. 107). Hamas members of the PLC, M30x and F30x had both been imprisoned after

[17] Wendy Pearlman puts the number of security officers at "an estimated 35,000 officers by 1997. Palestinians had a 50-to-1 ratio of police per capita, one of the higher in the world." (Pearlman, 2011 p. 132). Johnson and Kuttab put the numbers in the PASF at approximately 40,000 (Johnson and Kuttab, 2001 p. 23)

the Hamas victory in 2006. They are both now allowed to carry out only limited work, and one was not allowed to leave Ramallah.

In the aftermath of these elections, Fatah tried to expel Hamas from the West Bank. Many employees of the PA who were Hamas supporters in the West Bank were fired, or else, they were arrested in the wake of the Hamas victory (F1; M3; F5; F28). F1 told me: “A lot of people who were Hamas, and who were working with the government, like teachers and stuff, Fatah, the Palestinian government, fired them because they belonged to Hamas and they got them imprisoned.” (F1)

Hamas’s charitable and welfare organisations were dismantled, closed or put under Fatah leadership in the aftermath of the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip (M7). F30x, a Hamas member of the PLC, said:

> *“The PA, along with the occupation, they agreed to prevent all these things. For example, it is forbidden to give the poor money because the money is linked to terrorism. It is forbidden to give a seminar, because this was considered terrorism. Centres for memorising the Qur’an, which belonged to Hamas, they closed them. Charities which belonged to Hamas including the Juthoor centre, the Tadamun centre they changed the administrative boards. They are now all Fatah... You will find there is a war on them from every angle, everything it does they either forbid it or they imitate it.” (F30x)*

Political control over the mosques is particularly important for Fatah. F15 told me how a Hamas sheikh from her village was imprisoned and banned from giving lessons in the mosque (F15). M33 also told how a Hamas sheikh was arrested after giving a talk in the mosque in his village (M33). He said:

> *“Most of the sheikhs in the mosque they just support Abu Mazen. Maybe before two years or three years there was a sheikh from Hamas he was talking about the homeland and about the Islamic and after we went out from the mosque they put him in the jail directly.” (M33)*

Another moment of heightened political repression was during Operation Cast Lead, the Israeli assault on Gaza, when the PA tried to ensure sympathy with Gaza and support for Hamas would not destabilise the West Bank (Blecher, 2009). The PA initially forbade demonstrations (Blecher, 2009 p. 65), and surrounded mosques with 'plainclothes security personnel' (Blecher, 2009 p. 66). Blecher suggests that during

'Operation Cast Lead' the PA security chiefs worked in close cooperation with the Israelis, sharing intelligence and arresting wanted people (Blecher, 2009 p. 68).

Interviewees were aware of the dangers of openly declaring support for Hamas, which might mean "harassment from the PA, harassment from Israel" (F17). M23, a Hamas activist at university had been arrested himself. He told me:

> *"The Authority would arrest the student activists from the Islamic bloc. They would suffer during the imprisonment period... They treat us as if we are an opposition against the authority's beliefs and as if we are not allowed to work at the university. The basic charge is you are working for Hamas and Hamas should not be working in the West Bank" (M23)*

F5's brother had been arrested and tortured. She told me:

> *"my brother used to support Hamas, my older one. They used to take him to jail and torture him. He spent, like, more than a year in and out of their jails. And they took him to a jail in Ramallah. It is known as the slaughterhouse... because they torture them a lot. He spent months there without seeing even the sun. And when he got out of the jail he used to tell us the ways they tortured him." (F5)*

Fatah's increasingly authoritarian methods are not just applied to Hamas sympathisers, but reach anyone critical of the PA. Interviewees thought it was dangerous to speak out in public. Those who express opposition to the PA in public, or join in political events, risk threats and arrest (M1; M2; F33; F34). Those I spoke to were wary of spies, 'birds' or the secret police, who might be watching you online, at a demonstration or listening in to your conversations (M3; M9; F17; F28; M31; M33; M34; F32). F5 told me: "We can't say anything about the government, like even on phones, because we might get to jail. They don't care. They just take us to jail and torture us. And I know this as a fact." (F5) M3 said: "Here people are afraid of talking about politics and especially parties, because if you say you are from Hamas, you know maybe you will be arrested. So, I don't hear from any neighbours who is supporting Fatah or Hamas." (M3). M41 who had worked previously in Abu Mazen's office told me: "if we speak something against Abu Mazen you might get arrested after a few hours" (M41). F9 told me:

> *"People are sometimes afraid of the* sulta *[Palestinian Authority]. People take into consideration the PA's position or something like that, for example if there is a PA worker*

in front of you, you might be cautious about what you might say or what you might do in front of that person." (F9)

M5 told me: "The essential thing is fear. Because this is the Palestinian Authority. This is the power. And you cannot confront this. You have to go along with it." (M5)

Fatah's oppression has broadened to include many others who are seen to oppose the PA, including certain members of 'leftist' organisations and union members. F15 told me how PFLP members moved out of her village after pressure was placed on them (F15). When I was conducting my research, there was a teachers' strike taking place over severely low wages. Many teachers were harassed, prevented from attending demonstrations, threatened or even imprisoned. F28 was a striking teacher she told me that she and other teachers, as well as their husbands, were threatened by Fatah members with losing their jobs or worse (F28).

Several of those I interviewed told me that you could not criticise the PA online. Others had themselves been put under pressure and told to stop posting on Facebook (M20; F11; F28). M1 had been arrested for what he had put on Facebook. He told me:

"One time I post on Facebook about how there is injustice in our country, and the government just arrests me the next day [asking] 'Why [did] you post this on Facebook?'" (M1)

Sabri Saidam, who had been in charge of Fatah's digital media, despite saying "welcome to the land of openness", acknowledged that the culture within the PA tended towards closing down dissent. He described the internal debate in Fatah about shutting down critical websites:

"somebody had recommended that we should close some websites because they were insinuating against Fatah, but I was totally against this for a simple reason. Those websites are insignificant, closing them down is not only going to tarnish the reputation of Fatah as a liberal, dynamic, secular party [but it] is going to serve in favour of those running those websites. They want acknowledgement and you give them the platform by closing them. I showed [the Fatah Council] the figures. I showed them the stats for the specific website. [It was] only visited by a thousand people. When we closed it, it became a hundred thousand. So, you are turning the insignificant into the significant. I was grilled at the Council... I was the advisor to the president on technology and sent a memo saying we should reopen the

websites immediately. And I was criticised [by the Fatah Council who] said 'You are the advisor and that is bad advice. Those people are insinuating [insulting?] Fatah. They hate us.'" (M11x)

Hamas have also used violence and oppressive tactics against their opponents (Gunning, 2007 p. 183; Sayigh, 2011 p. 40). The most violent episode of the use of force against Palestinians in Hamas's history came in 2006-2007 in the aftermath of the 2006 election when they took over the Gaza Strip. In January 2007 alone, forty-five people were killed in Fatah-Hamas clashes (Gunning, 2007 p. 183). Hamas tends to be blamed for this violence. Many interviewees mentioned that Hamas seemed violent or had been violent in how they carried out the coup in Gaza (F1; M6; F10; M14x; F11; M27; M31; F39). M26 told me: "The monstrous killing and cruel acts that they did against Fatah in Gaza is basically the reason I'm against it. They killed 700 persons from Fatah." (M26).

When they took control of the Gaza Strip 'politically motivated arrests, beatings and torture of detainees, and often egregious violations of the constitutional rights of speech and peaceful assembly' were used to target Fatah activists (Sayigh, 2011 p. 40). Both Gunning and Sayigh argue that Hamas gains 'legitimacy' or 'authority' from its ability to use violence to maintain security in the Gaza Strip (Gunning, 2007 p. 139; Sayigh, 2011). Sayigh describes how this 'need to maintain security' in the criminal 'anarchy' of the Gaza Strip, has fused with their struggle for political survival (and their pursuit of religious legitimacy) to create an authoritarian environment in the strip (Sayigh, 2011 pp. 1-2, 5). Although by 2011, Sayigh claims this had become less severe, the situation continued to echo Fatah's practices against Hamas in the West Bank (Sayigh, 2011 pp. 39-40). Freedom House describes how, in 2016, 'Fatah is largely suppressed' and there is 'little display of opposition party activity' and there have been 'multiple incidents in which Hamas used excessive force or arbitrary detention against its political opponents and critics' (Freedom House, 2017 p. 617).

The press has also been restricted in Gaza under Hamas. After 2007, there were only 'a handful of newspapers' circulating without restrictions: '*Felesteen* and *al-Resalah,* published by Hamas, and *al-Istiqlal,* published by Palestinian Islamic Jihad' (Sayigh, 2011 p. 106). However, some of these restrictions have been eased with several Fatah-associated West Bank newspapers, and the PA's Palestine TV now allowed (Freedom

House, 2017 pp. 618-9). Several interviewees told me that Hamas restricted the press and journalists who criticise Hamas risk arrest (F36; F39; F40).

Hamas prevents freedom of expression in the Gaza Strip using "imprisonments, detaining people" (F37). F39 said that you were not allowed to demonstrate against Hamas or be seen to criticise them in the street or support Fatah (F39). M41, who was a Fatah activist in the Gaza Strip, had left Gaza partially because he feared arrest by Hamas. He said:

> *"They started like to attack us, and they started to use guns in order to scare us. And they started to for example kidnap some people... from Fatah youth... they used to call me... 'If you are going to come here we are going to arrest you, we are going to kill you.' It was like gambling your life..." (M41)*

However, other Gazans suggested the situation was not as repressive as in the West Bank. M38x said:

> *"Fatah in Gaza is allowed by Hamas to operate... Not like Hamas in the West Bank [that] is like a secret organisation. In Gaza, Fatah is there, there was some problem in the early days of the divide, but after the agreement on the reconciliation in 2011 in Cairo more freedom was given to Fatah… the leadership of Fatah they meet from time to time, they even meet with Hamas... there is more room for Fatah in Gaza to operate much more than the room that is given to Hamas [in the West Bank]" (M38x)*

Despite these descriptions of the repressive practices of the Palestinian Authority, Hamas and most of all the Israeli military, there is evidence to suggest that the culture of political pluralism has not been extinguished yet.

The international pressure on the PA, and its dependence upon international aid donations, does mean that it is forced to agree to some semblance of democratic standards. There have been elections in the Occupied Territories since the 1970s which have contributed to the politicisation of the population (Ghanem, 1996 p. 513). Student and union elections have been contested by Fatah, Hamas and 'leftist' representatives for decades (Gunning, 2007 pp. 45-46). The 1996 and 2005 presidential elections and the 2006 legislative election have all been considered for the most part as free, fair and democratic elections (Carter, 2006 pp. 142, 182; Caridi, 2012 pp. 168, 193; Tessler and Nachtwey, 1999 p. 22). Miguel et al. reported a turnout

of 72 percent in Palestinian elections in their polls, the highest out of their selection of countries in the region (Miguel, et al., 2015 p. 5). The 2012 municipal elections in the West Bank were criticised for the way they were conducted and for the exclusion of certain parties and candidates. Yet, despite this, many of those running against the dominant party, Fatah, won seats (Abu Aker and Rudoren, 2012; Guignard, 2016). Currently, the greatest problem with elections in Palestine has been their absence. Mahmoud Abbas's term in office was meant to have ended in January 2009, yet he has continued to rule. Indeed, since the 2007 split, 'the postponement of elections and the sidelining of parliamentary procedures through the issuance of executive decrees have become almost a daily routine' (Bröning, 2013 p. 4). The absence of elections have begun to cost the leadership a great deal of political legitimacy.

The Palestinian population seem to largely support political pluralism and democracy. All of those I interviewed understood the significance and relevance of the different political parties. M35x told me that Palestine had "a culture of political pluralism, but not necessarily democracy". He said "There is tolerance to differences in political views... But whether that is democracy or not is another story..." (M35x).

This view has been expressed at various points in the academic literature. Tessler and Nachtwey describe a moment of optimism following the Oslo Accords when they wrote in 1999:

> *'Palestinians themselves frequently complain about corruption and human rights violations on the part of their leaders. Nevertheless, political life in Palestine is characterized by institutional and ideological pluralism, by intense political competition, and by vigorous debate about government policy on a wide range of issues.' (Tessler and Nachtwey, 1999 p. 22)*

Shikaki, who runs one of the most respected polling organisations in Palestine, the PSR, has contended that the population of Palestine are hospitable to all the aspects of a democratic system. He writes:

> *'To the extent that public attitudes reveal a deeper culture and value system, survey research on Palestinians appear to show a political culture hospitable to democratic values and practices. Palestinians overwhelmingly support a democratic political system and show readiness to participate in the political process. They support freedom of the press, the*

rights of the opposition, and the right of women to political participation' (Shikaki, 1996 p. 12)

M38x emphasised that Palestinians were firm believers in democracy, even if the current situation meant this was increasingly difficult. He told me:

"We don't have official democracy, elections process, a formal democracy, but people themselves are democratic by their mind, by their culture. You know Palestinians, we don't have a government. We are civil society... we have this culture of democracy, open opinion, but PA made it difficult. If you compare between now and some 25 years ago we were in a better situation. So, people can speak and can put on the Facebook. If you go on the Facebook you will find criticism to all: to Hamas, to Abbas... people have this rooted into their culture. Of course, it is decreasing, it is shrinking... people still have civil belief in democracy, in informal democracy you can call it or community-based democracy." (M38x)

Most interviewees did not view the Palestinian system as democratic – indeed many of them just laughed when I asked (M9; F6; M10; F7; F9; M20; M22; M21; F22; M28; M29; F26; F27; M31; F29; M33; M34; F31; F33; M37; F34; F36; F37; F38). Nor did most interviewees think there was freedom of expression in the Palestinian Territories (M10; F9; F17; F20; F19; M24; F28; M31; M34; F33; M37; F34; F35; F40).

There were a few, usually Fatah supporters, who said that there was freedom of expression (F3; F8; F10; M25; M40; M14x). For example, M4 told me: "In the West Bank here, you can shout, anybody here 'Fucking Abu Mazen' and everyone will laugh. Fuck Abu Mazen. Here, you will find what you will not find in any Arab country. You can do, speak, and nobody will do anything for you. Do not do security things and do not break the law but speak as much as you want." (M4)

Although most interviewees did not think there was freedom of expression, almost everyone I spoke to said they were happy to talk to their friends and family (M10; F17; M19; F20; M26; M28; M29; F27; M31; M33; F33; M37; F34). F33 explained that although there might be potential repercussions, in general, people "love to talk about politics" (F33).

"I am not scared of what would happen to me if I said this and this and this, so to some extent there is freedom of speech, and there are a few instances where we heard that you could be... targeted for saying so and so and so, but I don't think it scared us as a society

from saying what you want to say... I think there are more people scared when it comes to jobs, because people do work in the PA, under like the PA, so I think they would be more scared to criticise it, but I think that's kind of normal, because if you work in a company anywhere in the world you would be afraid of criticising it to not be fired so..." (M19)

The fact that so many people agreed to be interviewed and then told *me* about corruption and lack of free speech is a testimony to the fact that although the environment was hostile, freedom of expression had not been completely closed down. It seems that while the political context is far from democratic, there is a strong culture of political pluralism.

It is important to note, and the gender aspects of this will be explored below, that there were certain factors that made people more confident about speaking out. Having a particularly high status, being a recognised voice of criticism or having a family member high up in the PA seemed to embolden people. A journalist, a prominent professor and the head of a rights NGO all claimed to criticise and speak out against the PA (M12x; F13x; M13x). F16 told me that she probably would not be harassed or arrested if she spoke out against the PA because "they know me, and they know my parents and I have family in the PA in really high positions" (F16). M33 also said that he could say his opinion in front of anyone in Fatah because his uncle is "in the *sulta* [Palestinian Authority] and he is Fatah too" so "he can protect the closest people" (M33).

The widespread violence and repressive measures used by Israel, the Palestinian Authority and the Hamas government are likely to impact political behaviour and expression in the Palestinian Territories. Individuals may, from fear of the repercussions, avoid associating with certain political groups, most obviously with organisations such as Hamas which are deemed as a terrorist organisation by Israel and are the unwelcome opposition party in the West Bank. Further, people may, despite supporting, say, Hamas, not feel comfortable in declaring their position to a researcher in an interview or an opinion poll. F29 explained: "We tend to not support Hamas out of fear, because our authority in the West Bank is Fatah and we are afraid of supporting Hamas because of the *sulta* [Palestinian Authority]." (F29)

Authoritarian tendencies and the fear of oppression are likely to impact political support and suggest the following hypothesis:

H5a: Attitudes towards authoritarianism and political coercion impact political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

On the other hand, the autocratic styles of Fatah and Hamas might have a negative impact on their approval ratings. Fatah have lost much popular goodwill because of their oppressive tactics (Gunning, 2007 pp. 48-49). F5 told me that Fatah's repression of Hamas made her “hate to vote for Fatah.” (F5).

I explore below how far we can test this hypothesis. The context of quasi-democracy, with restrictions on freedom of expression, makes research difficult, as these threats and tensions are likely to impact how respondents reply to both polling and interview questions. However, it certainly does not mean that all data gathered in this context should be discounted out of hand as the forthright critiques of the PA voiced in my interviews show that many Palestinians are willing to take risks in expressing their views. However, it is important not to underestimate the role of fear, coercion and oppression in shaping peoples responses to questions surrounding political support, when the livelihoods, personal safety and lives of respondents might be at risk.

B Gendered Political Oppression

Political coercion, and oppression, are gendered. Men are more likely to be targeted for forceful coercion than women. The literature on the use of violence in war and occupation suggests that men are 'overwhelmingly' the victims of violence and the targets of control (Segal, 2008 p. 32). Sjoberg suggests that frequently 'those checking at security checkpoints employ the gender essentialist assumption that women are less dangerous than men' and, as such, women are 'less likely to be scrutinized by security checkpoints than men' (Sjoberg, 2014 pp. 41-42). Khalili describes how occupying forces monitor and harass male members of the subject population more than females in her study of gendered practices of counterinsurgency. Describing the US-led military occupation of Iraq after the 2003 invasion she writes:

> *‘Men are differentially targeted in these wars. In the cordoned cities where retinal scans, thumb prints, identity cards and registers of residence are used to monitor the populations, men between the ages of 15 or 16 and 50 are considered the primary target of this intensive, aggressive, and invasive surveillance.’ (Khalili, 2010 p. 10)*

The way these occupying forces target men is also gendered in that often tactics are used to effeminise the subject population, through tactics such as ‘the undressing of men at checkpoints and in prisons and the use of language which is intended to dishonour men’ (Khalili, 2010 p. 10). In Egypt, where the political regime is 'best described as electoral authoritarian', Blaydes and El Tarouty have looked at government repression during elections (Blaydes and El Tarouty, 2009 p. 368). They suggest that while male members of the (opposition) Muslim Brotherhood often face harassment from the security services, women were targeted much less frequently, to the extent that 'the presence of women at or near polling stations can help to deter types of election violence.' (Blaydes and El Tarouty, 2009 p. 375). They cite an analyst who suggests that 'both the Brotherhood and the state have maintained an implicit agreement to put women outside of the repressive policy of detention and police harassment' (Blaydes and El Tarouty, 2009 p. 376). It seems therefore that male supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood are more likely to be targeted by the Egyptian security services than female members of the organisation.

The victimisation of the population by authoritarian regimes and occupying forces tends to have an important gender dimension which may affect how the population respond in public to questions of loyalty and support. Therefore, it is worth testing the following hypothesis:

> ***H5b: Men are more likely to be targeted for violence and harassment (whether by the Israeli military or Palestinian security services) than women.***

The literature on Palestine suggests that ***H5b*** is the case. Johnson and Kuttab suggest that 'gender is clearly an organizing principle of Israeli repression' (Johnson and Kuttab, 2001 p. 24). The targets of the occupation are largely male as it is the men and boys who tend to be arrested and taken away by Israeli soldiers (Afshar, 2003 p. 181).

Peteet's study of the First Intifada highlights the gendered nature of the violence inflicted upon men. She writes that 'one would have been hard pressed to find a young male Palestinian under occupation who had not been beaten or who did not personally know someone who had been' (Peteet, 2000 p. 107). She also notes that there have been few women beaten due to the ‘tendency of the Israeli Defense Forces to go for males first’ (Peteet, 2000 p. 118).

Men are also systematically targeted for control by the Israeli authorities. Johnson and Kuttab describe an order from the Israeli Chief of Staff - issued during the Second Intifada - which banned men from travelling in private cars in the West Bank. Male only cars were returned, and travel for men was only permitted if a woman was present (Johnson and Kuttab, 2001 p. 22). Weisman recounts in his book how at Huwwara checkpoint, in the West Bank, soldiers randomly 'decided to detain every ninth adult male wishing to cross the checkpoint' one day, and another 'every man whose name was Mohammad was detained' (Weisman, 2007 p. 147). These gendered policies, where men are presumed suspicious, are commonplace.

My interviewees confirmed the view that the most violent acts are targeted at men. This was explained to me by some of those I spoke to (M19; F22; F12x).

> *"Men if you are in a party, or if you are not just in a party… if you have a political view you will be arrested, shot, something" (F22)*

> *"I think that men get picked up [by the Israeli army] more than women do, but that doesn't mean that women don't get picked up at all. They do. But in terms of percentages, men get picked up more... men do get searched more" (M19)*

> *"Men are seen as a threat and women are not, and so a lot of times I don't even have to give my ID... they take the guys down and they search them, they don't take the women down" (F17)*

Women in Gaza told me how "men are not allowed to leave the country" (F37). F36 clarified that "men need certain permits" to cross at the Eretz or Rafah crossing points into Egypt or Israel, because they are seen as more of a threat (F36; F37).

Peteet suggests that the Israeli occupation, similar to the occupation of Iraq described by Khalili above, uses sexualised practices based on their 'pseudo-knowledge of the subject population' to further undermine Palestinians in detention (Peteet, 2000 p. 121). In my interviews, I heard about the Israeli soldiers taunting Palestinian demonstrators with sexual taunts (M41) and Palestinian men being raped by Israeli soldiers while in prison (F15), suggesting that these practices certainly occur.

Women also face harassment and oppression from the Israeli Occupation. Female activists, in their hundreds, have also been put in Israeli prison, with Ahed Tamimi

being the most prominent recent example (Pappé, 2006 p. 238). Women detainees face the additional stigma and suspicion surrounding their confinement with strange men (Peteet, 2000 p. 118). The politicisation of women's bodies and the conception of 'Palestinian womanhood as a signifier of national honor' has been reflected in the targeting of women for rape and sexual abuse by the occupation forces (Abdulhadi, 1998 p. 655). Sayigh describes this phenomenon in her 1981 article: 'Where girls and women are concerned they are vulnerable as females, not just as Palestinians, because the Israeli reading of Arab psychology leads to sexual aggression or threat being used against them as a means of intimidating the population as a whole.' (Sayigh, 1981 p. 7; Sharoni, 1995 p. 39) Women find it difficult to return to their communities, or even marry, after spending time in prison because of the assumptions of rape and sexual violation (Afshar, 2003 p. 182). F21x, a middle-aged female Fatah activist, was the only interviewee to mention this dynamic in the specific context of female prisoners:

"Society accepts somehow the imprisonment of men more than the imprisonment of women... Because they are afraid of what could happen to a female if she is arrested. Like physically the honour thing, they think that she will be affected" (F21x)

In my interviews, Israeli soldiers were seen as threatening women and their sense of self-respect and dignity in encounters at checkpoints. Two of the young women I interviewed told me of the stress, embarrassment, risks and inconvenience they faced when Israeli soldiers asked them, when travelling by bus, for their phone numbers (F17; F22). F17 said:

"maybe two or three times when a soldier insisted he wanted to take my number... I just didn't want to give them my number... I mean he's a soldier and he's very powerful and he can stop me from doing anything. He can even arrest me for doing nothing you know, so I kept saying no I don't feel comfortable giving you my number. I was very nice you know; you know I was. But it was very humiliating for me because he was, if he didn't have that power I would have slapped him, but it was very humiliating" (F17)

Some men seemed upset at the way women were treated at checkpoints as well. M21 and M22 told me that "at check points it is more humiliating for women to go through" in case "someone touches her" or "they move her scarf" (M21; M22).

"For females I think the checkpoints are a problem for them because we are Muslims here

we have different traditions... on the check points sometimes the soldiers there they are trying to check her and they are touching and so this is a bad, bad thing… because this thing is an honour stuff for us, so it is not allowed." (M33)

Women also suffer from the occupation in their roles within the family. Aweidah and Espanioli suggest that women have to hold families together and provide for their children when men are killed, maimed or in prison and cope with issues from the destruction of their home and the trauma faced by children. Women are 'the mother who heals the wounds of traumatized children, wanted sons and unemployed husbands' (Aweidah and Espanioli, 2007 pp. 9-10). Women have also had to face an increase in domestic violence as frustrated men turn 'their anger towards the women in their families' (Baxter, 2007 p. 750). Some figures suggest that domestic violence affects upwards of fifty or sixty percent of Palestinian women (Toman, 2006 p. 64; Women's Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling, 2012 p. 51). Studies also show that women bear devastating psychological effects as a result of the 'continuous and sequential trauma' of living under occupation (Women's Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling, 2012 p. 57).

Women face a specific kind of harassment, in that they are targeted because of the significance attributed to their bodies. I did not hear about women being targeted for their political beliefs in the same way as men were, instead women faced greater physical and reputational risks when coming into contact with the occupying forces or engaging in political activities. F12x described that women are victimised in a more structural way which just led to them restricting their lives to their home more (F12x). These findings reflect and reinforce some of the findings surrounding women's economic roles and their religiosity as described in the chapters above.

The starkest difference between how men and women are targeted seems to be those who are affiliated with Hamas. Hamas members are particularly sensitive to the fact that male Hamas members are more likely to face harassment and oppression. Gunning suggests that the increased role of women in Hamas's political campaigns is 'in part a response to the incarceration and assassination of male activists' (Gunning, 2007 p. 172). Ababneh suggests that female Hamas activists at Birzeit university advertise when they are standing for elections, but the young men do not do so 'for security reasons' (Ababneh, 2014 p. 46). I was told that because men were more likely

to be arrested “and tortured”, the “guys who associate themselves to Hamas” are “more afraid to say it” (F16). F17 made the same point. She told me: “Being a Hamas guy is very hard... It’s like choosing voluntarily every day to go through a lot of trouble... Harassment from the PA, harassment from Israel, harassment from you know, people around them. It’s not easy... to be a guy in Hamas” (F17). Male Hamas supporters, as described in Chapter 4 above, also might face losing their jobs, or facing serious obstacles to employment and ability to travel (M34; M26).

However, women in Hamas were much less likely to be targeted by the PA or Israel. Blecher notes that while the PA suppressed all support for Hamas in the West Bank during Operation Cast Lead, 'women and children sporting the occasional green headband or scarf generally were not harassed’ (Blecher, 2009 p. 66). This gendered targeting came through very strongly in my interviews.

Women were often acknowledged to be less 'active' in Hamas, and therefore less in danger of arrest for their support of Hamas (M26). F17 told me that “girls” in Hamas would get in “less trouble” because they do not have “the same role as men” within Hamas. She explained that: “Men [in] Hamas are in the field, you know, they are out there. Girls do all the other things. They organise things. They do things. They help people... They make a family out of it... Their role is not really out there, so they don’t have to face all these things.” (F17)

This belief also interacted with ‘traditional’ beliefs surrounding women, privacy and honour. F30x told me that men were arrested more than women because security services were reluctant to follow and arrest women as “in our society getting close to women is a bigger crime” (F30x). M18 agreed that Hamas women were less likely to be arrested. He said:

> *“[Hamas] know the women also if she go to the street, not anyone stop her in the demonstration... Now if you go to any demonstration, from now to any other area, you will see women more than the man in the demonstration with the flag and they say bad things about the [Palestinian] Authority, and no one will come.” (M18)*

M24 who worked for the PA security sector made the same point. He told me:

> *“The Islamic movements use the point of privacy of women to their advantage... The nationalist security apparatuses can take anyone they want from their beds, but it is*

shameful for them to follow around and surveil a woman, as such women are better at doing the secret work for the Islamic movements without being caught. Here in this country the Islamic movements use this method." (M24)

I would contend, as have many of my interviewees, that the view of women as less violent and less politically active than men is widespread in the Palestinian Territories. This contributes to an understanding of women as less 'dangerous' than men, in the eyes of the PA and Israel, even if they support Hamas. It seems to be the case that while women can be harassed, imprisoned, tortured or killed because of their political beliefs, men face these threats to a much greater extent. An individual's gender therefore is likely to impact whether they might expect repercussions for expressing their political opinions or criticising the government.

F27 gave me her explanation of the gender gap in political support. She said: "Probably like, the men if they wanted to support Hamas they would be in prison or they would be hurt, not necessarily imprisoned. Fear factor. As girls, we would know that probably nothing would happen to us. Because the traditions would save us from these things." (F27) M34 gave me his explanation of the gender gap in support: "Maybe the reason is that women are more free. Women can say her opinion without [being] scared and... the men... maybe they are afraid." (M34). F30x suggested the same explanation. She said:

"It could be that men support Hamas, but the security issue prevents them from talking about it, and the biggest evidence of this is the elections of 2005 and 2006, opinion polls said that Hamas were going to get 20 percent but when the elections took place Hamas got around 60 percent. It is the fear and the security issue which prevents men from this." (F30x)

The interview evidence and literature suggest that men are more likely to be targets of political violence and oppression. This is also evident in the statistics. A 2014 report published by Addameer suggests that 'more than 800,000 Palestinians have been detained under Israeli military orders in the occupied Palestinian territory... [which] includes approximately 10,000 women' (Addameer, 2014 p. 4). This means approximately eighty men are imprisoned for every one woman.

Statistics on Palestinian prisoners are more difficult to find, but the PCBS shows that 70-80 women were convicted offenders in 2014 compared to 5,500-6,500 male convicted offenders (different pages differ which accounts for the range of figures) (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics). While data on prisoners does not present a complete overview of the gendered nature of political oppression, it is sufficient to reject the null hypothesis and accept ***H5b*** as men are more likely to be targeted for violence and harassment (whether by the Israeli military or Palestinian security services) than women.

C Findings

Here I will look to see whether political oppression might impact the gender gap in political support through statistical analysis of the polling data.

> ***H5: Gendered fear of political oppression explains (reduces) the gender gap in political support.***
>
> ***H5a: Attitudes towards authoritarianism and political coercion impact political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.***

The role of authoritarianism on the part of Israel, Fatah and Hamas is difficult to assess when looking at the polls. It is unclear whether people will pretend to support Fatah, or at least not to support Hamas, for fear of reprisals, or whether they will take the opportunity of the polls to express their distaste for the authoritarian direction which the PA or Hamas is taking. Gunning suggests that threat of violence or harassment might make Hamas supporters less likely to declare their allegiances to a pollster (Gunning, 2007 p. 21). It is probable that the fear of repression, or the risk of losing a job, could have shaped the responses given by Palestinians in the opinion polls. This view was confirmed by some of those involved in the polling. M15x who coordinated some of the field workers for the polls told me "when you ask about their political support, especially if they have Islamist tendencies, they have reservations" (M15x). M17x, who coordinated the whole polling process told me:

> *"After the division between the West Bank and Gaza, the security situation in Gaza and the West Bank was not very stable. There was a fear among people in Gaza on expressing their opinion on who they voted for. The people in the West Bank who gave a vote to Hamas did*

not want to say that they voted for them anymore because they were afraid of the security situation from the Palestinian Authority. The opposite in Gaza. The problem was bigger in the West Bank." (M17x)

M17x suggested that the data could be weighted responses to address this problem, linking stated vote in 2006 to the real proportion of votes, however this does not help for polls before the vote or individuals too young to have voted in 2006. It might be the case that Hamas supporters have used alternative methods to express their support and opposition (as Miguel et al. found in their 2015 article)? M5 was the first to suggest this to me. He said:

"People do not declare who they support. Actually, most of the surveys in Palestine, even maybe since fifteen or 20 years ago till now, they can say that Fatah gets for instance 35 percent, Hamas [gets] 12 percent. That's not true, because about 30 percent [say] independent Islamic person... That 30 percent you can add it with the 12 percent... For us, for instance, because we believe that the atmosphere is not good to speak freely, if you ask us we will say independent Islamic. But in fact, until now I think that Hamas is much much better than Fatah, of course they have problems and they did mistakes, but still better." (M5)

Could it be an explanation of the gender gap in the polls, that, in fact, there is not a gender gap in support for Hamas but there is a gender gap in *reported* support for Hamas because men might feel themselves to be at more risk of repercussions (in the form of harassment, obstacles to employment, arrest and imprisonment) from the PA than women?

It is difficult, of course, to measure whether this is true. A first point of analysis would be to explore the question in the polls which asks, 'In your opinion, can people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip criticize the Palestinian Authority without fear?' and 'In your opinion, can people in the West Bank criticize the Palestinian Authority without fear?'. I have coded the answers '1) Yes', and '2) No'. A gender comparison of answers to this question can be seen in Figure 7.b below. Interestingly, here women indicate that they feel less able to criticise the PA without fear than men. A Pearson's Chi-Square test shows that this is statistically significant at the $p<0.001$ level. Accordingly, this answer might itself be influenced by fear of harassment in itself, although it is difficult to tell either way. This is a problem inherent in this kind of question. Interestingly, though,

the fact that so many people indicate that they think it is dangerous to criticise the PA suggests that there is a certain level of freedom of expression for them to be able to express these views.

I use a dichotomous version of this variable, with 'No' coded as 1 and everything else as 0, called *'free criticism'* in the logistic regressions below.



Figure 7.b To show percentage responses to question on freedom to criticise the Palestinian Authority without fear. PSR Polls 1-7, 11- 14, 16, 21, 25, 28, 29, 31, 37, 38, 42 and 56 (Merged Dataset), χ^2 (1)=79.98, p=0.000, n=27090

A second variable which might be useful in measuring repression is a question asking "How do you evaluate the performance of Palestinian security services?", with the answer options as "Very Good", "Good", "Neither good nor bad", "Bad", "Very Bad" which is present in PSR Polls 4, 13, 16, 21 and 28. This is shown in Figure 7.c below. Here men were more likely than women to describe the performance of the security services as bad, and the gender difference is statistically significant at the p<0.001 level. I use this variable in the logistic regressions below as *'security services'*.



Figure 7.c To show percentage responses to question on view of security services. PSR Polls 4, 13, 16, 21, 28 (Merged Dataset), χ^2 (4)=132.00, p=0.000, n=6,221

Together these graphs do not provide overwhelming evidence of political repression being gendered and, as such, creating a clear gender gap in how men and women respond to these questions in the polls. Indeed Figures 7.b and 7.c, seem to tell slightly different stories. With women more than men suggesting that there are repercussions for criticising the PA, but men more than women seeing the security services of the PA in a negative light. It should be noted that these measures are unable to shed much light upon fear of the Israeli security forces.

M5's suggestion that 'Independent Islamists' is what those who want to indicate their support for Hamas (but who are unwilling to declare it) will put in the polls, warrants exploration. There is a gender gap in support for Independent Islamists with men (3.9 percent) being more likely to support them compared to only 2.5 percent of women. This indicates that M5's suggestion might help show how oppression's effect on political support is gendered.

As a final attempt to test ***H5,*** and to explore ***H5a***, I will compare several logistic regressions to see whether the variables mentioned above, 'free criticism', 'security

services', or by combining Hamas and Independent Islamists, will convincingly show that the gender gap in political support can be explained by gendered oppression, and whether they indicate that attitudes towards these impact political support. What is not accounted for here is if there are many people in Gaza who are afraid to declare their support for Fatah due to the political situation there. It is much more difficult to assess whether this is the case in Gaza. Fatah supporters in Gaza are not such high targets as Hamas supporters in the West Bank as they do not risk reprisals from the Israeli army. The results of the logistic regressions on the following models can be seen in Table 7.a below.

Model 1b: *Political support ~ gender (+ poll number) + age + gaza + city + refugee camp*

Model 1b again serves as a point of comparison for the following model to be measured against.

Model 6a: *Political support ~ gender (+ poll number) + age + gaza + city + refugee camp + free criticism*

Model 6a here includes a variable for *'free criticism'*. It seems that those who think it is not possible to criticise the PA without fear, are both less likely to support Fatah, and less likely to support Hamas. The beta variable is negative and statistically significant for both models. This perhaps supposes that those who think of the PA as authoritarian, are less likely to support Fatah because they do not approve of this kind of behaviour and they are also less likely to say they support Hamas in the polls, perhaps because they are afraid of declaring it if they do. However, the evidence points to the fact that attitudes towards repression and coercion do impact political support. Thus, the null for ***H5a*** can tentatively be rejected, because attitudes towards repression and coercion impact political support. However, it is unclear as to whether those who do fear repression would answer this question honestly.

Including this variable does not, however, impact the gender gap in political support. Neither the beta value nor the level of significance is impacted when this variable is included. This perhaps suggests that a gendered fear of repression does not account for the gender gap in political support ***(H5)***.

Model 6b: *Political support ~ gender (+ poll number) + age + gaza + city + refugee camp + free criticism + security services*

Model 6b includes a variable for *'security services'*. This variable also does not reduce the gender gap in political support but actually slightly increases the beta value *'gender'* for *'Hamas support'*. Thus, this also does not suggest that fear of repression explains the gender gap in political support meaning we cannot reject the null hypothesis for ***H5***.

As might be expected, those who think the security services are bad are more likely to support Hamas, adding further weight to ***H5a***.

*Model 6c***:** *Support for Fatah vs. Hamas and independent Islamists ~ gender (+ poll number) + age + gaza + city + refugee camp.*

In this model, I change the dependent variable from a dichotomous variable for *'Hamas support'* to a dichotomous variable for *'Hamas and independent Islamists support'*. Here, I am taking independent Islamists to signify those who support Hamas but are afraid to say so, as indicated by M5. This reduces the gender gap substantially, bringing the beta value for support for Hamas down from 0.47 to 0.33.

Although at first glance this finding seems to support ***H5***, however other evidence undermines this finding meaning that this alone does not amount to enough to sufficiently reject the null hypothesis. For example, men are more likely than women to support every political party except for Hamas and Islamic Jihad and as such the higher levels of men's support for Independent Islamists may be due to some other factor. It is also very difficult to say definitively that support for Independent Islamists might equate to covert support for Hamas, as many people might actually support independent Islamists or Salafists or organisations like Hizb-ul-Tahrir.

A further difficulty is that in the PSR Polls individuals are given the choice of both 'Independent Islamists' and 'Independent Nationalists'. Hamas is an Islamist and nationalist organisation and so it is difficult to try to detangle which of these would be more appropriate a choice. I further feel that those who genuinely feared retribution for declaring their support might also either refuse to answer an opinion poll or would choose 'Fatah' or 'None' in their answer.

I would suggest therefore that while there is evidence that opposition towards or support for the PA's security apparatus and the prevalence of free speech do impact political support ***(H5a)***. There is no clear way of measuring the impact of gendered

political repression in the polls and it is unclear whether or how it impacts the gender gap in political support. Therefore, the null hypothesis for ***H5*** cannot be rejected. It could be that activists are rare enough not to feature particularly in the polls, and that among causal, 'ordinary' supporters, there is not such a great fear of answering questions in the polls that this impacts support.

Model/Variable	*Model 1b*		*Model 6a*		*Model 6b*		*Model 6c*	
	Fatah	***Hamas***	***Fatah***	***Hamas***	***Fatah***	***Hamas***	***Fatah***	***Hamas + II***
(Intercept)	-0.37 (0.03)***	-1.58 (0.04)***	-0.31 (0.03)***	-1.55 (0.04)***	-0.31 (0.03)***	-1.60 (0.04)***	-0.37 (0.03)***	-1.27 (0.04)***
Gender	**-0.35 (0.02)*** **	**0.47 (0.02)*** **	**-0.35 (0.02)*** **	**0.47 (0.02)*** **	**-0.35 (0.02)*** **	**0.48 (0.02)*** **	**-0.35 (0.02)*** **	**0.33 (0.02)*** **
Poll Number	0.01 (0.00)***	-0.00 (0.00)**	0.01 (0.00)***	-0.00 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)***	-0.00 (0.00) .	0.01 (0.00)***	-0.01 (0.00)***
Age	-0.07 (0.01)***	-0.05 (0.01)***	-0.07 (0.01)***	-0.05 (0.01)***	-0.07 (0.01)***	-0.05 (0.01)***	-0.07 (0.01)***	-0.03 (0.01)***
Gaza	0.05 (0.02)*	0.47 (0.02)***	0.05 (0.02)*	0.47 (0.02)***	0.05 (0.02)*	0.47 (0.02)***	0.05 (0.02)*	0.43 (0.02)***
City	-0.24 (0.02)***	0.02 (0.03)	-0.23 (0.02)***	0.02 (0.03)	-0.23 (0.02)***	0.02 (0.03)	-0.24 (0.02)***	0.02 (0.02)
Refugee Camp	-0.15 (0.03)***	0.02 (0.03)	-0.15 (0.03)***	0.02 (0.03)	-0.15 (0.03)***	0.03 (0.03)	-0.15 (0.03)***	0.02 (0.03)
Free Criticism			-0.28 (0.02)***	-0.12 (0.03)***	-0.28 (0.02)***	-0.14 (0.03)***		
Security Services					-0.00 (0.01)	0.08 (0.01)***		
Deviance (Null)	65594 (66445)	51171 (52125)	65426 (66445)	51149 (52125)	65426 (65445)	51089 (52125)	65594 (66445)	55847 (56602)
AIC	65608	51185	65442	51165	65444	51107	65608	55861

*Table 7.a Showing the B values, Standard Errors (in brackets) and level of significance for logistic regressions on the variables '*Fatah support' *and* 'Hamas support', *p<0.0001=***, p<0.001=**, p<0.01=*, p<0.05=. , Data = PSR Polls 1-38, 42 and 56 (Merged Dataset)*

D Conclusion

This chapter has explored a problem at the heart of studying political support in a non-democratic context. This kind of research is dependent on interviewees and polling respondents feeling free to express their opinions without fear of repercussions. The Occupied Palestinian Territories falls somewhere between having a free and open, and a closed and repressive political framework. There are several repressive security services operating in the Palestinian Territories - Israeli, and connected to both Fatah and Hamas – but there is also a long history and deep culture of political pluralism. Indeed, in the polls, it is half the population who thinks you can criticise the PA without facing repercussions and half who do not (as shown in Figure 7.b). Large proportions of Palestinians, in both my interviews and in the polls, have shown that they feel at least partially free to express their views by indicating that they support Hamas, which for the majority of the time examined, and for the whole period in the West Bank, has been the party of opposition. This I hope means that I have been justified to some extent in engaging with the responses given to me in the interviews and analysing the polling data. On the other hand my findings also show the importance of taking into account the role of political repression in shaping political beliefs as attitudes both towards freedom of expression and the security services impact support for Fatah and Hamas.

Further, I have begun to explore the ways in which repression seems to be gendered in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Men are the major victims of violence from both Israel and the political factions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. They face arrest, beatings and senior party members have often been assassinated. Equally, men are more pro-active in their involvement with the Palestinian struggle and so are more exposed to these risks. Women risk having their modesty and dignity, and even sexual 'integrity' placed in question with each interaction with Israeli soldiers. This has reinforced pressures upon women not to venture out unaccompanied.

While this gendering of repression comes through in my interviews, it is much more difficult to assess it in the polling data. In the polls, women more than men think that criticising the PA is likely to lead to repercussions, but it is men more than women who disapprove of the security services. The other measure suggested in my interviews,

that Hamas supporters who fear repercussions respond in polls that they support Independent Islamists, is very hard to verify without doing further research into the role of Independent Islamists in the Palestinian Territories across the period and different geographies. I am reluctant to suggest that gendered repression does in fact account for some of the gender gap in political support, without any further findings. It is therefore hard to assess the overall impact of political repression on the gender gap.

Chapter 8 Explaining the Gender Gap in Political Support

This thesis has set out to explain the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The previous four chapters have explored several theories and hypotheses which have been proposed as possible explanations. In this chapter, I aim to bring them together and account for the gender gap in political support using a combination of different variables. The chapters above have shown the extent to which hypotheses derived from the western gender gap literature can be used as explanations for the gender gap in political support in Palestine, and where the Palestinian context means these hypotheses by themselves are not sufficient. In order to build a model to explain the gender gap in political support I will bring together the findings of the previous four chapters and show which hypothesis have found support from the interview and polling data.

H1: Gender differences in socioeconomic status explain (reduce) the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

Chapter 4 examined the impact of socioeconomic status on the gender gap in political support. Women tended to score lower in terms of education and income and were less likely to be employed than men. These findings reflect expectations from the western gender gap literature. Yet *how* they interact with political support differs slightly as these parties cannot be understood primarily as 'left' or 'right' wing but instead as an Islamic organisation Hamas has closer links to the charitable sector and provides welfare and support to the most vulnerable in society whereas Fatah, by dominating the PA, has been able for several years to provide its supporters with employment opportunities. As such differential gender roles which mean women are more responsible for caring and supporting the vulnerable in society and men are under greater pressure to earn an income could explain why women support Hamas more and men support Fatah more.

A logistic regression (Model 2d) found that once differences in socioeconomic status were held constant, the beta values for *'gender'* for *'Fatah support'* and *'Hamas support'* were reduced. A combination of five variables were included to account for gender differences in socioeconomic status: *'married', 'family size', 'income',*

'employment' and *'education'*. These variables will therefore be included in a model to try to explain the gender gap in political support.

H2: Gender differences in religiosity explain (reduce) the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Chapter 5 looked at whether gender differences in religiosity might explain the gender gap in political support. The western gender gap literature suggested this might be a cause of the gender gap, and in a political context where one party strongly identifies as Islamic, religiosity could be an important explanation for support. Women were found to be more religious than men according to questions on self-identification, prayer and reading the Qur'an. These three questions were combined to make a single variable *'religiosity'* and this was found to reduce the beta variables for both *'Fatah support'* and *'Hamas support'*. As such *'religiosity'* will be included in a model to explain the gender gap in political support.

H3: Gender differences in feminist beliefs explain (reduce) the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Chapter 5 also looked at whether gender differences in feminist beliefs explained the gender gap. While it was found that women were, as expected from the gender gap literature, more supportive of gender equality than men, this variable did not help to explain the gender gap in political support. The interview data showed that feminist beliefs are not very politically salient in the nationalist context of the Palestinian Territories, and Islamic conceptions of gender equality might take precedence. That feminist beliefs were not an explanation for the gender gap was confirmed by a statistical analysis which showed that holding it constant did not reduce the beta values for *'gender'*. Therefore, feminist values will not be included in a model to explain the gender gap in political support.

H4: Gender differences in attitudes to violence and non-violence explain (reduce) the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Chapter 6 looked at attitudes towards the peace process, attacks on civilians and the belief that armed confrontations improved the situation for Palestinians. These questions showed that, to a certain extent, women seemed to be more in favour of

peaceful approaches than men, although this was not the case for all three questions. Gender differences were likely not very great on these questions because of the strong nationalist context in the Palestinian Territories which justifies the use of most methods for the aim of liberating Palestine. Further gender differences in attitudes towards the use of violence were not likely to explain the gender gap as the gender gap was in the opposite direction than these gender differences would suggest with women supporting Hamas, the advocates of the use of violent resistance, more than men and supporting Fatah, the advocates of the peace process less than men. As expected, when two of these questions were included in the logistic regression, they did not reduce the gender gap but instead the beta values for *'gender'* increased. Accordingly, these variables should not be included in a model attempting to explain the gender gap in political support.

H5: Gendered fear of political oppression explains (reduces) the gender gap in political support.

Finally, Chapter 7 tried to assess the role of political oppression on the gender gap in political support. Although interview data strongly suggested that men might be more afraid of repercussions for supporting the opposition party, there was no strong statistical finding that political oppression did explain the gender gap in political support. Therefore, none of the variables explored in Chapter 7 are likely to contribute to a model explaining the gender gap in political support.

The only two hypotheses (out of the five tested) which were proved correct were that gender differences in socioeconomic status and religiosity explained the gender gap in political support. These finding echoes what I was told in an interview: "Money and faith are the things that would make people do something." (F19)

A Modelling the Gender Gap

In order to bring together the major statistical results of the preceding chapters, I compare four models of the gender gap, and then test to see whether the gender gap is still statistically significant once the variables for socioeconomic status and religiosity are taken into account. The results of the logistic regression can be seen in Table 8.a below.

Model 1a: Political support ~ gender

This model shows the original gender gap in political support.

Model 1b: Political support ~ gender (+ poll number) + age + gaza + city + refugee camp

This model includes additional variables which account for differences across time and place. However, they do not reduce the gender gap when these variables are accounted for suggesting that no problem is caused with the polls speaking to more women or men in a particular geographical region or of a certain age.

Model 2d: Political support ~ gender (+ poll number) + age + gaza + city + refugee camp + married + family size + income + employment + education

This third model includes variables which account for socioeconomic status, which were explored in Chapter 4 and have been shown to account for a portion of the gender gap in political support, and in Table 8.a can be seen to reduce the beta values for '*gender*' by 0.09 for both '*Fatah support*' and '*Hamas support*'.

Model 3b: Political support ~ gender (+ poll number) + age + gaza + city + refugee camp + married + family size + income + employment + education + religiosity

This final model includes the *'religiosity'* variable from Chapter 5. This model shows the beta value for *'gender'* for *'Fatah support'* has reduced from -0.34 to -0.24, a reduction of 0.1. Comparatively, in this model the beta value for *'gender'* for *'Hamas support'* is now 0.35, reduced from 0.47 in Model 1, a reduction of 0.12. However, *'gender'* remains a significant predictor of political support when the models are applied to the combined data. This is likely because larger data sets make it easier for variables to be seen as statistically significant.

As such, I also compare the models in Figures 8.a, 8.b and 8.c below. Figure 8.a shows the gender gap in predicted probability of a man or a woman supporting Fatah or Hamas using the following equation:

> *Gender Gap = ((Predicted probability of a woman supporting Fatah - Predicted probability of a woman supporting Hamas) - (Predicted probability of a man supporting Fatah - Predicted probability of a man supporting Hamas))*

Below logistic regressions for the above models have been conducted on each poll individually, to generate predicted probabilities. This reduces the impact of analysing

such a large dataset and helps to show how the data varies across time. Figure 8.a shows the gender gap in predicted probability of supporting Fatah and Hamas. The further a point falls from the zero line, the greater the gender gap in political support. The gender gap is clearly greatly reduced in Model 3b compared to Model 1b.

Figures 8.b and 8.c show the *'gender'* coefficients, and the levels of significance for support for Fatah and Hamas for Models 1a and 3b. The lines attached to each point are of tapering thickness. The thinnest line shows a multiplication of the Standard Error for the gender coefficient of 3.29; the medium width line shows a multiplication of the Standard Error of 2.58, and the thickest line shows a multiplication of the Standard Error of 1.96. These three thicknesses denote the level of statistical significance of the coefficient. Where none of these lines cross the zero-line, gender is statistically significant at the $p<0.001$ level. Where the various lines cross the zero lines it shows that 'gender' is no longer statistically significant at that level.

Figure 8.b shows that in Model 1a, gender is a statistically significant predictor of political support for Hamas and for Fatah in a majority of the polls. In nine out of the forty polls *'gender'* is statistically significant at the $p<0.001$ level for both Fatah and Hamas. In only one poll – March 2010 – is *'gender'* not significant for either Fatah or Hamas.

Figure 8.c shows that once socioeconomic status and *'religiosity'* are taken into account, this is no longer the case. *'Gender'* is only a statistically significant predictor of support for both Fatah and Hamas in two polls but is not at all significant in twenty three of the forty polls.

These findings show that accounting for gender differences in socioeconomic status and religiosity for the most part explain the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. These two variables then explain why women are more likely to support Hamas than men and why men are more likely to support Fatah than women.

Model/Variable	*Model 1a*		*Model 1b*		*Model 2d*		*Model 3b*	
	Fatah	***Hamas***	***Fatah***	***Hamas***	***Fatah***	***Hamas***	***Fatah***	***Hamas***
(Intercept)	-0.46 (0.01)***	-1.61 (0.02)***	-0.37 (0.03)***	-1.58 (0.04)***	-0.23 (0.06)***	-1.59 (0.07)***	0.01 (0.06)	-2.02 (0.07)***
Gender	**-0.34 (0.02)*** **	**0.47 (0.02)*** **	**-0.35 (0.02)*** **	**0.47 (0.02)*** **	**-0.26 (0.02)*** **	**0.38 (0.03)*** **	**-0.24 (0.02)*** **	**0.35 (0.03)*** **
Poll Number			0.01 (0.00)***	-0.00 (0.00)**	0.02 (0.00)***	-0.00 (0.00)	0.02 (0.00)***	-0.01 (0.00)***
Age			-0.07 (0.01)***	-0.05 (0.01)***	-0.09 (0.01)***	-0.08 (0.01)***	-0.08 (0.01)***	-0.09 (0.01)***
Gaza			0.05 (0.02)*	0.47 (0.02)***	0.06 (0.02)**	0.38 (0.03)***	0.09 (0.02)***	0.34 (0.03)***
City			-0.24 (0.02)***	0.02 (0.03)	-0.23 (0.02)***	0.05 (0.03).	-0.25 (0.02)***	0.08 (0.03)***
Refugee Camp			-0.15 (0.03)***	0.02 (0.03)	-0.14 (0.03)***	0.04 (0.03)	-0.16 (0.03)***	0.06 (0.03).
Married					-0.02 (0.02)	0.20 (0.03)***	-0.01 (0.02)	0.19 (0.03)***
Family size					0.01 (0.00)*	0.03 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)**	0.03 (0.00)***
Income					-0.01 (0.02)	-0.09 (0.02)***	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.06 (0.02)***
Employed					0.21 (0.02)***	-0.13 (0.03)***	0.20 (0.02)***	-0.11 (0.03)***
Education					-0.07 (0.01)***	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.07 (0.01)***	-0.01 (0.01)
Religiosity							-0.19 (0.01)***	0.32 (0.02)***
Deviance (Null)	66262 (66589)	51789 (52239)	65594 (66445)	51171 (52125)	65045 (66032)	50719 (51815)	64868 (66032)	50373 (51815)
AIC	66266	51793	65608	51185	65069	50743	64894	50399

Table 8.a

*Showing the B values, Standard Errors (in brackets) and level of significance for logistic regressions on the variables '*Fatah support' *and* 'Hamas support', *p<0.0001=***, p<0.001=**, p<0.01=*, p<0.05=. , Data = PSR Polls 1-38, 42 and 56 (Merged Dataset)*



Figure 8.a To compare gender gaps predicted probability of support for Hamas and Fatah in Models 1b, 2d and 3b, Data = PSR Polls 1-38, 42 and 56 (Merged Dataset)



Figure 8.b To show 'gender' coefficients for support for Hamas and Fatah in Model 1a with levels of significance denoted through thick (p<0.05), medium (p<0.01), and thin (p<0.001) lines. Data = PSR Polls 1-38, 42 and 56 (Merged Dataset)



Figure 8.c To show 'gender' coefficients for support for Fatah and Hamas in Model 3b with levels of significance denoted through thick (p<0.05), medium (p<0.01), and thin (p<0.001) lines. Data = PSR Polls 1-38, 42 and 56 (Merged Dataset)

B Conclusion

The key variables in Model 3b which explain the gender gap in political support are variables which are very prominent in the gender gap literature. Socioeconomic status and religiosity are both highlighted frequently as areas where men and women differ, and which often impacts their political support. While the results of these statistical findings seem to reinforce the western gender gap literature, it is important to remember the context provided in the academic literature and interviews which suggest that these phenomena do not fit as clearly into the western models of gender and political support as might be expected.

The causes of the gender gap in the Occupied Palestinian Territories fit many of the ideas of what constitutes a traditional gender gap. Women are expected to be more religious than men in traditional or pre-industrial societies (Inglehart and Norris, 2000). This is also the case in Palestine and religiosity plays an important role in shaping women's engagement with political groups. Indeed, women being more religious than men has led them to choose the more socially 'conservative' party more than men, which seems to closely resembles the 'traditional' gender gap. Nonetheless, as shown in Chapter 5, religiosity in Palestine should not be pigeonholed as 'traditional'. Some Islamists in Palestine have rejected certain backwards traditions, advocating the improvement of women's social situation and endorsing female participation in the workforce and further education. Further Islamism in the Palestinian 'colonial' context interacts with revolutionary and nationalist ideas surrounding identity, authenticity and justice. As such women's greater religiosity cannot be seen solely as a conservative phenomenon, but one that interacts in a complex way with patriarchal social expectations, nationalism and ideas around gender equality.

The other main explanation for the gender gap in political support in the Palestinian Territories is the gender difference in socioeconomic status. Women and men both tend to hold traditional gender roles in Palestine, with men doing most of the earning and women having a more domestic role. Women are lower than men in most social indicators. These differences explain why women support Hamas which does more for the poor and vulnerable than men and why men support Fatah which is a better bet for employment opportunities and a stable economy more than women. While again,

on the surface, this explanation seems to endorse the hypotheses drawn from the western gender gap literature, on closer inspection the context is more nuanced. The role played by international aid, corruption, nepotism, and the charitable role of the Islamic establishment mean that the usual description of political economic positions as left or right-wing do not fit. Further, the gender gap in political support suggests that patriarchal family structures should not be seen as quite as all-powerful as has often been suggested, as clearly Palestinian women do not feel obliged to support the same political organisations as their male relatives.

However, much of the western academic literature on gender gaps has been very informative. There are in Palestine gender gaps in socio-economic status, religiosity and attitudes towards gender equality and peace and violence. However, only the former two were helpful in explaining the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Other theories, such as those surrounding gender equality and attitudes towards the use of violence do not seem to have explanatory power in the context of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Instead, the highly nationalist context of Palestinian politics has rendered many of these explanations less powerful. The importance of understanding the effects of nationalism has been clearly and repeatedly shown in the chapters above.

By modelling the gender gap in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, this chapter has shown the power of certain tenets of the western gender gap literature even in this distant context. However, it is what is absent from the model, i.e. the nuances of the context, the role of nationalism and variables relating to gender equality and attitudes towards violence, that should not be forgotten, because it is largely there that the new lessons for understanding how gender interacts with political support lie.

Chapter 9 Conclusion

This thesis has found there to be, and statistically accounted for, a gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It finds that women tend to be more supportive of Hamas and men tend to be more supportive of Fatah and that socioeconomic differences and religiosity are the main explanations of this gender gap.

This gender gap in political support was puzzling from a western feminist perspective. It is troubling for feminists to think of women not just supporting an organisation like Hamas, but doing so more than their male counterparts.

In the western media, Hamas is strongly associated with violence. For me, having lived in Tel Aviv during the Second Intifada, Hamas was most deeply associated with the suicide bombings of buses and cafés in Jerusalem, a hotel during Passover, and night clubs in Tel Aviv. Hamas is not just a violent organisation, but one which has targeted civilians indiscriminately.

Furthermore, after the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip there were numerous stories in the news about the imposition of Islamic law and the ways in which women have been repressed. These stories give accounts of women being shot for going out with men they are not married to, harassment of women not wearing the hijab, and male hairdressers being shut down because they were not allowed to touch women's hair.

For a western feminist, the idea of women supporting this organisation unsettles beliefs about women as both wanting equal rights and also as largely being a force for peace and non-violence. Why would women *more than men* support this violent organisation that oppresses women?

This thesis shows how these western feminist assumptions are misplaced, and that although Palestinian women do tend to support both gender equality and peace more than men, the context of the Palestinian Territories and the nationalist climate means that there are other reasons for supporting Hamas which explain their choice.

The problem with the western feminist perspective is that it is bound up in the more comfortable priorities of women in the West. For Palestinian women, violence is a part of life, and it is something that is visited upon them and their families much more frequently. As such, they are less likely to be as horrified by the prospect of suicide

bombing as western feminists. Equally, for Palestinian women, national liberation is the priority, accordingly objecting to wearing a headscarf seems petty in comparison, indeed, as I cited above, ‘everyone longs for liberation and, therefore, what one wears is of secondary importance’ (Holt, 1996 p. 76). The imposition of Islamic law and the veil are of course not an issue at all for most women, who themselves feel it a religious (and national) duty to show modesty and piety.

Finally, in the economic context of the Palestinian Territories, where Fatah is strongly associated with corruption and nepotism, while Hamas is known for funding and running clinics, orphanages and schools, Hamas again seems like a better choice.

On the face of it, there is less of a puzzle in understanding greater male support for Fatah. However, it is interesting to see the strength of the economic ties between men and the PA. The fact that men support Fatah so much more than women also undermines several ideas about family and patriarchy. Often it was suggested to me in conversation that women just vote the way their husbands or fathers vote, but this is not the case. Men are more closely connected with Fatah than women.

A Implications for Gender Gap Research

For scholars of the gender gap in political support, the gender gap in Palestine would have seemed easier to understand. Women in less developed countries tend to support right-wing organisations more than men according to the 'developmental theory' of the gender gap. However, a closer examination has shown that it is not simply a question of developmental factors which explain the gender gap, instead the warping effects of the aid economy and nationalism have promoted and demoted various forms of relationships between gender and politics.

The Palestinian context has shown how the western gender gap literature helps to understand the relationship between gender and political support beyond the West. The first and greatest similarity in findings is that women in the West tend to have lower socio-economic positions to men, and this, together perhaps with women's greater caring roles, explains why women tend to support political parties which provide welfare and services. In the Palestinian Territories, there is also a gender gap in socioeconomic status, most particularly in employment, and women also tend to support Hamas more than men which is well known as a party for providing welfare

and support. The other side of this is that men are more likely to be employed and they tend more than women to support Fatah, a party which through resource distribution and nepotistic connections, or through providing a stable economy is better able to provide employment. These findings reinforce the findings from studies in the western gender gap literature.

In the Palestinian Territories, women tend to place themselves as slightly more religious than men. This supports the finding in many studies in the West which find that women are more religious and attend church more often than men. Gender differences in religiosity partially explains the gender gap in political support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

This finding fits in well with the 'developmental theory' of the gender gap, where women are expected to be more religious in 'traditional' societies (Inglehart and Norris, 2000).However, data from my interviews suggests that female religiosity should be considered with more nuance than simply as being a result of traditional beliefs. Some women find that Islam grants them rights that they are not entitled to according to 'tradition'. It also means that women can participate in the national project without necessarily calling into question their reputation or sacrificing social norms. Further the nationalist context, as well as 'traditional' norms, restrict how women should be seen to behave. Understanding these nuances suggests that framing religious women as 'traditional' is insufficient. Several scholars, such as Gunning and Deeb, call into question the western assumptions around secularism, religion and traditional and modern behaviour, and this complexity should be recognised and increasingly integrated into further research on the subject (Gunning, 2007 pp. 273-274; Deeb, 2006).

The western gender gap literature also points to gender differences in support for peace/objections to violence and possibly also attitudes towards gender equality. While there were (slight) gender differences on these factors, they did not help explain the gender gap in the Palestinian Territories. The fact that these were not important in explaining the gender gap is largely as a result of the different political context of the Occupied Territories.

There are several major differences in political context between the western democracies (where the gender gap is usually studied) and the Occupied Palestinian

Territories, which impact upon the gender gap in political support. The West Bank and Gaza Strip are occupied by Israel and do not form a sovereign state. Violence and conflict are both part of the fabric of the Israeli occupation but also play an important role in the Palestinian resistance and liberation struggles. This context means that nationalist discourse dominates the political sphere. It also may account for the lack of a fully functioning democracy and for Palestine having an aid-dependent economy.

Nationalist discourse has significantly mediated the relationship between gender and politics. In particular the currently prevalent version of Palestinian nationalism is playing an important role in deprioritising gender equality and promoting conservative and religious rhetoric. As Palestinian nationalist rhetoric has evolved, it has come to increase pressure on women for social conformity and, in this context, Islamist nationalism has become a socially acceptable method for participation in nationalist activities for women. Further, nationalism serves to deprioritise support for gender equality. While women do tend to support slightly greater equality for men and women, this does not impact their political support. Nationalism, as a factor, has not been considered in the western gender gap literature but it is likely to be important in understanding the relationship between gender and politics in post-colonial states.

The Palestinian economy is warped by the occupation. It is highly connected to the economy of Israel, yet it is stifled by the policies of occupation. International aid also plays an important part in the Palestinian economy, much of which is funnelled through the PA. This aid money has created a form of rentier state where Fatah can guarantee support through distributing jobs and funding. This has enhanced the significance of socioeconomic status in explaining the gender gap given that much of Fatah's distribution tends to be to men, through patronage networks. Whilst Hamas's welfare network connects more strongly with women.

This tendency echoes the left-right gender divide found in the western literature but has its own nuance. Importantly, the findings in the Palestinian Territories show that a left-right view of political parties is problematic for understanding the differences between political organisations such as Fatah and Hamas, where Fatah is both more economically and more socially liberal, and Hamas is socially conservative but is connected to a broad range of welfare services.

The use of patronage is not exclusive to the Palestinian Territories; it is an economic-political practice which is common in many parts of the world. Therefore, beginning to understand its impact is important for a broader understanding of how gender and political support interact.

The continued occupation of Palestine provides a political context which means that support for the resistance or negotiations is an important political divide, and supporters of each method tend to align themselves with the parties which advocate them. As expected from the western gender gap literature women support negotiations slightly more than men, but these attitudes did not help explain the gender gap in political support. Women supported the resistance-inclined Hamas more than men despite their slightly greater support for a negotiated peace process. This outcome might be a result of the pervasiveness of violence in Palestine, meaning women were less concerned by this attribute of the party, in circumstances where they agreed with Hamas on many other levels. This finding might contribute to the work of scholars such as Eichenberg who suggests that women and men's attitudes to the use of violence depends on the contexts (Eichenberg, 2003).

This thesis is one of the first studies to examine gender and patterns of political support in a non-democratic and pseudo-autocratic society. There are, of course, several problems with relying on polling in this context (although polls in any context have their problems), however, by using interviews, I have tried to take account of any problems that might be inherent in the polling process. The oppressive political environment may also have implications for the gender gap, because men are targeted for their political views more than women, although it has been impossible to measure whether this is the case.

It is clear from this analysis that a wholesale application of theories or variables for testing from the western gender gap literature would have obscured, for example, the role of nationalism and political oppression as explanations for the gender gap. The western gender gap literature has often tended to assume a left-right political framework or a fully democratic political context, further they have often not had to take into account various forms of nationalist discourse, the implications of an aid economy or the role of corruption and nepotism. All of these features have been important in understanding the gender gap in the Palestinian Territories. This thesis

shows the importance of context for understanding the gender gap in political support. For understanding the context, a mixed-methods approach has been invaluable.

B Palestinian Politics

Finding and understanding the gender gap in political support has important implications for Palestinian politics. The most important of these is perhaps to throw more light on the Hamas legislative election victory in 2006. This thesis suggests that the gender gap in political support in Palestine may have changed the direction of Middle East politics when Hamas won this election. Accounts of the election victory show it as a surprise election; however, understanding the widespread female support for Hamas and, additionally, factoring in the possible role of repression on the polls, might have meant that Hamas's victory could have been better anticipated, and the subsequent violence and division might have been avoided.

This thesis brings together two substantial areas of research in the Palestinian Territories: research into politics and political organisations (Bröning, 2013; Caridi, 2012; Gunning, 2007; Milton-Edwards and Farrell, 2010; Sayigh, 1997; Shikaki, 1996; Shikaki, 1998) and feminist and gendered analyses (Ababneh, 2014; Abdo, 1994; Abdo, 1999; Abdulhadi, 1998; Aweidah and Espanioli, 2007; Aweidah and Omar, 2013; Baxter, 2007; Giacaman, et al., 1996; Golan, 2011; Holt, 1996; Jamal, 2001; Johnson and Kuttab, 2001; Massad, 1995; Ness, 2008; Peteet, 1991; Peteet, 2000). The former tends to include women, often either prominent women politicians or activists, or describe the visual effect of female Hamas activists; however, they often excluded a gendered understanding of Palestinian political parties. The latter also tend to exclude gender in a broader sense, focusing more generally on women peacemakers, feminist activists, female suicide bombers, or women refugees. This is the first analysis which considers how gender interacts with political support, and it shows that a gendered analysis can provide important insights into the power dynamics, and inequalities in Palestinian society, but also how they have led to clear gender differences in political support. In seeking either the end to the Israeli Occupation or greater gender equality in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, it is important to understand why women more than men tend to support a political party which is often seen to be an obstacle to both of these ends.

Further, the explanations for the gender gap also highlight how closely the economy links to political support. It is worth noting that the economic context of the PA is intricately linked with the Israeli occupation which hinders the growth of independent enterprises, making the population more dependent on the employment provided by the PA. At the same time, the situation within the Occupied Palestinian Territories means that the PA receives a great deal of aid money. This warps the economy to the benefit of Fatah and Fatah's patronage networks. Thus, there are important political implications to the giving of aid. Currently, aid funnelled through Fatah and the PA primarily benefits men and increases support for Fatah and the PA, while Islamic aid organisations connected to Hamas primarily benefit women and increase support for Hamas. Schemes promoting 'economic peace' are likely only to reach men already associated with the PA rather than women who form the backbone of Hamas support. Were socioeconomic inequalities to be addressed, this would probably change.

Further this thesis begins to point to complex profiles for supporters of Fatah and Hamas, pointing to the role played by geographical location, employment status, religiosity, attitudes towards the peace process and attacks on civilians and attitudes towards freedom of speech and the security services. These variables provide insight into the make-up of the bases of support for these two key players in Palestinian politics and might point to ways of understanding the internal pressures on parties to the Israel-Palestine conflict.

C Methods

A final important conclusion must address the importance of mixed-methods research for this thesis. They have been invaluable for this research, as the interviewees provided me with most of the explanations for the gender gap, and the polling data allowed me to test and explore these theories. This kind of research would not have been possible without access to such substantial quantities of polling data nor to such a broad spectrum of interviewees.

In many cases I found that the interviews highlighted a much more complex understanding of how certain 'factors' might influence political support, which otherwise might not have been clear purely from the polling data. They showed the nuances of religiosity and the way women in Hamas were seen in a positive light (as

“polite, quiet and religious” (F19)), as well as helping to explain the connection between men's employment and Fatah's support and Hamas's welfare system and women's support.

In the interviews I heard what people thought of the women's rights agenda and the female members of the PFLP. Interviewees explained to me how the climate of political oppression might impact the polling data. Some interviewees suggested that a gender gap in political support in the polls might really be because men were more afraid of stating their political preferences.

I did not, however, interview a representative sample of Palestinians but rather I was more likely to be directed towards the politically informed and outspoken members of Palestinian society. Therefore, the polling data was important to highlight where these biases might lie. I should add that, of course, many of the suggestions and opinions proffered in the interviews did not contribute to explanations of the gender gap. It was the opinion poll data which really helped me to distinguish between the different theories.

Equally, the opinion polls were incredibly important in showing where anecdotes and opinions really were representative of broader attitudes and for testing the hypotheses suggested by the gender gap literature. The polling data shows that the main explanations for the gender gap are because women are more religious than men and because Fatah can offer men employment. However, the polling data should also be treated with some caution. Analysis was limited to the questions asked, and often only asked infrequently. Further, as discussed above (in Chapter 2), polls are likely to have their own bias.

I would strongly recommend that further studies of the gender gap, particularly in contexts where similar research is thin or where there are substantial gaps in the literature, use both quantitative and qualitative methods together.

D Further Research

The findings in this thesis may help to understand the support bases for other political parties and movements in the wider Middle East region which may be made more

possible by the polling data which is becoming available for the wider Middle East thanks largely to the Arab Barometer project.

A first look at this data suggests that a gender gap in support for Islamic organisations at a broader Middle East level may exist with women reporting greater support for religious political parties than men and less support for non-religious political parties than men (Arab Barometer, 2012-2014). It is likely that gendered socioeconomic differences and differences in religiosity will be commonplace throughout the region, and in other semi-authoritarian states there may well be the same gendered approach to political oppression. As a next stage for this research, I would like to extend it to explore how gender interacts with political support on a wider comparative level in the Middle East region.

Appendix 1 Other Palestinian Political Parties and Movements

The other parties and movements in Palestine, besides Fatah and Hamas, are much smaller. Here I briefly describe the ones included in the PSR polls. The majority are described as 'the leftists' and are made up of historical socialist and communist parties and factions that have split from them, often to become more moderate, but the polls also ask about Islamic Jihad.

The ‘leftists’ used to be a serious force in Palestinian politics, but their power has reduced significantly in the last few decades. Their decline can be attributed to 'the demise of the Soviet Union and its deleterious impact on ‘leftist’ parties, the lack of cultural resonance of ‘leftist’ ideology in Arab societies and the inability of these parties to politically reinvent themselves’ but accounts should also highlight the ‘inauspicious reliance of both the ‘leftists’ and the ‘Liberal Democrats’ on western donor funding [which] delegitimised these political forces in the eyes of many fellow Palestinians, especially since they became more accountable to their donors than to the constituencies they were supposed to serve’ (Jamal, 2013 p. 285).

Prominent among these organisations is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) or Jibha Shaabiya. The PFLP is: ‘leftist, secular, and socially liberal, but wary of liberal democracy and capitalism... [they] accept the notion of a Palestinian-Israeli peace based on a two-state solution, but they do not support Oslo and refuse to participate in negotiations’ (Shikaki, 1998 p. 30). The PFLP, as with the other ‘leftists’, has declined as a result of the fall of the Soviet Union and the accompanying blow to their finances and ideological position. The PFLP is the largest of the ‘leftist’ organisations and is descended from the Arab Nationalist Movement. It has undergone several splits forming many of the other Palestinian ‘leftist’ groups – such as the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) (M12x). The PFLP was one of the major organisations which orchestrated plane hijackings and bombings in the 1960s and 1970s and suicide bombings and other attacks during the Second Intifada (2000-2005/6). They have also claimed responsibility for attacks and shootings more recently, in 2014 and 2015. They continue to be considered a terrorist organisation by Israel, the US and EU. They were, and continue to be, an important member of the PLO (M4). While the PFLP opposed the Oslo Accords, it has come to accept certain aspects

of them through agreements with the PA. Many of those I spoke to saw the PFLP as being hypocritical in its dismissal of Oslo, because they had subsequently come to cooperate with the PA (M21; F22). The PFLP plays a limited role in contemporary Palestinian political life. They are notoriously badly funded (F33; M13x), but do provide services aimed at promoting social equality, awareness raising and preserving cultural heritage (F24), often through NGOs which are run by former PFLP politicians (thus often becoming reliant on western donor funding and as a result losing popular support) (Jamal, 2013 pp. 279-285). Levels of support for the PFLP hover around three to eight percent in the polls. The PFLP has tended to embrace gender equality. From the start, it had mixed-gender training camps and in 1970 explicitly put women's liberation on the same footing as national and class liberation. They called for women's entry into the workforce and for women to gain the same military training as men (Sayigh, 1983 p. 883).

The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP or Jibha Dimocratiya) is an offshoot of the PFLP. It was created in the late 1960s (M4; M12x). It is a long-term member of the PLO, and accepts a two-state solution, while formally rejecting the Oslo Accords (Bröning, 2013, p. 173; M4). It originally was involved in 'armed resistance' but has 'largely put its militant past behind' (Bröning, 2013 p. 173). Its ideological basis is Marxist-Leninist. It is one of the smaller organisations in the Palestinian political landscape, having suffered with the other ‘leftists’ after the fall of the Soviet Union from a dearth of funds and a faltering support for their ideology. Levels of support for the DFLP are particularly low, not rising above five percent in polls over the last decade. Many of those I interviewed had not heard of them.

The PPP or Palestinian People’s Party is the renamed communist party of Palestine (Bröning, 2013 p. 146). It is strongly socialist, non-violent and accepts a two-state solution (Bröning, 2013 p. 146). However, they have often been seen as close to the PA (Bröning, 2013 p. 146). They are a small ‘leftist’ party with low levels of support. Many of those I interviewed had never heard of them or did not consider them important to the Palestinian political scene.

FIDA or the Palestinian Democratic Union is a small offshoot party of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, founded in the 1990s. Most of those I spoke to did not know or had hardly heard of FIDA or thought it no longer existed. It is a ‘leftist’

party, which accepts a two-state solution, but has very low levels of support (Bröning, 2013).

Al-Mubadara, the Palestinian National Initiative, was only founded in 2002. It espouses non-violence and accepts a two-state solution. It advocates national unity and social justice (Bröning, 2013 p. 121). They have been very critical of the authoritarian and nepotistic PA (Bröning, 2013 p. 122). It has been most effective in its work through youth and women's organisations across the territories, and in its connections to NGOs and grassroot organisations (Bröning, 2013 pp. 122-123). It has advocated an end to the Fatah-Hamas split and the declaration of a state in the Palestinian Territories to end the negotiations (Bröning, 2013 pp. 126-127). Few of those I spoke to knew of Al-Mubadara, although its leader, Mustafa Barghouti was widely recognised. Levels of support in the polls rarely reach one or two percent, although Barghouti himself is popular (Bröning, 2013 p. 124). Despite its small size, Al-Mubadara has something of a reputation for their projects and social work (M10; F8; F34).

Finally, the Third Way was a political party born in 2005, which rapidly faded from the Palestinian political scene.

The only other organisation included in the polls which is neither 'leftist' or 'liberal-democrat' is Islamic Jihad. It is an Islamic resistance organisation. Like Hamas, they were historically linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. They were one of the first Islamist organisations to become violently involved in the resistance (Pappé, 2006, p. 261; M13x). It is also considered a terrorist organisation by Israel, the US and EU. Islamic Jihad has remained largely outside of formal politics. It does not contest presidential or legislative elections in the Palestinian Territories because ‘they stemmed from the Oslo Accords’, which Islamic Jihad rejected (Ma'an, 2011). Islamic Jihad provide services through institutes in Gaza (F36). It has a television station, Palestine Today, which was seen as being particularly impartial (F28; M12x). It has also (as have other parties) used songs to gain support. M27 told enjoyed Islamic Jihad’s songs and told me “I really love them!” (M27). Islamic Jihad tends to have low levels of support in the polls, peaking at around 7 percent support at the beginning of the Second Intifada, but usually closer to 3 percent.

These parties and movements, because of the low levels of support, are not included in most of this research. Analysing the levels of support for these individual parties

would be difficult because statistical analysis becomes unreliable at such low numbers. However, they do play something of an important role in contextualising the political scene and in shaping the positions and attitudes of Fatah and Hamas.

Appendix 2 Variables

A Dependent Variables

'Fatah support' and *'Hamas support'* (together called *'Political support'*)

These are dichotomous variables coded from the question 'Which of the following movements and parties do you support?' in the polls. They are coded so that in '*Fatah support'*, Fatah supporters are coded 1 and in '*Hamas support',* Hamas supporters are coded 1 and everyone else is coded 0. These are present in all PSR polls.

'Hamas and independent Islamists'

This is a dichotomous variable used in Chapter 7 coded from the same question 'Which of the following movements and parties do you support?'. However, the responses of those who selected Hamas or Independent Islamists are coded 1, and everyone else's responses are coded 0. This is present in all PSR polls.

B Independent Variables

'Gender'

This is a dichotomous variable with female coded as 1, and male coded as 0. This is present in all PSR polls.

'Poll number'

This variable, which is used in some logistic regressions but not in the graphs where the data is separated into the different polls anyway, indicates the poll number. It is used as a proxy for variations in time across the different polls. I added this to each poll in the Merged Dataset and it ranges from 1-38, 42 and 56.

'Age'

This variable gives the age in years of the respondent divided by ten. As such an increase of one means an increase of ten years. It is in all the polls.

'Gaza'

A dichotomous variable where 1 indicates the respondent lives in Gaza and 0 indicates they do not. This was recoded from a question asking whether the interview was in the West Bank or Gaza Strip. This is present in all polls.

'City'

This variable is created from a question in the polls called Residence/place with three possible responses 'City', 'Village/Town' and 'Refugee camp'. I have recoded this to form a dichotomous variable where 1 indicates a City and 0 indicates all other options. This is in all polls.

'Refugee camp'

This is from the Residence question above with the three different options 'City', 'Village/Town' and 'Refugee camp'. I have recoded this to form a dichotomous variable where 1 indicates a Refugee Camp and 0 indicates all other options. This is in all polls.

'Married'

This is a dichotomous variable recoded from a question on marital status which gives three options: 'unmarried', 'married', 'other', recoded so that married is 1, and both other responses are 0. This is present in all polls.

'Family size'

Family size is almost a scale variable. I capped it at 13, because there were some responses of over ninety which were distorting the general trend. Thus, the number represents the respondent's family size unless they give a family size over 13, in which case it has been coded as 13. This is present in all polls.

'Income'

The income variable has been recoded from three different questions about household income, using Jordanian Dinars and Israeli Shekels as currency. I recoded into a three-point scale for the sake of ease, although the original scales were much larger. One of these three questions were present in all the polls.

'Employment'

This is a dichotomous variable created from a question about employment sector, with the options 'public', 'private' and 'other' or in some polls 'no work' (22-38, 42 and 56).

Being employed in either the public or private sector was coded as 1, and other or no work was coded as 0. This question was present in all the polls.

'Education'

This is a scale variable for level of education reached. There are seven options coded so that the highest level represents the highest level of education, 'illiterate' (1), 'elementary' (2), 'preparatory' (3), 'secondary' (4), 'college diploma' (5), 'BA' (6) and 'master's and above' (7). This question was in all the polls.

'Religiosity'

This is a scale variable of 1-3, with 3 indicating highest levels of religiosity. It is created from a composite of three questions, relating to frequency of prayer, religious self-identification and how frequently someone reads the Qur'an. The question on prayer is present in Polls 9-38, 42, 56, the question on reading the Qur'an is present in Polls 2-8, and the question on religious self-identification is present in Polls 19-38, 42 and 56.

'Housewife'

This is a dichotomous variable created from a question asking about the occupations of respondents. Housewife is coded 1, and all other values are coded 0. This question is present in all polls. The other options can be seen in Chapter 4.

'Gender equality'

This is a scale variable of 0-21 created from seven questions in PSR Poll 24. Respondents were presented with seven statements: 'A woman can be a president or prime minister of a Muslim country', 'A married woman can work outside the home if she wishes', 'On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do', 'A university education is more important for a boy than a girl', 'Men and women should have equal job opportunities and wages', 'Men and women should receive equal wages and salaries' and 'A woman can travel abroad by herself if she wishes' and could choose from four responses: 'strongly agree', 'agree', 'disagree' and 'strongly disagree'. Responses were recoded so that higher scores reflected a more favourable attitude towards gender equality, with the lowest scores given 0 and the highest scores given 3. Then they were added together. These questions have a Cronbach's Alpha of 634.

'Peace process'

This is a scale variable of three recoded from a question relating to attitudes towards the peace process. Respondents were asked 'Generally do you see yourself as:' '1) Supportive of the peace process', '2) Opposed to the peace process', '3) Between support and opposition' or '4) Don't know'. This is found in PSR Polls 19-38, 42 and 56. I recoded it so 'Supportive' is 1, 'Between' is 2 and 'Opposed' is 3.

'Attack civilians'

This is a scale variable of four which looks at attitudes towards attacks on civilians. The question reads 'Concerning armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel I...'. Respondents are then given five options '1) Strongly support', '2) Support', '3) Oppose', '4) Strongly oppose' and '5) No opinion/don't know'. The answers were recoded so that higher scores are given for supporting attacking civilians. This is found in Polls 2-7, 9-21, 27, 28, 30, 31, 34-38, 42 and 56. In Polls 42 and 56 it is worded 'Certainly support' rather than 'Strongly support'.

'Free criticism'

This is a dichotomous variable created from questions in the polls which ask, 'In your opinion, can people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip criticize the Palestinian Authority without fear?' and 'In your opinion, can people in the West Bank criticize the Palestinian Authority without fear?'. I have recoded the answers so 'No' is 1 and everything else is 0. These questions are present in polls 1-7, 11-14, 16, 21, 25, 28, 29, 31, 37, 38, 42 and 56.

'Security services'

This variable is Likert scale created from a question which asks, 'How do you evaluate the performance of Palestinian security services?', with the answer options as 'Very Good', 'Good', 'Neither good nor bad', 'Bad', 'Very Bad' and is in PSR Polls 4, 13, 16, 21 and 28.

C Correlation Matrix

Variable	*Gender*	*Poll*	Age	*Gaza*	*City*	*Refuge*	*Married*	*Family*	*Income*	*Employ*	*Educati*	*Religios*	*Housew*	*Gender*	*Peace*	*Attack*	*Free*	*Security*
Gender	1																	
Poll Number	0.01*	1																
Age	-0.05***	0.03***	1															
Gaza	0.00	-0.03***	-0.03*	1														
City	0.01*	0.18***	0.03*	0.16***	1													
Refugee Camp	0.00	-0.06***	-0.01	0.29***	-0.40***	1												
Married	0.07***	0.00	0.38*	0.05***	0.00	0.02***	1											
Family Size	-0.03***	-0.11***	-0.03*	0.21***	-0.05***	0.08***	-0.06***	1										
Income	-0.08***	0.13***	-0.02*	-0.18***	0.06***	-0.08***	-0.02***	-0.06***	1									
Employment	-0.55***	0.02***	0.01*	-0.09***	0.01**	-0.02***	0.08***	-0.07***	0.20***	1								
Education	-0.12***	0.11***	-0.29*	0.03***	0.06***	0.00	-0.11***	-0.10***	0.30***	0.25***	1							
Religiosity	0.10***	0.47***	0.10*	0.08***	0.05***	-0.01	0.08***	0.00	-0.03***	-0.07***	0.00	1						
Housewife	0.79***	-0.02***	0.06*	0.03***	0.00	0.01*	0.24***	0.00	-0.14***	-0.61***	-0.27***	0.09***	1					
Gender	0.01	NaN	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04	-0.01	0.01	1				
Peace Process	-0.04***	0.67*	0.01***	-0.04***	0.10***	-0.04***	-0.01*	-0.08***	0.13***	0.05***	0.13***	0.49***	-0.07***	-0.05	1			
Attack	0.00	-0.11*	-0.05***	0.10***	0.04***	0.04***	-0.02***	0.04***	-0.05***	-0.02***	0.00	-0.07***	0.00	NaN	-0.16***	1		
Free Criticism	0.02***	-0.01*	0.00	0.01	0.03***	-0.01**	0.00	0.00	0.01***	-0.01**	-0.01*	-0.05***	0.02***	NaN	-0.04***	0.12***	1	
Security	-0.03***	-0.13*	-0.01***	0.01*	-0.02***	0.00	0.00	0.01**	-0.01***	0.02***	0.02***	-0.06***	-0.02***	NaN	-0.08***	0.18***	0.12*	1

*p<0.001=***, p<0.01=**, p<0.05=* All correlations given as Pearson's correlation coefficient*

Appendix 3 Interview Schedules

A Interview Schedule (English)

Some of the question might be a bit private or about subjects you might not be comfortable talking about, please do not feel obliged to answer any questions you are uncomfortable with. Please do not give your name.

1. About you.

Could you please tell me a bit about yourself – without mentioning your name.

- Do you work?
- Have you ever worked?
- How old are you?
- Are you a refugee? Are you registered with UNRWA?
- What stage of education did you reach?
- Where do you live?
- Have you always lived there?
- Are you married?
- Do you have children?
- Are you Muslim?
- Is anyone from your family outside of Palestine?
- Have you visited them?
- Do you travel out of Palestine often?

Excuse me if this question is awkward, but I was wondering if you could tell me about your economic situation. [What kinds of jobs do your parents do?]

2. The current situation

What do you think about the situation with Israel?

What would you see as a solution, how could there be a solution to the conflict?

What is your experience, or your family, or friends or those close to you's experience of the occupation and the changing situation with Israel?

How does the occupation affect you?

Do you feel safe?

How is the economic situation in Palestine (Gaza)?

How does the economic situation affect you?

3. About your political activities and interests

Are you interested in politics?

Are you, or have you been, involved with any political or social activism?

Do you watch the news?

Do you post or write on Facebook or other social media?

Have you participated in any campaigns?

Have you attended any demonstrations?

Were you involved in student politics when you were at school?

Is anyone in your family active in politics?

Do you belong to any party?

Have you ever worked for any party?

4. Religion and tradition

Are you religious?

How do you practice your religion?

How often do you pray?

How do you see the role of religion in society?

What do you think should be the role of religion in politics?

How do you see the role of Palestinian traditions and customs in society?

5. Women's Rights

What do you think about women's rights?

What is the current situation regarding women's rights in Palestine?

6. Views on government, institutions and rights

What is your opinion on the Palestinian Authority and/or the Hamas government in Gaza?

Do you trust the PA? and/or Hamas government?

Do you think the PA is democratic? and/or Hamas government?

Do you think there is freedom of speech in Palestine?

Are you able to talk with your friends about politics?

Would you support resistance/ negotiations?

7. Issues/Priorities

What makes you choose to support one specific party in preference to another?

What political issue is most important to you?

Prompts:

- Services, education and health
- Peace, security and ending the occupation
- Equality
- The economy
- Morality

8. Political Parties

How do you see these parties? (some of them are very small so don't worry if you haven't heard of them.)

- PFLP
- Fateh
- Hamas
- Islamic Jihad
- DFLP
- People's Party
- Palestinian National Initiative – Al-Mubadara
- FIDA
- (Hizb-ul-Tahrir?)

What do you think of the leaders of the main parties?

Are you a member of any of these parties?

Do you feel closer to one political party over the others?

Have you voted in any previous elections?

Which parties have you previously voted for?

If there were an election tomorrow which party would you vote for?

Are any parties active in this community, or do they provide any services or help?

Are any of the parties active through the mosque?

Do you know the local representatives of any of the parties? What do you think of them?

Is there pressure from the family or community on how you vote in elections?

9. Views on gender difference and politics

In Palestine at the moment, do women face different problems from men?

Is there a difference in how women and men participate in political and nationalist activities in Palestine?

Is there a difference in the rate of participation of women and men in political and nationalist activities?

So, do you think there might be a difference in the priorities of women and the priorities of men in society and politics?

- Services, education and health
- Peace, security and ending the occupation
- Equality
- The economy
- Morality

Do you think that any of these differences might lead to support for different political parties?

What might explain the gender gap in political support?

Interview Schedule (Palestinian Dialect Arabic) **B**

في بعض الأسئلة ممكن تكون شوي خاصة، فإذا ما بدك تجاوبي أكيد عندك الحريّة.

١.

ممكن تخبّريني عن نفسك؟ (بدون ذكر اسمك)

بتشتغلي؟

اشتغلتي في الماضي؟

كم عمرك؟ قديش عمرك؟

انت مسجّلة في الأنروا؟ انت لاجئة؟

لوين وصلتي بالتعليم؟

بتعيشي هون؟

انت متزوجة؟

عندك اولاد؟

انت مسلمة؟

عندك أحد من عائلتك خارج فلسطين؟

زرتيهم؟

بعتذر لو كان هدا السؤال ما برّيحك، بدي أسألك عن وضعك الإقتصادي. كيف بتصنفو/ بتصنفيه؟

٢.

شو رأيك بالأمور مع اسرائيل؟

شو تجربتك اوتجربة عائلتك او تجربة اصدقاءك او تجربة مَعارفِك مع الإحتلال؟ ٠

كيف الإحتلال بيأثر عليكي/ على حياتك؟

بتشعري بالأمان؟

كيف الاوضاع الإقتصادية؟

كيف الاوضاع الإقتصادية بتأثر عليكي؟

٣.

انت مهتمة في السياسة؟

عندك أي مشاركة في الأنشطة السياسية (او الإجتماعية؟)

بتشوفي الاخبار؟

بتنشري او بتكتبي على الفيسبوك مثلاً؟

بتشاركي في أي حملات؟

بتشاركي او بتدعمي حملات المقاطعة؟

بتشاركي في المظاهرات؟

كنتي تشاركي في السياسة لما كنتي في الجامعة؟

في احد في عائلتك ناشط في السياسة؟

انت بتنتمي لأي حزب؟

اشتغلتي في السابق مع أي حزب؟

٤.

انتي متديّنة؟

كيف بتمارسي الدين؟

كم مرة بتصلي؟

كيف بتشوفي دور الدين في المجتمع؟

شو برايك لازم يكون دور الدين في المجتمع؟

لازم يكون في دور للدين في السياسة؟

كيف بتشوفي دور العادات و التقاليد الفلسطينية في المجتمع؟

٥.

شو رأيك بحقوق المرأة؟

كيف الوضع الحالي بنسبة لحقوق المرأة؟

٦.

شو رأيك بالسلطة؟

عندك ثقة بالسلطة؟

برأيك في حرية تعبير هون في فلسطين؟

عندك حرية تحكي مع اصدقاءك عن السياسة؟

برأيك السلطة ديموقراطية؟

بتفضلي المقاومة او المفاوضات؟

٨.

إيش اللي بخليكي تأيّدي حزب مُعَيّن بدل أحزاب أخرى؟

الخدمات والتعليم والصحة

السلام والامن وإنهاء الإحتلال

المساواة

الإقتصاد

الأخلاق

٨

كيف بتشوفي هدول الأحزاب:

(بعضهم كتيرصغار فمش مشكلة لو ما بتعرفيش اشي عنهم)

الجبهة الشعبية

فتح

حماس

الجهاد الإسلامي

الجبهة الديموقراطية

حزب الشعب

المبادرة

فدا (الإتحاد الديموقراطي الفلسطيني)

(حزب التحرير)

بتنتمي لاي حزب؟

أي حزب بتحسّي أقرب ألِك؟

بالماضي شاركتي بالإنتخابت؟

لأي أحزاب صوتي؟

في حال كان في انتخابات بُكرة لأي حزب رح تصوّتي؟

شو رأيك بزعماء الأحزاب الرئيسي؟

في أي حزب نشيط هون في المجتمع أو بيقدم خدمات أو مساعدات؟

في أي منهم نشطين (في المساجد أو) من خلال المساجد؟

بتعرفي أي من مُمَثِلين الأحزاب؟ شو رأيك فيهم؟

في ضَغط عليكي من المجتمع أو العائلة بخصوص التصويت في الانتخابات

٩.

في فلسطين حاليا في مشاكل خاصة بالنساء أو خاصة بالرجال؟

في فرق كيف بيشاركوا النساء والرجال في النشاطات السياسية والوطنية في فلسطين؟

في فرق بين نسبة المُشاركة النساء و نسبة المشاركة الرجال في النشاطات السياسية والوطنية في فلسطين؟

فبرأيك في فرق بين أولويات النساء وأولويات الرجال بالمواضيع السياسية والاجتماعية؟

الخدمات والتعليم والصحة

السلام والامن وإنهاء الإحتلال

المساواة

الإقتصاد

الأخلاق

فبرأيك في فلسطين حاليا في اختلاف بين الاولويات السياسية والاجتماعية بين النساء والرجال؟

فبرأيك هَي الفروقات بتأدي (أو بتتعلق) باختلافات بين النساء والرجال بالنسبة لتأييد أحزاب سياسية مختلفة؟

Interviews

F1: Nablus: 14 July 2014 (in Arabic with interpreter) female, student, with F2

F2: Nablus: 14 July 2014 (in Arabic with interpreter) female, with F1.

F3: Nablus governorate (rural): 17 July 2014 (in Arabic with interpreter) female, part-time working mother

F4: Nablus: 22 July 2014 (in English) female, housewife, with M5

F5: London/Salfit governorate (skype): 2014 (in English) female, student

F6: Salfit governorate (rural): 18 May 2015 (in Arabic with interpreter) female, housewife

F7: Salfit governorate (rural): 18 May 2015 (in Arabic with interpreter) female, housewife

F8: Salfit governorate (rural): 18 May 2015 (in Arabic with interpreter) female, housewife

F9: Ramallah governorate (rural): 5 June 2015 (in Arabic with interpreter) female, student

F10: Ramallah governorate (rural): 5 June 2015 (in Arabic with interpreter) female, housewife

F11: Ramallah: 9 June 2015 (in Arabic with interpreter), female, NGO worker, DFLP activist

F12x: Expert. Birzeit: 24 June 2015 (in English) female, feminist academic

F13x: Expert. *Lily Feidy*: Ramallah: 24 June 2015 (in English), female, NGO director

F14x: **Expert.** Jerusalem: 18 November 2015 (in English) female, feminist academic

F15: London: 14 January 2016 (in English) female, student

F16: London: 22 January 2016 (in English) female, student

F17: London: 24 January 2016 (in English) female, intern

F18x: Expert. Tel Aviv: 22 February 2016 (in English), female, feminist academic

F19: Ramallah: 25 February 2016 (in English), female, student

F20: Kufr Aqb: 25 February 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter), female, housewife

F21x: Jenin: 28 February 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter), female, Fatah activist

F22: Shu'afat: 29 February 2016 (in English), female, archaeologist

F23x: Expert. Ramallah: 2 March 2016 (in English), female, retired public servant

F24: Jericho: 3 March 2016 (in English), female, pharmacist

F25x: **Expert:** Ramallah: 7 March 2016 (in English), female, NGO director

F26: Ramallah: 8 March 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter), female, not-working

F27: Ramallah: 8 March 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter), female, shop worker

F28: Qalqilya: 10 March 2016 (in English), female, teacher

F29: Tulkarm: 12 March 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter), female, housewife

F30x: Expert. Nablus: 14 March 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter), female, Hamas PLC memer

F31: Birzeit: 16 March 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter), female, housewife

F32: Hebron: 22 March 2016 (in English and Arabic without interpreter), female shop worker

F33: Dheisheh Refugee Camp: 23 March 2016 (in English), female, NGO worker

F34: Nablus: 26 March 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter), female, housewife

F35: Jerusalem: 30 March 2016 (in Arabic without interpreter), female, domestic worker

F36: London/Gaza (skype): 4 May 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter), female, housewife

F37: London/Gaza (skype): 4 May 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter), female, housewife

F38: London/Gaza (skype): 4 May 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter), female, housewife

F39: UK: 16 May 2016 (in English), female, postgraduate student

F40: London: 19 May 2016 (in English), female, postgraduate student

M1: Nablus: 15 July 2014 (in English) male, postgraduate student

M2: Nablus: 15 July 2014 (in Arabic with interpreter) male, engineer

M3: Nablus: 15 July 2014 (in English) male, engineer

M4: Nablus governorate (rural): 17 July 2014 (in English) male, farmer

M5: Nablus: 22 July 2014 (in English) male, professor, with F4

M6: Balata Refugee Camp: 23 July 2014 (in English), male, NGO worker

M7: Balata Refugee Camp: 24 July 2014 (in English), male, NGO worker

M8: Balata Refugee Camp: 24 July 2014 (in Arabic with interpreter), male, NGO director

M9: Salfit governorate (rural): 18 May 2015 (in Arabic with interpreter), male, retired

M10: Salfit governorate (rural): 18 May 2015 (in English), male, student

M11x: Expert. *Sabri Saidam*: Ramallah: 28 May 2015 (in English), male, Fatah politician

M12x: Expert. Birzeit: 28 May 2015 (in English), male, academic

M13x: **Expert.** Kufr Aqb: 31 May 2015 (in English), male, journalist

M14x: Expert. Ramallah: 7 June 2015 (in Arabic with interpreter), male, pollster

M15x: Expert. Ramallah: 7 June 2015 (in Arabic with interpreter), male, pollster

M16x: Expert. Ramallah: 9 June 2015 (in Arabic with interpreter), male, DFLP politician and NGO director

M17x: Expert. Ramallah: 14 June 2015 (in Arabic with interpreter), male, pollster

M18: Bethlehem: 23 November 2015 (in English), male, taxi driver and police trainer

M19: London: 27 January 2016 (in English), male, postgraduate student

M20: Ramallah: 27 February 2016 (in English), male, office worker

M21: Jenin: 28 February 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter), male, office worker, with M22

M22: Jenin: 28 February 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter), male, office worker, with M21

M23: Birzeit: 1 March 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter), male, Hamas student activist

M24: Ramallah: 2 March 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter), male, in security services

M25: Jericho: 3 March 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter), male, waiter

M26: Tubas: 6 March 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter), male, postgraduate student

M27: Tubas: 6 March 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter), male, clothes seller

M28: Tubas: 6 March 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter), male, student

M29: Nablus: 6 March 2016 (in English) male, programmer

M30x: Expert: Ramallah: 8 March 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter) male, Hamas PLC member

M31: Qalqilya: 10 March 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter) male, pharmacist

M32: Tulkarm: 12 March 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter) male, public sector worker

M33: Hebron: 13 March 2016 (in English) male, between jobs

M34: Hebron: 13 March 2016 (in English) male, doctor

M35x: Expert. *Ali Jarbawi.* Birzeit: 16 March 2016 (in English) male, academic, ex-minister

M36: Nablus governorate (rural): 26 March 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter) male, farmer

M37: Nablus governorate (rural): 26 March 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter) male, farmer - with F34.

M38x: Expert. London/Gaza (skype): 27 April 2016 (in English) male, development

M39x: Expert. London/Gaza (skype): 27 April 2016 (in Arabic with interpreter) male, pollster

M40: London: 11 May 2016 (in English) male, student

M41: London: 29 July 2016 (in English) male, postgraduate student

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